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This is a partly theoretical and partly historical thesis whose 'focus-down' approach has as a 
main objective a detailed comparative dissection of Freire and Foucault's conceptions of 
knowledge, power, truth and the subject for authentic educational praxis and the implication 
these have for the practice of education for liberation in South Africa. The idea is to start by 
outlining the main tenets of both Freire and Foucault's theories before showing how these 
approaches have influenced the discourse around authentic educational praxis in the South 
African case. The core argument in the thesis is that despite the existence of some points of 
convergence between Freire and Foucault's projects, for instance, the similarity between Freire's 
concern for the cultural experience of the learner and Foucault's view that marginalised local 
knowledge need to be rescued from SUbjugation, Foucault's notion of power does not allow for 
liberatory education praxis. Only the pedagogy of knowing within the Freirian mould with its 
emphasis on dialogue and conscientisation makes liberatory praxis in education possible. In 
other words, while for Freire the interrogation of the cultural experience of the learners results in 
liberation, in Foucault's theory the rescue of marginalised knowledge does not lead to freedom. 
This fact has fuelled the charge that through its denial of the idea of freedom and liberatory truth, 
Foucault's theory promotes quietism, nihilism and fatalism. As a support to the view that it is 
only through the dialogical approach of Freire that liberation is possible, I constructed an 
overarching framework derived from a combination of concepts from Thompson, Giddens and 
McKay and Romm (ideology critique) and Habermas (communicative action! ideal speech act) 
to serve as a theoretical underpinning for the thesis. The combined effect of notions of ideal 
speech situation and ideology critique has the ability to further highlight the strength of Freire's 
solution to the problematic of domination - that dialogue provides an alternative model which 
links education to the broader socio-economic and political issues. Hence it is only through 
communicative action that a horizontal relationship between the oppressor and oppressed, 
revolutionary leader and the masses, teacher and learner could be achieved. Thus dialogue is the 
only means by which solutions within education and society in general could be found and 
maintained (dialogue as a continuous process). 
This theoretical-cum-historical thesis employs a research strategy commonly referred to as 
content analysis. In what resembles a 'focus-down' model, chapter 2 of the study, which is 











powerlknowledge, truth and subjectivity with a view to determine which of the two theories of 
pedagogy could be the basis for authentic educational praxis. I conclude that Freire's dialogue-
based conscientisation pedagogy of knowing is a foundation for liberatory educational praxis 
because dialogue between active subjects could, in revealing truth, defeat power as domination. 
In contrast, this is not the case with Foucault's framework which puts more emphasis on the 
impossibility of truth, freedom and, by implication, liberatory education praxis. Within the 
Freirian approach, the neutralisation of the dominant ideology is viewed as a basis for 
intersubjective action for liberation and authentic educational praxis. In the same vein, Giddens 
and Thompson have deployed their concept of ideology critique and/or the critical conception of 
ideology to create room for the possibility of political action in society. The former has been 
explicitly critical of the relativist and nihilist standpoint adopted by Foucault on the possibility of 
meaningful political action. This section has utilised Giddens and Thompson's views on 
ideology critique to anchor Freire's standpoint that the practice of education for freedom is 
possible. 
Employing semantic content analysis, the rest of this thesis, constitutes an empirical dimension 
composed of a case study on the impact of the Freire! Foucault debate on the South African 
educational praxis. It uses primary documentary and secondary sources to measure the impact, 
nature, and form that the FreirelFoucault debate took from the early 1970's to the early 1990's in 
South Africa. Consequently two groupings referred to as SA Freirians and SA Foucauldians, 
respectively, were generated from the content analysis derived data. Amongst the SA Freirians 
are organic intellectuals from the BCM and the PEPP movement (such as Biko, Alexander and 
Sisulu) and scholars who include Jacklin Cock, Shirley Walters and Veronica McKay. In the SA 
Foucauldian group there are educationists such as Prinsloo, Skinner and Macleod and 
poststructuralist feminists who include Enslin, Morrell and Mc Lennan. The latter group as a 
whole has seriously attempted to demonstrate the existence of a link between powerlknowledge, 
truth and subjectivity in the conduct and/or operation of the SA education discourse. 
Nevertheless, it has to be noted that a significant number of SA Freirians and Foucauldians have 
contributed to just one or two of the four aspects of the knowledgel power! subject/truth 
discourse and in some cases they vacillate between the Freirian and Foucauldian positions. A 
case in point is Flanagan who is a Foucauldian in my classification schema but on numerous 
occasions helps in the articulation and clarification of Freirian positions. Others in turn end up 
with radically different views from either Freire or Foucault's framework. Worse still a couple of 
these would completely summarise the debates between and within the two camps, offer some 











classification problems. Despite these slippery cases, content analysis-derived data helped frame 
the knowledge/power/subjectltruth discourse amongst a sizeable number of South African 
education scholars and organic intellectuals. In fact there exists a core group composed of 
educationists such as Macleod, Skinner, Wolpe, Mc Lennan, Prinsloo, Biko and the BCM, 
Alexander, the organic intellectuals within the People's Education for People's Power 
movement, Mason, Walters, and Walker who are not only explicit in their support of either 
position but also cover the whole range of issues at stake, that is power, knowledge, the subject 
and truth. Suffice to say that this group's central argument, consistent with the main thesis in this 
dissertation, is that SA Foucauldians's linking of knowledge/truth with power as well as with the 
production of particular types of SUbjectivity does not allow for liberation and creates serious 
difficulties for Freire's act of knowing. Notwithstanding this factor, Freire's pedagogy of 
knowing is considered a foundation for an authentic educational praxis and for the act of 
freedom. Further, theoretical and empirically driven arguments by SA Freirians have shown that 
through dialogue and conscientisation an authentic act of knowing, education for liberation, can 
bring about both humanisation and authentic educational praxis. This position has been 
theoretically justified throughout the thesis by the use of a combination of effects from the twin 
concepts of communicative action and ideology critique. It is on this basis that I reject the 
Foucauldian radical relativist standpoint which does not allow for progress towards truth and by 
implication the praxis of political action for liberation. In fact, the Foucauldian analysis renders 
the struggle for emancipation meaningless by incorporating the moment of resistance into the 
mechanisms of disciplinary power. In contrast, I think that Thompson and Giddens's concept of 
ideology critique is a means by which relations of domination can be contested and transformed. 
The similarity of this concept of ideology critique with the notion of self-reflection in Freire's 
theory makes the SA Freirian view that systems of domination, such as, that which existed in SA 
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SUMMARY OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
This introductory chapter outlines the core argument of the thesis and provides the rationale for 
the fusion of the theoretical and historical approaches in the study. In addition to the justification 
of the intersection of history and theory in the examination of the Freirian and Foucauldian 
discourses within the educational sphere in South Africa, the chapter also accounts for the use of 
semantic content analysis as a research strategy. Finally, the chapter points out that except for 
McKay and Romm (who have utilized Habermas to bring the critical theory debate up to date), 
no one within the South African Freirian camp has combined Habermas, Thompson and 
Giddens's theoretical insights, especially those provided by the concept of ideology critique, to 
enhance the depth of the Freirian pedagogy. 
CHAPTER 2: REFLECTIONS ON THE CORE ASPECTS OF THE FREIRE-FOUCAULT 
THEORETICAL DEBATE 
Chapter Two is theoretical in nature in that it compares and contrasts the Freire-Foucault 
conceptions of powerlknowledge, truth and the subject. It contains the Freire-Foucault 
international debate in its pure form without any South African influence. In subsequent 
Chapters, however, this debate is carried on with a South African flavour. Hence Chapter Two 
also serves the purpose of creating a theoretical framework utilized in this thesis. The chapter , 
begins with an explanation of key concepts deployed in the analysis of the thesis including 
conscientisation, dialogue and ideology critique. Special emphasis is made on the utility of the 
concept of ideology critique in relation to the possibility of political action for liberation. The 
rest of the chapter is a comparative dissection of Freire and Foucault's contrasting notions of 
knowledge, power, the subject and truth. The conclusion arrived at in the chapter is that 
Foucault's theory does not allow for meaningfulliberatory education praxis and political action. 
Enhanced with insights from Habermas, Giddens and Thompson, especially those derived from 
the conception of ideology critique, conscientising dialogue in the Freirian pedagogy showed to 











CHAPTER 3: SOUTH AFRICAN FREIRIANS CONTRA FOUCAULDIANS ON THE 
CONCEPT OF KNOWLEDGE 
Chapter Three focuses on the differing conceptions of knowledge by SA Freirians and 
Foucauldians. It begins with a succinct outline of the context within which the Freirian theory 
was transplanted into the SA setting, its spread and the emergence of the Foucauldian critique. 
This is followed by a detailed exposition of SA Freirians and Foucauldians's contrasting views 
on knowledge. The chapter shows that whilst both SA Freirians and Foucauldians consider 
education political, the latter group has linked knowledge to power to argue against the 
possibility of knowledge, truth and liberation. In contrast, SA Freirians have advanced a view 
that there is a dialectical link between the act of knowing and emancipatory praxis. Within the 
chapter the action and reflection embedded in the Freirian pedagogy of knowing is elaborated 
upon through the use of Habermas's communicative action and the critique of ideology. In 
addition, Giddens's notion of reflexivity and the Thompson-Giddens concept of ideology 
critique are utilized to show that systematic knowledge exists on the basis of which 
knowledgeable agents take meaningful action and reflection to transform their social life. It is on 
this basis that the chapter embraces and develops the Freirian view that the practice of education 
for liberation is a foundation for cultural action for freedom. 
CHAPTER 4: SA FREIRIANS CONTRA FOUCAULDIANS ON THE CONCEPT OF POWER 
Chapter Four compares and contrasts the various notions of SA Freirians and Foucauldians on 
power. It is argued in this chapter that power as domination can be transformed by the use of 
conscientisation and dialogical action for freedom. This is in contrast with the Foucauldian view 
that disciplinary power makes freedom an illusive goal. However, this chapter advances the idea 
that the conception of disciplinary power which creates a picture of a subject-less history must be 
rejected. In its stead, conscientising dialogue, reinforced by Giddens's conception of ideology 
critique, has to take center-stage. In fact this has been the case within the liberation strategy of 
SA Freirians. Ideology critique is an instrument through which the reality of domination is 
unmasked to the dominated thus opening the way for them to engage in action and reflection for 
liberation as active agents. In other words, the dialogical process in the Freirian pedagogy can be 
used to expose the anti-dialogical theory of action within systems of domination, such as, 
Apartheid, thus paving the way for action and reflection for liberation. In South Africa this 
educational praxis, which challenged power as domination, was referred to as People's 











action for liberation against relations of domination can only be possible within the Freirian 
framework. 
CHAPTER 5: SA FREIRIANS CONTRA FOUCAULDIANS ON THE ISSUE OF SUBJECTS 
FOR AUTHENTIC EDUCATIONAL PRAXIS 
Chapter Five explores the contrasting characterization of subjectivity by SA Freirians and 
Foucauldians. It problematises the dichotomisation of subjects by SA Freirians to argue that 
Blacks and Whites could not be easily categorized as passive and active subjects, respectively. 
During the Apartheid Era some Blacks were passive (necrophilic) while others were active 
(biophilic). However, the utilization of indoctrination strategies under Apartheid was intended to 
produce and reproduce unreflective agents (what Freire termed adapted or passive subjects). 
Although ontologically Giddens's subjects are always active agents and he does not have a 
conception of passive subjects, his unreflective and self-reflective agents are synonymous to 
Freire's passive and active subjects, respectively. Giddens's reflective subjects are imbued with a 
discursive consciousness which allows them to engage in the process of ideology critique. It is 
the possession of this discursive consciousness which explains why politico-educational activists 
in the BC and the PEPP movements were able to conscientise South Africans against Bantu 
education and Apaltheid rule. Hence, I think the Freirian conception of biophilic subjects can 
be strengthened by the use of the insights from Giddens. Suffice to say that the idea by SA 
Freirians of human agency capable of conscientising dialogical action for freedom should be 
preferred over the Foucauldian view which celebrates a fragmented, pluralist notion of multiple 
subjectivity. In addition, the constitution of the Foucauldian objectified subjects by technologies 
and strategies of power/knowledge makes them impotent agents incapable of transformative 
action. The consequence of this Foucauldian view is the constitution of a subject-less history. 
Such a radical relativist notion of subjectivity cannot be the basis of authentic education praxis 
for liberation. It is, instead, only through the Freirian notion of active subjects that transformative 
action for liberation is made possible. 
CHAPTER 6: SA FREIRIANS CONTRA FOUCAULDIANS ON THE (IM)POSSIBILITY OF 
TRUTH AND LIBERATION 
Chapter Six explores the debate between SA Freirians and Foucauldians on the (im)possibility of 
truth and liberation through educational practices. It shows that although SA Freirians at times 











truth is arrived at dialogically. This processual search for truth through conscientising dialogue is 
an integral part of the operation of the Thompson-Giddens ideology critique and Habermas's 
communicative action. The practice of inter-subjective discourse, ideology critique and self-
reflective action within liberatory education is the basis for transformative political action SA 
Freirians advocated. However, the chapter also indicates that most SA Foucauldians have 
criticized SA Freirians for commitment to determinate standards of truth and 'regime of truth' 
which legitimize some discourses at the expense of others which are silenced. In contrast with 
the SA Freirians, they hold the view that truth and liberation are illusive and unattainable 
phenomena. Despite their recommendation for a ruthless critique of standards of truth, SA 
Foucauldians, however, do not have a solution for the problem of domination. In fact they have 
failed to turn their politics of resistance into a positive programme of social transformation. It is 
for this reason, that I argued in the chapter that People's Education attests to a situation where 
the Freirian dialogical strategy was used in order to reach processual truth on the basis of which 
freedom from Apartheid domination, in all spheres including education, was achieved. 
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
This final chapter is a synthesis of the content of the thesis. It re-emphasizes the bankruptcy, 
fatalism and nihilism of the Foucauldian conception of power/knowledge, truth and subjectivity. 
It rejects this theory on the basis of its radical relativism and its paralyzing treatment of 
resistance as an integral part of mechanisms of disciplinary power. In contrast to the rendering of 
struggles for liberation meaningless in the South African Foucauldian framework, the process of 












CHAPTER l:GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
This is a theoretical and historical study whose main objective is to compare and contrast Freire 
and Foucault's conceptions of power/knowledge, truth and subjectivity and the effects of these 
interpretations on educational praxis in South Africa. To this end the dissertation utilizes a 
theoretical framework derived mainly from Habermas's concept of communicative action/ideal 
speech act and Thompson and Giddens' notion of ideology critique to argue that it is only 
through the deployment of Freire's pedagogy of knowing and its twin concepts of dialogue and 
conscientisation that authentic educational praxis and true liberation could be effected in the 
South African setting. The Foucauldian poststructuralist education rationality has been 
discounted for this purpose because its treatment of powerlknowledge, truth and subjectivity 
leaves no space for liberation. 
1.1 CORE ARGUMENT 
The core argument of the thesis is that a comparative analysis of major aspects of Freire and 
Foucault's educational rationalities especially the concepts powerlknowledge, subjectivity, truth 
and liberation, coupled with interpretations and adaptations of these aspects to the South African 
setting by followers of each of the theorists has revealed the utility of Freire's pedagogy of 
knowing in the transformation of education in the country. Freire's pedagogy and its twin 
concepts of conscientisation and dialogue provide an alternative approach which links education 
to the broader socio-economic and political issues. Comparatively speaking I find the 
Foucauldian poststructuralist critique of Freire's conception of knowledge, power, truth and the 
subject, although persuasive in parts, lacking in fundamental aspects. Chief amongst these 
aspects are the treatment of power as inescapable, and truth and liberation as unattainable thus 
making it impossible for liberatory educational praxis to be a realizable goal. In addition, the 
characterisation of subjectivity as inherently contradictory also creates difficulties for the 
humanist goal of emancipation from domination. The treatment of resistance as part and parcel 
of the mechanism of power is paralysing in the sense that any struggle against domination 
becomes meaningless as this will merely be some other form or manifestation of power (,where 
there is power, there is resistance'; 'we cannot escape power'). In contrast Freire's challenge to 












In fact, Freire is critical of all authority even when that authority pretends to advance a 
liberatory project. The same cannot be said of Foucault's theory which, through its denial of the 
idea of freedom and liberatory truth, promotes quietism, nihilism and fatalism. In contrast, the 
core characteristics of the emancipatory content of Freire's pedagogy are self-criticism and an 
ongoing dialogical process-implying knowledge-production as a dialogical activity and truth as 
provisional thus calling forth for a more flexible approach than Foucauldians would like us to 
believe. The latter quality of Freire's pedagogy of knowing has accounted for the model's 
integration into the South African liberatory educational praxis commonly referred to as 
'education for liberation' or 'people's education'. 
Notwithstanding the critique of South African Foucauldians and some few other scholars, 
Freire's problem-posing pedagogy is positively portrayed in the work of a significant number of 
South African organic intellectuals and educational theorists herein referred to as SA Freirians. It 
is for these reasons that SA policy-makers would be well-advised to consider Freire's pedagogy 
as the basis for authentic educational practice. The utility of the Freirian pedagogy in effecting 
authentic educational praxis is further reinforced by the affmity with which Freire's concepts of 
conscientisation and dialogue have with Habermas' notion of communicative action/ideal speech 
situation and the Thompson-Giddens concept of ideology critique. Ideal speech situation, in 
partucular, has proven to be an instrument on the basis of which political action within the 
educational sphere and society in general is made possible. Where there is undistorted 
communication, Habermas believes, an ideal speech act which promotes intersubjectivity is 
possible. Habermas is of the view that in a situation where there exist two mutually exclusive 
views on how to coordinate social action, it is impossible for participants to reach consensus and 
intersubjectivity. In contrast, where there is authentic communicative action and the absence of 
distorted communication, intersubjectivity and consensus can be attained. Hence Habermas's 
work is a ceaseless attempt to create a democratic public sphere and conditions conducive for 
authentic communicative action akin to the dialogical praxis of conscientised subjects in Freire's 
pedagogy. 
In the same vein, Giddens and Thompson see the analysis of ideology as possessing a critical 
potential by means of which relations of domination could be unmasked. Through ideology 
critique, a concept akin to Freire's twin concepts of conscientisation and dialogue, the nature of 
domination and modes of its reproduction in society are revealed and possibilities for their 
transformation are posed. The utilisation of Habermas, Giddens and Thompson in attempting to 











find a valid liberatory praxis points towards a theoretical approach which needs to be accounted 
for. 
1.2 THE THEORETICAL ASPECT OF THE THESIS 
According to Walters (1944:4 5), theorizing rather than mere research includes putting forward 
a political or practical programme after a thorough dissection of social reality in ways that open 
up space for action and reflection to transform society. Other kinds of theorizing involve critique 
of extant theory coupled with proposals of alternative theories; synthesis of existing theoretical 
insights by searching for commonalities and convergences and making critical interpretations on 
the major contributions of each of these theories; utilising existing theories to analyse new 
research findings thus ensuring an interchange between theory and research; making sense of 
great events and transformations; and searching for formalities or principles which could be 
utilised to explain social life in general. 
Taking into consideration Walters's insights on theorising, my thesis is a synthesis and critical 
interpretation of the major contributions of Freire and Foucault on the theory of pedagogy in 
such a way that their convergences and commonalities, strengths and weaknesses could be 
revealed. In addition, I critique their concepts of knowledge, power, truth and subjectivity with a 
view to determine their utility in the promotion of authentic educational praxis. The use of the 
South African case study in this respect has more to do with satisfying the need for an 
interchange between theory and research. I do this by factoring in new research findings, 
discovering the extent to which insights from the two education rationalities or theories played a 
role in the unfolding educational contest and by determining the possibility of their continued 
engagement in the education transformation processes in South Africa. The idea is not so much 
to show how agents acted in particular situations in South Africa but to demonstrate how they 
shape and are shaped by history. 
In the context of the struggle against Bantu education in particular and Apartheid in general, the 
objective is to explore whether these two theories could make sense of this major event, the 
social forces ranged against each other and the possible changes which could be made to the 
situation. In doing this, it was necessary to conceptualise what happened within Bantu 
Education, for instance, I show that Bantu Education was banking education. However, it was 
outside the focus of this thesis to explain the political, economic or social circumstances in 











words, the question I ask in this thesis is do the Freirian- and Foucauldian-based educational 
rationalities offer any principles which can be utilised to both explain and transform educational 
practices in the South African setting. 
Moreover, in line with both Freire and Foucault's belief that all social practices including 
education are not neutral but political, another aspect of the thesis is to propose a political agenda 
for the transformation of education practices in South Mrica. This political agenda, is not about 
spelling out the steps that South African education can take in future. Rather it is geared towards 
constructing a theory by which practical and political action becomes possible and conceivable. 
In other words, this is a primarily theoretical, as opposed to a practical or applied, exercise 
directed at finding a way out of relativist nihilism. Hence an alternative theory, and in this case 
the reinforcement of Freire's pedagogy with concepts communicative action and ideology 
critique, is proposed to both emancipate South Africans from dominating education structures 
and to bring into existence an authentic education praxis. Suffice to say that through a critical 
engagement with the main tenets of Freire and Foucault's concepts of knowledge, power, truth 
and subjectivity, I evolved a novel way of reinforcing Freire's view by utilising the writings of 
Habermas, Giddens, Thompson, McKay and Romm, and Aronowitz and Giroux, amongst others. 
The theoretical framework adopted for this thesis, therefore, is informed by a combination of 
concepts including Thompson and Giddens's critical conception of ideology! ideology critique 
and Habermas's concept of communicative action and! or ideal speech act. These concepts have 
also been elaborated in the work of various other theorists both internationally and nationally 
who include Aronowitz and Giroux, McKay and Romm and Carr and Kemmis. McKay and 
Romm in particular have articulated the relationships between the concepts communicative 
action and ideology critique and Freire's notions of dialogue and conscientisation, respectively, 
to indicate that Freire's problem-posing pedagogy could both be justified and augmented through 
the utilisation of the insights derived from the work of the above-mentioned theorists. However, 
since from chapter 3 to 6 this theoretical debate is occurring within a particular historical 
context, that of South Africa under Apartheid, it is therefore necessary to combine theoretical 
and historical aspects in our approach. 
1.3 THE HISTORICAL ASPECT OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is historical in the sense that it surveys South African writers involved in the 











Foucauldians, respectively. The utilisation of the Freirian humanistic insights in the South 
African setting started in the late 1960's in the University Christian Movement (UCM) and later 
spread to various BCM structures in the early 1970's. Since then Freire's view on liberatory 
action in education has been integrated into the struggle for educational and political 
emancipation in South Africa. 
The Foucauldian poststructuralist challenge to Freire's pedagogy of knowing in South Africa 
only began to mature in the late 1980's as a response to the People's Education for People's 
Power (PEPP) movement. A historical perspective is in this sense warranted. Such an approach 
would help identify who were the SA Freirians and Foucauldians, respectively, and to explain 
why is it that South African Freirians had connections with the national liberation movement 
whereas the SA Foucauldians were mainly White liberals operating within the universities. 
Hence, despite the fact that this is not an entirely historical thesis, but a partly historical and 
partly theoretical one, in the South African setting where the colour of one's skin determines 
access to certain educational institutions, the quality of education one would get, etc., a historical 
perspective becomes imperative. It was racial discrimination and Apartheid practices which were 
responsible for the emergence of an opposition movement within education and other social 
domains which need to be captured by this kind of perspective. Such an approach will clearly 
indicate the various ways in which the Freire-Foucault debate was appropriated and the exact 
period when these views were integrated into the South African situation, the strong focus of the 
debate on racial issues as well as pointing out whether in terms of the possibility of liberatory 
praxis SA Freirians and Foucauldians have found a solution. 
In other words, this is a history of ideas which demonstrates that the Freirian 'education for 
liberation' paradigm embraced by both the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) and the 
People's Education for People's Power (PEPP) movement arose in South Africa as part of the 
resistance against and critique of Apartheid ideas. In tum, the SA Foucouldian paradigm arose 
as a response to the Freirian ideas within the educational terrain. This generated a combative but 
lively discourse that overshadowed any other intellectual debate within the South African 
educational circles for most of the 1980's and 1990's. The historical perspective on the 
emergence of Freirian ideas and the Foucauldian critique not only added depth to the study but 
also established a cooperative dialogue between theoretical and historical aspects of the thesis. 
This is especially so in cases where historical information served illustrative purposes in the 
thesis. For instance, the constant reference to the BCM, PEPP and Neville Alexander, in no 











conscientisation and 'education for liberation', is an example of the dovetailing or intersection of 
theory and history. However, because the BeM, PEPP and Neville Alexander embraced Freire's 
pedagogy at different historical periods, it was necessary for the thesis to provide a historical 
sequence of the appropriation of Freirian ideas and their Foucauldian critique in South Africa. 
For this reason chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis include sections dealing with the history of the 
transplantation and integration of the Freirian paradigm into the South African educational and 
political discourse. These sections on the historical overviews also cover the emergence of the 
Foucauldian critique of Freirian ideas and the rigorous debates between intellectuals in the two 
camps since then. In addition, owing to the fact that a historical overview of the theoretical 
arguments between SA Freirians and Foucauldians necessitate the use of illustrative information, 
I use a lot of quotes and sometimes often repeat the same point because of the need to provide 
evidence of what they are saying and to show that they support a particular point. I utilise this 
style or strategy with a particular purpose in mind, that is to provide historical evidence. 
Utilising a historical perspective it could be argued that social movements such as the education 
for liberation and 'people's education' movement in South Africa show how central activism has 
become to the attainment of goals in modern society. This is because agents of social change 
have become aware of the importance of an understanding of social processes in order to 
transform our social reality. One chief exponent of this view, Alain Touraine, was not too much 
impressed with the mere listing or recording of past occurrences, and, according to Giddens, 
"Touraine has been less interested in the background conditions that give rise to 
social movements than in understanding the objectives social movements pursue. 
Social movements do not just come about as irrational responses to social divisions 
or injustices, they develop with views and strategies as to how these can be 
overcome. Social movements cannot be understood as isolated forms of association. 
They develop in deliberate antagonism with other groups-usually established 
organisations but sometimes with rival movements. All social movements have 
interests or aims which they are for, all have views and ideas they are against. In 
Touraine's view, other theories of social movements have given insufficient 
consideration to how their objectives are shaped by their encounters with others who 
hold divergent ideas-as well as the ways in which they themselves influence the 
outlooks and action of their opposites" (1989:627 - 8). 
Best and Kahn (1981 :60) are also of the view that history is not simply a list of chronological 
events. On the contrary, it is through the past and the related events that recent developments 
could be contextualised. For this reason, rather than merely recording past events, historical 
analysis is utilised to understand social movements, their ideas and institutions within which they 











ideas and those of opposing forces and the movements they put together as vehicles for social 
transformation. 
To reiterate, Touraine and Best and Kahn's view on how to utilise the historical strategy is 
applicable to this thesis. Looking at the evolution of educational struggles in SA it is clear that 
oppositional movements such as the 'education for liberation' and 'people's education' emerged 
in opposition to the Apartheid education system and so their development was 'in deliberate 
antagonism' to the Bantu Education system of the Apartheid government. In addition, these 
educational movements were clearly influenced by particular ideas about how education and 
society must be organised (Freire's pedagogy of knowing is relevant here) and had clear 
objectives and strategies to make the South African people take action to free educational 
institutions and society as a whole from practices of domination. Hence utilising Touraine's 
historical strategy it will, for instance, be possible to indicate that the BCM had a clear 
educational agenda to fight against Apartheid education through the utilisation of humanistic 
views such as those of Freire so that authentic liberation could be achieved within the education 
sphere and society. In fact the adherence to a historical perspective is an acknowledgement that 
agents of social change are themselves influenced by ideas prevalent in their society although 
they could act to change this society, its ideas and practices. They are a product of society 
despite the fact that they construct and remodel society with their action. Hence history is central 
to the understanding of human self-creation and preservation. Suffice to say that one central 
aspect of this thesis is to show how theory can allow the possibility for agents to shape, and in 
tum be shaped, by history. 
As already indicated the student activists of the early 1970's inhabited a space within which the 
Apartheid ideology was dominant in education; alternative ideas about democratisation of 
education such as those of the African National Congress CANC) had been driven underground; 
humanist views such as those of Freire about how liberation could be brought about within 
education were spreading throughout the world; and most South African social institutions were 
saturated will conflicts and contests against Apartheid control. It is in such a setting that 
particular movements with specific agendas emerged. These movements can be only understood 
with the aid of an historical approach. Such an approach will help in identifying the origins of 
these movements and individual agents, the ideological orientation and the specific goals of their 
programmes inter alia. According to Haralambos and Holborn, 
"History is therefore a process of human self-creation. Yet people are also a product 











which they create. An understanding of society therefore involves an historical 
perspective which examines the process whereby humanity both produces and is 
produced by social reality.... The history of human society is a process of tension 
and conflict. Social change is not a smooth orderly progression which gradually 
unfolds in harmonious evolution. Instead it proceeds from contradictions built into 
society which are a source of tension and ultimately the source of open conflict and 
radical change" (1990:781 - 2). 
Data subjected to this historical analysis has been extracted from historical documents, books, 
journals, conference papers, etc. through the use of a content analysis strategy. This content 
analysis approach and its various facets including semantic content analysis is a subject of the 
following section. 
1.4 DATA GATHERING STRATEGY 
In order to conduct a thorough-going comparative analysis of Freire and Foucault's 
understanding of the concepts knowledge, power, subjectivity, truth and liberation as well as 
determining both their impact and different usages within the South African setting from the 
early 1970s to the early 1990s, I utilised a content analysis derived data gathering strategy. I also 
employed the same strategy, in particular semantic content analysis, as an analytic method on the 
collected primary documentary and secondary data in order to determine which of the two 
educational rationalities could be utilised to effect a liberatory education praxis in South Africa. 
This data-gathering method with its dependence on documentary sources is most suitable for a 
historical approach. According to Peter Mann, 
"Documents are our (and other people's) history. They record events past, and the 
present stands in a causal relationship to the past. To ignore documents is to cut off 
sociology from the whole process of social change, which is one of the fundamental 
concepts of the discipline itself.. .. Every document has its contribution to make to 
research ... " (1985:94 95). 
In practical terms these sources of data included books, journals, conference papers, research 
reports, and pUblications of organisations. These were obtained from various libraries and 
resource centres throughout the country especially in this case libraries and resource centres at 
Rhodes University and UeT as well as libraries of the universities of (the) North West, Fort 












Content analysis is a method utilised by social scientists to examine information. This analysis 
is a systematic and objective description and examination of both quantitative and qualitative 
messages. Typical subjects or data for this technique is any type of recorded symbolic 
information such as journals, books, conference papers, research reports, official recordsl 
government documents, publications of organisations and pamphlets. In content analysis the 
researcher selects and analyse certain themes, words or sentiments expressed in symbolic 
communications. Nevertheless, as a resource for social science research, content analysis has 
been under-utilised. This factor, however, should not be used to undermine the utility of the 
method in making inferences and identifying specified characteristics of available data from 
secondary sources and primary documentary information (Gay, 1987:207; Kidder and Judd, 
1986:306; Labovitz and Hageborn, 1981:78; Philliber et aI, 1980:113). According to 
Krippendorff, 'content analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid 
inferences from data to their content' (1980:21). 
The above definition goes deeper than the one provided by Berelson who defined content 
analysis as 'a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the 
manifest content of communication' (Quoted in Krippendorff, 1980:21). Berelson's definition is 
restrictive in that it could lead researchers to exclude latent contents and qualitative methods 
from their analysis. In contrast, the content analysis approach adopted for this thesis, semantic 
content analysis, has a more qualitative focus and emerged as part of the data-gathering 
techniques from textual sources. 
According to Lindkvist (1981), approaches to textual analysis include structuralism, 
hermeneutics, analytical semantics and content analysis. The utility of structuralism was 
questioned owing to disagreements amongst structuralists in relation to adopting either a general 
textual model or a middle-range model of textual analysis (Lindkvist, 1981 :32;39). 
Hermeneutics, on the other hand, despite having a developed conception of interpretation and 
analysis, are compromised by their usage of 'psychoanalysis and Marxism as patterns for the 
analysis of symbols and societal phenomena' (Ibid:38). This is because psychoanalysis and 
Marxism are susceptible of psychologism and economic reductionism, respectively. The other 
approach to textual analysis, analytical semantics, evolved out of a tradition which involved the 
analysis of philosophical texts. At a later stage a systematic qualitative textual analysis of 
arguments in scientifical, political, ideological and ethical context was elaborated from this 
approach (Ibid: 26). However, analytical semantics's adherence to 'the principle of 











texts in general and debates' (Ibid:38) meant an exclusive concentration on a qualitative analysis. 
In this sense analytic semantics's exclusive focus on a qualitative analysis was considered a vice. 
According to Lindkvist, 'sometimes a qualitative analysis would offer a fruitful complement to a 
semantic analysis' (Ibid:40). 
In contrast with analytical semantics, 'content analysis was originally used to draw conclusions 
regarding the sender from quantitative data' and 'the quantitative profile of the text has been in 
focus' (Ibid:39). However, developments in content analysis points at 'tendencies towards using 
a qualitative approach much more than before' (lbid:40). It is the latter development which 
formed the basis for utilising content analysis as a data-gathering strategy for this study. In fact, 
the combination of elements of analytical semantics in the analysis of argumentative texts and 
debates between SA Freirian and Foucauldians and a more qualitative content analysis amounts 
to adherence to what Andren referred to as 'content analysis proper' namely, semantic content 
analysis (Andren, 1981 :43). 
Semantic content analysis encompasses procedures used to classify or provide the frequency 
with which certain concepts are referred to. It is a subject-matter or thematic analysis in which 
certain characterisation of concepts are made explicit (Krippendorf 1980:33). According to 
Andren: 
"Semantic rules relate concepts to words and sometimes to longer expressions than 
words. Most words can express different concepts, and most concepts can be 
expressed by different words. Which concept a concrete instance of a word is 
expressing depends on the linguistic structure of communication it belongs to and on 
the social context within which it is published. We can say the semantic rules define 
a set of possible interpretations for every sentence or permissible string of signs" 
(1981:62). 
In other words, the semantic content analysis method involves the inference of the semantic 
content of the text. This process entails identification and interpretation of 'those concepts or, 
propositions that are expressed' by the text (Andren, 1981 :59). It also presupposes 'knowledge 
about beliefs and intentions' of the authors as well as 'knowledge about the social context' within 
which they wrote (Ibid:63). In the initial phase of my study, which is examining the writings of 
South Mrican Freirians and Foucauldians, a survey of the relevant literature through the 
semantic content analysis strategy yielded the themes knowledge, power, the subject and truth. 
Linked to these themes or concepts was a particular view from each of the two perspectives, SA 
Freirians and Foucauldians, on the possibility of political action for liberation. In the second 











selected for inclusion in the study on the basis of whether they include one or all of the themes 
which emerged in the initial phase, namely, knowledge, power, the subject, truth and liberation. 
Then followed a laborious process of coding the texts in terms of the themes in line with the 
prescriptions of semantic content analysis. This labor intensive activity otherwise known as 
'symbolic analysis' (Judd et aI, 1991:293) involved breaking down 'long, complex sentences', 
'whole paragraphs', sections of the text and at times the entire text 'into theme format' (Weber, 
1985:22-23). The systematisation and reduction of the content of the selected texts into a 
thematic form took considerable effort to undertake. In line with Fibiger (1981: 160),s 
observation about other semantic content analysis studies, extensive quotations have been used 
in this thesis as illustrations of the content of the texts. For this reason, the thesis would be found 
to be circulating and repetitive at times. This was unavoidable as the point is to indicate in some 
detail how various writers have come at and supported the same point in relation to their 
conception of knowledge, power, the subject, truth or liberation. In addition, the substantial 
quotes in the thesis are meant to give the reader a feel of what the writers are saying. 
The utility of content analysis, however, should not be used to camouflage its own blemishes 
although these are negligible. Problems related to using available documents include the inability 
of the social researcher to control the data gathering process as these documents are presented in 
a finished form with no possibility for follow-up research. In addition, any variable of interest to 
the researcher omitted in available data from these documents may create gaps in the analysis 
phase. Nevertheless, the attraction of available information is chiefly the money and time saved 
by using data already in existence (Philliber, 1980: 116). 
Furthermore, in contrast with interviews, surveys, and questionnaires, content analysis is an 
unobtrusive technique. In this research strategy subjects are not aware of being observed or 
tested and there is no disturbance of the research instrument on the respondents. In addition, the 
researcher-respondent interaction which can bias the respondent's answer is non-existent. Thus 
content analysis's advantage as a research technique is in its non-reactiveness (Krippendorff, 
1980:29). Together with in-depth research, this method does not predefine choices for the 
respondents. Its ability to accept unstructuctured material makes it a naturalistic strategy which 
leaves no room for artificial and manipulated interviewee responses. Lastly, this analytic method 
is context sensitive thus making it possible for the researcher to process symbolic forms 
(Ibid:30). On the basis of this content analysis derived data an appropriate theoretical framework 












The aim of this general introduction is to outline the core argument of the thesis and provide the 
rationale for the combination of theoretical and historical approaches in the study. It also 
accounts for the utilisation of semantic content analysis as a research strategy. The chapter 
makes explicit reference to the fact that Freire's problem-posing pedagogy utilises two key 
concepts, namely, conscientisation and dialogue to argue that human subjects are capable of 
transformative action for freedom. The two concepts will be outlined and defined in more detail 
in chapter 2. I also bring in Habermas's theory of communicative action and Giddens and 
Thompson's notion of ideology critique, which are part of the subject matter of chapter 2. These 
are the foundation planks upon which this theoretical-cum-historical study stands and will be 
used as core aspects of the analysis in the rest of the thesis. By and large this is a distinctive 
aspect of the thesis. Freire and the SA Freirians have argued that the praxis of liberation is made 
possible by processes of conscientisation, dialogue and a ceaseless search for provisional truth. 
Dialogue within the Freirian paradigm is continuous and this process is engaged in even after the 
attainment of liberation as reality is a constantly changing phenomenon. However, I think the 
Freirian pedagogy needs to take contemporary theorists into account in order to augment its 
theoretical position. Within the South African educational circles only Mckay and Romm have 
been able to utilise Habermas's concept of communicative action in order to elaborate on 
processes of dialogical action for liberation within the Freirian framework. The present 
endeavor goes beyond these efforts. In this thesis, I make use of Giddens and Thompson's 
concept of ideology critique together with Habermas's notion of dialogue to bring critical theory 
up to date. I believe no one in the SA Freirian camp has been able to do this. What ideology 
critique, and Habermas's dialogue, gives us is a process which can make progress towards truth. 
Giddens, in particular, is talking about a virtuous circle of ideology critique which gives us a 
way of eliminating the worst aspects of distorted communication. SA Freirians's conception of 
provisional truth, which arise out of conscientising dialogue, on the basis of which educational 
praxis for liberation is conducted, can be enriched by the notion of ideology critique. There is a 
difference between Giddens and Habermas's position and that of the Foucauldians. While 
Giddens and Habermas think progress towards truth can be made, Foucauldians have no room 
for that possibility. It is this radical relativism and its inability to provide the basis for the 
formulation of a strategy for political emancipation which accounts for my rejection of the 
Foucauldian theory. I think, however, that a Freirian approach enhanced by insights from 
Thompson's concept of ideology critique and Habermas's dialogical strategy can be the basis for 











talk about is made more explicit in ways that approximate the processual reality of this truth 
elaborated in Giddens and Habermas's approaches. The content analysis derived data on SA 
Freirians and Foucauldians will also show that Foucault and SA Foucauldian conception of 
knowledge, power, truth and the subject promotes an 'anarchistic' politics of resistance which 
lacks a notion of a good society. It is this lack of a program of reconstruction that accounts for 
my rejection of their theory in favour of Freire's pedagogy and its adaptations for use in South 
Africa by SA Freirians. The next chapter inter alia succinctly outline and define concepts 
conscientisation, dialogue, and ideology critique as part of the process of creating a theoretical 











CHAPTER 2: REFLECTIONS ON THE CORE ASPECTS OF THE FREIRE-
FOUCAULT THEORETICAL DEBATE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main objective of this theoretical chapter of the thesis is to construct a comparative analysis 
of Paulo Freire's and Michel Foucault's conceptions of knowledge, power, the subject and truth 
with a view to utilizing insights derived from this process in the analysis of the debate on the 
possibility of liberatory educational praxis by South African Freirians and Foucauldians. In 
other words, the primary aim of the chapter is to set out a pure Freire-Foucault debate untainted 
with any South African influence. In the insuing chapters, however, I will show how this debate 
gets inserted into the South African situation. 
The position I advance in this chapter is that Freire's pedagogy of knowing is the basis upon 
which political action which leads to emancipation could be taken. Within Freire's pedagogy, 
knowledge production through conscientising dialogue is a means for the attainment of 
provisional truth on the basis of which authentic liberation could be attained. I also make use of 
Habermas's theory of communicative action and his notion of ideology critique to justify Freire's 
contention that liberatory action is possible within society in general and the education sphere in 
particular. In addition, I believe Freire's moral and political project for the emancipation of the 
oppressed can be enhanced by the use of the conception of reflexivity and ideology critique 
advanced by British social scientists Anthony Giddens and John Thompson. This is, of course, 
another way of strengthening Habermas's observation that knowledge is not impartial and free of 
human interest and that reality is always approached from a particular standpoint. Giddens, in 
particular, has intervened effectively in the debate by indicating that systematic knowledge 
(which, of course, is subject to continued critical reflection or reflexivity) is possible; that a 
conception of power which produces a 'subject-less history' must be rejected; that human beings 
must be treated as active and knowledgeable subjects; that through discursive consciousness 
these active subjects are capable of determining their own destiny and hence organised political 
action at both local and global levels is not only possible but necessary. Before engaging in the 
Freire-Foucault theoretical debate in detail, let me sketch out in a form of a brief summary its 
main contours. I will start with the core elements of Freire's pedagogy of knowing. 
Freire's pedagogy represents a ceaseless quest for cultural action for freedom within the 











For him, education is an act of knowing rather than domination. In other words, education is 
action and reflection for freedom. 
However, Freire (1970) insists that for education to be an 'act of knowing', it must establish a 
relationship of 'authentic dialogue' amongst educators and learners. True dialogue, in his view, 
entails that teachers and learners engage in reflection and action in the classroom as creative 
subjects. This practice of self-reflection, Freire maintains, is a means by which creative subjects 
transform their reality or engage in liberation praxis (Freire, 1970: 12-13). Hence within the 
Freirian theory 'education is cultural action for freedom and therefore an act of knowing and not 
of memorization' (Ibid: 1) 
In essence, the nucleus of Freire's pedagogy consists of a critical concern with the act of knowing 
and how the theory of power as domination prohibits authentic educational praxis. In his view, 
dialogue and conscientisation amongst knowing subjects, truth and liberatory praxis are negated 
by the domesticating education practices derived from the theory of domination. For this reason, 
Freire suggests the utilization of dialogue as a vehicle for education as cultural action for 
freedom. 
Foucault, on the other hand, has strategically deployed the concepts knowledge, power, truth and 
the subject to expose the operation of 'technologies and apparatuses of social regulations' 
(Foucault, 1977) in modern society. These disciplinary techniques also function within 
educational institutions. Amongst the various organizational and operational mechanisms which 
insure the effects of power in an education institution, according to Foucault, are the rules and 
regulations which govern the institution's practices and 'the disposal of its space' (Quoted in 
Marshall 1993:191). In addition, Foucault also talks about 'regulated communications' and ' 
power processes' within the education institution as mechanisms of control (Ibid). The former 
involves inter alia 'lessons', 'coded signs of obedience' and 'differentiated marks' whilst the 
latter has to do with 'the pyramidal hierarchy', 'surveillance' and 'reward and punishment' (Ibid) 
Indirect or implicit references to mechanisms of social control in education could be gleaned 
from Foucault's discussion on disciplinary/invisible power. Other arenas besides the school 
where mechanisms of disciplinary power operate are, to mention but a few, the prison and the 
clinic. Foucault says in the relationship between a teacher and a student, a warder and a 
prisoner, and a doctor and a patient, the subjects have internalised the mechanisms of social 











affinity between subjects of disciplinary power and those Freire viewed as subjected to banking 
education. 
According to Foucault, power is always exercised and it is everywhere. The question, however, 
is who possesses power. Foucault provides us with a notion of power without a subject. No one 
possesses power or 'has an official right to power' (Foucault, 1977:213). Power cannot be 
owned like property because it circulates in a net-like organization comprising, amongst others, 
regimes of knowledge and truth. Regimes of truth and rationality create rules and procedures for 
acceptable action and conduct in addition to 'true' discourses which legitimate certain practices 
by supplying reasons and justificatory principles (Smart, 1985:72). Truth, power and knowledge 
directly imply each other to an extent that we can talk of a golden triangle without anyone of the 
constituents elements taking centre-stage (Foucault, 1977:27; Smart, 1985:76). Disciplinary 
power in some situations takes the form of a normalizing judgement, for instance, punishment 
for lateness, absences, interruptions of tasks, impoliteness, disobedience, lack of cleanliness, 
'incorrect' attitudes, etc. in the school (Foucault, 1977: 178). Consequently individual students 
become entangled in an impersonal power relation which both constrain them simultaneously as 
making them become the principle of their own subjection (Ibid: 202-3) This is, however, only 
possible because disciplinary power is seen as grounded in scientific knowledge and truth. 
Foucault's diagnosis of the intersection of power/knowledge, truth and the formation of selves is 
a useful toolkit for understanding mechanisms of social control within education. However, 
During (1992: 131) believes this diagnosis of power and its implied multiplicity of truth and 
subjects (what Foucault's critics refer to as radical relativism) leaves no room for liberatory 
action within education and other societal institutions (Ibid: 136-7). This is by far the most 
problematic aspect of Foucault's theory to date. 
Thus the fundamental difference between Foucault and Freire is that while the former believes a 
correlation of power and knowledge implies an everlasting existence of multiple discourses and a 
plurality of voices in society, the latter maintains that the moment of reproduction and 
domination in education can be transcended through the transformative element (action and 
reflection) of the pedagogy of knowing. Freire's pedagogy of knowing openly signifies a 
ceaseless effort in search of a liberatory educational rationality. According to Joao da Veiga 
Coutinho, Paulo Freire's fundamental thesis is that education is not neutral but can be used for 











advance through the use of concientising dialogue embedded in the pedagogy of knowing 
(Freire, 1970:vi). 
There exist implicit justifications of this thesis in various of Freire's writings especially in the 
Cultural Action for Freedom (1970), The Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1972) and The Politics of 
Education (1985) which will be made explicit throughout the dissertation. This thesis has an 
affinity with Jurgen Habermas' conception of dialogue and/or ideal speech situation which 
produces intersubjectivity. Nevertheless, these justifications may be more strengthened if 
grounded on the notion of ideology critique and/or the critical conception of ideology found in 
British sociologists Anthony Giddens and John Thompson's theoretical reflections. However, in 
order to frame the theoretical approach for this thesis, I will briefly outline the key features of the 
concepts conscientisation, dialogue and ideology critique. This will be followed by an 
examination of the utility of the Thompson-Giddens conception of ideology critique in creating 
conditions conducive for political action for transformation. This will form a background for an 
in-depth theoretical debate between Freire and Foucault on knowledge, power, the subject and 
truth. 
2.2 CONSCIENTISATION 
"Conscientisation refers to the process in which men (sic), not as recipients, but as 
knowing subjects, achieve a deepening awareness both of the socio-cultural reality 
which shapes their lives and oftheir capacity to transform reality" (Freire, 1970:27). 
The notion of 'conscientisation' is central to Freire (1973)'s approach to learning. In concrete 
terms the concept refers to the interface of critical reflection and action as two separate but 
interconnected moments in the process ofindividual and collective emancipation. Literacy in this 
context becomes both a medium and a constitutive force for human agency and political action 
(Giroux, 1983:227). The basic condition for conscientisation, like education, is that its agent 
must be a conscious being because it is as subjects that human beings transform reality (Freire, 
1985:68). 
According to Freire, for the oppressed to achieve a voice endowed with critical quality, 
conscientisation is needed. However, conscientisation does not automatically happen like the 
biblical manna falling from heaven for the Israelites. Rather it emerges through a critical 
education approach-the process in which the masses achieve a deepening awareness of both their 











mere recipients. Conscientisation is directed at awakening critical consciousness so that 
oppressive conditions could be identified and challenged. In the initial phases conscientisation 
would create favourable conditions for the destruction of fragmented consciousness enforced on 
the masses by the ruling class to prevent the development of collective action. In the final 
analysis, however, it is geared towards the radical transformation of social reality (Connolly, 
1980:71). By its conscientising nature, the pedagogy of knowing is therefore political. 
In sum, conscientisation is a process through which people become aware of their situation, 
reflect on it, and act upon it as conscious social actors. Freire's conscientisation educational 
strategies emphasise dialogue and equal participation by all concerned. He believes that in 
education for liberation, no-one conscientises anyone else. Whether we are students, educators, 
political leaders, workers, etc., we must all take part in the conscientisation process (Freire, 
1985: 125). I think conscientisation, an equivalent concept to the notion of ideology critique, 
coupled with dialogue, is a means by which people are made aware of the oppressive nature of 
relations of domination so that they can act to change this situation. 
2.3 DIALOGUE 
In order to resolve the inherent contradiction in the theory of anti dialogical action, a new 
perspective devoid of relations of domination between subject-conqueror and object-conquered 
dimensions is required. According to Freire, cooperation is the central feature of the alternative 
theory which he called 'the dialogical theory of action' (Freire, 1972: 135). In this conception 
human beings as subjects cooperate in order to create, name, and transform the world (Ibid.). In 
addition, Freire says, 
"The same is true of revolutionary action. That is the oppressed and the leaders are 
equally the subjects of revolutionary action, and reality serves as the medium for the 
transforming action of both groups. In this theory of action one cannot speak of an 
actor, nor simply of actors, but rather of actors in intercommunication" (lbid:99). 
Unlike in the situation of conquest where there exists a subject who oppresses and the dominated 
object, subjects in the dialogical theory create and recreate, construct and reconstruct their world 
as equals. 
Only dialogue could resolve the contradiction within the teacher-student relationship. It has to be 
noted, however, that dialogue involves more than a mere exchange of information. As a strategy, 











and humanisation (Alschuler, 1980:27; Freire, 1972:77). Anti-dialogue, in contrast, is practiced 
by teachers who in their efforts to impose their authority over learners by enforcing rules and 
punitive action perpetuate conflict within the schools. Dialogue instead is based on mutual 
respect and democratic involvement of educators and learners in formulating rules which 
regulate their conduct in the classroom (Aschuler, 1980:69). According to Freire, this loving 
dialogue is impossible where an authoritative structure exists. In his own words: 
"[Dialogue] cannot exist in a relation of domination .... Domination reveals the 
pathology of love: sadism in the dominator and masochism in the dominated" 
(Freire, 1972:78). 
When educators attempt to control the learners 'by mocking, mimicking and bribing them, by 
sarcasm and embarrassment and by admonishing, ordering, and threatening them', they are 
engaged in anti-dialogue (AI schuler, 1980:67). Freire teaches us that: 
"Dialogue cannot be reduced to the act of depositing ideas in another, nor can it 
become a simple exchange of ideas to be consumed by discussants. Nor yet, is it a 
hostile polemical argument between people who are committed neither to the naming 
of the world nor to the search for truth, but to the imposition of their own truth ... It 
must not be a situation where some people name on behalf of others ... It must not 
serve as a crafty instrument for the domination of one person by another" (Freire, 
1972:77). 
While the lust for domination breeds anti-dialogue, love, humility, faith, trust, hope and critical 
thinking are initial conditions for authentic dialogue. As Freire puts it, 
"Love is at the same time the foundation of dialogue and dialogue itself ... true 
dialogue cannot exist unless the dialoguers engage in critical thinking.... For a na'ive 
thinker, the important thing is accommodation to this normalised 'today'. For the 
critic, the important thing is the continuing humanisation of people" (Ibid:78 81). 
It is clear, therefore, that dialogue is the primary instrument for resolving the teacher-student 
contradiction within the schools. It now remains the duty of educators and learners to acquire the 
skills necessary for dialogue to triumph. Freire's concern with 'intercommunication' and 'loving 
dialogue' is a mirror image of Habermas's position that intersubjectivity could be attained only 
through an undistorted communicative action. Both Freire and Habermas are weary of 
'impositions of truth' and an ideological and distorted communication whose aim is the 
suppression of alternative views. For Freire in particular this state of affairs could be corrected 











ideology critique-a concept which, together with Habermas's notion of communicative action, is 
central to the theoretical framework adopted for this thesis. 
2.4 IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE 
Ideology critique, according to Giroux (1981:104), has to do with critical involvement in 
knowledge production processes which entails a dialogical engagement with those 
interpretations of social reality which masquerade as orthodoxy. The implication here is that we 
engage in ideology critique only when we ruthlessly reveal the constraining nature of speech acts 
that are distorted. Hence, ideology critique can be a foundation for social praxis geared towards 
action and reflection for liberation. It is for this reason that Aronowitz and Giroux (1986:42) 
have urged intellectuals to engage in critical thinking that will advance the struggle against 
ideological impositions such that 'politics becomes pedagogical'. What this means within the 
educational arena is that educators and learners as equal partners have as their principal 
pedagogical and political task the creation of 'conditions for emancipatory forms of self and 
social empowerment' (Ibid:43) 
In other words, teachers and students join each other in a dialogical, problem-posing learning 
process devoid of any ideological impositions and prior prescriptions. In the process, they are 
expected to fight 'for ideological and material conditions within the schools that will allow them 
to function as intellectuals' (Ibid.). It is the function of ideology critique that there be no 'holy 
cows'. According to Gergen (1994:xiv), ideology critique has as a function the unmasking of the 
scientist as a moral subject advancing particular ethical and political standpoints which condition 
readers to follow prescribed lines of enquiry. Hence, despite claims of neutrality, social 
scientists, their accounts and terminology have prescriptive implications and evaluative 
connotations. In the final analysis, the reader is directed towards particular lines of research as 
well as being prohibited from following those accounts which are suppressed (Ibid.). It is on this 
basis that Habermas ceaselessly pointed out that the road to ideal speech situation could be 
charted by those brave enough to expose the dangers of distorted communication in processes of 
social interaction (Habermas, 1972:58). 
Similarly, Carr and Kemmis are of the idea that ideology critique, an aspect of what they refer to 
as action research, has an ability to make a clear distinction between ideologically distorted and 
undistorted speech acts (Carr and Kemmis, 1986:193). The unmasking of distorted 











providing explanations which furthers the goal of emancipation. It is this concern of Carr and 
Kemmis and Habermas with the linking of communicative action to liberatory practice which 
constructs a bridge between their notion of ideology critique and Freire's twin concepts of 
conscientisation and dialogue for freedom. I believe the notion of ideology critique is equivalent 
to Freire's conception of critical reflection and action whose foundational plank is 
conscientisation. As already indicated, conscientisation is the process through which people are 
made conscious of their capacity to critically engage their reality in order to change it. Similarly, 
an authentic process of ideology critique makes people aware of their ability to be critically 
involved in the creation and recreation of the knowledge and reality of their society. 
2.5 IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF POLITICAL ACTION IN 
EDUCATION 
This section seeks to utilize the insights of Jurgen Habermas on communicative action and 
British social scientists Anthony Giddens and John Thompson on ideology critique in order to 
strengthen Freire's position on the possibility of authentic educational praxis and transformation. 
To do so, we will begin with the identification in Freire's pedagogy of instances which point 
toward a dialectical theory and a critique of ideology before concretising these through 
Habermas' notion of dialogue and the Giddens Thompson notion of ideology critique. 
In Cultural Action for Freedom (1970), Freire worked out justifications for his pedagogy of 
knowing and action and reflection necessary for liberatory and/or authentic education praxis. It 
is within this text that most of the philosophical foundations for his humanist project are to be 
found. Freire believes an act of knowing entails not only a theory of knowing but also a method 
which corresponds to the theory. In terms of this method, social reality can never be just simply 
the objective facts, but is also how homo sapiens perceive this datum. In this way, Freire avoids 
both subjectivism and objectivism on the way towards critical analysis and authentic dialogical 
action (Freire 1970: 13-4). Differently put, for him, 'failing to understand this dialectic, we will 
not understand the dialectic of change and permanence as the expression of the social structure' 
(Ibid:33). 
Humanization for Freire is a utopia whose achievement is human beings' vocation. The utopic 
nature of dialogical action for freedom must be based on communion with the people (Ibid:43). 
Authentic communion entails equal dialogue between active subjects in the process of creating 











can be a viable human project. Reflection and action, the main elements of conscientisation, 
yield perceptive clarity or the condition of ' the maximum potential consciousness', thus 
transcending 'real consciousness' (Ibid:46). In this sense, conscientisation entails critical 
insertion of human beings into a demythologized reality. For conscientisation to occur, there 
should be a radical denunciation of dehumanizing structures and the unveiling of a new reality 
which presupposes cultural action for freedom. Cultural action for freedom is mainly 
distinguished by its conscientizing power and dialogical action. For this reason, it is an 
antithesis of the antidialogical cultural action for domination which operates in order to 
domesticate human beings into passive objects. Cultural action for freedom is part of the 
problem posing pedagogy whereas cultural action for domination merely sloganises (Ibid:46). 
Freire links the necessity of cultural action for freedom to the issue of ideology critique in the 
following way: 
"Since cultural action for freedom is committed to the scientific unveiling of reality, 
to the exposure, that is of myths and ideologies, it must separate ideology from 
science. Althusser insists on the necessity of this separation. Cultural action for 
freedom can be satisfied neither with 'the mystifications of ideology', as he calls 
them, nor with 'a simple normal denunciation of myths and errors', but must 
undertake a 'rational and rigorous critique [of ideology].' The fundamental role of 
those committed to cultural action for conscientisation is not properly speaking to 
fabricate the liberating idea, but to invite the people to grasp with their minds the 
truth of their reality" (lbid:47). 
In the same vein, through the critique of ideology, Habermas has reconstructed the foundations 
of the universal conditions of knowledge and action (Cooke, 1994: 1). For Habermas, the 
possibility of social action and order is based on his theory of communicative action. 
Communicati ve action in this sense is a primary mode of action coordination, that is, the 
principal mechanism of social integration which account for intersubjectivity within the life-
world. Habermas believes in a situation where there exist two mutually exclusive mechanisms 
for coordinating social action, namely, consensus and influence, it is impossible for an agent to 
genuinely strive for consensus simultaneously with intentions to influence other participants. In 
contrast, authentic communicative action for consensus entails an orientation towards 
understanding. Thus, in the absence of a systematically distorted communication, an ideal 
speech situation logically resulting in intersubjectivity and consensus can be undertaken (Ibid:8-
27). Tony Smith succinctly summarised Habermas's position on dialogue as follows: 
"In a discourse without coercion the participants would agree only to proposals and 
evaluations in their interest. Any consensus reached would be an expression of 











upon an arbitrary decision but rather built into the structure of all communication, 
and if a 'principle' of universalizability is built into the communication which 
anticipates an ideal speech situation (since in an uncoerced speech situation 
participants would agree only to what is in their interest, so that any consensus 
reached would be an expression of generalizable interest), then it follows that the 
acceptance of a principle of universalizability is no more arbitrary and based on mere 
decision than is the fact of human communication" (Smith 1991: 178). 
Like Freire, Habermas believes critical theory cannot be value -free or 'neutral'. For this reason, 
Habermas explicitly spelled out his deliberate effort to secure the normative foundations of 
critical theory as part of a broader programme for the rejuvination of the critical theoretical 
enterprise. In other words, Habermas openly admits that securing the moral basis for critical 
theory entails embracing particular values. However, it should be noted that this does not imply 
holding any arbitrary values but only those values which are symbiotically linked to the 
advancement of dialogical and ideal speech acts. For Habermas, communicative action is central 
to social science. Habermas maintains that this theoretical-cum-moral insight is paramount in 
deciphering and negating systems of distorted communication and domination (1982:221;232). 
For an unconstrained communication to occur, he argues, participants must question the 
authenticity, morality and the appropriateness or accuracy of speech acts (Habermas, 1987). For 
him, subjects as agents are orientated towards an uncoercive interaction and communication free 
from domination. They work towards agreement on issues of truth and rightness. We therefore, 
Habermas insists, must strive for reaching consensus even if this goal might seem illusive 
(Habermas, 1972:58». 
Freire's project could also be improved/modified in order to render it more effective through the 
use of the British social scientist Anthony Giddens' conception of the dialectical relationship 
between structure and agency and ideology critique. For Giddens, in the notion of agency 
resides the capacity for individuals to reconstruct their society. Giddens deploys the term praxis 
to emphasize the transformative qualities of human action. This is due to the fact that homo 
sapiens are knowledgeable social actors who produce and maintain social structures which are 
both constraining and enabling. Thus social agents in some sense know the social structures that 
they have created (Craib, 1992:34,44.166; Bryant and Jary(eds.), 1991). Giddens' definition of 
structure clearly reflects his conscious attempt to avoid both objectivism and voluntarism as 
could be demonstrated in the following statement: 
"Structures must not be conceptualized as simply placing constraints upon human 
agency, but as enabling. This is what I call the duality of structure. Structures can 
always in principle be examined in terms of their structuration as a series of 











to explain how it comes about that structures are constituted through action, and 
reciprocally how action is constituted structurally" (Giddens, 1976:161) 
The centerpiece here is the concept of duality of structure which implies that structures are both 
produced by human action and are the medium of human action or that they are both 
constraining and enabling. The reciprocal relationship of structure and agency is dependent 
upon this duality (Giddens, 1976:121-2; Craib, 1992:34). 
While Giddens dismisses Hegel's 'absolute' subject, he also does not subscribe to the notion of 
history without 'knowledgeable human subjects.' He maintains that history is explained on the 
basis of situated activity of knowledgeable agents. It is for this reason that Giddens has rejected 
the relativist and nihilist position taken by Foucault on human agency and the possibility of 
political action. Foucault dismissed the idea that human beings are knowledgeable social agents 
and the possibility of authentic trans formative action because, for him, social practices are 
inextricably bounded to power (and are unable to escape power effects). In turn, Giddens 
believes in the existence of systematic knowledge which has to be subjected to critical appraisal. 
In addition, he argues that because all systems of power have ideological aspects they can be 
studied from the point of view of ideology critique. This is in contrast with Foucault's view that 
the concept of ideology is useless and the distinction between science and ideology erroneous. 
Despite this Foucauldian objection, Giddens maintains that the critique of ideology is likely to 
compromise the knowledge and truth claims of at least some subjects benefiting from specific set 
of power relations (Boyne, 1991:52-73; Held and Thompson(eds), 1989:5; 288-93). 
Social science, for Giddens, is inextricably involved in ideological critique. Giddens' view of 
social theory as critique entails that ideology not be treated as false knowledge in contrast to 
scientific knowledge since ideology critique refers to the analysis of how modes of signification 
or discourse are co-opted within exploitative systems of domination. For this reason, a critique 
of ideology is not only necessary but part and parcel of social scientific practices. Social science 
critique, consequently, is bound to yield new forms of counterfactual thinking and practical 
programs of social intervention which could provide stimulus to social transformation (Held and 
Thompson(eds), 1989:5; 288-93; 300-1). 
Giddens' arguments create serious problems for Foucault. According to Colin Gordon 
(1980:118; 131-3), Foucault says the political problem of social scientists is not to criticize 
ideological contents which are said to be conjoined to science or to take a correct ideological 











truth. In his view, error, illusion, alienated consciousness or ideology do not constitute the 
political question. On the contrary, Foucault believes delinking the power of truth from forms of 
hegemony is our pressing political problem. Giddens' elaboration of the nature of the social 
science critique, which includes a detailed discussion on intellectual, practical and moral 
critiques, is one way out of the Foucauldian nihilism but space does not allow further treatment 
of this issue. 
In the same vein, Giddens' colleague, John Thompson, has worked out more detailed theoretical 
and factual arguments in favour of a reformulated concept of the social science critique of 
ideology. To start with, Thompson distinguishes between two traditional conceptions of 
ideology, namely the neutral conception of ideology and the critical conception of ideology. 
Neutral conceptions of ideology treat ideology as one aspect of social life amongst others. This 
implies that ideology as a phenomena is not necessarily misleading, illusory or aligned with the 
interests of any particular group. Ideology is available for use to everyone, the dominant and 
subordinated groups. The former group can utilise it to defend the status quo whilst the latter 
could employ it for revolutionary transfromation. The critical conception of ideology, on the 
other hand, conveys a negative, critical sense. In his reformulation of a new critical conception 
of ideology, Thompson draws on particular aspects of these two traditions. Thompson's analysis 
of ideology concerns ways in which symbolic forms intersect with relations of power and ways 
in which meanings are mobilized to bolster people in power positions. Thus, for him, the study 
of ideology is an investigation into how meanings serve to establish and sustain relations of 
domination (Thompson, 1990:53-56). 
In formulating his new critical conception of ideology, Thompson draws on Marx's latent 
conception of ideology. However, he does not embrace this conception as a whole but only one 
criterion of negativity as a defining feature of ideology. This criterion deals with the 
establishment and sustenance of relations of domination by ideology. The criterion of falsity in 
ideology (the Marxist view that ideology distorts reality) is rejected by Thompson as is Marx's 
belief that relations of domination are class relations. The distinctive aspect of Thompson's 
reformulated critique of ideology, however, relates to his use of general modes of operation to 
reflect on the ways in which meanings serve to establish and sustain relations of domination. 
These general modes of operation are linked, in particular circumstances, with strategies of 
symbolic construction. These modes are legitimation, dissimulation, unification, fragmentation, 
and reification (Ibid:56-60). Legitimation has to do with the establishment and sustenance of 











charisma of an individual or his/her exceptional character is used to justify hislher right to 
exercise authority in a nation state. A typical legitimation strategy is rationalisation. This 
strategy relates to a chain of reasoning which seeks to justify a set of social relations by 
presenting them to people as worthy of support. Two other strategies within the mode of 
legitimation are universalisation and narrativisation. The former serves to represent institutional 
arrangements which promote interests of some individuals as advancing the interests of all whilst 
the latter relates to the use of stories to justify the exercise of power by those who possess it and 
to mobilise others' consent to this state of affairs (Ibid:61-2). 
In dissimulation, relations of domination are formed and maintained by being concealed, denied 
or obscured, or by being represented in a way which deflects attention from existing processes. 
Displacement, a typical dissimulation strategy refers to situations where a term customarily used 
to refer to one individual is used to refer to another and thereby the positive or negative 
connotations of the term are transferred to the other individual. For instance, when a term, 
authoritarianism, customarily used to criticise the traditional education model is used to refer to 
another pedagogical method, say, the critical model. The strategy here is about the transference 
of the positive and negative connotations of authoritarianism from fundamental pedagogics, an 
example of the traditional education model in SA, to the Freirian model, even if the latter is 
known for its adherence to dialogical and democratic practice. Euphemization is another 
dissimulation strategy. This strategy relates to the description or redescription of actions or 
social relations in terms which elicit a positive valuation. The last strategy of dissimulation, 
trope, concerns the figurative use of symbolic forms to dissimulate relations of domination 
(Ibid: 62-4 ). 
Unification is the third mode of operation of ideology. This involves the establishment and 
sustenance of relations of domination through the notion of unity thus giving collective identity 
to divergent groups. Through standardisation symbolic forms are adapted to a standard 
framework presented as the basis for symbolic exchange. Symbolization of unity, on the other 
hand, involves the production of symbols of unity, such as, a flag and a national anthem, which 
are diffused throughout a society (Ibid:64-5). 
Fragmentation and reification are the other modes of operation of ideology. Through strategies 
such as differentiation and the expurgation of the other, fragmentation establishes and maintains 
relations of domination by creating divisions amongst individuals and groups capable of 











gender differences rather than those aspects which are common amongst the people. Emphasis 
on differences rather than commonalities is used for the promotion of divisions rather than unity 
amongst individuals and groups against a totalitarian system such as that which existed in former 
Eastern European communist countries. Naturalisation, externalisation, normalisation and 
passivization are strategies of reification which operate to ensure that a transitory, historical state 
of affairs is represented as if it was permanent, natural and unavoidable (lbid:65-6). 
It is inter alia the latter mode of operation of ideology, namely, reification which led Thompson 
to seek a reformulated critical notion of ideology which would avoid viewing ideology as a kind 
of 'social cement' binding members of society together. Thompson's reformulated critical 
concept aims at redirecting the notion of ideology towards the investigation of complex ways in 
which meaning has been used to form and defend relations of domination. In this view, 
symbolic forms are not perse ideological. Their ideological nature is the outcome of how they 
are utilised in specific contexts. The study of ideology, therefore, is mainly concerned with the 
social uses of symbolic forms. A symbolic form which is ideological in one situation can be 
subversive and contestatory in another context. However, it is to be noted that while the study of 
ideology will encompass the investigation of contestatory symbolic forms, contestatory symbolic 
forms are not ideological because symbolic forms are ideological on the basis of their serving to 
establish and maintain asymmetrical relations of power. Ideological forms can be challenged, 
contested and disrupted by contestatory symbolic forms or what might be referred to as incipient 
forms of the critique of ideology (Ibid:6-8;66-8). In Thompson's own words, 
"The very existence of ideology may call forth its obverse: rather than passively 
accepting ideological forms and the relations of domination which they serve to 
sustain, individuals may attack or denounce these forms and relations, may parody or 
satirize them, may seek to defuse whatever force ideological expressions may have in 
particular circumstances. In so doing these individuals are engaging, not in the 
promulgation of a new ideology (although, in other respects, they may be doing this 
as well), but rather in an incipient version of a form of critique which may be carried 
out in a more systematic way within the framework of a comprehensive interpretive 
methodology" (Ibid:68). 
It is for this reason that Thompson sees the analysis of ideology as possessing a critical potential. 
Through critical reflection, relations of domination can be unmasked. The interpretation of 
ideology, therefore, is symbiotically related to the critique of domination, to a critical reflection 
on relations of power and domination. Its proper utilization can lay bare the facts about 
asymmetrical social relations and those who derive benefit most as well as the least beneficiaries 











" ... to emphasize the enduring significance of domination in the modem world, they 
were right to stress that individuals are self-reflective agents who can deepen this 
understanding of themselves and others and who can, on the basis of this 
understanding, act to change the conditions of their lives; and they were right to 
regard the critical analysis of ideology as one phase in the dynamic relation between 
domination and action, between the establishment and reproduction of forms of 
domination, on the one hand, and the process of critical self-reflection which may 
enable individuals to challenge these forms, on the other. ... Some recent theorists 
have become so preoccupied with diversity and difference ... that they fail to take full 
account of the fact that ... diversity and difference are commonly embedded in social 
relations which are structured in systematically asymmetrical ways. We must not 
be so blinded by the spectacle of diversity that we are unable to see the structured 
inequalities of social life" (Ibid:330-1). 
To conclude, Freire's thesis can be reinforced through Habermas' concept of dialogue, and the 
modifications derived from Giddens structuration theory and ideology critique (a concept more 
elaborated in Thompson's work). Habermas, Giddens and Thompson have explicitly distanced 
themselves from the nihilism of Foucault and other post-modem theorists. The direct challenge 
to Foucault's relativist and nihilist views more than anything strengthens Freire's view that 
conscious subjects could transform their social reality through reflection and action (as opposed 
to the notion of history without 'knowledgeable subjects' in Foucault's theory). Thompson not 
only makes elements of ideology critique more explicit but also openly endorses several aspects 
of critical theory such as the critique of domination and the notion of self-reflective agents who 
could transform their social reality. In addition, he has questioned the political agenda of 
pluralists whose preoccupation with diversity and difference has diverted attention away from 
asymmetrical relations of power and the need to challenge and transform this situation. This 
position clearly creates serious problems for Foucault's project. In contrast, Giddens and 
Thompson's insights give more leverage to Freire's position that authentic trans formative praxis 
is feasible within education. 
2.6 KNOWLEDGE 
This section deals with the contrasting positions of Freire's pedagogy of knowing and Foucault' s 
conception of knowledge which cannot escape power. While Freire recognises that education 
could be turned into an act of domestication and domination in the banking approach, an 
authentic act of knowing is both dialogical and liberatory. In addition, for true dialogue and 
learning to take place, Freire maintains that the starting point should be the interrogation of the 
cultural experience of the leamer-subject. The latter point, that of rescuing the cultural 











marginalized knowledge. Foucault believes that since generalised knowledge through truth 
discourses has excluded the Other/Unthought (marginalized knowledge), our present genealogy 
of knowledge is incomplete. Nevertheless, for him, the retrieval of marginalized knowledge 
through multiple discourses while necessary as a critique of totalizinglglobalising discourses 
cannot serve the purposes of liberation because knowledge is always political or linked to power. 
The position adopted in this section is that dialogical education is an act of knowing 
symbiotically intertwined with cultural action for freedom. This implies that the pedagogy of 
knowing makes authentic pedagogical praxis possible within education. 
To start with, we will examine Freire's pedagogy of knowing before contrasting it with 
Foucault's conception of knowledge. In one of Freire's celebrated works, Cultural Action for 
Freedom, he wrote: 
" ... education is cultural action for freedom and therefore an act of knowing can 
never be accounted for in its complex totality by a mechanistic theory, for such a 
theory does not perceive education in general ... as an act of knowing. Instead it 
reduces the practice of education to a complex of techniques, naively considered to 
be neutral, by means of which the educational process is standardised in a sterile and 
bureaucratic operation" (Freire, 1970: 1) 
Freire makes a clear demarcation between knowing and memorisation and proposes an education 
praxis informed by authentic dialogue. Such a discussion should be based on the interrogation of 
students' existential experience. The ability to critically evaluate this cultural experience and to 
transform our world is only possible through the act of knowing (Ibid:5). Freire further argues 
that: 
" To be an act of knowing the adult literacy process demands among teachers and 
students a relationship of authentic dialogue. True dialogue unites subjects together 
in the cognition of a knowable object which mediates between them. If learning to 
read and write is to constitute an act of knowing, the learners must assume from the 
beginning the role of creative subjects. It is not a matter of memorising ... learning 
to read and write ought to be an opportunity for men (sic) to know what speaking the 
word really means: a human act. .. Speaking the word is not a true act if it is not at 
the same time associated with the right of self-expression, of creating and recreating, 
of deciding and choosing and ultimately participating in society's historical process" 
(Ibid: 12). 
In A Pedagogy for Liberation, Freire maintains that the dialectical relation between the two 
moments of the gnosiological cycle, production and perceiving knowledge, must be left intact. 
Their separation reduces the act of knowing into a mere transference of existing knowledge. As 











action, critical reflection, curiousity, demanding inquiry, uneasiness and uncertainty. Teaching 
has a lot to do with the production of knowledge. Teaching is an act of reknowing and 
researching. Thus critical education integrates the students and the teacher into a mutual creation 
and recreation of knowledge (Freire and Shor, 1978:8). 
Banking education, in contrast, creates a contradiction between students and the teacher. On the 
one hand, the teacher teaches, knows, thinks, talks, disciplines, chooses and acts as the subject of 
the learning process. On the other hand, the students listen meekly, memorise, comply and adapt 
to this domesticating process as mere objects (Freire, 1972:46-7). In this sense the banking 
approach presents knowledge as objective facts and legitimate experience beyond repproach. 
This pregiven body of knowledge is transferred to students in a static (lifeless) form. By so 
doing banking education inhibits creativity, questioning and critical thinking in students and 
mystifies as well as legitimizes given belief and value systems. The result is psychological 
oppression, ideological manipulation and indoctrination as these norms and values are 
reproduced through memorisation by students without any critical reflection. Thus banking 
education is not only a reactionary and/or conservative political act, but also a mechanistic view 
of the world which serves the purposes of domination and subordination. 
As opposed to the dehuminising learning approach of banking education, the pedagogy of 
knowing disavows a top-to-bottom learning structure between the educator and the educatee 
whilst encouraging learning with conversation. This enables learners to reflect on both their 
history and cultural experience resulting in the production of new and transformed knowledge 
(Aronowitz and Giroux, 1986:12). 
The learning process cannot be reduced to memorisation of lifeless objects not linked to man's 
existential experience. On the contrary, it should be viewed as a serious attempt to construct and 
reconstruct one's world - a trans formative act (Bee, 1980;42). Freire believes that scientific 
knowledge can only be discovered and developed through a problem posing methodology. It 
is through this approach that the oppressed become conscious of their situation in the world 
(Matthews, 1980:89-90; Mackie, 1980: 102). Knowledge is obtained through a restless 
questioning attitude exercised by active subjects. It emerges out of ceaseless reflection upon past 
actions, that is, it is intimately linked with social praxis (Matthews, 1980:83). 
The pedagogy of knowing is unquiet - it is more investigative and doubtful of what might be 











1987:XVI). Here learning and teaching take a conversational form where teachers and students 
become aware of themselves as knowers. Consciousness of oneself as a learner is a form of 
empowerment. It is upon this sceptical and interrogative attitude, which Freire termed 
'conscientisation', that dialogic action depends (Ibid:XVII-XVIII). Although political action 
cannot be replaced by education, the role of education in the development of critical 
consciousness-the basis for transforming one's situation-is of vital importance for social praxis 
(Freire, 1972:60) 
By its conscientising nature, the pedagogy of knowing is therefore political. In Paulo Freire's 
world a neutral education process is anathema. Education either functions to bring about 
conformity to the logic of the status quo or it serves liberatory purposes. If it takes the latter 
form, human beings are put in a position to creatively and critically participate in the 
transformation of their social environment (Giroux, 1988:28). It is on this basis that Freire puts 
much emphasis on the political nature of education. Freire has consistently maintained that the 
claim of neutrality by traditional educators is an attempt to camouflage a political stance. 
Narrative education, he contends, is meant for domestication purposes because neutrality does 
not exist in human praxis. The only true alternative to domesticating education is liberatory 
pedagogy which can only be achieved when narrative forms of education are eliminated. 
Banking education treats the learner as mute and dependent. It transforms her into a passive 
object. By defining the nature and form education should take, the power elite imposes both its 
will and the culture of silence on the masses. Banking education is thus an instrument for 
maintaining domination (Connolly, 1980:70). Listen to Freire's warning: 'Because education is 
politicity, it is never neutral. When we try to be neutral, like Pilate, we support the dominant 
ideology. Not being neutral, education must be either liberating or domesticating' (1985: 17-18). 
The duty of the teacher, therefore, is to validate the cultural experience of the educatee. 
Empowering and validation of students' cultural experiences demands that the educator 
interrogates with them their already acquired voice in order to develop it further (Aronowitz and 
Giroux, 1986:66). A serious examination of cultural forms of the educatees, while empowering 
them, would also recover their strengths and weaknesses which could be helpful in determining 
what students need to learn outside their experiences (Ibid: 156). 
Cultural politics as a pedagogical category functions to expose the strengths and limitations of 
the experiences learners bring with them to school. In this sense the pedagogical moment is 












Freire's view that the denunciation of cultural action for domination in education and the 
annunciation of a new reality leads to liberation find difficulties when measured against 
Foucault's view that power is correlated to any knowledge. For Foucault the link between 
knowledge and power implies that liberation from systems of power is a pipedream. In addition, 
humanism's claim to a transcendental ideal is a form of mask disguising the operation of power 
relations in knowledge. In fact this ideal's treatment of scientific knowledge as pure promotes 
totalizing views which exclude other knowledges. 
Foucault treats well-established knowledges as 'established regimes of thought'. For this reason 
he advocates for local criticism or what he called 'a return of knowledge'. Through local 
criticism subjugated know ledges could be recovered. Subjugated knowledges, for him, refer to 
historical contents hidden and camouflaged in the course of functionalist formal systemisation of 
knowledge; to disqualified and insufficiently elaborated naive knowledge. Buried knowledges 
and disqualified knowledges have been excluded from the hierarchy of know ledges and sciences 
through force. They constitute popular knowledge and are concerned with what Foucault termed 
a historical knowledge of struggles. They are marginalised knowledge whose re-emergence is 
necessary if the tyranny of globalizing discourses has not only to be challenged but also totally 
eliminated. Through genealogy Foucault want us to combine erudite (learned) knowledge and 
local memories in order to construct a historical knowledge of struggles which will be utilised 
tactically to disrupt the hegemony of hierarchical and privileged 'scientific' knowledge. 
Genealogy's function is to promote local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledge in 
opposition to claims of a unitary body of theory which serves as a criterion of demarcation 
between true and false knowledge; science and non-science. In this sense, genealogies are anti-
sciences. Their main preoccupation is to struggle against the effects of power in those discourses 
considered scientific (Foucault, 1980: 80-87). In sum, Foucault says: 
" in contrast to the various projects which aim to inscribe know ledges in the 
hierarchical order of power associated with science, a genealogy should be seen as a 
kind of attempt to emancipate historical knowledges from that subjection, to render 
them, that is, capable of opposition and of struggle against the coercion of a 
theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific discourse. It is based on a reactivation of 
local knowledges of minor knowledges as Deleuze might call them - in opposition 
to the hierarchisation of knowledges and the effects intrinsic to their power ... Our 
task, on the contrary, will be to expose and specify the issue at stake in this 
opposition, this struggle, this insurrection of know ledges against the institutions and 












The above has been a broad framework concerning the different types of knowledges, namely, 
well-established knowledge and subjugated knowledge. However, constituent elements of each 
of these two broad categories of knowledge need to be specified. Within the well-established 
knowledge is found two strands, namely, general knowledge and formal knowledge. General 
knowledge is a totality of knowledges consisting of the variety of political, economic and 
practical (everyday life) know ledges dispersed throughout a specific historical social formation 
and in mutual relationship to each other. It is distinctively specific and correlated to concrete 
strategies of power in society. 
Formal knowledge, on the other hand, is contained in an established discipline, such as, clinical 
medicine which has developed a specific set of rules. Note has to be taken, however, that formal 
knowledge is one of the constituent elements of general knowledge despite warranting special 
treatment (Lemert and Gillan, 1982: 133). General knowledge is material and concrete (rather 
than ideal and abstract) and it is associated with the operation of power in society. Similarly, 
formal knowledge in the form of science is political and embedded in power relations (Ibid: 136). 
There is therefore no pure knowledge as the essential principles of knowledge and truth involve 
strategies of social controL This intersection of knowledge, power and truth strategies was the 
reason for Foucault's conclusion that knowledge is gained only through criticism of knowledge, 
that is, through incessant transgression of established norms of truth (Ibid: 137). 
To reiterate, Foucault says knowledge is plural and science is not pure but political and filled 
with errors (Ibid: 16). The Unthought is an outcome of these errors or exclusions. This 
Unthought, the unconscious, the Other, is what Foucault referred to as subjugated know ledges. 
The unconscious is always the negative pole of science, that which challenges, resists or disturbs 
it. Foucault would like to uncover this unconscious knowledge as a positive element of 
knowledge (Ibid: 18). Nevertheless the correction of error cannot rescue science from 
mechanisms of power (Ibid: 16). Nineteenth century knowledge which operated in the guise of 
humanism is controlled knowledge which subjugated thought to a transcendental ideal (Ibid: 19). 
In the form of humanism knowledge functioned behind its enlightened, reformist exterior to 
control human behaviour as in the control of knowledge and truth by the discipline of clinical 
medicine (Ibid: 19-20). It has also set and enforced limits on thought and social action. 
Humanists have incorporated these limits within their theory of knowledge in order to 
marginalize historical knowledges. Although recognising that these limits like the sociological 
concept of taboo cannot be destroyed, Foucault believes they can be transgressed (Ibid:133-4) 











the Other represents the limits within which knowledge is produced. It represents politically 
suppressed knowledge. This subjugated knowledge can be reclaimed through a critique of 
regimes of knowledge (Ibid: 137). Thus actual knowledge is political in the sense of operating to 
mask the part played by power in the production of knowledge (Ibid: 137-8). 
Foucault believes it is a myth that knowledge is based on reason. Instead knowledge emerges 
out of struggles and jealous conflicts amongst scientists (Major-Poetzl, 1983:37). For this 
reason, scientific knowledge cannot claim to be 'truer' than non-scientific discourses (During, 
1992:97). There exists therefore no standard according to which true knowledge can be 
demarcated from non-science. This Foucauldian position on knowledge has been convincingly 
expressed by Deleuze when he said: 
"There is nothing prior to knowledge ... Knowledge is a practical assemblage, a 
'mechanism' of statements and visibilities. There is therefore nothing behind 
knowledge (although there are things outside knowledge) that is to say that 
knowledge exists only according to certain widely varying 'thresholds' which 
impose particular layers, splits and directions on the stratum in question. In this 
respect, it is not enough to speak of a 'threshold of epistemologization' : the latter is 
already moving in a direction that leads to science, and will still cross a threshold of 
'scientificity' and ultimately a 'threshold of formalisation'. But other thresholds, 
moving off in other directions, also leave their mark on the stratum: thresholds 
involving ethics, aesthetics, politics,etc." (1988:51). 
There is, therefore, no prior foundation to knowledge. The will-to-knowledge (and/or the subject 
of knowledge) is not neutral or devoted exclusively to truth. It operates to the exclusion of 
certain 'truths'. For instance, starting from the classical to the modern time, changes in the 
understanding of truth were derived from a system of exclusion. Foucault says this reality 
cannot be grasped by those who inquire about the truth and falsity of knowledge but on the 
contrary by those who ask 'why one wishes to know'. Truth therefore is arbitrary and 
historically conditioned (Cooper, 1981: 66-8). 
The will-to-knowledge is closely linked to the will-to-power (Ibid:66). Foucault has challenged 
those who have accorded an autonomous status to forms of knowledge. For him, forms of 
knowledge are located within power technologies or origins from practices of power (in Kelly, 
1994:1; Habermas, 1994:81). Knowledge and power are interconnected in a dialectic relationship 
in such a way that no body of knowledge is formed outside systems of power. What we have is 
the fundamental forms of knowledge/power without any of the two poles dominant over the 
other. In a sense, power is one of the conditions of knowledge. There exist no power relation 











establishes the correlative power relations. It is therefore incorrect to believe the renunciation of 
power is a condition for true knowledge. Despite the disguise of this reality through scientific 
techniques and discourses and the moral claims of humanism, knowledge reinforces effects of 
power (Sheridan, 1980:131;138;140). 
Foucault's project to recover subjugated knowledges is an aspect which deserves particular 
attention in this project. However, his charge that the humanist project is an attempt to disguise 
the fact that knowledge reinforces effects of power is unsound. To reiterate, Giddens and 
Thompson have stated that the practice of reflexivity and ideology critique is a means by which 
relations of domination can be challenged by contestatory symbolic forms which are non-
ideological. Utilising the concept of reflexivity, Giddens (1990:38) advanced the idea that social 
practices are continually altered or reformed on the basis of incoming information. Modem 
social life, to Giddens, therefore, can only be properly understood within a theoretical framework 
which takes the concept of reflexivity seriously. As he puts it: 
"The reflexivity of modernity, which is directly involved with the continual 
generating of systematic self-knowledge and knowledge applied in lay actions. 
Knowledge claimed by expert observers (in some part, and in many varying ways) 
rejoins its subject matter, thus (in principle, but also normally in practice) altering it" 
(Ibid:45). 
It is for these reasons that Giddens rejects the view that 'no systematic knowledge of human 
action or trends of social development is possible' (Giddens, 1990:46 - 47). In contrast, Giddens 
has insisted that homo sapiens are knowledgeable and capable agents who are at the same time 
producers and products of history (Giddens, 1982:226). In fact Giddens says if systematic 
knowledge was impossible, nobody would be able to write a book and intellectual activity such 
as postmodernism or 'playful deconstruction' would be a pipedream (Ibid.). Hence the 'absence 
of foundationalism' cannot be used to argue for a position which claims that continually and 
reflexively reviewed systematic knowledge does not exist (Ibid.). In other words, systematic 
knowledge of our situation is not in any way 'precluded by the reflexivity of modernity' 
(Giddens, 1990: 150). Consequently Giddens believes that 'the universal features of truth claims 
force themselves upon us in irresistible ways' (Ibid.). Nevertheless, even this systematic 
knowledge derived from the new global phenomenon is not precluded from the treatment of 
reflexivity. It is on the basis of this formulation of the nature of systematic knowledge that 












According to McLennan, Giddens urges us to reject the postmodernist view that any claim to 
proper knowledge should be dropped in favour of language games, insights and opinions that 
were fragmentary (McLennan, 1992:243). Of course, as McLennan has indicated, like Foucault 
and other poststructuralists, Giddens is suspicious of philosophical attempts to find essential 
foundations of knowledge. Knowledge, for him, cannot be grounded on indubitable foundational 
truth and methods. This is because, Giddens argues, scientific categories are always undergoing 
change and therefore are never stable (Ibid:343 - 344). Hence there will continue to exist 
conflicting viewpoints in the society (Ibid:344). In fact critical reason implies an approach which 
questions any 'pre-given foundation for knowledge and society'. This critique of reason and 
progress is a voice that has always been internal to modern thought. This self-critical (a voice of 
suspicion) element of modern thought is what Giddens calls reflexivity (Ibid.). The existence of 
existential doubt, self-questioning or reflexivity can be seen in the ceaseless discussion 'about 
whether knowledge has any foundations or not' (Ibid.), In addition, Giddens' view that power 
has a transformative capacity and Thompson's acceptance of the humanistic idea that self-
reflective agents are capable of acting to change their condition of existence without doubt make 
political action within education feasible. Nevertheless, since Foucault's position about the 
impossibility of liberation emerges from a particular understanding of the notion of power, it is 
to Freire and Foucault's differing perspectives on power (and the implication these have for the 
practice of education for liberation) that we turn. 
2.7 POWER 
The main objective of this section is to reflect on the differing perspectives of Freire and 
Foucault on the notion of power and the implication these divergent conceptions have for 
authentic educational praxis. This section, therefore, will demonstrate that, for varying reasons, 
both Freire and Foucault see power as linked to knowledge and truth. Nevertheless, while 
Foucault maintains that power and knowledge are conjoined in such a way that we can never 
escape systems of power (implying that truth and liberation are impossible), Freire's position is 
that power as domination (located in what he termed the Theory of Domination) can be 
transcended through the utilisation of the revolutionary (problem-posing) moment of the 
dialogical theory of action. In other words, for Freire, 'power that springs from the weakness of 
the oppressed' (1972:21) makes the search for truth and liberation a viable project. 
To start with, let us examine the two theories of action in Freire's conception of power, namely, 











and freedom. The following statement comprises Freire's conception of the Theory of 
Domination: 
"Any situation in which A objectively exploits B or hinders his (sic) pursuit of self-
affirmation as a responsible person is one of oppression. Such a situation in itself 
constitutes violence, even when sweetened by false generosity, because it interferes 
with man's (sic) ontological and historical vocation to be more fully human". (Freire, 
1972:31). 
Freire says where domination is practised the oppressors are subjects and the oppressed mere 
objects to be domesticated. In addition, a vertical relationship between the dominators and the 
subjugated is established. As Freire puts it, 'We can legitimately say that in the process of 
oppression someone oppresses someone else' (Ibid: 1 03) 
The praxis of the oppressors is an antithesis of freedom. They treat the dominated as objects to 
be given prescriptions for behaviour. In the process of imposing their word on others, the 
dominant group tum the oppressed into their possession. The oppressed are denied the right to 
think and to have a voice. They are compelled to live their life on the basis of deposits and 
prescriptions of their masters intended to exercise a domesticating influence. This denies them 
true praxis: expression, communication, and effective participation in naming and transforming 
the world as subjects. The theory of domination thus implies a situation where 'some men (sic)' 
are 'against others, as oppressing and oppressed classes' (Ibid:l02). The tyranny through which 
domestication and dehumanisation is achieved includes the use of myths. For instance, the 
dominators, 'perpetuate the myth which absolutizes the ignorance of the people' (Ibid: 1 04-5). 
The oppressed are not conscious of the various mechanisms through which oppression is 
established in their societies. Freire has looked at some of these characteristics of domination 
which included conquest, divide-and-rule, manipulation and cultural invasion. 
Conquest is either repressive or paternalistic. It is a relationship which can only happen when 
there are two poles: conqueror and conquered. The former imposes its will over the latter as in 
owning property. In this way men are reduced to the status of objects. This is a form of 
domination where the oppressed are nothing more than 'things'. To preserve this relationship 
certain myths are perpetuated such as the myths of the universal rights to education, equal 
opportunities and meritocracy. The mass media is used to spread these lies to the oppressed who 











Secondly, 'divide-and-rule' is another primary dimension of the theory of domination. Unity 
amongst the oppressed is a threat to the established authority of the oppressors. For this reason, 
the ruling class divides the dominated classes and integrates strategies for the perpetuation of 
these divisions within its policy for as long as it is in power. The oppressive elite does not 
hesitate to use any means including violence against any attempts at forging a united front for 
liberation. In order to maintain its rule, the dominant group would strive for the weakening of 
the oppressed through isolating them, and creating and deepening rifts amongst them by any 
means possible (Ibid: 111). 
The third and fourth mechanisms of oppression are manipulation and cultural invasion. 
Manipulation tactics of the dominant group are directed at conditioning the masses to the 
former's prescriptions. One important myth which is utilised here relates to the view that the 
oppressive order is a 'free society' (Ibid: 111 :-121). Cultural invasion, on the other hand, is an 
anti-dialogical strategy which serves the ends of conquest. Here the invaders destroy the culture 
of their victim by systematically imposing their own systems of thought, values, and norms at the 
same time as curbing the invaded people's creativity and self-expression. In the long run the 
invaded people lose their originality. In the process the invaders assume the position of authors, 
actors, teachers and choosers while the invaded masses are relegated to being objects, followers 
of choices made for them, perpetual children, etc. This type of domination, invasion, while it has 
other forms, is implicit in class domination. For it to succeed, the invaded people are 
indoctrinated of their intrinsic inferiority as antithetical to the superiority of their conquerors. 
This is followed by the adoption of the latter's dress codes, mannerisms, values, etc. Cultural 
invasion is one of the most reliable measures ofthe success for conquest or domination since it is 
both an instrument and a result of domination (Ibid: 121-123). 
In order to resolve the problematique inherent in the theory of antidialogical action, a new 
perspective devoid of relations of domination between subject-conqueror and object-conquered 
dimensions of the former is required. The dialogical theory of action, whose primary 
characteristics are cultural synthesis, co-operation and unity for liberation, is such a perspective. 
According to Freire, 
"In the antidialogical theory of action, cultural invasion serves the ends of 
manipulation, which in turn serves the ends of domination. Cultural synthesis serves 
the ends of organisation, organisation serves the ends of liberation. This work deals 
with a very obvious truth: just as the oppressor, in order to oppress, needs a theory 
of oppressive action, so the oppressed, in order to becomes free, also need a theory of 











The dialogical theory of action is revolutionary (Ibid:99). Unlike in the situation of conquest 
where there exists a subject who oppresses and the dominated object, subjects in the dialogical 
theory create and recreate, construct and reconstruct the world as equals. Freire believes that in 
any situation where the oppressed are dominated and hence cannot operate as subjects, recourse 
to the 'pedagogy of the oppressed' will be helpful: 'the posing of their very oppression as a 
problem (which always involves some form of action) will help them achieve this vocation' 
(Ibid: 135). Revolutionary action, however, is not possible without conscientisation. 
Freire's concept of conscientisation stresses the importance of the oppressed understanding the 
cause of their oppression through critical reflection on their conditions of existence. It is through 
critical reflection that political action by the oppressed can come about. The concept of 
conscientisation can therefore be defined as a process through which people become aware of 
their situation by the adoption of dialogical education strategies, reflect upon their situation and 
act upon it as conscious social actors. Freire argues that: 
"within the word we find two dimensions, reflection and action, in such radical 
interaction that if one is sacrificed, even in part, the other immediately suffers. There 
is no true word that is not at the same time a praxis. Thus to speak a true word is to 
transform the world" (Ibid, 1972:60). 
In contrast, Foucault rules out humanist emancipatory politics arguing that power and truth are 
conjoined and truth therefore cannot be freed from power. Modem power's strategy of self-
legimation involves it being exercised as part and parcel of scientific truth. It camouflages itself 
by being exercised through the production of truth (power as productive) and by giving these 
'truth' the status of advanced objective knowledge about human beings (Simons, 1995:43-4). 
Thus modem power produces 'truth' that cannot be delinked from it. For this reason, Foucault 
maintains, truth linked to power can never serve as a condition for freedom. Power and 
disciplinary apparatuses are everywhere, attached to the regimes of knowledge and truth, and 
inescapable (Tilley, 1990:286-7). 
In addition, Foucault believes power implies resistance but this resistance cannot yield a state of 
affairs free from power. The constraining nature of power at the point of application implies an 
everpresent two-pole relationship of power I resistance (May, 1993: 114). The outcome of this 
situation in no way include a state of liberation envisaged by humanist narratives of 
emancipation. In a nutshell, Foucault maintains that the opposition directed at power-











therefore implies the negation of any possibility for liberation (Tilley, 1990:288). To further 
clarify this issue, a close examination of Foucault's analytics of power is necessary. 
Traditionally power has been defined essentially as 'power-over' implying that power is 
exercised by agent X over Y if the action of X affects Y in such a way that his interests are not 
served (Hoy, 1986:125). Foucault has rejected this view and reformulated the notion of power in 
line with the social forms knowledge takes in the modern society. The rethinking of the notion 
of power has lead him to a conception of power as exercised rather than as possessed and hence 
the dismissal of traditional and 'negative' ways of analysing power. As a result he moved away 
from the conception of power as that which limits, censors or prohibits. In Discipline & Punish 
(1977), Foucault described the process which accounted for the transformation of government 
form which lead to the shift from sovereign to invisible power. The latter form of power is 
situated within elements of sciences which he termed the 'technologies and apparatuses of social 
regulations' . 
What Foucault is saying is that the modern disciplinary power relies on technologies of 
normalisation rather than authoritarianism in order to maintain order. This theory of power is in 
direct conflict with the monarchical conception of power especially in the way in which it 
characterises the subject. Foucault believes that we as subjects internalise systems of 
surveillance to the point that we become our own overseer (the concept of disciplinary power). 
In his own words, 
"Power must be analysed as something which circulates, or rather as something 
which only functions in a form of a chain. It is never localised here or there, never in 
anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is 
employed and exercised through a net-like organisation. And not only do individuals 
circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously 
undergoing and exercising this power. They are not inert or consenting target. They 
are always the elements of its articulation. In other words, individuals are vehicles of 
power, not its point of application "(Foucault, 1986:234). 
The above statement is a clear testimony to Foucault's opposition to power as a commodity, a 
property or a possession. Instead, he sees power as a relation. In fact, Foucault believes the 
representation of subjects in discourses such a science, schooling, and the clinic is responsible 
for the positioning of subjects in relations of control, discipline and moral regulation. Thus 
power is always everywhere, it operates through discourses as woven in networks (Macdonell, 











In this dissection of the modem system of power, Foucault reveals that modem power's strength 
is in its disguise as science. In the nineteenth century knowledge-production was interconnected 
with the search for strategies for social control (Taylor, 1986:69; Walkerdine, 1992:16). These 
techniques of population management have a 'regime of truth' intimately linked to them. 
Although this idea seems to run contrary to the conventional view that truth is liberating, 
Foucault defends it on the basis that each society 'defines its own variant of truth' (Taylor, 
1986:70). Thus Foucault makes the idea of freedom impossible on the basis that each society 
has its regime of truth which cannot be rescued against systems of power. 
To conclude, if we take seriously Foucault's analytics of power, transformative action of the kind 
Freire want practised within the educational sphere is impossible. But this is an ethically 
untenable and nihilistic position which lacks a theory of political action. In contrast, human 
beings as opposed to other animals consciously create and recreate their social environment thus 
transforming it for purposes of satisfying their needs (although this action is both constrained 
and enabled by the structure). From this, it logically follows that Freire's cultural action for 
freedom is a feasible programme. Such a view can be nourished by insights from Anthony 
Giddens who believes power has a transformative capacity. Accordingly, he defined power as, 
"the use of resources, of whatever kind, to secure outcomes. Power then becomes an 
element of action, and refers to the range of interventions of which an agent is 
capable. Power in this broad sense is equivalent to transformative capacity of human 
action: the capacity of human beings to intervene in a series of events so as to alter 
their course. In this sense, power is closely bound up with the notion of Praxis, as 
relating to the historically shaped, and historically mutable, conditions of social and 
material existence" (Giddens, 1977:347-8). 
Giddens maintains that the dialectic of powerlessness and empowerment has to be examined in 
terms of both action and experience (Giddens, 1990: 150). It is on this basis that Giddens rejects 
the Foucauldian conception of power and other theories of power. Giddens's view is that social 
theory in general is marked by a lack of a satisfactory theory of power. He accepts Foucault's 
idea that power is chronically and inevitably involving all social processes. However, he accepts 
this on condition that it be acknowledged that 'power and freedom are inimical; and that power 
cannot be identified with either coercion or constraint' (Giddens. 1982:226). In his own words: 
" ... I think it quite wrong to be thereby seduced by the Nietzschean radicalisation of 
power, which elevates it to the prime position in action and discourse. Power then 
becomes a mysterious phenomenon that hovers everywhere, and underlie everything. 
I consider it very important to reject the idea that power has primacy over truth, or 











reductionism of power is as faulty as economic or normative reductionisms are" 
(Ibid:226 - 227). 
Furthermore, Giddens is of the view that Foucault's theory is disadvantaged by a real lack of a 
theory of the state. This lack is perhaps linked to, in Giddens's position, 'the very ubiquity of 
power as discipline' (Ibid:244). On this issue, Giddens suspects that Foucault has substituted the 
state with the 'calculated technology of subjection' (Ibid.). This links up to Giddens's criticism 
of Foucault's idea of 'history without a subject'. 
Giddens is critical of Foucault's conception of power especially because it produces a 'subject-
less history' which suggests that certain forces determine the happening within society without 
the human beings affected by this process being aware of it. It is for this reason that Giddens 
constructed his theory of structuration. In terms of the theory of structuration humans are 
knowledgeable beings despite their actions being constrained by 'unacknowledged conditions 
and unintended consequences of their acts' (Ibid:221 - 222). Hence Giddens considers erroneous 
Foucault's characterisation of 'power', 'punishment' and 'discipline' as if they were the 'real 
agents of history' (Ibid:222). This is because, he maintains, prisons, hospitals, and clinics where 
consciously designed by the real agents of the state who wanted to control urban miscreants as a 
result of the failure of the previous community strategies to sanction them successfully (Ibid.). 
Hence Giddens believes that Marx's observation that history is made by human beings although 
under circumstances not of their own choice is still as valid today as at the time he made it 
(Ibid.). In addition, Giddens indicated that structures put in place in prison and those in the 
factory were not the same and therefore whilst the concept of disciplinary power can explain the 
conditions in prison, such an analysis cannot be extended to the factory where workers through 
their trade unions resisted any form of unfair labour practice by management. This, for Giddens, 
shows that within the factory the workers were not the 'docile bodies' Foucault talked about. 
Prisoners, it must be noted, Giddens further argued, were denied all the 'bourgeois or liberal 
freedoms', 'free-wage labour' and the rest of the population were formally granted (Ibid:222-
223). Giddens's analysis convinces us that indeed human subjects as agents can transform their 
social reality thus making it possible for liberatory praxis to take place within the education 
sphere. 
2.8 THE SUBJECT 
This section will present the contrasting views of Freire and Foucault on the subject in order to 











emancipatory project. Indeed Foucault's notion of the subject is one which does not allow for 
the possibility of an act of freedom and/or Iiberatory education praxis. Nevertheless, John 
Thompson's argument in favour of critical pedagogy on the basis of which individuals become 
self-reflective agents capable of acting to challenge systems of domination in order to change 
their society (Thompson,1990:330-1), is but one of the reasons for rejecting Foucault's position 
in preference of the problem-posing pedagogy's conception of the subject. 
To start with, Freire is of the view that where domination exists, oppressors are subjects and the 
oppressed are objects. In the process of reducing the oppressed into the status of manageable 
'things', a vertical relationship of domination and subordination is established in favour of the 
oppressors (Freire,1972:103). Cultural action for domination practised by dominant groups is 
against humanization and freedom. This is due to the fact that the oppressed are considered 
objects to be given prescriptions for behaviour. In the process, the dominated are turned into a 
property/possession of their oppressors. They are prohibited from exercising their right to think 
and have a voice. Instead, they are compelled to swallow un-chewed the domesticating rations 
of deposits and prescriptions of their superiors. This denies them authentic praxis of 
communicative dialogue in naming and transforming their social environment as active and 
knowing subjects. For the oppressors, correct thinking presupposes the non-thinking of the 
people. In this conception of thinking, people are merely objects thought of (Ibid:46-7; 1 02). A 
good example of this practice of domination can be found in the situation of conquest. 
Conquest, as already indicated, is either repressive or paternalistic. It is a vertical relationship 
that occurs in a two-pole situation, the conquerors on the one pole and the conquered on the 
other. The former impose their will over the latter as in owning a possession. In this way men 
are reduced to the status of 'things' (Ibid: 1 08-10). To escape the contradiction inherent in a 
situation of conquest and/or domination, new horizontal relationships of equal subjects which 
move beyond the subject-object categories must be established as part of cultural action for 
freedom (Ibid: 135). Freire uses this analogy in dealing with the situation within the educational 
institutions. 
For Freire, Banking education creates necrophilic 'subjects'. Necrophily processes within the 
school produce a two-pole situation. One pole is that of a teacher who is an active narrative 
subject. The other is constituted by the students who are patient listening 'subjects' (read objects 
of the domesticating process). The teacher as an active participant narrates the content of the 











filled. The students on the other hand, as docile listeners, memorize this content without critical 
reflection on it. In this sense, the reality conveyed by the narration becomes static and lifeless as 
it is banked unaltered. The active participation of the teacher as against students' passivity 
implies an existence of vertical relationships in Banking education. Indeed this unequal 
relationship can be clearly reflected in the practice of the teacher as the knower, thinker, 
investigator, and disciplinarian whilst students as knowing nothing are expected to listen meekly 
and to comply with all instructions (or prescriptions) from the former. Freire believes Banking 
education as an act of depositing is a paternalistic practice of domination and domestication. It is 
an instrument of dehumanisation which, through hampering the development of critical 
consciousness, promotes necrophilic oppression and the fear of truth and freedom. Banking 
education is thus a denial of authentic praxis (Freire, 1970:5-25;43; Freire, 1972:40,45-59). 
The opposite process, biophily, produces active subjects who are capable of critical thinking, 
knowing and reflexive action. These are conscious cognitive agents who, with the aid of 
dialogue, are committed to creative intervention in reality. They are committed to thought and 
action which serves the purposes of social transformation. In communion (or solidarity) with 
each other they are capable of engaging in cultural action for freedom in order to liberate one 
another. Problem-posing pedagogy therefore is a condition for, and a means of, liberation 
(Ibid.). 
In sum, Freire maintains that the learning process cannot be reduced to memorisation of lifeless 
objects not linked to man's existential experience. On the contrary, it should be viewed as a 
serious attempt to construct and reconstruct one's world-a transformative act (Bee, 1980:42). 
Forcing students to be passive consumers of knowledge is to deny them their right to think and to 
actively participate in the making of their own history. It is indeed not only a disservice to them 
but also a denigration of their humanity. To be fully human, students must become authors of 
their own history (Worpole, 1977: 198). 
The pedagogy of knowing cannot take place in contexts where the teacher acts as if he has 
monopoly over knowledge thus making students appear powerless, voiceless and inferior 
(Giroux, 1983 :226). Education for liberation requires that the teacher also become a learner 
rather than merely filling students with skills and information without the latter's participation as 
active subjects-beings capable of knowing. The educator should employ a discursive strategy 
which will enable him to enter into dialogue with students about real life experience. Liberatory 











where the teacher and his students are co-investigators. In this context students would become 
subjects of their learning (Bee, 1980:43). 
Foucault, on the other hand, has rejected the idea of a 'knowledgeable subject' in favour of the 
notion of 'power without a subject' (Boyne, 1991:57-59). The idea of 'power without a subject' 
is intertwined with Foucault's dismissal of the conception of power as a 'matter of one person 
(group) exercising sovereign control over another' as in social and economic relations (Taylor, 
1986:84). Contrary to this view, Foucault is more inclined to emphasise the power intrinsic and 
internal to these relations. According to him, in the relation of power between a doctor and a 
patient the former does not impose his arbitrary will on the latter. The two parties' relation with 
each other is regulated by the 'regime of truth' in their society despite the existence of 
domination on the part of the former. It is because of common understanding and activity 
(techniques of regulation) that in this set-up those who are dominated (patients) cooperate in 
their subordination. They are not conscious of the relation of domination because they have 
internalised the norms of the common activity. In this situation 'there is not necessarily a 
continuing identity of dominators and dominated over time' (Ibid: 84). Thus power/knowledge 
and truth are linked to the process of the constitution of subjects. Subjects are formed through a 
dialectic relation amongst power, knowledge and truth strategies (Foucault, 1977:55; Tilley, 
1990:315;318). According to Foucault, 
"Let us not ask, therefore, why certain people want to dominate, what they seek, 
what is their overall strategy. Let us ask, instead, how things work at the level of on-
going subjugation, at the level of those continuous and uninterrupted processes 
which subject our bodies, govern our gestures, dictate our behaviours, etc. In other 
words, rather than ask ourselves how the sovereign appears to us in his lofty 
isolation, we should try to discover how it is that subjects are gradually, 
progressively, really and materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, 
forces, energies. materials, desires, etc. We should try to grasp subjection in its 
material instance as a constitution of subjects. This would be the exact opposition of 
Hobbes' project in the Leviathan, and of that, I believe, of all jurists for whom the 
problem is the distillation of a single will [ ... J from the particular wills of a 
multiplicity of individuals" (Foucault,1980:97). 
In essence, Foucault's view of the subject is a materialist conception of the subject. This 
decentered subject is constituted through the exercise of power in three specific modes of 
objectification, namely, dividing practices, scientific classification, and self-subjectification. 
Dividing practices are techniques of domination or modes of classification, control and 
containment through which a subject is objectified by a process of division within himself or 











becomes the victim of these processes of objectification and constraint as in marginals such as 
prisoners and mental patients. It is the spatial, temporal and social compartmentalisation in 
prison and the clinic which ensures the victim status. These modes of manipulation are justified 
through scientific discourses and are linked to the practice of exclusion. They are not only 
interconnected with the emergence of the social sciences but they combine power and the 
knowledge derived from these sciences to create and exclude dominated groups. The resultant 
subjects are thus constituted as objects of research and techniques of power (Tilley, 1990:318-9; 
Simons, 1995:30-34; Ranibow(ed), 1984:7-12). 
The second mode of the objectification of the subject, scientific classification, arises from modes 
of enquiry which try to give themselves the status of science. In the analysis of wealth and 
economics, scientific classification objectivises the productive subject, that is, the subject which 
labours. The discourses of life, labour and language are thus structured into disciplines. 
Scientific classification are therefore modes of classification through which we have come to 
understanding ourselves scientificial1y as subjects and objects of knowledge. Suffice to say that 
the relation to domination here is more oblique and the body is increasingly treated as a thing. 
Note however that there is an interplay between dividing practices and scientific classification in 
terms of the passive and constrained position of the subject. Collectively these two modes of 
objectification constitute the axis of disciplinary technologies to ensure docility (Tilley, 
1990:318-9; Simons, 1995:30-34; Ranibow (ed), 1984:7-12). 
The third mode of objectification is self-subjectification which is also reffered to as simply 
subjectification or techniques of self. These are modes of objectification that we have used to 
form ourselves into meaning giving selves. Additionally, it points at ways in which human 
beings achieve a sense of themselves. In other words, self-subjectification concerns how 
individuals turns themselves into subjects. This is a process of self-formation in which the 
person is active. Active self-formation takes place through a variety of teChniques and 
operations on people's own bodies, souls, thoughts, and conduct. This is a process of self-
understanding mediated by an external authority figure, be slhe a confessor or psychologist 
(Tilley, 1990:320-1; Simons, 1995:34-36; Ranibow (ed) 1984:7-12). In sum, the three modes of 
objectification in Foucault's analysis create subjects who are not capable of action and reflection 
for liberation. 
In order to support the view that Foucault's position on the subject does not allow for freedom, I 











of overt violence in traditional conceptions of power by disciplinary control. Modern power, for 
Foucault, produces regimented, isolated, and self-policing subjects. Here lies Foucault's 
difference with critical theorists - his differing conception of the human subject. Foucault's 
main target is, and remains, the modern self-reflective subjectivity. He believes the partial 
modern suppression of physical constraints is part of a process whose central feature is self-
restraint which negates any form of freedom for the subject. This self-surveillance is so deeply 
ingrained in us that we no longer see the effect of power as that which constrains us but as 'truth'. 
In putting forward this view, Foucault negates the philosophical link between consciousness, 
self-reflection and freedom. In other words, Foucault's establishment of a direct relation 
between subjectification and subjection in the modern society is the basis for his denial of the 
view that 'there remains any progressive potential in the ideal of the autonomous subject'. For 
him, the humanist 'free subject' is in fact intrinsically heteronomous, constituted by power. 
Nevertheless, Foucault's theory has been marked by a vehement denial of the possibility of the 
normative foundations of a political critique (Dew, 1984:72-95). 
For further clarifications on the issue of the subject, let us distinguish three types of identity from 
each other, namely, the enlightenment subject, the sociological subject, and the post-modem 
subject. The Enlightenment subject is characterised by a view of the homo sapien as a centred, 
unified person capable of reason, consciousness and action. 
The sociological subject, on the other hand, acknowledges the fact that the complexity of modern 
societies limits the autonomy and self-sufficiency of the subject. This is an interactive 
conception of identity and self which takes into cognizance the fact that the subject is formed in 
relation to 'significant others'. The formation of this self in interaction with society (its values 
and norms) makes possible the balance between subjective feelings and objective circumstances 
(structure) within which we live. This process produces selves and social environments which 
are both reciprocally more unified and predictable. 
The last type, the decentered subject, is devoid of any fixed, permanent identity. It assumes 
different identities and it is constantly shifting depending on time and place. The post-modern 
subject is acted upon by many contradictory variables thus making it difficult to adopt any fixed 
or unified identity (Hall, 1992:275-7). Foucault is one of the theorists who view the subject as 
decentered, and for purposes of this discussion, he will be treated as holding the post-modern 











However, this conception of the subject has met with fierce resistence from Anthony Giddens in 
particular. Giddens believes in a 'knowledgeable social actor'. His notion of agency is one 
which gives subjects the capacity to transform their social environment. For Giddens both the 
transcendental/absolute subject of Hegel and the view that one can talk of history without 
'knowledgeable human subjects' as Foucault seems to suggest, must be rejected. History in this 
view can be understood by reference to trans formative human activity of knowledgeable agents. 
This is possible because the structure does not only constrain, but it is also enabling to human 
action (Giddens, 1976:161;Boyne, 1991:52-73). 
The theory of the subject, Giddens maintains, while avoiding objectivism should be careful not 
to end up embracing subjectivism. For this reason, he put forward an idea of the subject that does 
not give primacy to either the subject or the object. On this basis, he argues, a sound explication 
of sUbjectivity is the one which relate discursive consciousness to practical consciousness and to 
the unconscious. Practical consciousness relates to knowing how to go on in society. As in the 
case of knowlegeability, capability which is the possibility of choosing differently, is an inherent 
aspect of routine day-to-day behaviour (Giddens, 1982:8 - 9). The capacity to act otherwise is 
central to the structuration theory of active agents (Ibid:9). Nevertheless, Giddens accepts that 
the acknowledged conditions and the unintended consequences of human action should also be 
brought into the analysis of the human subject. The unconscious features prominently in these 
acknowledged conditions of action. As he sees it: 
"Unconscious sources of cognition and motivation form one 'boundary' to the 
knowlegeability / capability of agents. But the 'bounded' character of knowlegeably 
reproduced practices also necessarily implicates social analysis in a continuing 
concern with the prime focus of functionalist approaches; social reproduction via 
feedback relations of unintended consequences. Here the unintended consequences 
of action are simultaneously unacknowledged conditions of system reproduction ... 
In the theory of structuration, 'social reproduction' is not regarded as an explanatory 
term: it always has itself to be explicated in terms of the bounded and contingently 
applied knowlegeability of social actors" (Giddens, 1982: 10). 
Giddens identifies Foucault as one of the theorists who have advanced the theme of the 
decentring of the subject (Ibid:219). Hence, Giddens (1987:94 - 95) is of the view that 
poststructuralism has been 'unable to generate satisfactory accounts of human agency' because 
the process of writing can only be understood when we are in a position to 'recombine 











In addition, Giddens is critical of the idea in Foucault's analysis that history is not an outcome of 
the action of human subjects, that 'history makes human beings ... through the process of 
historical development' (Ibid:98). Thus the view that human beings are not responsible for 
history and that instead history constructs human beings is the basis of Foucault's idea of a 
decentred subject (Ibid.). While Giddens's accepts Foucault's idea that 'history has no subject', 
he is unable to comprehend the total absence of active subjects in Foucault's poststructuralism. 
As he puts it: 
"That 'history has no subject' can readily be accepted. But Foucault's history tends 
to have no subjects at all. It is history with the agency removed. The individuals who 
appear in Foucault's analyses seem impotent to determine their own destinies. 
Moreover, that reflexive appropriation of history basic to history in modern culture 
does not appear at the level of agents themselves. The historian is a reflexive being 
aware of the influence of the writing of history upon the determination of the present. 
But this quality of self-understanding is seemingly not extended to historical agents 
themselves" (Giddens, 1987:98). 
Furthermore, Giddens insists that without a clear understanding of the nature of human agents it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, to properly develop a theory of cultural production. Granted 
that the poststructuralist demand for a 'theory of the subject' to replace the supposedly 
'subjectivity unmediated by group experience' is an understandable one, note has to be taken that 
this must relate to 'the need for interpretation of the agent, rather than the subject, and of agency 
rather than subjectivity alone, 'subjects' are first and foremost agents' (Ibid:98 - 99). 
Giddens points at two elements which might be utilised when explicating human agency, 
namely, practical consciousness and the contextuality of action. He deploys these concepts to 
deal with the conscious-unconscious distinction in structuralism and poststructuralism. In fact 
Giddens feels that the concept of practical consciousness can resolve the conscious -
unconscious distinction in such a way that it could be possible to talk of human agency. 
According to Giddens: 
" ... Now, we may agree that a concept of the unconscious is necessary to provide a 
comprehensive account of why human agents act as they do. We may also accept that 
the relation between what can and what cannot be put into words is of elementary 
significance in human aCtiVIty. However if, unlike structuralism and 
poststructuralism, we seek to grasp human life within frameworks of practical action, 
we reach a different view from that characteristic of these schools of thought. What 
cannot be put into words, as Wittgenstein proposes, is what has to be done. Human 
action does not unfold as a result of programmed impulses. Rather, human beings 
reflexively monitor what they do as an intrinsic part of what it is that they do. Such 











practical consciousness. It is nonetheless extraordinarily elaborate, and is a chronic 
feature of even the most trivial of human activities" (Ibid.). 
The second element, the contextuality of action, according to Giddens, involves the idea that 
'contexts form 'settings' of action' (Ibid.) which agents draw upon as they interact with each 
other. In fact it is the common awareness of these settings for action which constitutes the basis 
of the 'mutual knowledge' from which meanings of what is said and done are derived (Ibid.). It 
is therefore at the level of reflective consciousness that context-sensitive transformative action 
can be taken. Hence the position adopted by Giddens here can be used to strengthen Freire's 
argument that conscientised subjects through action and reflection could practice cultural action 
for freedom and hence, education for liberation. 
2.9 TRUTH AND FREEDOM 
In this section we will demonstrate that truth and freedom, and hence the practice of education 
for liberation, are attainable goals on the basis of Freire's concept of dialogue. In contrast, in 
Foucault's analysis, 'truth' and 'freedom' are not seen as dialectically opposed to domination. 
Foucault considers the idea of freedom and liberating truth a mere illusion. In this view, there is 
no place to hide from power since power relations are coextensive with human social 
organisation. There is, therefore no possibility for freedom (Taylor, 1986:70). Against 
Foucault's position, it will be argued that without the idea of liberation, the concept of power is 
empty and meaningless. So, power is dialectically linked to liberty, to emancipation, to truth. 
By Foucault's own admission power requires that we 'collaborate in our own subjugation', it 
gets us to consent to its designs 'in the name of truth' (Taylor, 1986:92). If we accept Foucault's 
line of argument, 
"then 'truth' is an essential notion, because the imposition proceeds here by foisting 
an illusion on us; it proceeds by disguises and masks, it proceeds thus by falsehood ... 
Mask, falsehood makes no sense without a corresponding notion of truth. The truth 
here is subversive of power: it is on the side of lifting of impositions, of what we 
have just called liberation. The Foucauldian notion of power not only requires for its 
sense the correlative notions of truth and liberation, but even the standard link 
between them, which makes truth the condition of liberation. To speak of power, 
and to want to deny a place to 'liberation' and 'truth', as well as the link between 
them is to speak incoherently" (Ibid:92-3). 
Freire's argument for the possibility of truth and liberation runs along the same lines. It is a 











knowing which entails genuine communication in search of liberating truth is a negation of 
cultural action for domination. Freire maintains that: 
"Speaking the word is not a true act if it is not at the same time associated with the 
right of self-expression and world-expression, of creating and recreating, of deciding 
and choosing and ultimately participating in society's historical process" (Freire, 
1970:12). 
AND 
"There is no true word that is not at the same time a praxis. Thus, to speak a true 
word is to transform the world" (Freire, 1972:60). 
Freire further argues that no one can say true words alone as true words imply communication 
and communion with others. Hence the centrality of dialogue in action and reflection for 
freedom (lbid:61). In order to resolve the inherent contradiction in the theory of antidialogical 
action, a new perspective devoid of relations of domination between subject-conqueror and 
object-conquered dimensions of the former is required. According to Freire, cooperation is the 
central feature of the alternative theory which he called 'the dialogical theory of action' 
(Ibid: 135). In this concept human beings as subjects cooperate in order to create, name, and 
transform the world (Ibid:135). 
In other words, unlike in the situation of conquest where there exists a subject who oppresses and 
the dominated object, subjects in the dialogical theory are engaged in the process of critical 
thinking within a situation which promotes horizontal relationships. Together with love, 
humility, faith, trust and hope, critical thinking is a foundation for authentic dialogue. In Freire's 
view critical thinking can only be achieved through a problem-posing pedagogy. In this way 
knowledge can become a conscientising instrument and a positive condition for freedom. 
Problem-posing pedagogy is anti-ideological and anti-domestication and it is grounded on 
dialogue. It is cultural action for freedom which implies that truth and liberation can be attained 
within education and other social spheres. 
In contrast to Freire's view that truth and liberation are attainable goals, Foucault believes the 
ideal of freedom is impossible because each society has its own regime of truth which cannot be 
rescued against systems of power. The following constitute the core of what Foucault has to say 











"Contrary to myth whose history and functions would repay further study, truth isn't 
the reward of free spirits ... not the privilege of those who have succeeded in 
liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world; it is produced only by virtue of 
multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society 
has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth; that is, the types of discourse 
which it accept and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which 
enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is 
sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; 
the status of those who are charged as saying what counts as true" (Foucault, 
1980:131). 
The essence here is that there exist no single standard for distinguishing between what is true and 
false. In the course of showing that truth is political, Foucault presents five closely related 
elements of the 'political economy of truth' to show how truth operates in various societal 
institutions. First, truth is an integral part of scientific discourses and those institutions that 
produce science such as research institutes, medical or otherwise. Second, truth functions to 
legitimize and promote specific forms of economic and political systems over others. In this 
sense, it does not only control political and economic production but also conditions and 
constrains the types of instigation permitted in the economic and political spheres. Third, truth 
circulates in educational and informational apparatuses as an object of distribution and 
consumption and hence it contains a domesticating influence. Fourth, the universities, the army, 
writing and the media must be conceived as political and economic machines primarily 
constituted for the production and transmission of truth in society. Lastly, truth strategies are 
embedded in political debate and social conflicts ('ideological' struggles) (Cooper, 1981:134-5; 
Foucault, 1980:131-2). 
The existence of the 'regime of truth' and the idea of the 'politics of truth' lead Foucault to the 
conclusion that the notion of ideology is useless and that it should be rejected as an analytic tool. 
The concept of ideology has always been viewed as a negation of what is considered as truth. 
Foucault, however, believes that the comparison of ideology and science or truth is unwarranted 
because truth is created and distributed within discourses which are themselves neither true nor 
false. Preoccupation with the notion of ideology only serves to divert attention away from the 
politics of truth. In Foucault's view, truth is always contested as there exists no pre-given 
criteria for demarcating between truth and falsity. The struggle for the status of truth is a logical 
consequence of the fact that truth is always attached to specific effects of power (power induces 
resistance). Hence the primary research problem for intellectuals concerns the correlation of 
truth and power rather than the distinction between science and ideology. Suffice to say that 
truth is a system of ordered procedures for the creation and circulation of statements associated 











sustain, induce and extend truth practices in the first place. These regimes of truth are not to be 
simply viewed as ideological or superstructural as they are apriori conditions for the operation of 
concrete practices, such as capitalism. The task of the intellectuals, in Foucault's view, 
therefore, is not to produce critiques of ideology but, on the contrary, to detennine the feasibility 
of establishing an alternative politics of truth. Transfonning the consciousness of the people 
does not help if the politico-economic and institutional regime of the production of truth remains 
intact. What needs to be done, argues Foucault, is to remove the power of truth from the fonns 
of social practices within which it operates. The problem for him therefore is truth itself rather 
than alienated consciousness or ideology (Foucault, 1980:118; 131-3). 
Put differently, for Foucault, 'the desire to know, to find out the truth, can itself entice us into 
new relations of power' (During, 1992: 135). Truth discourses and fonns of knowledge thus link 
up with specific relations of power to control social action despite constant challenge by the 
resistance it induces (Ibid.). The will to truth is therefore implied in the establishment and 
sustenance of systems of domination. This is due to the fact that truth is created by these 
systems of power. Consequently, truth cannot be liberated from power implying that truth is not 
a condition (or a means of) for freedom (Tilley, 1990:286-7). 
In addition, Foucault is of the view that replacement of one discursive fonnation by another does 
not represent an advance towards truth. The truth produced by each discursive fonnation is 
confined and conditioned by the time and space within which it operates. There are therefore no 
universal standards for truth and rationality. This is more so because power -knowledge - truth 
strategies are intentional. For this reason, the notion of ideology becomes redundant. The 
intentionality of truth also implies that struggles against regimes of truth yield an infinite regress 
of a succession of regimes of truth rather than freedom from power (Ibid:286-7; 300). 
Foucault believes truth constrains in the sense that it contains systems of selection and 
exclusions linked to power (Cooper, 1981:67). This circular relation between truth and power 
means that in no way can truth be extricated from power. In sum, Foucault maintains that truth 
is political and any idea of its liberation from powerlknowledge is mere wishful thinking 
(Simons, 1995:27;54; Haber, 1994:80). The implication of this Foucauldian thesis for education 
is grave indeed; that education for liberation is not a feasible ideal because there is no truth 











Keith Hoskin (1994), however, believes the charge that Foucault is an anti-materialist, neo-
conservative and a part of the post-modernist attack on reason cannot be sustained. For him, 
Foucault's project is not relativist, anti-rational, arguing for the collapse of reason but a reasoned 
critique of the history of reason. Its main focus is the study of ways in which dominant forms of 
rationality get established. Of vital importance, Hoskin argues, is the potential of Foucault's 
analysis to provide 'a new reasoned approach to understanding ourselves and our world' 
(Hoskin, 1994: 1). In this sense the project was aimed at constructing a history of different 
modes by which human beings are made subjects (Foucault, 1982:777). 
Foucault's VIew nevertheless centres around the exclusion of subjugated knowledges and 
discourses in materialistic and humanistic theories. In his defense of Foucault's position, Hoskin 
points to an irresolvable paradox in materialistic accounts. In an account which treats the human 
subject as constituted, in the last instance, socially, by what means does the materialist authors' 
socially constructed self evade this trap in order to state the truth, he asks. This dilemma is also 
embedded in the separation of ideology from truth. The concept of ideology implies a truth 
principle which enables ideology to be authentically differentiated from truth. This truth 
principle is supposed to be knowable by a sovereign rational subject who distinguishes truth 
from falsity. However, Hoskin argues, the view that there is a sovereign rational subject is 
ruled out by the materialist base of the theory (Hoskin, 1994:12-13). In rejecting the 'truth' of 
the sovereign rational subject, Hoskin put emphasis on the fact that central to Foucault's project 
was a ceaseless and reasoned search for truth. This reasoned search after truth was part of a new 
theory of practices (Ibid: 14). Nevertheless there seems to be a tension between an all-
encompassing power inhibiting authentic truth and disempowering critical thought and action. 
Hoskin himself acknowledges that even 'if occasional moments when power-knowledge 
relations change' do occur, nonetheless 'a new dominant form of reason, with new 'truth garnes' 
get established' (Ibid: 15). 
The latter statement is akin to positions taken in Giddens and Thompson's projects in exposing 
the power dimensions of ideology. In essence Foucault is saying that the regime of 'truth' is 
itself a power-game set-up as part of modernity vis-a-vis capitalism. Exposing that game is part 
of Foucault's project. Nevertheless the eclectic position of Giddens' work does not allow 
complete identification with any of the two competing social explanations. 
Giddens rejects the post-modernist idea that we should relinquish any claim to proper knowledge 











embrace the enlightenment project because of its foundationalism. Instead, he introduces the 
concept of reflexivity in place of both 'fragmentary insights' of post-modernism and the 
'foundationalism' of the enlightenment project. Modernity, for him, is not so much about 
rational progress or being 'unsettled' but intellectual puzzlement and existential doubt. Self-
questioning and endlessness of debates about the (non) existence of foundations of knowledge 
constitute for him the chief characteristics of modernity (McLennan, 1992:343-4). Giddens' 
eclectic approach and his attempt to strike 'a happy compromise' between post-modernism and 
enlightenment, however, is viewed as a sign of indecisiveness on his part. In addition, his 
concept of reflexivity does lend itself to some form of relativism, something he wanted to avoid 
in the first place (Ibid:346). 
Nevertheless, despite its limitations, Giddens' theory provides ample space for political action. 
Giddens would say that progress towards liberation is possible without escaping power because 
power is also enabling. This however is a wholly different notion of freedom which does not 
imply freedom from all kinds of constraints, but the capacity to act, to speak a language, to have 
relationships with people and to enter the political arena. While Freire believes dialogical truth 
can expose ideological forms and create conditions for liberation, Foucault denies this 
possibility. Giddens and Thompson whilst they to some extent agree with Freire, nonetheless 
see ideology critique as giving us a process which can make progress towards truth rather than 
an end-position. In fact this is also what Habermas proposes when, like Freire, he puts forward 
dialogue-ideal communication as an instrument on the road to truth and liberation. 
Freire's concept of dialogue is one of the main reasons for upholding the 'pedagogy of 
knowing'. In grounding the possibility of reflection and action for liberation on dialogue Freire 
is, as already indicated, in agreement with Habermas. According to the latter: 
"The human interest in autonomy and responsibility is not mere fancy, for it can be 
apprehended a priori. What raises us out of nature is the only thing whose nature we 
can know: language. Through its structure autonomy and responsibility are posited 
for us. Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and 
unconstrained communication" (Quoted in Bernstein, 1995:47). 
This implies that distorted communication is an ideological instrument for the suppression of 
generalizable interests. For this reason, it is only through authentic communication geared 
towards real consensus that the goal of freedom can be achieved. Intersubjectivity (and 
consensus) is in principle possible through speech oriented towards understanding or speech 











(Bernstein, 1995:48). Consensual speech is derived from the explicit mutual recognition of four 
types of validity claims. These validity claims concern the linguistic intelligibility and 
comprehensibility of speech acts; the truth of the propositional content; the sincerity of the 
speaker; and the appropriateness of speech acts relative to existing values and norms (Ibid:48-9). 
Habermas thus urges the communicative community to achieve consensus solely through the 
force of a better argument in a situation free from any and all forms of distorted 
communication-in a context where ideal speech acts are possible. Paraphrasing Habermas, 
Bernstein says: 
"an ideal speech situation would be one in which all the participants had an effective 
equality of chances to take part in the dialogue .... Further. .. each must have the 
freedom to radicalize the discourse by moving it to higher levels of abstraction and 
reflection, which in tum may require the modification of the originally accepted 
conceptual framework. Equally important is the proviso that the participants in an 
ideal speech be motivated solely by the desire to reach a consensus about the truth of 
statements... Finally, strategic motivations and inhibitions will not be overcome if 
the norms binding agents are not symmetrical, that is, participants to dialogue must 
neither possess role privileges, nor be subject to one-sidedly binding norms. The 
conditions for an ideal speech situation are not, then, linguistic in character, rather, 
they are social and material conditions" (Ibid:51). 
Habermas believes social scientists must seriously consider the positive role of the original 
Enlightenment epoch, notably, 'the prospect of a self-conscious practice' which could make 
possible self-determination and self-realization. He maintains poststructuralists's conservatism 
can only result in despair. Poststructuralism, for him, is a purely negative critique which works 
against the promotion of justice and human fulfillment (McLennan, 1992:334-5). Habermas' 
view that communicative action as ideal speech acts is a process which ensures intersubjectivity 
and freedom can be utilized to strengthen Freire's idea that the practice of education for 
liberation is possible in society. In fact it has been Giddens's idea that on all levels, global or 
local, 'coordinated political engagement' is 'both possible and necessary ... '(Giddens, 1990:150). 
Giddens's framework especially his concepts ideology critique and reflexivity as well as his 
theory of structuration have proven to be very useful in the unfolding analysis of the possibility 
of liberatory political action. Similarly, the embracing of the notion of processual progress 
towards truth rather than final truth in Habermas's theory of communicative action means that 
his approach also practices ideology critique. This makes his views on the possibility of 
progress towards liberation very close to those of Giddens. The latter aspect together with 












From the above discussion, it follows that Freire's problem-posing approach to education praxis 
offers plausible possibilities for authentic truth and liberation. While Freire does not contest that 
education is political, his view is more attractive for its inclusiveness(as opposed to Foucault's 
ever-present and everlasting plurality or multiplicity of discourses and identities) in the liberation 
process. The pedagogy of knowing is a conscientisation practice which utilizes dialogue in 
search of truth by means of which the oppressor-oppressed contradiction is resolved. 
Moreover, the pedagogical nature of the dialogical pedagogy means both the oppressors and the 
oppressed will be educated about those factors which prevent full humanisation so that they can 
be rooted out as part of the broader cultural action for freedom programme. Indeed dialogue can 
only take place under conditions free of domination and in authentic communion with others. It 
is under the conditions of equality and intersubjectivity that communication entails true words 
and reflexive action for freedom. It is my belief that the practice of problem-posing pedagogy 
within the education arena cannot only create a horizontal relationship between the teacher and 
students as active subjects of the learning process but could also open up space for authentic 
liberatory praxis which could, in due course, be spread throughout society. Hence Foucault's 
erroneous idea that freedom from power is a pipedream must be rejected. This view is shared by 
Seidman who has been very sympathetic to Foucault's poststructuralist perspective. 
According to Seidman, Foucault's politics of resistance in disciplinary society rejects the dream 
of freedom from domination and control as an illusion. However, Seidman criticizes Foucault of 
having failed to translate the politics of resistance into 'a positive program of social 
reconstruction'. Seidman considers it sociologically naIve for Foucault to treat all social 
regulation as domination while retaining an implicitly 'anarchistic social ideal' (Seidman, 1994: 
227 - 228). He also believes Foucault's failure to make explicit his notion of 'a good society' is 
compounded by a lack of any clear 'moral and political standpoint' on the basis of which he 
constructs a critique of Western societies (Ibid:231). The texture of what Seidman said on this 
issue is as follows: 
"There is a definite strain of antimodernism in poststructuralism. At times, it appears 
in the implication that all social regulation and constraint is domination. Foucault's 
interpretations of the regime of sexuality as a system of social control is indicative of 
this naIve sociological position. Why naIve? Social life is unimaginable without 
social norms, identities, and a system of social control. The compelling moral and 
political issue revolves around the kinds of choices, social differences, and social 
relations that different systems of social control make possible and the ways they are 
implicated in democratization and hierarchy. The tendency in Foucault to collapse all 











Poststructuralism has been unable to tum its challenge to Enlightenment into an 
entirely cogent social vision" (Ibid:231 232). 
2.10 CONCLUSION 
As part of an attempt to construct a theoretical framework for this thesis, the concepts 
conscientisation, dialogue and ideology critique were defined at the beginning of the chapter. 
The contours of this chapter also included an outline of aspects of Giddens's structuration theory 
especially the concept of ideology critique, Thompson's critical conception of ideology and 
Habermas's theory of communicative action. All these issues as outlined are combined to form a 
theoretical framework for this study. The rationale for doing so is that Giddens's structuration 
theory and the concept of ideology critique in both Giddens and Thompson's work allow human 
subjects to take political action to transform their social lives. This is made possible by a process 
of critical self-reflection and counterfactual thinking that challenges relations of domination in 
order to transform them. It is argued herein that the notion of ideology critique is also embedded 
in Habermas's theory of communicative action and Freire's conscientising dialogue. 
Habermas's intersubjective consensus and Freire's truth which is derived from conscientising 
dialogue are seen as means by which human subjects could utilize the knowledge they have 
achieved to take action which will yield freedom from power as domination. It is on the basis of 
these theoretical reflections that the notions of knowledge, truth, power and the subject from 
Foucault are rejected. 
To conclude, the purpose of this chapter was to reflect on how the Freire-Foucault debate was 
conducted internationally. In the process, the comparison of Freire and Foucault's conceptions of 
powerlknowledge, truth and subjectivity in this chapter has revealed that it is only through 
Freire's pedagogy of knowing that authentic educational praxis can be realized. On the contrary, 
Foucault's position which lacks any theory of reconstruction and promotes relativistic, nihilistic 
and anarchistic views cannot provide a foundation for any meaningful political action. Hence 
only dialogue-based conscientisation within Freire's pedagogy can yield truth which is 
subversive to power as domination to ensure that liberation is attained. In subsequent chapters I 
will show how this debate is transplanted to, and carried on in, South Africa. In addition, 
theoretical reflections in this chapter will form the backbone of the theoretical framework which 
will be utilized to analyse SA Freirians and Foucauldians's conceptions of knowledge, power, 











CHAPTER 3: SOUTH AFRICAN FREIRIANS CONTRA FOUCAULDIANS ON THE 
CONCEPT OF KNOWLEDGE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
South African Freirians have linked the act of knowing to emancipatory praxis especially 
through, for example, education for liberation practices. In contrast South African Foucauldians 
are of the view that the political nature of knowledge, its link with power to form a 
powerlknowledge axis, and the fact that absolute knowledge/truth is unthinkable means that 
liberatory action is impossible. The above position by SA Foucauldians creates a serious 
challenge to Freire's act of knowing which is considered by SA Freirians as a foundation for an 
authentic educational praxis and/or the act of freedom. Theoretical arguments reinforced by 
insights of Giddens, Habermas and McKay and Romm inter alia and content analysis derived 
data from the work of SA Frerians would none-the-Iess show that through the mediation of 
dialogue and conscientisation an authentic act of knowing, education for liberation, can bring 
about both humanisation and an authentic educational praxis. In brief I deploy Giddens and 
Habermas's concepts of ideology critique and reflexivity to further elaborate on Freire's 
conception of knowledge so that its capability for allowing political action within education is 
enhanced. To do this I use Giddens's conception of systematic knowledge and its continued 
review through the process of reflexivity to ground Freire's dialogical knowledge. It is on the 
basis of the idea of the existence of reflective, systematic knowledge that I reject Foucault and 
South African Foucauldians's position that we drop any conception of systematic knowledge 
in favour of fragmentary mUltiple discourses. Combining Giddens's conception of systematic 
knowledge with Habermas's notion 'knowledge-constitutive-interest', it is then argued that 
knowledgeable actors are capable of liberatory political action within education and society in 
general. Use is also made of Giddens's conception of domination to deflect accusation by SA 
Foucauldians that the creation of dualities, dichotomies, hierarchies and homogeneities by the 
Freirian pedagogy is a vice. The creation of these dichotomies and hierarchies by social actors, 
it is argued, is in line with Giddens's view that the common awareness of settings for action 
constitute the basis of 'mutual knowledge' of meanings of the happenings in the society. Lastly, 
the concept of ideology critique is utilised to show that Freire cannot be accused of having an 
ineffectual revolutionary strategy as conscientisation and dialogue, like ideology critique, 











However, before making the above points, I begin with a succinct outline of the context within 
which the influence of Freire's pedagogy spread and the Foucauldian post structuralist opposition 
emerged in South Africa. This is followed by a detailed separate presentation of the views of 
first, the South African Freirians on knowledge and then, the SA Foucauldians on the same 
subject. A brief route map of each account is presented below starting with SA Freirians. 
SA Freirians accept, without any reservations, Freire's view that education is political and not 
neutral. In this sense knowledge is an instrument of power which could be utilised by the 
oppressor for purposes of domination and oppression and by the oppressed for liberatory action 
and humanisation. In the case of the former, the political nature of education can be seen in 
indoctrinatory practices of the banking education system. This is an education system structured 
in ways which promote vertical relationships between the teacher and students; a narrative 
pedagogical approach transmitting knowledge as if it is static; a learning process which treats 
learners as objects rather than subjects; and an educational approach serving purposes of 
domestication and the creation of docile subjects. 
In contrast, Freire's conception of education for freedom as cultural action for freedom promotes 
a problem-posing approach whose main objective is to conscientise the oppressed so that they 
could liberate themselves from oppression. This is a dialogical education praxis which utilises 
the cultural experience of the masses so that they could democratically participate in working out 
strategies to transform their social situation. Freire insists that critical thinking, critical inquiry 
and creativity are central to this educational praxis. For this reason, the teacher is both political 
and a critical co-investigator whose equal partnership with learners as teachers is unshakable. 
Thus Freire's problem-posing education aims at communion between the teacher and the 
students. It is democratic and community-oriented combining education/culture with 
conscientisation and political action for freedom. In other words, this is a universal Third World 
pedagogy with the goal of liberating oppressed societies through its humanizing and liberatory 
content. 
Proponents of the Black Consciousness philosophy and other organic intellectuals, such as, 
Neville Alexander, embraced and transformed Freire's problem-posing pedagogy to suit the 
conditions around which the education struggle, and indeed the whole national liberation praxis, 
was conducted in South Africa. Both these groups were primarily impressed by Freire's anti-
capitalist and democratic stand. In starting from the interrogation of educational processes in 











constitute a strategic combination for the practice of freedom. For them, as a starting point, 
conscientisation is a means by which the effects of cultural invasion could be negated thus 
opening up the educational terrain for acts of critical understanding and mobilisation for 
liberation. Dialogical education praxis in South African educational institutions was an 
emancipatory process which, in their view, lead to the development of a critical capacity, by 
conscientised Blacks, which ensured their active participation in the struggle that unshackled the 
chains of Apartheid bondage. Within the educational sphere itself, this universal Third World 
pedagogy ,can promote a spirit of independent inquiry which will ensure that both teachers and 
students are subjects(rather than objects) who jointly determine their destiny. In the same vein, 
the pedagogy of the oppressed creates subjects who consciously construct and reconstruct their 
history and culture. 
Similarly, the People's Education for People's Power(PEPP) movement and SA Freirian 
scholars proposed an anti-capitalist, democratic and grassroots based education praxis as a 
replacement for the SA education for racial domination andior Apartheid education. The 
emphasis here was on the active participation of the community and the use of their collective 
power to transform Apartheid education. People's Education for People's Power(PEPP) was in 
this sense viewed as both the means by which an emancipatory process from Apartheid 
domination could be effected and the end-product/goal of such struggles. This end-product, 
PEPP, was envisaged to be a unique SA pedagogy which will ensure the construction of a 
participatory curriculum; the production of knowledge pertinent to a non-racial South Africa; the 
promotion of democratic values of cooperation and active participation; and the legitimation of 
the school curriculum by the active participation of the community through the Parents-
Teachers-Students Associations(PTSA's).In this sense the teacher in the non-racial, democratic 
South Africa was expected to be a liberator who encouraged both critical thinking and acts of 
freedom amongst his/her students. 
SA Foucauldians, however, believe that no act of education(or knowledge production and 
dissemination process) can have as its outcome truth and freedom since knowledge is power. 
Below follows a summary of the concept of knowledge as propounded by the SA Foucauldians 
and other South African critiques of the Freirian pedagogy. 
The critique of the Freirian theory advanced by the South African Foucauldians begins by 
accepting Foucault's distinction between formalised and marginalised knowledge in order to 











science and it is this association with science which places it at the top of a hierarchical order of 
know ledges at the expense of historical, marginalised and/or excluded knowledges. In addition, 
the link between knowledge, power and truth makes the subjection of other knowledges 
possible. This happens simultaneously with the consolidation of formalised knowledge's 
structural operation due to the fact of its claim to truth. SA Foucauldinans maintain that the 
processes which authenticate some knowledge while marginalising others are political and hence 
their project will involve opposing and struggling against the coercion of scientific knowledge 
in order to emancipate historical knowledges from subjection. Note, however, that Freire also 
considers education political and not neutral. In addition, his interest in making the cultural 
experience of learners a starting point in the pedagogy of knowing approximate the mission of 
Foucauldians to rescue historical knowledges from marginalisationiexlusion. The two aspects 
represent some of the rare points of convergence between Freirian and Foucauldian theoretical 
frameworks. 
Having indicated that scientific knowledge is linked to power and therefore cannot claim to have 
discovered the truth about the human subjects, South African Foucauldians go on to show that 
liberatory education praxis would not be possible from the practice of such knowledge because 
knowledge is linked to power to form a powerlknowledge axis. To back up this argument, they 
reflect on various faults within the Freiran theory which they believe would discount it as a 
credible theory of praxis which includes the problem of, dichotomisation, hierarchisation and 
homogenisation in Freire's theory which has resulted in a faulty theorisation of the human 
subject. Consequently, SA Foucauldians further argued, the revolutionary goal of Freire's 
pedagogy cannot be achieved on the basis of wrong conception of the subject. In fact there is 
even a feeling in the SA Foucauldian camp that the central plank of Freire's pedagogy of 
knowing, the concept of 'consciousness-raising' is problematic in the sense that the oppressed 
masses might remain at the consciousness-raising phase without a clue as to how to move to the 
stage of political action. Further, it is argued that instead of Freire's pedagogy operating as the 
consciousness-raising aspect of political action, education for liberation must be an inseparable 
part of social action for emancipation itself. The other issues covered in this critique include the 
accusation that Freire's pedagogy has a faulty theorisation of authority thus inviting question 
marks on its claims to democratic practices and the idea that there exists a contradiction between 
the revolutionary goal of Freire's pedagogy and the notion of individual growth or critical 
thought. The latter factor relate to the fact that a critical, conscientised subject might choose to 
deviate from the prescribed revolutionary goal of Freire's pedagogy. All in all, the arguments of 











liberatory action in the education sphere or the idea that a political, scientific knowledge, which 
is inter· linked with power, could be an instrument of liberation. In fact the latter group doubt if 
liberation from power is an achievable ideal at all. Hence the chapter will provide the differing 
perspectives of the South African Freirians and Foucauldians on knowledge. Structurally, we 
will start by presenting the entire SA Freirian standpoint on knowledge, beginning with the view 
that education is political, before outlining the SA Foucauldian and other critiques of the Freirian 
stance on knowledge as seen from the contextual background of South Africa. Before doing 
that, however, we will give a brief outline of the context within which the influence of Freire's 
pedagogy spread and the Foucauldian poststructuralist opposition emerged in South Africa. 
3.2 THE CONTEXT WITHIN WHICH THE INFLUENCE OF FREIRE'S PEDAGOGY 
SPREAD AND THE FOUCAULDIAN POSTSTRUCTURALISM EMERGED IN SA 
One of the elements utilised when explicating human agency, Giddens believes, is the 
contextuality of action. Agents, he maintains, draw on the contexts, which form the settings of 
action, during the process of interaction. It is the common awareness of these settings for action 
which forms the basis for 'mutual knowledge' (Giddens, 1987: 98 - 99). For these reasons, this 
section will in brief give contours of the characteristic features of the South African socio-
political and educational situation when Freire's pedagogy was transplanted in the early 1970's, 
give a brief account of its spread in the 1970's and the 1980's, and also account for the 
emergence of the SA Foucauldian poststructuralist critique especially in the early 1990's.At the 
end of the section, I will roughly indicate the institutional and political backgrounds of the 
individuals involved in the Freire-Foucault debate in South Africa and examples of the 'sea-
change' that the two approaches had undergone despite the retention of their terminology and 
structures as they were integrated into the South African setting. Note, however, that Freire and 
SA Freirians have a tendency of using words with sexist connotations such as 'men' instead of 
inclusive ones like 'human beings'. I use the word 'sic' to indicate this sexist language when it 
crops up. However, I point to any of these words only once in a quote. With this in mind, let us 
now look in a very summarised form at the South African context at that time. 
In the Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Paulo Freire captured the essence of the general conception of 
praxis when he wrote: 
"Men (sic) will be truly critical if they live in the plenitude of praxis, that is if their 
action encompasses a critical ... reflection which increasingly organises their 











higher level, one which enables them to perceive the causes of reality" (Freire, 1973: 
125). 
In a nutshell, successive South African educational policies during the Apartheid era were a 
negation of this Freirian notion of praxis. From the 1953 Bantu Education Act through the 1983 
Government White Paper on Education to the 1992 Department of National Education's 
Education Renewal Strategy, we witnessed a consistent effort to fashion an education policy for 
the domestication and dehumanisation of the majority of South Africans. 
Dr. H. F. Verwoerd, Minister of NaIve Affairs, had this to say with regard to the general aims 
and objectives of the Bantu Education Act: 
"My department's policy is that education should stand with both feet in the reserves 
and have its roots in the spirit and being of Bantu society ... The Bantu must be 
guided to serve his own community in all respects. There is no place for him in the 
European community above the level of certain forms of labour. Within his own 
community, however, all doors are open. For that reason it is of no avail for him to 
receive a training which has as its aim absorption in the European community, where 
he cannot be absorbed. Until now he has been subjected to a school system which 
drew him away from his own community and misled him by showing him the green 
pastures of European society in which he is not allowed to graze" (Verwoerd, 1954). 
The conclusion which can be drawn from Verwoerd's statement is that Bantu Education was 
aimed at preparing Africans for life in a tribal community in the 'reserves' This meant the denial 
of social, economic and political rights for Africans in the urban areas where they could only 
occupy the position of labourers. The 'reserves' were seen as the only place where Africans 
could fully express themselves in community life with guidance or trusteeship of Whites. Thus 
the whole strategy's objective had to do with the denial of citizenship to Africans, to remove 
them from 'white' areas where South Africa's economic power was concentrated, and to 
socialise them through Bantu Education for positions of servitude. The purpose of the overall 
game-plan, therefore, was to defend and perpetuate White prosperity and supremacy (Johnstone, 
1982: 20). 
However a discussion of the Bantu Education strategy would be devoid of content if it fails to 
take stock of acts of resistance of one form or another directed at this domesticating education by 
the oppressed. The contest for ideological hegemony in the educational arena and over control of 
the schools themselves started with resistance against the implementation of the Bantu Education 
Act of 1953. Although in 1953 opposition to Bantu Education was initially from teachers' 











1953 Bantu Education Act (Cameron, 1986: 177). Another crucial input towards the resistance 
against Bantu Education came with the 1976 Student Uprising which started in Soweto. The 
government responded to the 1976 uprising by dropping the name 'Department of Bantu 
Education' and changed it to the 'Department of Education and Training' in 1978. Following this 
development, an Education and Training Bill was passed in 1979 to replace the Bantu Education 
Act of 1953 (Davies, 1984: 341-342;351-352). 
Davies also indicated that Black organisations rejected the Bill because it categorised people 
according to 'race' and did not reflect any move towards the abolition of separate departments 
for African, Coloured and Indian education. The Bill's emphasis on control and its lack of 
commitment towards equal distribution of educational resources was seen as an instrument to 
further entrench 'separate development' (Davies, 1984; NEUSA, 1982; Bot, 1984; Financial 
Mail 15/06/84; RESA, 1987:13-4). This exacerbated the crisis events in education into the 1984-
5 period. 
One marked feature of the mid-80's was that campaigns against Bantu Education were more and 
more being launched in a protest language fused with concepts from Paulo Freire's dialectical 
humanism. For instance, demands for education for liberation or people's education for people's 
power, for democratic governance of schools through PTSA's, for the changing of syllabi to 
reflect the history and cultural experience of all South Africans, for democratisation of all 
educational institutions were mostly coined in critical pedagogy's language (SASPU focus 3 (2), 
November 1984; Seize the day, Seize the hour, pamphlet issued by the Azanian Revolutionary 
Movement of Students, July 1985). However, a proper account of the history of the impact of 
Freire's pedagogy begins in the 1970's. 
The influence of Freire's 'pedagogy of knowing' in South Africa was first detected in the theory 
and practice of Black Consciousness activists, such as, Steve Biko. This was during the period 
immediately after the English translation and publication in 1970 of Freire's classical text, 
Pedagogy of the Oppressed (Youngman, 1986:151). Specifically, it was the University Christian 
Movement (UCM) and the South African Students' Organisation (SASO) which discovered 
'Freire's pedagogy and his concept of conscientisation' (Alexander, 1990:54). The banning of 
Freire's works by the Apartheid government during this period failed to prevent covert 
circulation of this literature amongst BCM activists in 'bush colleges'. The Black Consciousness 
Movement (BCM) saw Freire's 'pedagogy of knowing' and its concept of conscientisation as a 











conscientisation projects amongst rural and urban oppressed communities were established 
(Ibid:57 - 58; Wilson, 1988:283-284; 286). 
In this sense, it is accurate to argue that BCM organisations before their banning in 1977 were by 
and large influenced by Freire's 'pedagogy of knowing' (see also Alexander and Helbig, 
1988:68 - 9). Even after the ban of BCM groups in 1977, other organisations carried forward, in 
various ways, Freire's visions and methods of effecting liberatory pedagogy right into the 
1980's. Mastin Prinsloo (1990) and Barbara Hutton (1992) not only acknowledged the impact of 
the Freirian method on the South African literacy strategies but also identified specific literacy 
organisations, such as, the National Literacy Co-operative (NLC) and the Adult Learning Project 
(ALP), which practically implemented Freire's ideas on the ground. The efforts of these literacy 
organisations were complemented in the early eighties by the Azanian People's Organisation 
(AZAPO),s, a BCM offspring, continued embrace of the Freirian approach to the educational 
struggle in line with the tradition established by its predecessors, such as, SASO, the Black 
People's Convention (BPC), and the Black Community Programmes (BCP) in the 1970's. 
The 1980' s witnessed the rising influence of the pedagogy of Paulo Freire on South African 
scholarly and political literature as well as on the activities of community organisations. The 
writings of Johnson (1985), Mkhatshwa (1985), Walters (1985; 1986), Cock (1986), 
Mahlomaholo and Matlou (1986), Khotseng (1986), Molobi (1986), Sisulu (1986), Prinsloo 
(1987), Alexander (1987), Alexander and Helbig (1988), Nkomo (1990), Njobe (1990), and 
Walker (1988; 1990) paved the way towards the integration of Freire's liberative pedagogy into 
the South African educational praxis. The influence of Freire's pedagogy extended beyond the 
educational arena to other community organisations in South Africa. Shirley Walters (1985) 
cited the Careers Research and Information Centre (CRIC) based in Cape Town and radical 
Christians within The South African Council of Churches (SACC) and The Western Province 
Council of Churches (WPCC) as examples. These groups, together with some trade unions, 
women's organisations and other community organisations throughout South Africa practised 
radical humanism within which Freire's pedagogy of knowing falls. Freire's theory, according to 
Walters, became a significant influence on CRIC's functioning due to the fact that the first 
director of the project was a Freirian (Walters, 1985: 4 8). Other individuals who (and 
institutions which) engaged in Freirian-type social practices, to mention but a few, include Rick 
Turner (1980), Melanie Walker (1990), and the Education Departments of the Universities of 











From the mid 1980' s, but especially in the early 1990' s, Foucauldian and other critiques of the 
Freirian pedagogy started to emerge. In the 1980's writers who challenged Freire's pedagogy 
included Kallaway (1987), Prinsloo (1987), Levin (1988), Enslin (1986) and Walters (1985; 
1986). Note has to be taken that Levin (1988) and Kallaway (1987) cannot be in any way be seen 
as Foucauldians although they did advance a critique of Freire's pedagogy. In fact even 
Walters's earlier writings would easily be classified as Freirian although her latter writings in the 
1990's fits the Foucauldian label (see Wolpe, 1994). The 1990's heralded a period when the 
Foucauldian poststructuralist critique of Freire's pedagogy grew from strength to strength. The 
key players here included amongst others, Skinner (1998), Wolpe (1994), Flanagan (1991), 
Macleod (1995), Deacon and Parker (1993), Coetzee (1995), Frigerio (1990), Levett (1990), 
Carrim (1993), de Kadt (1991), Muller (1990), Mc Lennan (1994) and Morrell (1994). 
Johan Muller says the Freirian radical humanism promised equality and freedom. In contrast 
Prinsloo and other poststructuralists believed the liberation movement promised 'democratic 
ideals' of 'radical equality of participation they could not deliver' (Muller, 1996: 183). In fact 
Muller maintains this became a contest 'between sociologies of dialogue and sociologies of 
discourse' (Ibid: 181). Muller warns us about confusing the terms postmodernism and 
poststructuralism and preferred the latter as a better term for the sociologies of discourse 
because the former are 'post- industrial populists' (Ibid: 186). 
The question however remains as to who South African Freirians are and what distinguishes 
them from the Foucauldians. From information gleaned from the book Vintage Kenton compiled 
by Wendy Flanagan et al (1994) and Muller's article entitled Dreams of Wholeness and Loss: 
Critical sociology of education in South Africa (1996) as well as information gained during 
interaction with fellow education academics during Kenton conferences, the following seems to 
be an accurate depiction of participants in SA Freirian and Foucauldian camps. South African 
Freirians are composed mostly of individuals who were linked in one way or another to the 
liberation struggle against Apartheid whether located in tertiary education institutions, non-
governmental organisations, trade unions, community organisations and anti-Apartheid political 
organisations and educational organisations of parents, students and teachers. Within this camp 
Walters, Khotseng et aI, McKay and Romm, Cock, Hutton, Mahlomaholo and Matlou, 
Nolutshungu, Nkomo, Masekela, Jantjes, Jansen, Clifford, Matabane, etc. would represent the 
academics. Alec Erwin will represent trade unions. Biko, Pityana, Alexander, Mkhatshwa, 











organisations and van den Heveer, Johnson, Mkhatshwa, Sisulu and Molobi for educational 
organisations. 
Surprisingly enough most of the members of the category labelled SA Foucauldians seem to 
mostly originate from White English-speaking liberal universities. This fact tends to create 
suspicions that the contest between SA Freirians and Foucauldians about the possibility of 
political action within education has been divided along racial lines. Biko and the BCM, Neville 
Alexander, Mkhatshwa, Sisulu, Johnson, People's Education proponents and most Black 
intellectuals in the dialogue-discourse debate believe that liberatory education praxis of a 
Freirian mould is possible within the education terrain. Of course some White scholars such as 
Cock and McKay and Romm also believe in the 'radical possibilitarian emancipatory politics' 
(Muller, 1996: 186). Nevertheless, the South African Foucauldians are almost all composed of 
academics from traditionally White liberal universities such as UCT, WITS, Rhodes University, 
and the University of NataL A close look at the affected individuals will confirm this observation 
as follows: Skinner (University of Natal), de Kadt (University of Natal), Levett (University of 
Cape Town), Carrim (WITS), Deacon (University of Natal), Parker (University of Durban 
Westville), Morrell (University of Natal), Bensusan (WITS), Shalem (WITS), Flanagan (UCT), 
Macleod(RU), Levin (WITS), Muller (UCT), Prinsloo (UCT), Walker (UCT), Coetzee 
(Stellenbosch) and Frigerio (Natal). Muller (1996) attributes this state of affairs to one strand 
within the Kenton Education Association (KEA) tradition. 
According to Muller, poststructuralism began to emerge as 'a theoretical reaction against the 
new normativists' within KEA (Ibid: 184). In fact Muller indicates that the dialogue-discourse 
contest was centred around, in terms of the view of the poststructuralist group, the fact that 'the 
democratic ideals' of a 'radical equality of participation' .. .'could not be translated into 
functionally different social realism of social activity without further ado, and without 
generating unintended and often unwelcome consequences' (Muller, 1996: 183). In this sense, 
Muller reveals some form of pessimism in this group about the possibility of the liberation 
movement delivering freedom to the majority of South Africans. Interestingly most of the South 
African Freirian and Foucauldian academics have deep roots in the Kenton traditions. More so 
because even some of the political activists such as Eric Molobi and Neville Alexander had on 
occasion delivered papers at the KEA conference. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the 
majority of the political activists from the BCM, UDF and the trade union movement took little 
part in the discussions within the Kenton Education Association and that this discourse whether 











poststructuralists was an internal KEA debate which had no crucial input on the ongoing praxis 
for educational and political transfOImation. Hence you find that the key component of South 
African Freirians were political activists who operated outside the White-dominated KEA. A list 
of key people in the poststructuralist approach by Muller will confirm my view that Whites 
predominated in the integration of this view to the South African educational discourse. The 
sample included Deacon (1991), Ensor (1993/94; 1995), Wolpe (1993/94), Soudien (1995) and 
Morphet (1994) thus confirming my view that the variable 'race' seems to have something to do 
with holding particular views in South Africa and therefore it would be important to make 
explicit the way in which ideas of Freire or Foucault have been appropriated in the South Mrican 
situation. Whether these ideas have been appropriated in their pure form or whether their 
adaptation meant some modifications or distortions and reasons thereof is also a relevant issue. 
While many such adaptations, modifications or distortions will be detectable within the thesis 
and I will point them out as they appear, few demonstrative example will be given here. 
The first has to do with the fact that Freire's Christian-Socialist approach to education that was 
both humanist and radical (Jarvis, 1995:83; 86) was derived from the context of working class 
and rural resistance against the political conditions of Latin America. A lot of creativity was 
therefore necessary to utilise his framework for the South African situation of racial oppression. 
However Freire's pedagogy's more broader anti-colonial and anti-domination approach and the 
conscientisation theme had an appeal to the BCM which was searching for a new strategy for 
political action after the ANC, the PAC, SACTU and the SACP were driven underground in the 
early 1960's. The fact that racial discrimination and racial inequality or national oppression was 
so pervasive in South Mrica resulted in groups working within Freire's pedagogy finding 
racialised agents, for example, the 'Black man you are on your own' BCM conscientisation 
strategy and the substitution of the black working class for the working class by Neville 
Alexander (Cross, 1994: 236). 
Second, you have conceptual confusions in the process of the adaptation of Freire's pedagogy to 
South Africa. A good example is the mistake made by Khotseng et al (1986) relating to Freire's 
problem-posing approach and the problem-solving concept of education. It has to be pointed out 
that the problem-posing approach as part of critical theory, of which sociology of education has 
relevance, is quite different from the 'applied education politics' or practical education 
technology known as 'problem-solving' (Muller, 1996: 178). Another conceptual confusion 
relate to the erroneous replacement of conscientisation by consciousness-raising by Walters, 











Third, you also have South African scholars who identified with Freire's pedagogy but on 
occasions taking pot-shots at his theory. McKay and Romm (1992: 9) indicate that for the 
People's Education Movement to stay loyal to authentic liberation praxis its practices cannot be 
grounded on reference to 'collective consensus' which can result in the 'suppression of 
difference' . 
Alexander (1990), who has also embraced Freire's pedagogy, indicated that Freire is ambivalent 
on the question of resolving the dilemma relating to the authority of the teacher. Yet, there is 
Coetzee (1995) who seems to be advancing some form of synthesis of Freirian and Foucauldian 
ideas as she deploys both of these ideas in her analysis of the relationship between the school 
curriculum and the struggle for power. These issues will be more apparent in subsequent sections 
of this chapter and in the rest of the thesis. We now turn to a detailed examination of the SA 
Freirian view on knowledge beginning with the claim that education is political and not neutral. 
3.3 SOUTH AFRICAN FREIRIANS ON KNOWLEDGE 
To reiterate, the section on SA Freirians on the concept of knowledge will begin by showing that 
education is political and not neutral. To demonstrate this fact two areas where the political 
nature of education can be demonstrated is in the instance of cultural invasion and the operation 
of Apartheid education as an example of education for domination. At this point it will be 
necessary to introduce the concept of conscientisation which is key to Freire's political strategy 
to negate both the effects of cultural invasion and Apartheid education. The strategy of 
conscientisation is linked and indeed is a core element of what Freire called the pedagogy of 
knowing. For this reason, the rest of the section will be dedicated to the accounts of SA Freirians 
on what Freire's pedagogy of knowing means to them in relation to the challenge of their own 
local context. The various characteristics of Freire's pedagogy of the oppressed as seen by SA 
Freirians include its dialogical nature, its liberatory quality and its operation as an instrument for 
humanisation. All these aspects of the SA Freirian pedagogy are dealt with in the sections which 
follow below. 
3.3.1 THE POLITICAL NATURE OF EDUCATION 
South African Freirians such as Alexander (1987), Mkhatshwa (1985), Flanagan (1991), 











political. Echoing Freire, Alexander (1987: 13) maintains that no ideologically neutral education 
exists and by implication the Apartheid education system in SA served the interests of the White 
ruling class. Consequently, the destruction of the existing education inequalities was a political 
rather than an educational goal. In the same vein, Mkhatshwa (1985: 8) who believed 'education 
was inextricably linked to the social system' and that it was political rather than neutral, 
recommended that because people were 'capable of knowing' what conditioned them, they ought 
to use education as a political instrument for deconditioning and liberation (Mkhatshwa, 1985: 8; 
10; see also Adendorff, 1993: 264 and Prinsloo, 1991: 361). 
Matabane (1990), Jansen (1990) and Flanagan (1991) concur with Mkhatshwa. Matabane is in 
agreement with Freire's view that ideology is a core ingredient of a liberative education which is 
both meaningful and politically empowering (1990: 353). Flanagan concurs that education is 
political and that a pedagogical approach sensitive to the political nature of schooling would 
encourage a situation where students as subjects are taught in their political context (1991: 6; 
174). A similar view in support of the political nature of education is presented by Jansen (1990: 
333) who insists we must totally reject the argument that a politically neutral curriculum with a 
non-ideological content exists. The position that there exists no neutral education is seen as 
applicable to SA by Freirians such as Matabane and Flanagan. 
Flanagan, for instance, embraces Eric Molobi's view that the 'people's education for people's 
power' concept cannot avoid being 'decidedly political and partisan with regard to oppression 
and exploitation (Molobi, 1986: 4; Flanagan, 1991: 5). In addition, she also supports George 
Mashamba's position that the struggle for political power in South Africa was intertwined with 
struggles in ideological, educational, cultural and economic domains (Mashamba, 1990: 12; 
Flanagan, 1991: 7). This view is also corroborated by Adendorff who did not only accept 
Mkhatshwa's view that the Freirian idea that education is not neutral but political is applicable to 
the analysis of Apartheid education but also that the struggle for political power in South Africa 
was linked to the struggle for educational liberation, hence 'people's education for people's 
power' (Adendorff, 1993: 264). This position is akin to Matabane's standpoint on the campaign 
for literacy in South Africa. According to Matabane, this campaign, like education in general 
must have a political character. As a political act, literacy work cannot be neutral because an 'act 
of revealing social reality in order to transform it, or of concealing it in order to preserve it, is 
political 53' (Matabane, 1990: 354). For Matabane, therefore, the main objective of the literacy 
campaign was part and parcel of the ongoing struggle to change the political, economic, social, 











present a statement by Sisulu (1991) who represents a generation of activists who coined the 
concept 'people's education for people's power': 
"The demand for free, democratic people's education, we have said is part of and 
indeed inextricably tied to the struggle for a free, democratic, people's South Africa. 
The struggle against apartheid education is not a question for students and teachers 
alone. A conference like this demonstrates the concern of the entire community with 
the problem of gutter education. Likewise the enemy views education as a crucial 
political issue. To ensure that our demands are not met, to maintain the existing 
educational system, SADF and SAP are deployed against our children, shooting and 
tear-gassing them: driving them into and sometimes out of schools, detaining and 
harassing them in numerous other ways. Our demands at the December conference 
were against apartheid education and also the broader acts of war against our 
communities" (Sisulu, 1991: 267). 
The reason why the education struggle was to be linked with the broad struggle for liberation in 
South Africa was that, as Erwin argued, education was 'the heart of ideological control' (1991: 
314). For Erwin, Apartheid education was a means by which the domination of the capitalist 
ideology was infused and collective action discouraged. It was as a response to the stifling 
ideological control of Apartheid education that the bitter struggle of students within schools gave 
rise to people's education. The struggle around people's education was directed at negating the 
effects of the divide-and-rule and hence individualism within the education institutions. On the 
basis of the slogan people's education school pupils were able to mount collective action which 
opened up political space and altered consciousness in favour of a liberatory praxis which 
worked against 'conventional notions of teaching' and 'the authoritarian structures of schools' 
(Erwin, 1991: 315). By so doing, students were in line with Freire's dictum that 'the interests of 
the leamer' must be the starting point and specifically that 'the leamer's political interests' were 
paramount in any liberatory educational praxis (Enslin, 1986: 233). According Khotseng et al 
(1987: 158-159), we should relieve ourselves of the faulty notion that education is neutral rather 
than political. For them, it is a myth perpetuated by conservative fundamental pedagogies 
adherents that neutrality must be central to our pedagogical practice. In other words, according to 
Khotseng et aI, neutrality in matters of knowledge production and dissemination is tantamount 
to adopting 'a convenient ideology that hides the political function of schooling" (1987: 157). 
The latter view is a carbon -copy of Freire's idea that the dominant ideology always attempts to 
convince the educator to be neutral in the name of the pupils. However, Freire is of the view that 
this notion of neutrality represents a false respect for learners. For him, failure to state your point 
of view in as clear terms as possible to learners because of the fear of being branded/labelled 











which, as a result of our negligence would be left intact (quoted in Walker, 1988: 17 - 18). 
Coetzee (1995: 14 - 15) concurs with this interpretation of Freire's view on the political nature 
of education. Utilising Freire's insights, she argues that 'curricular knowledge is a subversive 
force and that knowledge can never be neutral', hence 'the oppression evident in the school 
curriculum is the result of the "overwhelming control" of curricular knowledge' (Ibid.). 
In the light of the political nature of Apartheid education practices and processes of domination 
inherent in those practices, I think it is crucial that the educators make manifest the interests 
providing guidance for their research and teaching. I say this because if there exists no neutral 
enquiry, it follows that each researcher/teacher must advance a particular interest in the methods 
and content of her or his research programmes and teaching. The moral and political interest 
which I think should predominate, however, is that of human emancipation which implies non-
authoritarian and discursive dialogical practice in the process of knowledge-production. 
Habermas has seen this as a way of exposing distorted communication through social science 
critique of ideology whose fundamental aim is to generate intersubjective understanding. McKay 
and Romm (1992: 94) believe, by intersubjective understanding, Habermas implies the fusing of 
knowing and acting into a single act in the interest of liberation rather than cultural invasion and 
domination. 
3.3.2 CULTURAL INVASION 
In a situation where the culture of the Black people was marginalised and excluded through 
cultural invasion processes, the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) argued for the adoption 
of strategies which encouraged them to 'relearn, rediscover and re-evaluate their own culture and 
history' (AZAPO Education Secretariat, 1991:233). Amongst the issues, which needed to be 
revitalised, was African languages and the history of the African people. The AZAPO Education 
Secretariat was of the view that the glorification of the English language and literature had dire 
consequences for African culture and languages -the idea that these were inferior and minor 
concern 'not worthy of serious pursuit'. In addition, the organisation said that the official 
Apartheid history syllabus which was 'the study of the success of the conqueror over conquered' 
was to be 'transformed in order to reflect honestly on the resistance of African people against 
colonisation' (Ibid: 226). On this basis a foundation could be laid for a more dialogical and 
inclusive history and culture of South Africa. The implication this has for the pedagogic process 











start from the knowledge and experience students bring with them to school. Since pupils are not 
blank, the critical analysis or interrogation of their cultural experiences can yield new knowledge 
which can further advance our understanding of social reality (Erwin 1991: 297). In this way the 
role of the masses as students-teachers of traditional culture and history would be 
acknowledged(AZAPO Education Secretariat, 1991: 232). 
According to Barney Pityana (1972), those who are subjected to a system of domination are 
culturally alienated. These are individuals whose alienated culture deceived them that their 
thinking and worldviews could be embraced in communities which are not their own. Such 
persons, Pityana believes, suffer the effects of cultural invasion (or alienation). This concept has 
been defined by Freire in the Pedagogy of The Oppressed as follows: 
"In cultural invasion ... the invaders are the authors of ,and actors in, the process; 
those they invade are the objects. The invaders mould, those they invade are 
moulded. The invaders choose ;those they invade follow that choice or are 
expected to follow it . The invaders act; those they invade have only the illusion of 
acting, through the action of the invaders" (Freire,1972: 121). 
In a similar vein, Barney Pityana characterised the oppressed Black people of South Africa as 
follows: 
" ... the black person has been 'uprooted ,pursued , battled , doomed to watch the 
dissolution of the truths he (sic) has always treasured'. As a result of this antimony 
that co-exists with us Blacks, we can draw two conclusions : 'White men (sic) 
consider themselves superior to black men. Black men want to prove to white men 
at all costs , the richness of their thought, the equal value of their intellect'. This is 
true and is to be regretted. It is a negative way of expressing one's values. It creates 
the unfortunate impression that all values are white orientated and all standards are 
white determined. This I cannot accept. I believe that we have values and standards 
which are bound to be different from those of the whites simply because the whites 
enjoy the privileges blacks are robbed of. There cannot be much in common between 
two peoples in that situation of imbalance. I am not aspiring to be equal to a white 
man but I am determined to establish my worth as a God-created being. I have to 
assert my BEING as a person" (Pityana, 1972: 178 ). 
In this regard, Alexander says there is a need to work towards the transformation and 
Africanisation of the curricula and syllabi as the Apartheid education system was a denial of our 
African heritage and a negation of African experience. In addition, Alexander argues that 
liberatory education practices should aim at the recognition and interrogation of our African past. 
It is for this reason that critical educators should not wait for the final achievement of liberation 
in order to begin transforming our education system. Whilst the changing of the educational 











and parcel of complex processes through which our freedom could be won (Alexander, 1987: 
15). 
Within the education system part of egalitarian praxis will, according to Jansen (1990 : 332), 
involve giving expression and validating pupil's existential experience and prior knowledge. In 
such a process the language and cultural forms which 'give meaning to student's experiences' are 
acknowledged (ibid.). In other words, Iiberatory education is an education whose curriculum is 
constructed with the view to integrate student's forms of culture and knowledge in the classroom 
dialogue process(Ibid:333). This, according to Flanagan (1991:6) and Njobe (1990:59), is in 
line with people's education's view that the socio-political and cultural context must be taken into 
consideration when the school curriculum is constructed. Flanagan says one of the aims of 
people's education is to design a curriculum which is sensitive and relevant to the life 
experiences of the educattee. Njobe on the other hand believes 'an education for liberation 
curriculum must grow out of the cultural experience of society' (Ibid.) 
In this regard, Coetzee says Freire advocated for a cultural revolution in which culture will be 
reconstructed within a broader liberation process. Within this reconstruction process the school 
curriculum will be redesigned to serve as a conscientisation instrument of such a cultural 
revolution (1995: 123). In her own words: 
"At the root of most of the criticism that people's education brought against the 
existing (traditional) school curriculum in South Africa was that this curriculum 
reflected the western cultural ideal as established by colonial rule. This included the 
values, skills and knowledge pertinent to capitalism, domination by the white male 
Euro - centric (white) high culture, academic excellence and individualism - all of 
which were claimed to be alien to indigenous people and did not take account of the 
indigenous cultural heritage. The 'academic' curriculum (with its European roots) 
was not acceptable to people's education; the proposed aim of people's education was 
to inculcate the worth of the indigenous people and the value system of their own 
traditional cultures ... "(Coetzee,1995:132). 
Coetzee's view is supported by Khotseng et al (1987: 157) who argue for an education system 
which encourages educators to strive to understand the language and modes of experience of the 
learners. Khotseng et al believe Freire was right in saying that liberatory education practices 
must centre on learners experiences, for the pedagogical process derived from this approach 
might help students to validate their own experiences. Hence such an interrogation of their own 
cultural experience with the teacher might yield self-expression and self-confirmation cultural 
practices for the learners (Ibid.). Such a development of self-awareness or critical consciousness 











of the view that the teacher must build on the thematic universe of the students (1986:233). 
Similarly, McKay and Romm (1992:143) say these themes and their inter-linkages must be 
analysed within the historical cultural context of the learner. Nevertheless, Alexander advises 
that the privacy of the educatee's experience must not entail an uncritical acceptance of student's 
world-views. For him, while the leamer's experience provides a point of departure in the 
learning process, teachers must not accept student's perspectives, worldviews and experiences 
uncritically. Instead, the educator's task is to guide students to a critical understanding and/or 
analysis of such experiences. However, Alexander believes the marginalisation/ exclusion 
processes which affect the oppressed's experiences and knowledge in the curriculum content 
warrant such exclusive focus on their culture (Alexander, 1990:220). In my view Giddens's 
concept of ideology critique which is similar to Freire's notion of critical reflection should be 
utilized in order to expose cultural invasion and banking education practices as acts of 
domination which need to be challenged and transformed. 
3.3.3 APARTHEID EDUCATION AS BANKING EDUCATION 
SA Freirians have characterised Apartheid education as a banking-type pedagogy which played a 
part in promoting domination mechanisms of the Apartheid state. Alexander (1987) and 
Mkhatshwa (1990) in particular characterised education under Apartheid as symbiotically 
intertwined within Apartheid power. For Alexander, Apartheid education was a form of social 
control (1987:13) while Mkhatshwa, who believed education was either for domination or for 
freedom, considered people's education 'a devastating indictment on apartheid slave education' 
(1990: 300). Hence Khotseng urged South Africans to struggle for the total eradication of the 
dehumanisation elements of Apartheid education (1986: abstract). This view was shared by 
Jonathan Jansen, who, following Freire, called for the transformation of the banking concept of 
education in order that the students-subjects can engage in an act of knowing which brings about 
liberation (Jansen, 1990: 332). 
In the same vein, Jantjes (1997:3-5) criticised Apartheid education for promoting retelling, 
repeating, and of memorisation of prescribed material without critical thinking. Consequently the 
students who went through this indoctrination process were compelled to intemalise whole 
aspects of this dehumanization education without question (Khotseng et ai, 1987: 166). In other 
words, the products of under-negotiated and rigidly adhered to curriculum plan were dependent 
and domesticated subjects incapable of independent action (Adendorff, 1993: 327). Paraphrasing 











that this banking education turns students into containers and the educator, a depositor of 
knowledge into students-depositories. For this reason, Njobe said the traditional teaching method 
which compelled pupils to echo and memorise knowledge content as prescribed must be 
rejected. In support of this view, Coetzee believed the stunting of critical thought and creativity 
in banking education accounted for its rejection. 
Furthermore, Coetzee is of the view that banking education is in the service of an oppressive 
power structure which uses the school curriculum to manipulate people to conform to the 
'system'. In this sense, the school curriculum is an instrument of power, conquest, and 
oppression. Its objective is to discourage people from critical thinking so that they can be easily 
manipulated and domesticated such that they consider the status quo as natural and inevitable 
(Coetzee, 1995: 15-16). Enslin sees this state of affairs, of treating oppression as natural/normal, 
as an outcome of anti-dialogical education's indoctrination. She believes both the oppressors and 
the oppressed are manifestations of dehumanisation. As she puts it: 
"Anti-dialogical, 'narrative' education, which is found in oppressive systems is 
likened by Freire to a system of 'banking' in which the knowing teacher transfers 
learning to the passive, ignorant, learner (37). This domesticating learning leads to a 
distorted view of reality" ( Enslin, 1986:228-229). 
In page 6-7 of the 1997 Curriculum 2005 document, Apartheid education was seen as promoting 
passive learning, rote learning, teacher-centredness and a rigid content-based syllabi and 
curricula. Apartheid education, as Mkhatshwa has indicated, was education which was 
'inextricably, linked with the social system' (1985:8). In the same vein, Khotseng et aI, believed 
South African schools under apartheid had 'become extended caricatures of oppression and 
dehumanisation' as they served to justify the discriminatory policies of the Apartheid state 
(1987: 151). Consequently, this education operated to reproduce 'apartheid structures of 
oppression, domination, dehumanisation and humiliation' (Ibid.). Through a divided curriculum 
Whites and Blacks were socialised differently in Apartheid schools with the former prepared for 
the exercise of power and domination and the latter for subservient roles in the social structure. 
In this sense, the curriculum under Apartheid rule was an instrument of social control with White 
students assured of future dominant positions and Blacks 'low-status' jobs in society (Ibid: 151-
153). Echoing Freire, Khotseng et al believed Black children had to fight for their right to be 
human by challenging an education system whose control mechanisms were meant to cow them 
into accepting the status quo (Ibid:153). The banking concept of education, they argued, needed 
to be replaced by 'problem-solving education'(a concept mistaken for Freire's problem-posing 











dominated beings who accepted the Apartheid status quo without question. For this reason, and 
like Freire, Khotseng et al believed the banking Apartheid education had to be discontinued as it 
represented an insult to Black children's human dignity (Ibid: 165). 
According to McKay and Romm (1992: 30), banking education has as its chief characteristic a 
'one-way-transmission' or rather a 'jug-and-mug' approach to learning with educatees as 
receptacles 'to be filled by the teacher'. This approach to learning encourages the uncritical 
retention ofthe social system as students are only accorded a passive role. As a result they never 
fully develop their critical consciousness which could make it possible for them to change their 
social environment or to interact with it as conscious social subjects. The passive students are 
made objects of history and culture-adapted being who do not have any active role in the 
creation and recreation of their social reality. Following Freire, McKay and Romm (Ibid.) are of 
the view that banking education is implicated in the system of oppression because it regulates the 
way pupils perceive the world and spells out the criteria for demarcating between true and 
discredited knowledge. They also support Freire's view that conscientisation processes must be 
utilised so that students and/or the oppressed could come to the awareness of their enslavement 
in order to abolish it (Ibid.). 
It was also this realisation that led the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) to conscientise 
people to understand that White education was an education for domination and that this racist 
education which socialised pupils to accept an oppressive and exploitative system itself needed 
to be abolished. For the BCM activists, the only alternative to Apartheid education was and 
remains a Freirian-type education for liberation. 
The search for an alternative to Bantu Education was also part of the programme of the trade 
union movement which viewed Apartheid education as some form of ideological control which 
served to perpetuate the domination of the capitalist mode of production (Erwin, 1991: 314). 
According to Alec Erwin, the structures of the S A educational institutions during the Apartheid 
era were undemocratic and authoritarian. Knowledge was separated from existential experience 
and only the teacher was deemed knowledgeable while students knew nothing. In Erwin's own 
words: 
"The process of abstraction is important to advance beyond the specific but when it 
becomes fetishised into static body of knowledge that is known to the teacher but not 
the pupil, then it reinforces authoritarian controL .. In South Africa, Bantu Education 
very explicitly used racism to cultivate division among oppressed people and to 











become ideals which lead in turn, to resistance. The brutality of apartheid had to 
suppress this dangerous possibility. In short, education in a capitalist society and 
education under apartheid weighed heavily against collective action and certainly a 
notion such as people's education was complete anathema" (Ibid:314-315). 
The position taken by Erwin and the trade union movement on Apartheid education is akin to 
that espoused by the HCM's AZAPO offspring which believed the Apartheid education 
philosophy promoted a dogmatic religious view, a divide-and-rule education dispensation and an 
education which served the interests of the capitalist society. This, AZAPO argued, was effectual 
through the imposition of Christian National Education philosophy to all South Africans, the 
fostering of a differentiated education system for Blacks and Whites, and by the inculcation of 
competitive and individualistic values in pupils. The school itself fostered the process of 
alienation by subordinating the religion and culture of the majority of South Africans to an alien 
religious dogma of the dominant White group, by promoting racism and ethnicity amongst 
pupils, and by socialising them with bourgeois values and aspirations. All these factors combined 
to alienate South Africans from African culture and reality while at the same time converting 
them into third-hand imitations of Westerners culturally, socially and economically (AZAPO 
Education Secretariat, 1991: 223). In other words, AZAPO believed Apartheid education 
indoctrinated and domesticated learners. In addition, it promoted the desire for the oppressed 
majority of South Africans to mimic and ape their White oppressors, and socialised pupils to 
adapt to the Apartheid's status quo and to accept this state of affairs as normal and inevitable 
(Ibid:224). The organisation viewed the adapted person as a person as object who must be 
conscientised so that slhe can abandon this state of being in preference of the person as subject 
position (lbid:230). 
Apartheid education in this sense served purposes of enslavement which Freire allotted to 
banking education. According to Mastin Prinsloo(1991: 362), banking education or education for 
domination as characterised by Freire saw teaching as the transmission of culture to passive and 
ignorant students. Reality in this sense was perceived as lifeless and petrified and the pupils as 
mere receptacles wherein the active educator deposits knowledge which students passively 
absorb. Prinsloo said this approach to the learning process served the interests of the dominant 
elite who oppressed and controlled the passivised, adapted, and dominated majority. Freire's 
concept of 'problem-posing' education or education for liberation emerged as an alternative 
which seeked to counteract the negative effects of education for domination. This alternative 
education concept, education for liberation, Prinsloo maintained, was essentially an interactive 
and non-hierarchical pedagogical strategy which replaced the bank-clerk-teacher with a humanist 











"Instead of necrophilic tendencies which treat people as objects and thus reify 
individual consciousness, 'problem-posing' education sees people as conscious 
beings, and consciousness as being directed towards the world'. 'Liberating 
education consists in acts of cognition, not transferals of information'. It is a learning 
situation in which the cognisable object, the contents of the learning activity, far 
from being the end of the cognitive act intermediates the cognitive actors-teachers on 
the one hand and students on the other'. 'Problem-posing education demands the 
resolution of the teacher-student dichotomy'" (Ibid:363). 
The resolution of the oppressor-oppressed and teacher- student dichotomy, SA Freirians believe, 
could only happen within the framework of a problem-posing pedagogy whose key element is 
conscientisation. In fact it is the concept of conscientisation which accounts for the 
unproblematic way Freire's pedagogy was integrated into the political and educational struggle 
in South Africa. 
3.3.4 CONSCIENTISATION 
SA Freirians especially the political activists in the Black Consciousness Movement(BCM) 
embraced Freire's concept of conscientisation because of its utility in the mobilisation of Black 
people against Apartheid oppression and Bantu education. A critical analysis of key statements 
made by leading BCM activists at the time reveals a distinctive affinity with the Freirian method 
, in particular , his concept of conscientisation. For instance Steve Biko's elaboration of the 
philosophy of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) is unmistakenly derived from Freire's 
concept of conscientisation. According to him, 
"Conscientisation is a process whereby individuals or groups living within a given 
social and political setting are made aware of their situation. The operative attitude 
here is not so much awareness of the physical sense of their situation, but much more 
their ability to assess and improve their own influence over themselves and their 
environment. .. thus then conscientisation implied a desire to engage people in an 
emancipatory process, in an attempt to free them from a situation of bondage" (in 
Woods, 1978:145). 
Similarly, Barney Pityana (1972:174) believed that for Blacks to work towards preserving their 
humanity in Apartheid South Africa they had to adopt or encourage the formation of a 'new 
consciousness' . In fact Alexander (1990:58) echoed this view when he argued that part of the 
reason for the acceptance of Freire's method in South Africa was its ability to combine 
'education/culture with conscientisation and politicisation' in its liberatory strategy. Another 











oppressed masses to be aware of their situation of oppression so that they could transform it 
(AZAPO Education Secretariat, 1991:223). These statements by BCM activists and Alexander 
were both mirror images and an extension of Freire's concept of conscientisation. In Freire's own 
words, "conscientisation' referred to learning to perceive social, political, and economic 
contradictions, and to take action against the oppressive elements of reality' (Freire, 1972: 16). 
According to Enslin (1986: 211) Freire saw the development of critical consciousness as 
essential in the liberatory struggle against any form of oppresesion. For the subjugated people to 
fight for liberation, critical consciousness was needed for the unveiling of their oppressive 
conditions of existence which were masked Idisguised by the dominant ideology (Ibid:226). 
This view was supported by McKay and Romm (1992:17) who considered people's education a 
pedagogical approach to 'reinvigorate consciousness as part of a liberative education strategy'. 
The implication here is that the subjugated masses needed mobilisation or conscientisation in 
order for them to come into awareness of their conditions of oppression. In addition, McKay 
and Romm (Ibid:98) believed that dialogue was the only instrument by means of which the 
conscientisation process could be made to serve the purposes of liberation. 
Freire's concept of conscientisation also anchored the reflections of African intellectuals who 
were searching for a strategy for integrating the education struggle into the broader national 
liberation struggle in South Africa. Amongst these were Khotseng (1986), Mahlomalolo and 
Matlou (1986) and Matabane (1990). Khotseng, for instance, not only urged South African 
educators to adopt 'conscientasation and self -reliance programmes in education' (1986:abstract), 
but also utilised Freire's educational theory in the analysis of the divided education system in 
South Africa. Khotseng recommended Freirian consceintisation programmes in order to destroy 
socialisation processes within the schools which promoted both the master and slave 
mentality(1986:5 6). In their recommendation for an education suitable for South Africa, 
Khotseng's colleagues, Mahlomaholo and Matlou (1986), echoed Freire when they argued that 
students want 'education that would enhance and intensify self- awareness ,an education that 
would make them more free by providing them with many alternatives from which to 
choose'(Mahlomaholo and Matlou, 1986:3). 
In the same vein, Matabane (1990) recommended for the use of Freire's conscientisation 
strategies to effect social transformation. In her view, for conscientisation which gives the 
subjects the capacity to transform their reality to be effected a literacy campaign which 'seeks to 











social classes but as subjects empowered with critical skills that can help them transform their 
social reality' (Matabane, 1990:354 ), must be undertaken. This, according to her, is the only 
process which brings about a participatory learning-teaching praxis, commitment , and a 
development of a truly liberated society (Ibid.). In this sense, education becomes a political 
instrument for the mobilisation of the oppressed for liberatory action. The politicisation and 
mobilisation function of education in the South African setting was acknowledged by, amongst 
others, Alexander (1987), Kallaway (1987), Coetzee(1995). Alexander believed it was through 
the pedagogy of liberation that students and parents could be mobilised to transform the 
Apartheid education system (1987:13). The Soweto uprising in 1976, he argues, bears testimony 
on how Freire's pedagogy has been utilised in the 1970's for purposes of 'radicalisation or overt 
politicisation of the educational arena' in South Africa (Alexander, 1990:58). Alexander cautions 
that this is not simply a question of mere politicisation but instead, the question of emancipatory 
education praxis in a deep sense (lbid:64). By the same token Kallaway has acknowledged this 
political and conscientisation function of education for liberation in South Africa. As he puts it: 
"I have no quarrel with the use of the slogan as part of a political programme for 
mass mobilisation, nor with the idea that 'people's education' might be part of a 
programme for political education in a time of fundamental transition, a kind of 
counter hegemonic ideological discourse along Freirian lines." (Kalla way , 1987: 1). 
This position is also reflected in Coetzee's writings wherein she argued that the education arena 
was seen by people's education proponents as 'the only viable location from which to mobilise 
children for the struggle for liberation' (Coetzee, 1995:126). Political education within the 
schools was to be directed at transforming the curriculum such that it could form part of the 
means by which Apartheid in general could be challenged and liberation purposes could be 
advanced by its utilisation. In addition, because curricular knowledge would become an 
instrument for breaking the boundary between community and school struggles, its designated 
function was thus to aid in the mobilisation and conscientasation of the oppressed for 
emancipatory praxis. By the same token educators would serve the important function of 
'preparing students to take part in the struggle for power'(Ibid.). In this sense, people's education 
was no longer just challenging the authoritarian, divisive, and discriminatory Apartheid 
education structure , but instead had grown to represent a full-blown programme for the 
liberation of South Africa (Ibid. :128). Hence students were no longer demanding education 
similar to that of White children as this was education for domination but they were now fighting 
for liberatory education which gives power to the people (Ibid: 126). I concur with SA Freirians, 
especially McKay and Romm (1992:9), that conscientisation generates critical consciousness 











situation. Such a conscientisation process is located within Freire's pedagogy of knowing whose 
other characteristics include dialogue, liberatory action and humanisation. 
3.3.5 PEDAGOGY OF KNOWING 
The BCM before its banning in 1977 was by and large influenced by Freire's 'pedagogy of 
knowing'. Various reasons and positions have been advanced for the attractiveness of 
conscientisation strategies for these activists. Helbig and Alexander seem to have captured the 
essence of these when they argued that Freire's pedagogy was acceptable to SA educational 
activists because its anti-capitalist stand was in accord with their views; its pedagogical approach 
which was an admixture of education/culture with conscientization and politicisation was in 
accord with the BCM ideology and this method was later embraced by the entire liberation 
movement; and its sensitivity to democratic principles appealled to alternative education activists 
who were up against an Apartheid education which was evidently authoritarian, impregnated 
with undemocratic procedures and divisive (Alexander and Helbig, 1988: 68-69). In addition, 
Helbig, and Alexander believed Brazil where Freire's problem-posing education approach 
emerged had some resemblance with the situation in South Africa's 'ghettos and homelands' 
(Ibid.). Hence it became easier for South African educationists and political activists such as 
Rick Turner and Neville Alexander inter alia to embrace Freire's pedagogy of knowing as an 
instrument of educational and political liberation in South Africa. In the early 1970's, Rick 
Turner synthesised the essence of Freire's pedagogical approach in the following statement: 
"There is no body of key facts that have to be learned in some specific order. What 
has to be learned is a particular way of thinking, the ability to analyse, to think 
critically, and to think creatively" (Turner, 1980: 67). 
In an article entitled Fundamentals of a Pedagogy of Liberation for South Africa! Azania in the 
Eighties, Neville Alexander also argued for an approach to educational transformation similar to 
that of Freire. According to him, education should encourage students to question, doubt and 
challenge racial capitalism (Alexander, 1987: 13). With the advent of the 'People's education for 
people's power' in the mid-1980's, Father Simangaliso Mkhatshwa became one of the politico-
educational activists who initiated moves to integrate Freire's pedagogy into the educational 
praxis in South Africa. Mkhatshwa was of the view that education cannot be separated from 
other elements of the social system, such as, the socio-economic, politico-ideological and 
cultural components of which it was inextricably intertwined (Mkhatshwa, 1985: 8). In the 











by quoting from one of Freire's celebrated books, Cultural Action for Freedom. Mkhatshwa's 
unreserved endorsement of the transformative nature of Freire's critical pedagogy was based on 
the following grounds: First, the idea that education is political and not neutral. Second, the 
Freirian thesis that education either serves purposes of domination or liberation. For Mkhatshwa, 
despite the traditional view that education serves social control purposes, education can also be 
successfully utilised as a vehicle for social change or transformation. The reason for this capacity 
for education to promote emancipation or transformative processes is, as Mkhatshwa puts it, 
'because people are essentially capable of reflecting on their action and behaviour' (Ibid.). 
A student leader, Lulu Johnson, who shared the same platform with Mkhatshwa, confirmed the 
general acceptance of Freire's conception of education when he said 'those who learn must teach 
and those who teach must learn' (Johnson, 1985:20). Indeed, one of the 1985 - 1986 NECC 
conference resolution encouraged this spirit of critical co-investigation between the teacher and 
his/her pupils when it stated that the people's education 'programme must encourage critical and 
creative thinking and working methods' (in Millar et aI, 1991: 253). In support of this view, 
Muller (1991:329) believed for people's education to be successfully implemented emphasis 
should be put on the process of creating learner-driven 'learning packages' which could be 
operationalised even in the absence of a knowledgeable teacher and the development of critical 
skills amongst learners. The development of critical skills was also a preoccupation of 
Mokubung Nkomo's Freirian-inspired proposal for a broad literacy campaign in South Africa. 
As part of the requirement for the implementation of 'People's Education for People's Power', 
Nkomo proposed that: 
"A massive literacy campaign must be undertaken to bring the power of the word to 
the thousands who have been forced out of school under apartheid education and 
millions in the rural areas who have been on the periphery of the education system 
and society. Such a campaign 'must seek to enable the participants to view 
themselves not as objects who are at the mercy of the dominant social classes but as 
subjects empowered with critical skills that can help them transform social reality' 
47" (1990: 305). 
The observation which can be made from Nkomo's statement is that conscious subjects with 
critical skills, as those in Freire's dialogical pedagogy, can engage in trans formative action 
which can bring about liberation. Nkomo links this transformative process in SA to attempts 
which have been made to transform schools into organs of 'People's Power for People's 
Education' in the mid to late 1980's. A case in point here is the link made by Mkhatshwa 
between the practice of people's education and the development of critical skills in South Africa 











"by .. people's education, we mean one which prepares people for total human 
liberation, one which helps people to be creative, to develop a critical mind, to help 
people to analyse, one that prepares people for full participation in all social, 
political or cultural spheres of society" (Quoted in Nkomo, 1990:300). 
Other South African scholars who concur with the view that liberative education must socialise 
critical skills to students include Clifford (1991), J antjes (1997) and Jansen (1990). On this issue 
Clifford was of the view that education must serve purposes of awakening critical consciousness 
in the learners. This implies that education must be liberating rather than domesticating. In 
addition, Clifford believed 'such education is a process and not a body of knowledge which is 
banked or deposited by the teacher in learners' minds' (Clifford, 1991: 57). For Jantjes, on the 
other hand, 'reflection and action on the processes of teaching and learning' must take centre-
stage (Jantjes, 1997: 1). Furthermore, Jantjes treated this open learning and inquiry as some form 
of lifelong education situation within which creativity, critical analysis, critique and 
transformative action are promoted (Ibid: 10). In her own words: 
"Education for me become a process of illumination, which is more than just an 
intellectual's task. It had become real - a process of both knowing reality as well as 
how reality is made ... It is knowledge that is not given and which is not absolute, 
just as the processes of teaching and learning are not absolute. With ongoing 
interaction and communication between the learning process and the reality of 
changing societies there can never be an end-point or a stopping-point in the 
development of a teacher" (Jantjes, 1997: 10). 
For the above reasons, Jansen (1990: 333) has recommended that prospective teachers must get a 
critical theoretical orientation which could allow them a critical choice of alternative education 
strategies. Hence, it can be argued that Clifford, Jantjes and Jansen's educational approaches 
have been informed by Freire's pedagogy. Through content analysis notions such as 
humanisation, liberation, creativity, critical thinking and full participation in their writings could 
be found to be Freirian in origin. The call for people's education which would transform 
Apartheid education in the process leading to liberation, justice and freedom was, therefore, a 
mirror image of Freire's recommendation that we practice dialogical problem-posing pedagogy 
or education for liberation which not only negates the effects of banking education but also 
conscientise the masses to engage in cultural action for freedom. 
Freirian-type literacy campaigns are seen as means of overcoming illiteracy, oppression and 
exploitation the legacy of colonialism especially Christian Nationalism has imposed on the 











by which we can 'stimulate intellectual growth, critical thinking and active participation of the 
people in the radical transformation of the country's political, economic, social and cultural 
structures' (Matabane, 1990: 354). In support of this position, Coetzee says 'knowledge must not 
be perceived to be a gift by the knowledgeable to students who know nothing'. Students are not 
in a state of total ignorance that teachers must transmit knowledge in an absolute form as the 
banking system would like us to believe. Rather, knowledge is a process of enquiry, invention 
and reinvention, creation and recreation, and construction and reconstruction necessary for 
people to transform their socio-historical situation for the benefit of humanity as a whole 
(Coetzee, 1995:129-130). In other words, the Freirian pedagogy which informed the pedagogical 
struggle of the 1970's and the 1980' s in South Africa has as a central element critical thinking 
which ensures the liberation of the oppressed masses from an oppressive society (Enslin, 
1986:227). This then, is the critical attitude towards men's existential conditions which Freire's 
pedagogy encourages-an attitude of no surrender or submission to the decisions or choices of the 
dominant elite. It is an attitude which demands that the oppressed transform their existential 
situation as conscious subjects rather than objects (Ibid.), Hence Van den Heveer believes 
Freire's pedagogy is well-placed to inspire us to action and reflection for liberation-in a word, 
cultural action for freedom. As he puts it: 
"When one considers that the development of critical analysis of the nature of 
oppression and a joint commitment of teachers and students to a liberated curriculum 
content have become a feature of our high school today, then it is clear that Freire's 
pedagogy of liberation is adequately suited to our present needs in education" (Van 
den Heveer, 1987: 6). 
I think Freire's pedagogy of knowing which has as central features critical and creative thinking 
is possible. Such a pedagogy will be akin to the practice of reflexivity and ideology critique 
advanced by Giddens and Thompson. This practice involves unmasking relations of domination 
through the process of creating and recreating meanings and social practices in the light of 
incoming information (Giddens, 1990:38). It is through the utilisation of the concept of 
reflexivity that the process of generating and reforming systematic knowledge could be grounded 
(Ibid:45). And since Habermas says human knowledge is not disinterested but guided by interest, 
the analysis of how modes of discourse are co-opted within systems of domination through 
ideology critique is necessary. Hence Habermas believes as part of social science practice we 
must incorporate an emancipatory cognitive interest whose primary objective is human 
emancipation in our research agendas (McKay and Romm, 1992:77-78). In line with this 
thinking, Giddens is of the view that social science critique is a means by which counterfactual 











are made possible (in Held and Thompson (eds.), 1989:5; 288-293; 300-301). The practice of 
reflexivity and ideology critique involves ceaseless discussions and self-questioning about the 
status of knowledge inherent in Freire's dialogical stmtegy. 
3.3.5.1 THE DIALOGICAL NATURE OF THE PEDAGOGY OF KNOWING 
The international enthusiasm for dialogical educational praxis was not only shared by the BCM 
and literacy organisations in South Africa but also became an instrument through which 
educational struggles were linked to the broader liberatory project. The specific implication for 
the educational institutions was that the educator and the educatee were to be encouraged to learn 
through conversation (Aronowitz and Giroux, 1986:12). Amongst the pioneers in the exposition 
ofthis approach in scholarly writings in South Africa was Jacklyn Cock who argued: 
'The key to sociological engagement lies in bringing the student's experience into the 
classroom. This stress on experience involves creating an atmosphere of openness 
and trust in the classroom so that students are able to articulate and share experience. 
The lecturer must make it very clear that students are not viewed simply as empty 
vessels waiting to be filled, but as experienced participants in a way of life with 
valuable views and understandings. The lecturer must know something of the 
students' backgrounds and to build on widely differing experiences so as to enable 
the building of bridges. Students are far more likely to get involved in a subject of 
open-ended questions in the classroom by breaking the class into smaller groups 
(buzz-groups) so that a lively atmosphere of involvement is created, and co-
opemtion, mutual tolerance and respect for disagreement encouraged" (Cock quoted 
in Dixie, 1986: 5 - 6) 
Cock's theorisation of the pedagogical strategies to be employed in the teaching of sociology 
mentioned above bears testimony to the deep influence of Freire's pedagogy of knowing on the 
South African 'alternative' educators. There is a clear acceptance by Cock here of Freire's view 
that the cultural capital of learners should be central to curriculum construction. In addition, 
both the critique of narrative education and the suggested alternative, dialogical education, from 
Freire's Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1972) constituted the extreme poles in Cock's discussion 
about classroom practices. It is therefore not surprising that other South African educators 
considered Freire's approach a starting point in the analysis of education. 
Other Freirian-type social practices were experimented in the form of 'action research and school 
improvement' projects. These experiments were undertaken by both the university of the 
Western Cape (UWC)and the University of Cape Town (UCT) as part of a training programme 











is my contention that what is termed 'Action Research' is identical to the theory and practice of 
Freire's pedagogy of knowing. Melanie Walker sums up the transformative potential of action 
research ( and by implication that of the pedagogy of knowing) as follows: 
"The interest among progressive teacher educators in action research, however, also 
arises from its potential to inform crucial questions about transformative curric ulum 
practice in people's education while also contributing to the professional growth of 
teachers trained under apartheid education"(Ibid.). 
Adendorff is one of other educationist who, following Freire's recommendation that dialogue be 
central to the education process, has adopted the conversation style in conducting university 
lessons (1993:273). He is of the view that using discussion groups is not a mere tactic for getting 
results or making students more friendly to the educator so that they cannot question processes 
which obscure reality within the classroom. Rather, he maintains, genuine and democratic 
communication is a tool for affirming freedom in creating and recreating culture and history. In 
addition, Adendorff says dialogue disconfirms domination in a process whose end-product is the 
empowerment of both the teacher and his students (Ibid:318,321). Such an empowerment 
demands that students and their teacher have joint responsibility of the classroom processes. The 
promotion of shared responsibility between the leaner and the teacher and participatory two-way 
learning methods, as well as the egalitarianism advocated by Matabane (1990:354), are a carbon 
- copy of dialogical strategies Freire advocated for towards the realisation of education and/or 
broad revolutionary social transformation. 
In Freire's view knowledge and praxis are inseparable and therefore social transformation 
informed by knowledge is only possible when the agent's strategy involves active dialogue 
(Coetzee, 1995: 15). According to Flanagan and Sayed (1994: 159), 'dialogue is a highly 
systematic form of communication which requires a teacher'. Nevertheless, dialogical relations 
are only possible if both the teacher and students co-operate with each other such that both learn 
and teach simultaneously (Prinsloo, 1991: 363). 
In this regard, Enslin (1986:228-229) says Freire's dialogical education has as its central feature 
the development of an autonomous individual. This, according to her, can only be achieved by 
the use of anti-authoritarian teaching methods which are by their nature dialogical. For this 
reason, she continues, anti-dialogical 'narrative' education strategies are rejected by Freire 
because they are domesticating and oppressive. These banking methods treat students as 
knowing nothing or ignorant and the teacher as a carrier of knowledge which he transfers to 











works to awaken political consciousness III students so that they could be active agents of 
liberation. Within the school, Enslin says dialogical education encourages a dialectical 
relationship between the teacher-student and learners-teachers. In this sense the educator-pupil 
contradiction has been resolved and transcended by the process of critical co-investigation 
within the classroom. Enslin (lbid:23l) says it is important to note that dialogical education 
produces an autonomous, fully developed individual who is incompatible with the 'subject as 
object' produced by banking education. The reason for this is that the passive subject who 
emerges from memorising knowledge 'deposits' has been fashioned by an authoritarian process 
rather than the democratic dialogical one allowed in Freire's pedagogy. 
Dialogical education processes are also promoted in McKay and Romm (1992), s work on 
education for liberation. McKay and Romm say Freire's dialogical education embraces 
discursive knowledge where the teacher and the students are critical co- investigators in dialogue 
with each other. Critical co-investigation implies participation in dialogue and self-reflection 
which is the basis for emancipatory social transformation. Nevertheless reflection might also 
lead to the postponement of action without those involved being criticised for inaction. This is 
because critical reflection in itself implies action as action and reflection happen simultaneously. 
In addition ,delaying action while still weighing up options is an action of transforming ideas and 
consciously reflecting on all possible choices (McKay and Romm, 1992:95-96). The key factor 
here is the acknowledgement of the relativity or non-finality of social reality. It is for this reason 
that democratic decisions are only achievable through a dialogical process which does not imply 
a total absence of doubt. In the absence of dialogue decisions are made which in the final 
analysis might tum out to be oppressive to those who did not participate in the process. Only 
through dialogue could people be conscientised to transform their conditions of existence as 
conscious subjects. Decisions which are reached without dialogue impose silence and passivity 
as well as prevent people to develop consciousness necessary for liberatory action (lbid:98). In a 
situation like the one which existed in South Africa under Apartheid rule where dialogue and 
participation were forbidden , the conscientisation strategy which makes people conscious of 
their oppressive reality so that they can change it must be employed (Ibid.). This is exactly what 
the BCM, influenced by Freire's pedagogy of knowing, set out to do since the late 1960's. 
According to Nolutshungu (1982: 160), the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) of South 
Africa concentrated on conscientising the oppressed masses and raising their political aspirations 












In relation to the nature and form conscientisation should take within schools, McKay and 
Romm advocated vigorously for the learning facilitation strategy to be adopted within the 
classroom (1992:116). Such a strategy, they maintain blurs the distinction between the educator 
and the learner such that both become critical co-investigators. In this way domesticated 
consciousness is averted and both the educator and the students become intellectuals who 
participate fully in the knowledge production process (Ibid: 139). Dialogue again becomes central 
to this learning facilitation strategy which makes teachers and students alike co-learners. Hence 
McKay and Romm say the people's education project can benefit much from the communicative 
discourse advocated by Freire (Ibid: 140). In addition, they argue that since speech is indissolubly 
linked with freedom, and oppression with the theme of silence, those who want to transform our 
education system must treat 'discursive skills as fundamental in educational curricula' (Ibid: 141-
142). 
With regard to the issue of the curriculum, McKay and Romm are of the view that any course 
material can be explored through the use of a dialogical approach so that the critical aspect of the 
subject matter could be investigated, scrutinised and/or interrogated. Put differently, dialogue is 
central in the critical investigation of any historical dimension of knowledge (Ibid:143). Even 
where project leaders are to be chosen, the criteria for their selection must include 'possession of 
a dialogical consciousness', 'critical and self-critical' abilities and 'popular accountability' 
(Ibid: 149). 
Mckay and Romm are also of the idea that dialogue is central to the establishment of democratic 
action and reflection and democratic decision-making processes. It is the experience of dialogue 
and participation which is responsible for the emergence of conscious beings who could act to 
transform their social reality (Ibid:98; see also Freire 1976: 118), The dialogical process becomes 
democratic if various perspectives are brought in and interrogated before any intersubjective 
understanding is reached. This is in line with Habermas's concept of the 'public sphere' which 
refers to 'the space in which citizens deliberate about their common affairs, hence, an 
institutionalised arena of discursive interaction' (Torres and Morrow, 1998:22). In the concept of 
the public sphere, Habermas puts emphasis on 'discursive interaction' that is open-ended enough 
to accommodate internal differences and debates (Ibid:23). Torres and Morrow say that this 
aspect of democratic conversation and discourse is encapsulated in Freire's concept of dialogue 
especially because of Freire's 'lifelong quest to identify and cross borders' (Ibid:25) in order to 
accommodate differing perspectives and identities in the ongoing dialogue whose main 











In fact McKay and Romm have embraced Freire's conception of dialogue because it had 
characteristics which were similar to Habermas's communicative action theory which they found 
convincing. In their view, Habermas's idea that for emancipation to take place people should be 
engaged in dialogue, is defensible. The reason they give for this acceptance is the fact that 
emancipatory interest derived dialogue in Habermas is not only meant for the quest for 
knowledge but, in addition, it is also the basis for intersubjective understanding (McKay and 
Romm, 1992:94). I think Habermas's critique of ideology has created conditions for 
intersubjective knowledge and social action for emancipation as explicated in his theory of 
communicative action. Communicative action is a primary mode of action co-ordination 
accounting for intersubjectivity in society. Hence I believe Habermas's view that in order to 
achieve intersubjectivity, distorted communication be replaced by ideal speech situation (Cooke, 
1994:8-27), is not only akin to Freire's conception of dialogical action for freedom but it is also 
a strategy which must be embraced for the universal humanisation of all. In a context where 
consensus is arrived at through the force of better argument free from any distorted 
communication, the achievement of liberation and humanisation is possible. It is to the liberatory 
nature of the pedagogy of knowing that we tum. 
3.3.5.2 EDUCATION FOR LIBERATION. 
SA Freirians, such as, AZAPO, believe that 'education is liberatory' because it can be used to 
'conscientise' the oppressed to take action to transform their situation (AZAPO Education 
Secretariat, 1991:230). This view attests to AZAPO's adherence to Feire's 'pedagogy of 
knowing' during the late 1970's and the 1980's. This is a trend which emerged in the South 
African educational and political struggle since the formation of SASO in the late 1960' sand 
went on to inform the practice of AZAPO from its formation in the late 1970's through to the 
1980' s. The Azanian Manifesto advocates for an educational praxis which serve purposes of 
liberating South African people from 'all forms of oppression, exploitation and ignorance' 
(National Forum, 1991:272). 
According to the AZAPO Education Secretariat (1991:232), the overall function of education 
must include equipping learners for change or social transformation. To do this 'it must spell 
freedom from ignorance , fear , dehumanisation and oppression' (Ibid.) such that our 
educational activity might form part and parcel of the overall struggle for liberation from 











aims. In its stead education should be seen as a liberating instrument. Furthermore the AZAPO 
Education Secretariat is of the view that education as an integral part of a revolutionary praxis 
must also be utilised for building a liberated society which has as its key values, collective 
responsibility, co- operation, full participation by all, critical co-investigation and inventiveness 
(Ibid :233 ). 
What this implied was that through education the oppressed in South Africa during the Apartheid 
era were to be conscientised to understand their situation of oppression so that they could change 
it through liberatory activities. Part of this process of liberation involved relearning, 
rediscovering, re-evaluation and reinvigorating their own history and culture (Ibid:233). In 
support of this view was Neville Alexander, a key educationist whose political development 
occurred within the Unity Movement and also as a member of the National Forum, who 
believed the implementation of alternative education demanded the re-education of educators 
so that their capacity to effect social and educational changes could be revealed (Alexander 
1987:13). While Alexander was sceptical about the ability of the oppressed to seize the control 
of formal educational institutions under Apartheid, he nevertheless encouraged social practices 
whose main objective was to turn schools into arenas for liberation. In his view, it was through 
the pedagogy of liberation that students and parents could be mobilised to transform the 
Apartheid education system. This goal was intertwined with the objectives of the broader 
liberation struggle. In order to effectively serve the interests of national liberation , Alexander 
maintained education for liberation was to expose the shallowness of the White ruling class 
conception of knowledge (Ibid.). 
For this reason, Alexander recommended that education must socialise in students the ideals of a 
socialist future as part and parcel of the broader liberation struggle. But this should be done in a 
democratic way such that this politicisation process become part of a liberation pedagogy geared 
towards unleashing the creative powers of students for the emancipation of their society. 
Learning in this sense is linked to political action for a socialist future. For this reason, 
alternative education or people's education in South Africa was necessarily education for the 
liberation of the Black oppressed from processes of domination and exploitation (Alexander, 
1990: 63 - 66; 109). Unlike the sectarian, who think for others and imposes his views on them as 
if they were mere objects, the liberatory educator participates with their subjects in the process of 
liberation. The AZAPO Education Secretariat had this to say on this matter: 
"Liberatory education and sectarianism are incompatible. Sectarianism, is 











communicative. The sectarian disrespects the choice of others, he tries to impose his 
own choice on others. Herein lies the inclination of the sectarian to activism: action 
without the vigilance of reflection; the sectarian sloganises, which remains at the 
level of myths and half-truths and attributes absolute values to that which is relative. 
The liberatory educationist rejects mere activism and submits his action to reflection" 
(1991: 230). 
In the mid-1980's a new politico-educational struggle which also drew inspiration from Freire's 
problem-posing pedagogy took centre-stage. As a result of struggles within the education arena 
between the students and the Apartheid educational authority and the crisis thereof, a national 
consultative conference was called by the Soweto parents towards the end of the 1980s. It was at 
this consultative conference on education on the 28th and 29th December 1985, where the idea of 
'people's education for people's power' originated. During the conference the delegates declared 
that: 
"People's Education is education that: 
Enables the oppressed to understand the evils of the apartheid system and prepares 
them for participation in a non-racial, democratic system; 
Eliminate capitalist norms of competition, individualism, and stunted intellectual 
development and one that encourages collective input and active participation by all, 
as well as stimulating critical thinking and analysis; 
Eliminates illiteracy, ignorance, and exploitation of any person by another; 
Equips and trains all sectors of our people to participate actively and creatively in the 
struggle to attain people's power in order to establish a non-racial, democratic South 
Africa; 
Allows students, parents, teachers and workers to be mobilised into appropriate 
organisational structures which enable them to participate actively in the initiation 
and management of People's Education in all its forms; 
Enables workers to resist exploitation and oppression at the workplace" {SAIRR 
Topic Briefing, Reg. No. 05/1 0068/08 (PD/3/86)}. 
According to Zwelakhe Sisulu, one of the pioneers of the people's education movement, the only 
alternative to Bantu Education was People's education. People's education was a democratic-
type of education which liberated people to take charge of their lives. It was different to both 
Bantu Education and White Education, two of the various versions of SA's own education for 
domination, Apartheid education, because it was education at the service of all South Africans. 
In addition, people's education was part of the overall struggle for liberation in SA and its 
entrenchment could only be secured when liberation was achieved (Sisulu, 1991:266). The most 











involved conscientisation for 'total human liberation' which entailed critical thinking and full 
participation in society's activities(in Nkomo,1990:300). In Mkhatshwa's own words, 
"people's education 'is a devastating indictment on apartheid slave education. The 
call is now for liberation, justice and freedom. It is a demand for full participation in 
all social structures' 35" (Quoted in Nkomo, 1990:300). 
Another South African scholar involved with the education transformation debate, Coetzee 
(1995) saw the objectives of people's education as linked to the principal aim of the South 
African liberation struggle. According to Coetzee, both people's education and the freedom 
struggle wanted political power to be transferred from the Apartheid state to the liberation 
movement so that the effects of colonialism and Apartheid education could be completely 
obliterated. Within the classroom the aim was to democratise the process of constructing the 
curriculum such that parents, teachers and students participate fully in mechanisms and strategies 
of knowledge production. Because education can serve both domination and liberation functions, 
the People's education movement wanted a school curriculum whose 'relevant' knowledge 
content would be able to conscientise students to come to an awareness of their oppressive 
situation, and transform it. In the envisaged transformed situation, domination, oppression and 
individual interest were to be replaced by collective interest, hence 'people's education for 
people's power' (Coetzee, 1995:130-131). 
The concept of "People's Education for people's power" is related to Freire's notion of 
education for liberation(see SAIRR Topic Briefing, Reg No. 05/10068/08/(PD/3/86); Freire, 
1984:125). Coetzee(1995) is also of the view that the main objectives of People's Education 
have been derived from Paulo Freire's critical educational theory. Freire's influence, she 
maintains, is clearly discernible in the majority of what is presented as the educational, social, 
and political objectives 'people's education' is supposed to have. In the first instance the 
rejection of Apartheid education because it serves domination purposes fits in well with Freire's 
rejection of banking education as education for domination which prevents liberation processes 
to take root. Secondly, Freire has argued consistently that education and politics are linked and 
that education is political and not neutral. The advocation for the linking of the educational 
struggle with the political struggle in South Africa in a way which turns curriculum content into 
knowledge pertinent to the fight for national liberation clearly reflect close kinship between 
people's education activists and Freire. Third, Freire's rejection of banking education in favour 
of education for liberation also strike a similar cord with people's education which not only 











for the attainment of 'people's power'. Fourth, the fact that the school curriculum under the 
people's education system must be the outcome of the participation of all members of the 
community is a mirror image of Freire's view that authentic knowledge /truth is provisional and 
it emerges through dialogue. Fifth, both Freire and the people's education proponents are of the 
view that education should empower the oppressed masses. Sixth, they both also believe that 
authoritarian and individualistic values in education should be replaced by collective and 
democratic values of co-operation. Seventh, creative and critical thinking is central to the 
practice of both people's education and Freire's education for liberation. Lastly, while for Freire 
the operationalisation of problem-posing pedagogy will require political power, for People's 
education to be effected, the Apartheid system was to be abolished (Coetzee, 1995:131-132). 
Apart from Coetzee, Walters is one of other South African scholar who believes that Freire had 
made a major contribution towards our understanding of 'education for liberation'. This is 
because his pedagogical approach allows for the integration of education and politics, for the 
development of organic intellectuals responsible for the conscientisation (or 'consciousness-
raising') process amongst the masses on the basis of which the development of the ability to 
think critically is ensured (Walters, 1986:16-17). Van den Heveer (1987:6) and Khotseng 
(1986: abstract) concur that the practice of education as a liberating activity linked to the whole 
process of democratisation and liberation in South Africa has been a chief preoccupation of the 
Freirian pedagogy. The view that Paulo Freire has influenced liberatory education experiments 
including the people's education movement is shared by Coetzee (1995: 129) and Matabane 
(1990:353). 
Matabane (a vocal proponent of the People's Education for People's Power concept )'s 
adherence to the Freirian project and her belief that South African education transformation must 
tap on the rich wealth of this pedagogy is more apparent in her contention that any debate about 
literacy cannot avoid a thorough dissection of Freire's pedagogy of knowing. For her Freire's 
various literacy campaigns in South America and Africa have more bearing in the South African 
education restructuring experiment. In her own words, Freire's writings: 
"have enabled many people to be exposed to his work and his philosophy on 
'transforming education'. Freire asserts that the role of ideology is fundamental to a 
meaningful, liberating and politically empowering education. His writings provide 
excellent examples of the development of literacy material and effective teaching 












The egalitarianism in Matabane's education for transformation is similar to that of the 
revolutionary education and social transformation education by Freire (Ibid: 154). 
Jonathan Jansen is one other South African education scholar who recommended Freire's 
approach in the struggle for education transformation and democracy in South Africa. Writing on 
the same topic of literacy in South Africa, Jansen believes to facilitate the process of 'mental 
decolonisation', a liberative curriculum is the starting point. He maintains that unless we 
seriously challenge the nature of teaching and learning in an oppressive Apartheid society in 
order to change it, liberatory educational praxis is a pipe-dream (Jansen, 1990:332). 
One of the pedagogical approaches which seem to seriously challenge the nature of teaching and 
learning in South Africa is the action research method. According to Melanie Walker, the action 
research method has similar goals as Freire's liberatory education praxis, that of social 
transformation. But there is a need for a link between critical study in the classroom and action 
aimed at changing society. For this reason, Walker argues, 'if action research is developed 
outside of any oppositional context it might well have the effect of promoting conformity to 
existing social relations rather than challenging them ... ' (1988:2). Action research, like Freire's 
pedagogy, promotes the process of educating for liberation because it does not only serve 
reproductive functions but could be utilised as an arena of contestation and struggle which could 
in the long run contribute to the overall liberation struggle (Adendorff, 1993:73; 144). This 
process of social transformation is characterised by McKay and Romm (1992:113) as: 
"an ongoing process in which people are permanently mobilised to participate in 
defining and fashioning the world. This is what Freire can be seen as referring to 
when he posits 'that revolutionary process which is permanent' .... " 
Problem-posing pedagogy was indeed central to the revolutionary strategy for liberation in South 
Africa. Khotseng et al (1987: 165), in agreeing with these sentiments, argued that because people 
suffering from domination must utilise liberatory education for conscientisation purposes 
necessary for their emancipation, 'problem solving' education(mistaken for Freire's problem-
posing education) is in this sense 'revolutionary futurity'. 
Note the confusion between the Freirian problem-posing education and what Khotseng et al call 
'problem-solving' education. I have argued elsewhere in this chapter that it is the Freirian 
problem-posing education which is the basis for dialogical communication involving reflection 










of education not amenable for dialogical strategies for emancipation. This type of education is 
not part of critical theory. Nevertheless the general idea that education must be a process of 
liberation centered around dialogue involving reflection and action for human emancipation, is a 
defensible one. I think this has more to do with choices since human beings as 'knowledgeable 
social actors' have the capacity to transform their social environment (Giddens, 1976:161). In 
fact Giddens himself has acknowledged that taking the position that agents are 'knowledgeable' 
and 'capable' is to make manifest one's standpoint. Hence human subjects are not simply acted 
upon by knowledge as objects, but instead are active agents who utilise knowledge for their 
social practices, action and reflection (Giddens, 1982:15-16). I believe the political stance one 
takes must be based on what Habermas calls 'normative rightness and subjective sincerity' 
(Dew, 1984:72-95). Claims to 'normative rightness and subjective sincerity' are the foundation 
for authentic communicative action which Habermas believes, like Freire's true dialogue, is the 
basis for the practice of freedom. Hence Giddens's and Habermas's standpoints here could be 
used to strengthen Freire's argument that conscientised subjects through action and reflection 
can make moral and political choices which will enable them to practice cultural action for 
freedom and education for liberation and humanisation. It is to the concept of humanisation that 
we turn. 
3.3.5.3 EDUCATION FOR HUMANISATION 
Amongst those who believe education is not only a process towards liberation but a means for 
the attainment of human emancipation, is AZAPO. According to the AZAPO Education 
Secretariat, education for liberation embodies critical reflection which gives human beings the 
capacity to intervene 'in reality in order to change it' for purposes of humanisation (1991 :230). 
This view has an affinity with Freire's idea that all people have the 'right to be human'. 
According to Enslin (1986:213), Freire's pedagogy has been conceived as an instrument by 
means of which both the oppressors and the dominated could be humanised. This, she argues, is 
made possible by the liberatory education's ability to unveil the reality of oppression to the 
oppressed who through reflection and action engage in cultural praxis for liberation (Ibid.). This 
idea is a carbon-copy of Coetzee (1995:15)'s view that Freire recommends that curricular 
knowledge within education for liberation must serve as an instrument through which the 
oppressed masses liberate themselves and by so doing regain their humanity. According to 
Nkomo(1990; 300), South African proponents of people's education, such as Sisulu, have sought 
an educational approach which, like that of Freire, favoured an idea of an education for liberation 











could only materialise when the power of the oppressors (or those who benefit from the 
operation of education for domination) in the knowledge production processes was curtailed 
(Coetzee, 1995: 15; Nkomo, 1990:300). 
The influence of Freire's pedagogy extended beyond the education arena to other community 
organisations in South Africa. Shirley Walters(1985) cited the Careers Research and Information 
Centre (CRIC) based in Cape Town and radical Christians within the South African Council of 
Churches (WPCC) as examples. These groups, together with some trade unions, women 
organisations and other community organisations throughout South Africa practised radical 
humanism within which Freire's pedagogy of knowing falls (Walters, 1985:4-8; Walters, 
1991:356-357). 
In this regard, McKay and Romm say the critical humanist approach which informs people's 
education has as its major concern the abolition of enslavement from systems of domination 
(1992:56). In this approach, dialogue and humanised action are only possible when actors 
recognise the non-finality or relativity of their conceptions which could be altered during the 
dialogical process (Ibid:98). In other words, critical humanism has as its key aspect discursive 
skills because ideal speech situations are by their nature emancipatory and therefore could be a 
vital aid in the constitution of a liberated curriculum (Ibid: 142). Hence, people's education must 
embrace the emancipatory possibilities of the anthropology of humanism (Ibid: 103). It is 
through the use of this humanist approach that curricular reconstruction projects could be the 
basis of a decolonisation process in South Africa (Jansen, 1990:331). 
According to Khotseng (1986:abstract) the adoption of humanistic, liberatory education demands 
that dehumanisation aspects be removed from the education of the future South Africa. This 
implies that propaganda and manipulative elements of Apartheid education, education for 
domination, be totally eliminated in order that the humanisation process can take root. Such a 
humanizing pedagogy will expose the oppressive reality of the Apartheid system to the 
oppressed so that it can be possible for them to participate fully in creating knowledge which can 
enable them to transform their society (Khotseng et aI, 1987: 159). In addition, humanizing 
education which can only be fully realised when the Apartheid system has been overthrown will 
eliminate any form of indoctrination from the curriculum content and the pedagogical practice 
thereof. However, for such a liberatory pedagogy to be established committed involvement by 
organic intellectuals is needed so that conscientising work which will make the oppressed aware 











conscious subjects could practice 'education as a liberating process' which will enable them to 
critically reflect on their conditions of existence in such a way that action and reflection for 
humanisation can be effected (Ibid: 159). 
Khotseng et al also believes that conscientisation is also necessary to dispel the myth that 
education is neutral. Once that myth is destroyed South Africans will be in a position to establish 
education institutions which serve the interests of justice, democracy, and emancipation. In this 
way a people's pedagogy may be established which will provide a platform for students to 
validate their own cultural experiences. This, according to Khotseng et aI, is humanistic 
education which serves liberation purposes (Ibid.: 157; 159). 
In sum, the argument advanced on the issue of knowledge by SA Freirians is that through 
conscientisation and dialogical strategies a knowledge base can be created on the basis of which 
reflection and action that could bring about liberation and humanisation is possible. Giddens's 
arguments on self-questioning and critical reflection(reflexivity) in the creation and recreation of 
systematic knowledge and the concept of ideology critique have been utilized to ground the 
possibility of liberatory praxis within education. Habermas's notions of communicative action 
and the public sphere which are synonymous to Freire's concept of dialogue have also been used 
to strengthen Freire's view that the practice of the pedagogy of knowing can bring about 
liberation and humanisation (bearing in mind that the agents would have to make conscious 
political choices to pursue these goals). SA Foucauldians ,however, believe liberatory education 
is a romantic vision and hence liberation through conscientising critical education is a pipe-
dream. In view of their cynicism about the existence of any systematic knowledge and their 
express aim to rescue marginalised knowledge from SUbjection, it is of crucial importance that 
their critique of the Freirian conception of knowledge be outlined. 
3.4 FOUCAULDIAN AND OTHER CRITIQUES OF FREIRE'S CONCEPTION OF 
KNOWLEDGE 
SA Foucauldians embrace Foucault's categorisation of knowledge into formal scientific 
knowledge and marginalised knowledge and the view that because scientific knowledge is 
political and linked to power its claims to truth is questionable. Therefore it is doubtful that 
knowledge/truth can ever escape power thus creating problems for any claims that liberation 
from power is possible. In addition, SA Foucauldians claim hierachisation of knowledge and 











result in a faulty conceptualisation of human subjects. The implication here is that a proper 
theory of the subject would not have resulted in the types of revolutionary/liberatory goals 
Freire's pedagogy has set itself to achieve. The most important criticism, however, relates to the 
fact that Freire's pedagogy is lacking some ingredients of a 'good' pedagogy for liberatory 
action because of conceptualisation and theorisation faults which include the conceptualisation 
of 'consciousness-raising', the theorisation of the authority of the teacher, and the contradiction 
between revolutionary goals and critical thought. Two points seem to summarise these critiques. 
The first involves the Foucauldian position that liberation from power is impossible and since 
knowledge/truth is interlinked with power liberation is a pipedream. The second has to do with 
the evaluation that Freire's pedagogy cannot be the basis for liberatory action because of the 
conceptualisation and theorisation problems within it. 
3.4.1 KNOWLEDGE IS POLITICAL 
Like Foucault, SA Foucauldians, such as, Flanagan, believe formalised knowledge projects itself 
as science. But its scientificity does not imply that it is non-political. Rather scientific formalised 
knowledge is linked to power thus making it political (Flanagan,1991:174;184).This means that 
knowledge/power functions through surveillance making the task of a teacher equivalent to that 
of, say, a policeman. Through surveillance strategies both teachers and policemen observe, 
monitor and constrain the activities of students and prisoners, respectively. The result is the 
denial of freedom to students and prisoners alike (Ibid: 179). Know ledge/science, which is 
responsible for this situation, is in a position to impose this operational structure due to the fact 
of its claims to truth. Science has claims to the production of facts which create difficulties for 
emancipatory practices in schools. Nevertheless, she argues, it is inaccurate to think of scientific 
knowledge as ideological. Despite the political nature of scientific know ledges (or education), 
they are neither ideological nor cultural representations and, therefore, cannot be eliminated 
through truth (Ibid: 184). 
The other extreme pole of knowledge, Flanagan believes, is occupied by marginalised or 
excluded knowledge. The existence of marginalised knowledge bears testimony to the fact that 
there is no neutral education process (Ibid.). For Flanagan, the school curriculum is part of the 
overwhelming control of curricular knowledge which through the selection processes 
authenticate some knowledge while marginalising others. Nevertheless, in Flanagan and 
Coetzee's view, knowledge/power at the margins can be used effectively in the overall struggle 











concluded that in order to be capable of opposition and of struggle against the coercion of 
scientific discourse, we must emancipate historical know ledges from subjection(Flanagan, 
1991:184). Essentially this means that we must struggle against the power of knowledge. Hence, 
according to Flanagan's view, knowledge is symbiotically intertwined with power because 
discourses are linked to power(Ibid: 186). 
Jane Skinner (1998:4), who concurs with Flanagan's position, says, unlike the Freirian view of 
knowledge, the conception of powerlknowledge in Foucault's theory makes possible the 
detachment of the power of truth from the constraining hegemonic practices. This Foucauldian 
poststructural viewpoint has the ability to make us more conscious of 'the multifarious possible 
foundations of knowledge' (Ibid.). By the same token, our awareness of knowledge's provisional 
status and the fact that absolute knowledge is impossible, is increased. Skinner says acceptance 
of this state of affairs implies the adoption of eclectic rather than ideological approaches to social 
reality. Hence, she insists, respectful but sceptical treatment of all educational theories becomes 
an integral aspect of our pedagogical practices (Ibid.). 
Similarly, Coetzee (1995) reflects on the issue of the existence of multiple voices in the debate 
about the curriculum in South Africa today. Nevertheless, Coetzee believes 'the many new 
voices' reflect the fact that the curriculum debate is by its nature political as 'it is the status of the 
individual in the balance of power that is being questioned' in this dialogue. This struggle is 
opposed to the power effects associated with knowledge, it seeks to negate the privileging of 
dominant knowledge discourses in the power structure of society (Coetzee, 1995:12). 
Specifically, following Foucault, Coetzee is saying that we must be sceptical of the value of 
scientific knowledge or the value of the supposedly verified truth. This is because knowledge is 
linked to power and as such it circulates or functions as an aspect of the power/knowledge axis. 
We therefore can never talk about the operation of knowledge without making explicit its 
relations to power. 
In this sense, what comes out from the power struggle in the curriculum debate is an opposition 
to a technique or form of power that is responsible for the way in which the knowledge content 
of the school curriculum has been constituted. Because this opposition is not directed against a 
particular social group or class, it is clear that power, both from the top and from the bottom, 
cannot be underestimated and lor undermined. The implication of this statement is that power at 
the margins can sway the struggle for knowledge/power in favour of the excluded groups if 











that knowledge is not absolute because of the continuous dialogue in its constitution as well as 
the provincial status of truth. In sum, SA Foucauldians believe that knowledge is political and 
knowledges/epistemes are power relations thus making power a means by which knowledge is 
legitimised and vice versa. Capitalising on Freire's claim that his pedagogy is committed to 'the 
scientific unveiling of reality', 'exposure' of 'myths and ideologies' and separation of 'ideology 
from science' in justifying his approach as a 'rational and rigorous critique of ideology'(Freire, 
1970: 47), SA Foucauldians argued that humanists's tendency of creating knowledge hierarchies 
which privilege scientific knowledge at the expense of historical and marginalised or excluded 
know ledges must be resisted. The school curriculum for them is part of technologies of control 
which through the selection processes authenticate some knowledges while marginalizing others. 
Hence knowledge/power at the margins can be used effectively in the overall struggle against the 
coercion of scientific discourses and for the emancipation of historical knowledges from 
subjection. 
Giddens, however, finds the view that systematic knowledge of society does not exist and that 
history has no knowledgeable actors erroneous. The concept of reflexivity is key to his analysis 
of knowledge. His view is that reflexivity implies that systematic knowledge is constantly 
reviewed in terms of incoming information. In addition, Giddens says reflexivity allows for an 
approach to systematic knowledge which gives prominence to the questioning of pre-given 
foundations of knowledge and this self-critical element has always been internal to modern 
thought thus making possible the continued existence of conflicting viewpoints. On this basis he 
rejects the idea that we must renounce the existence of systematic knowledge in preference of 
fragmentary insights and opinions. Hence Giddens believes knowledgeable actors are capable of 
coordinating political engagement. 
Giddens's insights on systematic knowledge are shared by Habermas whose conceptualisation of 
'knowledge-constitutive interest' makes possible an understanding that knowledge is not 
impartial and free of human interest. Habermas maintains that since disinterested true knowledge 
is impossible it is important that the knowledge production process takes a discursive and 
dialogical approach rather than a distorted communication form. But in the process scientists 
must make explicit their moral and political project of emancipation, which serves as a guide to 
their enquiry. It is my contention that Freire's pedagogy of knowing also calls upon human 











The Foucauldian critique of the conception of knowledge/power in Freire's pedagogy is linked 
to other criticisms of the same theory which include the SA Foucauldian view that the exists 
evolutionist and dichotomous constrains within Freire's theory. This involves dealing with the 
criticism of dualities and dichotomies directed at Freire's theory and finding out how this can 
affect the status of knowledge derived from this framework. 
3.4.2 THE DICHOTOMISATION PROBLEM IN FREIRE'S PEDAGOGY 
Critics of Freire such as Prinsloo (1987) and Macleod (1995) are of the view that his theory is 
constrained in terms of its evolutionist and dichotomous teleology. According to Prinsloo (1987) 
Freire's theory creates dichotomous categories of human activities. Hence his pedagogical 
approach, argues Prinsloo, is constrained by dualities and an excessive form of structuralism. 
One example here is the dichotomy between critical and naIve consciousness embedded in his 
theorisation of the complex practices of cultural and ideological factors (prinsloo, 1987: 13). 
Another is the division between the oppressor and the oppressed in the theorisation of power. 
There is, argues Prinsloo, no sense of the dynamics of the conflict between these dualistic 
categories. Lastly, the rest of the issues within this concept which Prinsloo feels still need proper 
theorisation include the relationship between the revolutionary/revolutionary educator and the 
oppressed; dialogue and conscientisation; teacher and student; etc. Linked to these untheorised 
entities, according to Prinsloo, is the problem arising from the way in which the teacher· student 
dichotomy is resolved through dialogical mechanisms which make students teach as they learn 
and teachers learn as they teach (the teacher becoming teacher-learner and the student, learner-
teacher). Prinsloo criticises Freire of failing to account for the way in which the authority of the 
teacher has disappeared (Ibid: 14). He insists on a proper explanation for the disappearance of the 
teacher authority within the classroom situation. In fact Prinsloo believes the latter issue is more 
relevant because of the material differences between the educator and the educatee which have 
the capacity to complicate their relation further (Ibid: 15;1991 :369). 
In addition, Prinsloo says that Freire characterises conscientisation as a means by which people 
who are submerged in reality become conscious of their ability to change their conditions of 
existence. Dialogue plays a central role in this movement from naIve consciousness to critical 
'mature' consciousness (Ibid: 14). This process is analogous of the way in which, through 
conscientising dialogue, learners and their teacher drop banking strategies in preference of 
problem·posing ones. But then again Prinsloo sees dualities and dichotomies in the way Freire 











banking and problem-posing education, Prinsloo argues, characterise the former as 'bad' and the 
latter as 'good' (Ibid: 17). 
This, according to Prinsloo, is unacceptable because the discursivity of knowledge and its 
locatedness in culturally and historically specific practices is not intertained thus resulting in an 
'essentialist discourse which denies its own discursive location'(Ibid:17-18).In the same vein, 
Catrina Macleod has claimed that there are detectable dichotomization related problems in the 
Freirian-based critical theory. For example, education is viewed within the Freirian pedagogy as 
'either domesticating or liberating' (Macleod, 1995:71-72). Hence, Macleod recommends that 
social scientists should move away from these dichotomies in order to avoid the 'danger of 
slipping into functionalism' (Ibid.). 
In other words, Poststructuralist theorists contend that any serious sociological theory must 
transcend the characterisation of the individual in terms of essentialist notions of personality, 
biology or society in a monolithic fashion. The concept of 'complex interaction', according to 
Macleod, does also not escape this dualism as it 'fails' to capture the true essence of this 
interaction. In contrast, postructuralists believe that subjectivity is historically and socially 
produced through discursive and signifying practices. Prinsloo concurs that the major problem of 
Freire's pedagogy is that in an attempt to argue for educational praxis which serves the interests 
of liberation, it creates a dichotomy between education for domination and education for 
liberation, justifying the latter ('good') by reference to the former which he sees as 'bad' 
(Prinsloo, 1987:24). 
Some of the dualisms and dichotomies which SA Foucauldians are questioning are the naIve 
consciousness vis-a.-vis mature consciousness and the oppressor-oppressed dialectic. While this 
might directly relate to the creation of subjectivity, it also has a lot to do with one's own 
conception of power within a particular context. There is a variation in terms of the operation of 
systems of domination on both global and local contexts and in each case it is important to 
identify the actors if any reconstruction project has to be effected. According to Giddens(1981: 
60 - 61), 'any system of domination is harnessed to sectional interests' despite the fact that 
'sectional and universal interests are never wholly exclusive'. In addition, Giddens believes 'all 
social actors, both the powerful and the relatively powerless, have some degree of discursive 
penetration of the conditions governing the reproduction of the social systems they produce and 
reproduce in their action' (Ibid: 62). Of course, to delineate groups and categories neatly is quite 










However, Giddens says the contextuality of action has important implications for the 
knowledgeability of social actors. Contexts for him, are settings of action and agents draw upon 
them as they engage in social intercourse (Giddens, 1987: 98 99). In his view, it is the common 
awareness of these settings for action which constitutes the basis of the 'mutual knowledge' from 
which meanings of what is said and done are derived (Ibid.). In fact the issue of dichotomies in 
Freire's theory has been coupled with other supposed 'vices' of this pedagogy, namely, 
hierarchisation and homogenisation of the people and their experience which I discuss below in 
that order. 
3.4.3 THE HIERARCHISATION PROBLEM IN FREIRE'S PEDAGOGY 
According to SA Foucauldians and other critics of Freire's critical theory especially Deacon and 
Parker modernist theories are essentialist explanations of reality which have hierachised social 
relations. For this reason, their utility in treating issues of 'different identities of, and the 
hierarchical relationship between, teacher and learner and subjects and knowledge' is in doubt 
(Deacon and Parker, 1993: 134). Elaborating on this point Deacon and Parker are of the view that 
the problem of hierarchising the relationship between the teacher and the student affects Freire's 
pedagogy. In addition, they believe this hierarchisation process is associated with the operation 
of knowledge/power relations. The aim of such knowledge/power relations within the school 
classroom, they believe, is to exclude those discourses which are deemed irrational. Thus despite 
the self-dissociation of Freire's pedagogy from imperialistic practices, such as, authoritarianism, 
in the learning situation, Deacon and Parker are however of the view that this pedagogy is 
implicated in the hierarchisation activity thus compromising its utility as a theory of social 
change (Ibid: 134-135). 
In my opinion, Freire's pedagogy cannot be accused of practices which promote hierarchisation. 
On the contrary it is the express aim of the Freirian praxis to identify these hierarchies so that 
they could be transformed. The process involved here is similar to the operation of ideology 
critique which unmasks the forms of impositions existing in systems of domination so that 
reflection and action to lift these impositions can be undertaken. Similarly, SA Freirians exposed 
the hierarchical relationships between the teacher and students within Apartheid education in 
order to transform it through a pedagogical approach whose key element is dialogue. In fact 
displacement, one of the dissimulation strategies in Thompson's theory, is at work here. Deacon 
and Parker are accusing the Freiran pedagogy of the sins customarily known to be associated to 











hierarchisation sins to the Freirian praxis. This is despite the fact that Freire's pedagogy has been 
constructed especially to challenge and transfonn these hierarchies. It is on this basis that I found 
this criticism of the Freirian project questionable. A related criticism which I think is also 
groundless is the idea that the Freirian pedagogy of knowing should be disqualified because it 
homogenises subjects which I tackle below. 
3.4.4 THE PROBLEM OF HOMOGENISATION IN THE FREIRIAN PEDAGOGY 
Peter Kallaway and Richard Levin have clearly stated that certain concepts utilised within the 
SA Freirian model need to be problematised instead of being used simplistically. Kallaway 
(1987) says, in this regard, that the struggle against Apartheid oppression was expected to yield a 
unitary democratic dispensation in South Africa. People's Education, he argues, was supposed to 
be an educational programme which was part of a broader project for the realisation of this 
'people's power' or unitary non-racial, non-sexist, democratic South African state. This people's 
power, Kallaway maintains, was supposed to reflect the collective strength and the will of the 
community or the people (1987:34). But Kallaway believes that the utility of the concepts 
'people's power' and 'people's education' depends much on what it is that we mean by the tenns 
'national', 'community' and 'the people'. In addition, the taken for granted view that the national 
liberation struggle will put power in the hands of the people should be questioned (Ibid:35). In 
KaUaway's view, the call for people's education ignores the fact that under capitalism it is not 
possible for education to serve the interests of the majority of the people. In his own words, 
" ... such a call ignores the massive evidence available that mass education strategies 
in capitalist society do not empower the people nor do they work to increase the 
chances for working class children in the employment market. On the contrary, all 
the evidence suggests that mass education under capitalism acts as an agent of 
political and ideological control and domination and helps to ensure the dominance 
of liberal/capitalist ideology/hegemony and middle class interests" (Ibid:36). 
McKay and Romm (1992:9) are also of the view that for the people's education movement to 
remain true to its liberatory goal, 'it cannot ground its claims or practices in a suppression of 
difference and a call to collective consensus'. Furthennore, they argue, the notion of critical 
thought embedded in the Freirian pedagogy must be 'located within the parameters of a non-
realist epistemological framework' (Ibid: 10). 
Levin (1991) has also been critical of the Freire-derived concept of 'people's education' in South 










discourse of education for liberation. In addition, he believes these are imprecise terms which 
only gained prominence as a reflection of generalised hostility towards Apartheid. Once the 
Apartheid state is overthrown, Levin argues, these concepts might loose their utility in the 
struggle against capitalism because the set of humans referred to by such concepts are not 
homogeneous (1991:1-18). It is the homogenisation of the human experience through the use of 
unitary concepts such as 'the people', 'the community' and 'the nation' that Levin and Kallaway 
as well as the poststructuralist feminists want to discourage. 
This is why Levin maintains that the discourse of People's Education must be problematised. 
Levin (1988:4) argues that the concept of people's education has failed to challenge capitalist 
forms of schooling. Essentially he is of the idea that this education discourse is equivalent to 
bourgeois democratic transformation discourses the world over (Hanagan, 1991 :8). Mashamba 
(1990:1; 8) also warns that in exploring the conceptual terrain in people's education note should 
be taken that these concepts are used not only in the education debate but also in the broader 
discourse of national liberation in South Africa. Hence Hanagan says conceptual clarity on what 
we mean by the term 'the people' is needed. Because the concept 'the people' applies to diverse 
classes and social categories it is doubtful whether the emancipation of the working class from 
class exploitation can be served by its use (Hanagan, 1991:8-9). Consequently the future of the 
South African education is uncertain and will be determined by the social forces which will 
emerge hegemonic at that point in time (Kallaway, 1987:49; Hanagan, 1991:9-10). Further, 
Kallaway warns us against romanticising the concept of a democratic education in the post-
Apartheid South African future (Kallaway, 1987: 1-2). 
In my opinion the criticism of homogenisation is not applicable to Freire's project. Torres and 
Morrow have pointed out that Freire's 'lifelong quest to identify and cross borders in education' 
is evident in his dialogical approach to pedagogy (1998:25). In addition, they argue that 
'distinctions constitute identities but also constitute the life line of the conversation' (Ibid.). 
Nevertheless, SA Foucauldians have characterised this ongoing quest to cross borders through 
dialogue as an attempt to remodel power relations rather than doing away with them. For 
instance, they view efforts to transform the vertical relationship between the teacher and her 
students in traditional pedagogy into a horizontal dialogue-based one as another form of 
authoritarianism. It is to the SA Foucauldian critique of Freire's pedagogy's theorisation of the 











3.4.5 FAULTY THEORISATION OF AUTHORITY AND MATERIAL RELATIONS OF 
TEACHER AND LEARNER 
Skinner (1998:47) believes it is too optimistic to think, as Freire did, it is possible for students to 
draw upon their own reading skills and prior experience to forge an empowering knowledge 
which will inspire them to change their society. The reason for this is that the school curriculum 
has a special relationship with the struggle for power by means of which the truth of knowledge 
is legitimised. In this sense, the authority of the teacher in the classroom is utilised to tip the 
balance of power in the social reality in favour of the grounding and justification of the origin 
and/or truth of curricular knowledge (Coetzee, 1995:8). The problematique of the authority of 
the teacher in Freire's theory is also reflected in Neville Alexander (1990:5),s work wherein he 
says that Freire's work has not succeeded in resolving the dilemma relating to the authority of 
the teacher. Rather, Alexander maintains, on this issue, 'Freire shows a profound ambivalence'. 
Nevertheless, Alexander is impressed by Freire (in dialogue with Ira Shor)'s position that while 
teachers and students critically coinvestigate educational issues together, they are not equal (Ibid: 
55). This is Freire's view that dialogical teachers are different from their students, but what 
distinguishes them from the banking traditional ones is the democratic, liberating and non-
antagonistic learning environment they create in the classroom (Ibid: 56). Freire believes an 
antagonistic teacher is authoritarian (Shor and Freire, 1987:92-93). 
Despite this apparently democratic nature of Freire's pedagogy South African Foucauldians are 
adamant that this is simply a smokescreen for its authoritarian tendencies. Deacon and Parker 
specifically pointed at the fact that 'the critical model cannot overcome the contradiction 
inherent in a teacher 'making' learners autonomous without directing them'(Deacon and Parker, 
1993:135). 
Furthermore, Deacon and Parker see the problem as more than simply the fear that critical 
theory's notion of participation might be appropriated by traditional or instrumental models to 
legitimise co-optative power relations. Instead, it also encompasses the problematic issue relating 
to the myth of the teacher as a subject enforcing rules of reason in the learning process. The 
rationalist myth of a teacher as having a privileged access to knowledge and scientific tools of 
rational analysis, evaluation and reflection is a means by which struggles for the right to speak 
are regulated. In this way, conflicts and inequalities amongst participating subjects are concealed 
and students are disciplined through the insistence that they construct and advance only those 











through the instrumentalism of traditional and vanguard educative practices that the conditions 
for authoritarianism and inequality are created', Deacon and Parker, in contrast, believe 'it is 
through inequalities of power and knowledge embodied in education that disciplinary educative 
practices are precipitated' (Ibid.). 
I think however that in a situation where undistorted communication and/or authentic dialogue 
directed at human emancipation is in operation, a democratic relationship between the teacher 
and her students can be guaranteed. Paraphrasing Habermas, Romm (1996:200) argues that this 
situation can be created by ensuring that validity claim checks for statements made during social 
encounters are in place. This would guarantee that statements made during the process of social 
interaction are understandable, authentic, moral and appropriate. In this way ideal 
communicative action is made possible and a democratic relationship promoted amongst 
participants. Moreover, conscientising dialogue generates critical consciousness which makes all 
participants to question and critically review all existing viewpoints before arriving at an inter-
subjective position. The following subsection will look at this conscientisation process which 
other critiques of the SA Freirian project have mistaken for 'consciousness-raising'. 
3.4.6 THE CRITIQUE OF FREIRE'S 'CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING' CONCEPT 
Apart from the Foucauldian poststructuralist critiques of Freire's education project 
internationally and locally, there are other critiques of the same project inspired by concepts 
which do not easily fit into poststructuralism. For instance, while some writings of Walters and 
Prinsloo are helpful in illuminating some of the educational issues raised by Freire, others reflect 
a critique of Freire inspired by the Foucauldian poststructuralism and yet there also exists an 
independent critique of the Freirian pedagogy in their work. Walters and Prinsloo's critique of 
Freire's concept of conscientisation or as they call it 'consciousness-raising', is a case in point. 
Another South African scholar who criticised the work of Freire from an independent position is 
Enslin (1986) who believes there is a contradiction between the revolutionary goal and the 
fostering of individual growth and/or critical thought in Freire's pedagogy. We will start by 
examining Walters (1986) and Prinsloo (1991)' s critique of Freire's notion of conscientisation or 
'consciousness - raising' before turning to the above-mentioned criticism of his theory by 
Enslin. 
According to Walters (1985: 135), Freire is ofthe view that critical understanding is the basis for 










pedagogy. The problem with this position, Walters maintains, is that it is carved outside a clearly 
defined theory of the state in addition to the absence in Freire's pedagogy of a systematic theory 
of transition. For instance, a dialectical relation between this pedagogy and political action is 
absent (Walters, 1986:5). In this case any political action informed by Freire's pedagogy might 
promote individualism rather than the desired collectivist outcomes (Walters, 1985:135). In 
addition, Walters believes, the overemphasis on democratic principles and the need to advance 
the interests of the oppressed are cancelled out by the lack of commitment to class struggle and 
political action (Ibid.). On a political level, without a clear line of march, the danger Walters sees 
is that the oppressed masses might remain at the consciousness-raising phase without a clue as to 
how to move to the stage of political action. Unless the conscientisation process encompasses not 
only ways and means of overcoming the 'state of false consciousness or fragmented 
consciousness' but also the exploration of revolutionary issues such as the nature and form of 
domination practices, the ideological hegemony embedded in this domination and political 
action options available to overthrow such a system, social change cannot be effected (Ibid; 
Walters, 1986:5). Nevertheless, Walters seems to collapse 'conscientisation' into 
'consciousness-raising' . 
Mackie believes that the Freirian concept of conscientisation is not static since the goal of a 
dialogical praxis is to be an instrument through which the oppressed move from magical through 
naIve to critical consciousness (Mackie, 1980:96). For this reason, Kenway and Modra 
(1992:156) urge us to move away from the tendency to collapse conscientisation in the Freirian 
context into consciousness-raising. In their view, a clear distinction between the development of 
critical consciousness which is an integral part of the concept of conscientisation and 
consciousness-raising strategies must be made. For them consciousness-raising can be achieved 
in a process which is disarticulated from socio-political action. Kenway and Modra maintain that 
awareness of contradictions and alienation is not always followed by action as those affected 
might feel powerless to do something about their situation. They cite the example of Feminist 
groups who are conscious of the fact that the 'personal is political' but who somehow have not 
translated the meaning of this catch-phrase to concrete programmes of action (Ibid.). Put 
differently, Kenway and Modra maintain that: 
" ... consciousness-raising can so easily become the reflection without action which 
Freire calls wishful thinking. On the other hand, critical consciousness facilitates 
analysis of the context of problem situations for the purpose of enabling people 
together to transform their reality, rather than merely understanding it or adapt to it 











However, the criticisms of Freire's pedagogy on the basis of its lack of mechanisms of 
translating its strategic insights to political action, despite Kenway and Modra's rebuke, have 
mushroomed uncontrollably in South Africa. Prinsloo is one of the South African theorists who 
is disappointed by the inability of Freire's 'consciousness-raising' to translate to political action 
for fundamental education and social change. According to Prinsloo, Freirian projects in South 
Africa have been 'very small and vulnerable to state approval' (1991:370-371). These projects, 
he argues, have also been characterized by 'small numbers of participants' and a high rate of 
dropouts (Ibid.). In fact, Prinsloo is adamant that the Freirian pedagogy is vacuous, lacks a 
credible theory of action and has a curriculum which 'is not located with any sense of facilitating 
group formation, and group identity in the context of struggle' (Ibid.). 
Note should be taken, however, that despite this scathing attack on Freire's pedagogy, Prinsloo 
maintains that this project constitutes an attempt at providing alternatives to education for 
domestication. In addition, Prinsloo feels that Freire has relatively succeeded in constructing 
'educational strategies that combine processes fostering individual growth ... together with a 
substantial efficacy (or revolutionary potential)' (Ibid:361). Indeed, it is Prinsloo's view that the 
merits of Freire's pedagogy is its ability to help learners to acquire socially useful knowledge 
while encouraging them to learn with reflection (Prinsloo, 1991:371). Notwithstanding these 
merits, Adendorff criticises Freire's theory for failure to integrate the education struggle to the 
overall political action for national liberation in South Africa. 
3.4.7 FREIRE'S CONCEPT OF SOCIAL CHANGE OR TRANSFORMATION WANTING 
According to Adendorff (1993:345), Freire's theory has been criticised for concentrating 'on 
subjective factors, in the transformation of consciousness' at the expense of advocating for the 
integration of the struggle for educational change with practical action for the broader social 
transformation experiment. Adendorff says instead of operating as the 'consciousness-raising' 
aspect of political action, education for liberation must be an inseparable part of the social action 
for emancipation itself. In the South African setting, he maintains, educational change can only 
take place as an indissolvable part of the socio-economic and political struggle for national 
liberation. In this sense, Adendorff argues, the linking of 'people's education' and 'people's 
power' in the South African education struggle, was a clear recognition that the transformation 
of education did not involve change in content alone but also the restructuring of politico-
administrative structures which themselves were building blocks of the entire Apartheid 











education' is 'good' education must be abandoned as such a view might lead education activists 
to concentrate only on issues internal to the education process without locating these within the 
broader struggle for the transformation of the entire dominant, Apartheid social structure. It is for 
this reason, that Adendorffbelieves that the liberatory power of Freire's theory is constricted by 
lack of consideration of other sites of social change rather than the education domain (Ibid: 264). 
Hence he concludes that Freire does not provide an adequate strategy for social transformation, 
and therefore, his theories of social change and power are wanting (Ibid: 264). However, 
Adendorff's view indicates a lack of understanding of Freire's idea that speaking the word is 
being involved in praxis or action and reflection to transform the world (Freire, 1972: 60). 
Conscientisation rather than 'conciousness-raising' entails reflection and action occurring 
simultaneously. In other words, the concept refers to the interface of critical reflection and action 
as two separate but interconnected moments in the process of individual and collective 
emancipation. It is for this reason that Freire considered dialogical education as both a medium 
and constitutive force for human agency and political action (Giroux, 1983:227). McKay and 
Romm concur that praxis cannot be dichotomised into a prior stage of reflection and another 
phase of action. Instead, they maintain, following Freire, that reflection and action occur 
simultaneously in such a way that decision through reflection about the inappropriateness of a 
certain form of action cannot be viewed as inaction. Consequently conscious participation in 
critical reflection is an engagement in ideology critique. This is a dialogical encounter which 
involves the action of reflecting on ideas, deciding on options and alternatives and acting to 
transform these ideas (McKay and Romm, 1992:95 - 96; 102). 
Nevertheless there are other South African Foucauldians such as Prinsloo who slightly differ 
with Adendorff in that they recognise the transformative potential of Freire's theory although 
they are critical of its effectivity in this regard owing to the fact that it has always operated 
outside, rather than inside, the formal schooling structure. It is to the critique of the Freirian 
pedagogy's ineffectualness in formal schooling that we tum. 
3.4.8 FREIRIAN PEDAGOGY INEFFECTUAL BECAUSE IT OPERATES OUTSIDE THE 
FORMAL SYSTEM 
According to Prinsloo (1987:20-21), Freire's pedagogy while revealing oppressive aspects ofthe 
established schooling system, deals with this institutionalised form of education in passing as a 
means to outline liberatory education. In fact, he argues, Freirian programmes have never been 











makes the possibility for entrenching 'people's education' in South Africa a pipe dream. 
Nevertheless, the people's education movement will have to face the challenge about what is to 
be done with state education in South Africa and Prinsloo maintains that the solution to this 
problem will be demanding because 'it is one of the features of state control of mass education 
system that alternatives will be attacked which threaten the hegemony of the state system' 
(Ibid:21). The Apartheid state's hostility to the 'people's education' initiatives in the mid-to late 
1980's is the case in point. In addition, the perception that 'People's education' is ideological, as 
opposed to the scientific 'high status' knowledge in the formal schooling system, further puts it 
at a disadvantage (Ibid.). Worse still, Prinsloo maintains, 
" to turn to notions of 'non-formal' education, which Freirian thought might 
encourage as a major strategy seems to be a bad option. It is precisely because 
organised education is a socially powerful institution that it is a site of contestation. 
To vacate this site is to relinquish this struggle. The political problem in education is 
not how to evade the power of the state, nor even how to best use what is available in 
the state system, nor how to resist state power in education, it is, ultimately, how to 
take control of the education system" (Ibid:22). 
In other words, Prinsloo (1987; 1991) is critical of the potential of the entire of Freire's 
educational project (on whose foundation the 'People's Education' concept has been 
constructed) because none of the Freirian pedagogical programmes have been utilised in formal 
state schooling systems. For him, the fact that Freirian-type educational programmes have 
operated outside the schooling system and that their role in the state schooling system has been 
for resistance purposes means that 'People's Education' will not be able to take control of formal 
education structures in South Africa (Prinsloo, 1991:372). Prinsloo's view is shared by Skinner 
who says that the Freirian education approach was the vehicle through which education activits 
were conscientised about the issues of power in the South African setting since the 1970's. The 
transformative moment of the Freirian epistemology empowered these formerly marginalised 
education activists to assert their own visions of education-what essentially came to be known as 
alternative education, education for liberation and/or 'people's education'. However, Skinner 
believes that this development cannot camouflage the fact that their views about education failed 
to directly affect society as these efforts were only concentrated outside the system (Skinner, 
1998:1). 
Prinsloo says that there is no way that the Freirian pedagogy can mushroom under an oppressive 
system. In fact, in South Africa, Freirian programmes operated under difficult conditions 
imposed by the oppressive nature of the Apartheid authority structure. This has impaired the 











intolerant of any oppositional initiative- be it in education or any other social sphere. Seen from 
this angle education for liberation and people's education initiatives remained ineffective in 
South African schools because efforts to implement them were vulnerable to state repression 
(Prinsloo, 1987: 16-17). Skinner shares unreservedly this view that lib era tory education was 
unable to directly influence social structures in South Africa. 
Skinner says Paulo Freire's critical pedagogy treats education as an instrument through which 
democratic transformation can be attained in our society. Amongst the Freirian pedagogy's 
learning and teaching strategies were the democratic and dialogical relationship between the 
educator and the educatee; the recognition that the leamer's experience is a foundation of the 
knowledge creation and recreation process; and the idea that knowledge is not valid and absolute 
as given (and therefore needs problematising). While this pedagogical framework empowered 
education activists in their struggle against Apartheid education, Skinner believes critical 
pedagogy (or the people's education version of it in South Africa) was not in a position to 
influence the formal structures of the Apartheid society, including the schools, directly (Skinner, 
1998:378). 
SA Foucauldian and especially Prinsloo (1987), s criticism that the Freirian pedagogy is 
potentially transforming but ineffectual because it operates outside the formal system is, 
however,misplaced. I believe a clear understanding of the genealogy of Freire's pedagogy would 
have solved this issue for Prinsloo. The successful operationalisation of Freire's pedagogy in 
countries, such as, Chile and Guinea-Bissau, renders criticisms that Freire's pedagogy has not 
been tried and tested inside the state schooling systems absurd. This criticism cannot be 
sustained because, for instance, as part of his programme in the Geneva-based Institute for 
Cultural Action, Freire helped design educational programmes for the newly independent 
Guinea-Bissau. Freire's experience during the process of formulating the education policy for 
Guinea-Bissau contained in his 1978 publication, Pedagogy in Process: The Letters to Guinea-
Bissau, attests to this fact (Mackie, 1980: 7). 
In fact linked to this mistaken criticism of lack of influence in formal structures of Apartheid is 
the critique of the revolutionary potential of Freire's pedagogy itself. On this point, Enslin 
(1986) believes that one of the limitations of Freire's pedagogy has to do with its inability to 
resolve the tension between its two primary objectives, namely, its revolutionary goal and the 











3.4.9 THE CONTRADICTION BE1WEEN REVOLUTIONARY GOAL, INDIVIDUAL 
GROWTH AND/OR CRITICAL THOUGHT 
According to Enslin there is a contradiction between the revolutionary goal of Freire's pedagogy 
and the quest for critical thinking embedded in its theorisation. In the first place, Enslin says that 
one of the main tenets of Freire's theory is that neutrality in education is anathema. While 
antidialogical education serves oppressive purposes, dialogical education for liberation serves 
emancipatory purposes. In this sense, dialogical education is geared towards social 
transformation along Marxist lines. But this view contradicts another Freirian view that 
dialogical education encourages open and critical thought amongst the educatees (Enslin, 
1986:248). The emphasis on critical thinking, Enslin maintains, is a call for the development of 
individual autonomy. However, the problem arises when such autonomy clashes with the 
prescribed goal of a Marxist revolution. For this reason, it is nonsensical that an anti-
instructional, non-authoritarian, dialogical education is also expected to serve a fixed 
revolutionary goal conducted on the basis of a prescribed Marxist revolutionary strategy. 
Consequently, some mixture of dialogue and directed learning through the utilisation of a clearly 
defined instruction method would be needed if classical Marxist texts required for finer details of 
this dialectic theory have to be deciphered by the students (Ibid:249-250). In Enslin's own 
words: 
"This ambiguity in the uneasy relationship between the political goals of dialogical 
education and the goal of the informed, autonomous individual is also present in 
Freire's notion of the role of the teacher. Freire casts the teacher in a key role in the 
overthrow of oppression. Yet at the same time he is insistent on the removal of the 
supposed teacher-learner dichotomy. Freire apparently refuses to give a directive role 
to the teacher, but this sits uncomfortably with the teacher's role in the struggle 
against oppression. More serious is: what if the learners were to choose a direction to 
the pedagogy which they forge together with the teacher which was at odds with the 
political goals of the teacher? To be true to these political goals, could a point not be 
reached where the teacher would set aside her egalitarian relationship with the 
learners, if she knows a truth about the ideal goal of political action which apparently 
eludes the learners" (Ibid:249). 
In other words, Enslin is arguing that there is a tension between the development of the 
autonomy of the student in the selection of knowledge content in the learning process and the 
integration of dialogical education in the revolutionary transformation process informed by the 
Marxist dialectical theory (Ibid:230). Enslin wonders how will the conflict which might arise 
when the autonomous students emerge from the dialogical education with knowledge/truth 











(Ibid.). Unless the thesis of dialogical education for the development of a critical thinking, 
autonomous being is dropped, Enslin maintains, the revolutionary goal of this education cannot 
be achieved and vice versa Obid:234). Enslin is thus of the view that the tension lies in 
prescribing a revolutionary goal at the same time as developing a critical analysis in student 
which have the potential of disrupting that conception-immediately when the conscientisatised 
educatees choose otherwise, the liberatory project/goal collapses (Ibid:237). This tension 
between individualism and collectivism has been detected by other South African educationists 
such as Walters (1991) and Prinsloo (1991). Walters admits that Freire's theory is ambiguous on 
these issues although it must be noted that his conscientisation strategy put more emphasis on 
self-realisation of the individual as the ultimate outcome (1991:356). Prinsloo on the other hand 
believes that there is an equal stress on the individual growth and the development of a 
revolutionary consciousness in Freire's pedagogy (1991:361). 
Linked to the above problematic is the issue of the elimination of the dichotomy between 
learning and working. According to Enslin, Freire's educational model is for the dissolution of 
the distinction between school and the place of work (Enslin, 1986:254-255). Enslin believes 
convincing grounds exist for opposition of such an educational strategy. Her opposition to this 
view is essentially based on the linkages of knowledge and truth. She believes that the concern 
for achieving targeted production rates in the workplace may work against fundamental values 
which inform the enterprise of education (lbid:255-256). 
The concept of ideology cdtique which, as I have demonstrated in Chapter 1, is embraced by 
Freire, Habermas, Giddens and Thompson is useful in ensuring that the revolutionary goal of the 
leaders do not cloud the dialogical process which is supposed to subject all viewpoints under 
critical reflection. In Habermas's position, for emancipation to take place people should be 
engaged in dialogue. This dialogue is both a quest for knowledge and a basis for inter-subjective 
understanding rather than a prescriptive view of one individual. In fact the use of ideology 
critique implies that we engage in an open-ended, counterfactual critique of capitalism geared 
towards an outcome which itself is not concrete but in a state of flux. Hence suspicions by Enslin 
that an individual's critical thought might be hampered are misplaced. This is because, McKay 
and Romrn, following Freire, maintain that the Frerian concept of conscientisation has to do with 
the generation of critical consciousness which would enable people to participate in the dialogue 
about their situation. McKay and Romm believe that dialogue about social reality is continuous 
and expected to happen even after transformation has brought a new face of reality. What this 











blindly accept a particular given view of reality (McKay and Romm, 1992:9-10). In fact Freire 
teaches us to be critical of all authority, even when that authority pretends to advance a liberatory 
project (Freire, 1972:59). 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter SA Freirian and Foucauldian conceptions of knowledge have been compared and 
contrasted. As an outcome of this discussion it was argued that through the practice of the 
Freirian pedagogy, liberatory action which could bring about emancipation within the education 
sphere and society as a whole is possible. This is despite the counter-argument of SA 
, Foucauldians that the inter-linkage of knowledge and power implies that liberation from power 
effects is a pipe-dream. In addition, SA Foucauldians argue that formalised scientific knowledge 
through which humanists want to liberate society is implicated in modern disciplinary power 
strategies through which human beings are subjected to technologies of control. It is these 
technologies of subjection and surveillance derived from scientific knowledge, they maintain, 
which account for the hierarchisation, homogenisation and dichotomisation of subjects as in the 
oppressor-oppressed and teacher-student relationships. Hence in their view this knowledge, 
which has also operated to exclude other historical knowledges, that is so implicated in modern 
power strategies cannot be a means for liberation. In fact SA Foucauldians, following Foucault, 
believe because modern power is everywhere and is always conjoined with knowledge to form a 
• 
powerlknowledge axis, liberation is not possible. I think we must avoid both subjectivism and 
objectivism in our theoretical approaches. In Foucault, invisible power, as is structure in 
structuralist accounts, seems to overwhelm human agents. An approach similar to Giddens's 
structuration theory where knowledgeable agents take meaningful action and reflection within 
the confines of conditions which affect and are, in turn, affected by their actions will do. It is on 
this basis that I argue that conscious agents are capable of understanding the context of their 
action as they always have an option to do otherwise. The issue of contextuality of action, as 
Giddens has indicated, has to do with agents's mutual knowledge of the situation within which 
they operate. Aspects of this mutual knowledge would naturally include the hierarchies, 
dichotomies and what might be seen as common characteristics of that society. In the case of 
South Africa during the Apartheid period this would include domination and subordination 
relationships between Whites and Blacks and/or the oppressor and oppressed dialectic between 
them. It is on this basis that I think the accusations of essentialism, dichotomisation, dualism and 











acknowledge(or which attempts to negate) these contextual realities would not be in a position to 
formulate strategies for the betterment of social life. 
My support for SA Freirians's idea that the pedagogy of knowing is the foundation for 
authentic dialogue for liberation is largely based on insights derived from Giddens's twin 
concepts of reflexivity and ideology critique. I take the concept of reflexivity as referring to the 
fact that the knowledge-production process involves ongoing efforts of critical inquiry, self-
questioning and review or alteration of existing systematic knowledge in the light of the 
continuous emergence of new evidence. Ideology critique, on the other hand, while 
encompassing all the qualities of the notion of reflexivity also involve an ever-present awareness 
that reality is always viewed from a particular standpoint and that the task of social science is to 
unmask the ideological position within which certain claims to knowledge are made so that 
alternative moral and political choices which could inform human beings's praxis ('action and 
reflection') are investigated. The idea here is to embrace the idea that systematic knowledge 
exists without precluding the possibility for its revision and reform in the light of incoming 
information from our day-to-day social practices. I think this is the meeting point between 
Giddens and Freire. If one examines the conception of dialogue and conscientisation, it becomes 
very clear that the action and reflection, creation and recreation of reality, self-questioning 
attitude and preference of problem-posing rather than banking strategies characteristics of the 
two are akin to those of the above-mentioned Giddensian systematic knowledge justification 
concepts. 
In other words, SA Freirians's contention that through conscientisation and dialogical action 
liberatory practice for freedom is possible can be grounded through the use of Giddens's 
structuration theory. This entails acceptance of the idea that there exist systematic knowledge 
which through self-questioning and critical re-examination can be reformed and altered as a 
matter of an ongoing process of reflexivity. As a further justification of Freire's pedagogy, I have 
also indicated that there is an affinity between, on the one hand, Giddens's concepts of 
reflexivity and ideology critique and Habermas's theory of communicative action and the 
critique of ideology. Habermas's theory of communicative action in this case refers to a 
dialogical process in know ledge-production which could lead to actions for emancipation. It is 
through social science critique, he maintains, that elements of distorted communication can be 
exposed and a moral and political project for emancipation established. This process, as both 
Giddens and Habermas have indicated, involves making particular choices. In Giddens's view 











'knowledge-constitutive-interest' explains the political nature of education. Hence Habermas 
says social scientists have to consciously opt for an emancipatory cognitive interest when doing 
research and teaching because this can ensure a dialogical process, in a word, communicative 
action for emancipation. Similarities between this idea and Giddens's view that 'knowledgeable 
actors' involved in reflexive action are capable of creating and recreating their knowledge and 
environment in the light of new incoming information, are obvious. It is therefore clear, and as 
Giddens has insisted, that organised political action is not only possible but necessary. This idea 
links up with Freire and the SA Freirians's conception of knowledge. 
Like Freire, SA Freirians believe authentic knowledge can expose processes of domination such 
as cultural invasion and indoctrinatory mechanisms of Apartheid education. Through dialogue 
and conscientisation the pedagogy of knowing can reveal reality for the participants in such a 
way that they could become aware of their situation of oppression, be they the oppressed in 
general or students involved in vertical relationship with the oppressors and teachers, 
respectively. What is more central to Freire and SA Freirians's conception of knowledge is that 
both conscientisation and dialogue involve reflection and action as conjoined processes. In this 
sense those who are involved in the process of 'reflexivity' are also engaged in action to change 
their situation. However, even in Freire's pedagogy the participants in dialogical action and 
reflection for liberation and humanisation would have to make their political stance explicit as 
knowledge by its nature is political and not neutral. The only options in knowledge production 
and dissemination available therefore are either practising education for domination or for 
liberation. This is the point of divergence between SA Freirians and Foucauldians. 
Whereas Freire and the SA Freirians are of the view that it is a human vocation to fight for 
liberation and humanisation, SA Foucauldians doubt the possibility of knowledge symbiotically 
linked to power to form a powerlknowledge axis liberating people from mechanisms and 
strategies of modern power. In addition, they doubt whether liberation from power should even 
be considered in the light of resistance strategies, such as, those implied in the concept of 
conscientisation, ideology critique and reflexivity, being part and parcel (or manifestations) of 
power. This Foucauldian position is in direct opposition to Freire's contention that anti-
dialogical action result in power as domination and dialogical action being the basis for 
liberation from this subjection. Whilst several issues raised by SA Foucauldians as part of their 
critique of the stance taken by SA Freirians on the concept of knowledge have been addressed in 
the chapter, especially the criticism directed at the concept of conscientisation (erroneously 











towards reflection without action), it is the linking of knowledge to power in a way that does not 
allow for liberation from power by SA Foucauldians that we must tum. As in my resolution of 
the conscientisation-'consciousness-raising' debate where I pointed out that the Freirian concept 
of conscientisation can bring about liberatory praxis on the basis of its linking of reflection and 
action, I also want to indicate here that through conscientising dialogical action, liberation from 
power as domination is possible. Hence the chapter which follows below (Chapter 4) will deal 











CHAPTER 4: SA FREIRIANS CONTRA FOUCAULDIANS ON THE CONCEPT OF 
POWER 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main purpose of this chapter is to compare and contrast the various notions of SA Freirians 
and SA Foucauldians on power. The argument in the chapter is that SA Freirians' s conception 
of power as domination allows for conscientisaiton and dialogical action for freedom to be 
undertaken. This is not the case in SA Foucauldians's view of disciplinary power which is 
everywhere and has no subject. The Foucauldian conception of power instead of having 
identifiable agents who exercise power has multiple and contradictory subjectivities and 
identities. Consequently no conscious political action is possible within this framework. Within 
the text I argue that the act of knowing through dialogue could be used to unmask the theory of 
anti-dialogical action within systems of domination thus paving the way for action and reflection 
for liberation. I utilize Giddens's structuration theory to ground my acceptance of the SA 
Freirians's conception of power. First I utilize Giddens's idea that systems of domination are 
harnessed to the sectional interests of groups implying that asymmetrical relations of power and 
identifiable powerful and relatively powerless agents exist within relations of domination. This 
view is shared by Thompson who believes relations of domination are structured in asymmetric 
ways and could be discerned from the 'structured inequalities of social life'. Responding 
directly to Foucauldians's argument for multiple and contradictory subjectivity, Thompson says 
in systems where asymmetrical relations of power and structured social inequalities exist, the 
powerless also represent the 'diversity and difference' enmeshed within the social relations. In 
addition I also utilize Thompsons's concept of fragmentation to reflect on the operation of the 
divide-and-rule strategy. The divide-and-rule strategy within relations of domination operates to 
fragment or divide the dominated groups in order to prevent unity amongst them against the 
system of domination. 
Second, I utilize Giddens's concept of the dialectic of control to indicate that systems of 
domination reproduce relations of autonomy and dependence between the powerful and the 
relatively powerless in such a way that the powerless can tum resources against the strong. This 
idea can be utilized to ground the view by SA Freirians that the practice of education for 
liberation and People's education for People's power could result in liberation from Apartheid 
power. The specific operation of the dialectic of control is in a way linked to the functioning of 











plank for processes of exposing ideologies inherent in relations of domination. The unmasking 
of systems of domination by the critique of ideology would create space for action and reflection 
by knowledgeable actors to transform relations of domination. Hence the idea by SA Freirians 
that through conscientizing dialogical action, Apartheid power could be transformed and 
liberation achieved is justifiable. 
Third, Giddens's view that coordinated political action is possible is utilized to indicate that 
freedom from any power, disciplinary or otherwise, is an achievable goaL Giddens has indicated 
the potential 'bourgeois' and 'liberal freedoms' have for revolutionary action by the trade union 
movement. SA Freirians have also indicated the link the People's Education had with the overall 
liberation movement against Apartheid power. In fact the idea by SA Foucauldians that power 
has primacy over everything including truth is a reductionism which, as in the case of Marx's 
economic reductionism, must be rejected. Instead we must see power and truth as dialectically 
related. Truth as part of the process of ideology critique is subversive to power. In addition to 
being part of the process of exposing ideological justification of relations of domination, truth is 
part of strategies for lifting impositions. Hence truth and liberation are diametrically opposed to 
power making freedom from power a possibility. This implies that the argument by SA Freirians 
that education for liberation was an instrument for liberatory action for freedom against 
Apartheid power and that this was an attainable goal must be accepted. By the same token the 
view that we cannot escape power must be rejected more especially because Giddens has insisted 
that to view modem power as disciplinary is a misrepresentation of facts. Disciplinary power is 
applicable only to the prison system. Even in the case of prisons, Giddens has indicated that it 
was real agents within the modem state who designed and reorganized the prison system to 
control the miscreants because previous community strategies to do so had failed. Let us now 
tum to a crisp summary of the differing contours of arguments about power by both SA Freirians 
and Foucauldians before an elaborated versions of these in the rest of the chapter is presented. 
Like Freire, who had two extreme poles of power, one for domination and another for liberation, 
South African Freirians believed Apartheid oppression and subordination represented power and 
domination whilst the democratic people's movement for power represented by the forces within 
the National Liberation struggle such as the African National Congress (ANC), the BCM, the 
UDF, the People's Education for People's Power Movement, etc. constituted the other pole, that 
of mobilized community power as a means of effecting liberation. To start with let us examine 
the pole of oppressive power which Freire and the South African Freirians have rejected. As 











description of an antidialogical theory of action or simply the theory of domination whose 
purposes are domestication and dehumanisation. In Apartheid domination we had a situation 
where dominant Whites were subjects and the subordinated Black community being the object of 
their action. This implies that the dominant White elites were active agents/actors and Blacks 
were passive objects. In a similar vein the functioning of Apartheid and/or Bantu education 
promoted passivity and docility amongst students and a feeling of authority in teachers who 
transmited knowledge as if it is static. This was, of course, Apartheid education content that the 
teacher presented in an unquestionable format in order to serve purposes of Apartheid 
indoctrination. As a result, the Black community accepted their inferiority as natural and 
inevitable. The long-term goal of this process was the maintenance and perpetuation of the 
Apartheid system. 
The power of Apartheid domination was directed at the socialisation of Black children to serve 
their White masters in all socio-economic and political spheres. This was overtly and covertly 
done through the infusion of educational content with Apartheid ideological indoctrination in 
schools in addition to the brute force administered in the rest of society to preserve oppression 
and exploitation. Significantly, the practices embedded in the Bantu Education processes 
involved prescription, cultural invasion, conquest, and divide-and-rule aimed at the total 
SUbjugation of Black South Africans. In this sense, Bantu education was directly linked to 
Apartheid power and processes meant to reinforce this power as domination. 
SA Freirians also maintained that through manipulation, paternalism and co-option strategies 
infused in educational practices, education ceased to be objective but rather an instrument of 
Apartheid power. Education as an instrument of power has as a primary objective massification, 
domestication and dehumanisation. Dehumanisation happens when human beings do not 
appropriate their history and culture as active, critical and creative subjects. In the SA case 
Blacks were compelled, through their acceptance of a top-down school authority structure and 
the authority of the school curriculum and/or the unquestionable authority of the teacher's 
knowledge to view the authoritarian Apartheid rule as unchallengeable or sacrosanct. The 
passivisation process, manipulation tactics and the promotion of a conformist mentality served 
purposes of conquest. This ensured that Black children develop a dependent slave mentality 
whose long-term effects were apemanship, mimesis and self-devaluation which negates 
processes of humanisation. This Apartheid knowledge was knowledge in the service of an 












In order to counter processes whose main aim was the denial of freedom to the South African 
masses, Apartheid power had to be replaced with a democratic people's power which was 
revolutionary in nature. This power is analogous to Freire's dialogical power derived from the 
theory of revolutionary action. The dialogical liberatory theory of action, through organisation, 
unity for liberation, cultural synthesis and co-operation processes makes possible the 
transformation of the oppressed's conditions of existence. The objective is humanisation as a 
permanent process whose principal endproducts are freedom and emancipation. Freire believes 
that this process is made possible by the intersubjectivity of subjects-actors (revolutionary 
leaders) and actor-subjects (the oppressed) as reality is never appropriated or transformed 
passively. Democratic people's power, to be revolutionary, must arise from processes of 
conscientisation which propel the oppressed into liberatory action as active subjects. For this to 
happen, a state of intersubjectivity leading to action to transform the Apartheid system had to be 
reached. 
South African Freirians believe it is through dialogue, mobilisation, organisation and People's 
Education for People's Power that such an intersubjectivity necessary for liberatory action can be 
attained. However, this liberatory action is broader than sometimes perceived. It is a penetrative 
and deepgoing revolutionary action (rather than a narrow one) aimed at the liberation and 
universal humanisation of both the Apartheid oppressors and the oppressed in South Africa. In 
other words, an authentic act of freedom liberate both the White oppressors and the oppressed 
Black masses in the service of humanity as a whole. It is not an act which replaces White 
oppressors by Black ones or which privileges the leaders at the expense of the masses. Rather it 
is an act of knowing which transforms both the oppressor-subjects (and/or leaders-subjects) and 
oppressed-objects (and/or the masses-objects) into actors-subjects who fully participate in their 
historical vocation of creating their own history and culture and transforming this same reality as 
active thinking subjects. 
The more explicit means by which SA Freirians link power and knowledge (and/or education) is 
through the concept of People's Education for People's Power (PEPP). Note that other 
movements like the BCM instead of using this term they utilised a notion directly taken from 
Freire's writings to describe the same process, namely, education for liberation or liberatory 
education. Like Freire, the proponents of People's Education for People's Power (PEPP) believe 
the education processes involved here are pedagogical in nature seeking to conscientise students 











People's Education for Peoples' Power(PEPP) in this sense was an emancipatory process, in a 
word, a liberatory pedagogy, whose main aim was to effect democratic rule in a non-racial, non-
sexist South Africa. 
It is vital however to make explicit the fact that the definition of what is to be the social, 
economic and political utopia of this democratic South Africa differs slightly in terms of the 
political convictions (radical or otherwise) of each liberation movement involved in this 
liberatory praxis. For instance, the BCM and Neville Alexander will particularly make emphasis 
on the anti-racial, anti-capitalist and socialist nature of the transforming South African society. 
While the same undertones are implicit in the People's Education for People's Power Movement, 
there was no particular emphasis on these variables in their statement. Rather one gets a feeling 
that final decisions on these issues have yet to be made because contradictions abound in the 
PEPP document allowing a seemingly pro-capitalist utterance in one paragraph to be followed by 
an implicitly anti-capitalist statement in another. Nevertheless within an all-embracing concept 
of a democratic, non-racial, non-sexist South Africa a dialogical conscientisation process is 
supposed to bring about humanisation, autonomy and freedom from power. All this would be 
mediated by the power of authentic dialogue which South African Freirians, following Freire, 
believe is the authentic act of knowing whose only outcomes are liberation and emancipation. 
As indicated at the beginning of this section, South African Foucauldians, like Foucault, believe 
it is a pipedream to think that freedom and truth are achievable. SA Foucauldians also feel inter 
alia that a Freirian conception of power which constructs rigid binary divisions amongst subjects 
such as oppressor/oppressed or free subjects must be rejected. For these reasons a full 
description of SA Foucauldians on the subject of power which lay bare their differences with 
Freirians is needed. 
SA Foucauldians reject the traditional conception of power. This is the juridical or monarchical 
version of power which places power in the hands of some individuals, groups or the powerful 
making others powerless. Following Foucault, SA Foucauldians believe that power is not a 
property to be owned or possessed. Rather power operates in a netlike organisation. It circulates 
in a weblike fashion such that each individual or group is either affected or affect the rotating 
power. Modem power is everywhere. It is in a perpetual state of motion in both micro and 
macro contexts. This is disciplinary power which is invisible thus making it possible, as Coetzee 
and Flanagan believe, for power at the margins to subvert macro-power systems resulting in the 











used effectively in the struggle for powerlknowledge. Nevertheless we can never escape power 
as it is everywhere. 
The analytics of power advanced by SA Foucauldians is a non-economic analysis of power in the 
sense that ownership of power is not the central issue. Instead, the characteristic feature of 
disciplinary power is in its links with knowledge, truth and subjectivity thus making difficulties 
for the possibility of liberation despite critical theory's incessant belief that cultural action can 
bring about freedom. South African Foucauldians maintain that power and knowledge are 
conjoined to produce a powerlknowledge axis. Flanagan, Deacon & Parker, Prinsloo, Skinner, 
Macleod, Coetzee, and de Kadt are amongst South African educationists who believe knowledge 
is power because knowledge is legitimised through power and vice versa. For them, knowledges 
are power relations because discourses are directly linked to the operation of power. For 
instance, in the case of prisoners and pupils disciplinary knowledge is political in the sense that it 
prohibits them some behaviours while allowing/prescribing others. The implication thereof is 
that where there is power there is no possibility for freedom and authentic liberation. For this 
reason, education for liberation advanced by South African Freirians, SA Foucauldians believe, 
is a utopian dream, a romantic vision which is not attainable because of the saturation of systems 
of knowledgeltruth by effects of power. This creates tremendous theoretical problems for the 
praxis of People's Education for People's Power in South Africa. 
However, the use of the Habermasian concept of communicative action and undistorted speech 
acts would demonstrate that dialogue is the central aspect of the humanisation process Freire was 
working towards. Owing to the extreme divergence of the views of SA Freirians and 
Foucauldians it seems necessary for us to roughly sketch out the differing strategies and 
theoretical frameworks directed at contesting, challenging, and ultimately overthrowing 
Apartheid power in South Africa during the 1970's and the 1980's before dealing with the power 
discourse itself between the two camps in this country. 
4.2 A BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE DIFFERING STRATEGIES AND THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORKS DIRECTED AT THE NEGATION OF APARTHEID POWER IN THE 
1970' S AND THE 1980' S 
This section is intended to serve as a reference point to statements of both South African 
Freirians and Foucauldians on the concept of power and the subsequent chapters on their 











continuation and reinforcement of historical insights on the context within which both Freire and 
Foucault's frameworks were adopted in South Africa covered in Chapter 3. The rationale of 
placing this section here is that it contains issues which are directly related to the theme of power 
although the two sections together serve as a historical anchor to the entire study. Let us begin 
with the strategies adopted by the BCM in order to liberate the oppressed Blacks from Apartheid 
power. 
The formation of the South African Students Organisation (SASO) in 1968 was not only a 
reaction to the feeling that Black concerns were not properly catered for within the multi-racial 
National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) but also the realization of the need for new 
organizations to fill the vacuum created by the banning of the African National Congress (ANC) 
and the Pan African Congress (PAC) in 1960 (Price, 1992:iv-v; 5; 7; 13). In this sense, the 
inauguration of the Black People's Convention (BPC) in 1972 as a broader front composed of 
community groups, church groups, trade unions and students attests to the fact that the BCM saw 
itself as continuing the work of the older liberation movements which were at that time driven 
underground (Ibid:vi; 10-11). However the BCM's conscientisation strategy derived from 
Freire's pedagogy and its concentration on the political mobilisation of Black people 
distinguished its politics from that of the Freedom Charter movement led by the ANC. The 
Charterists, as the latter group was referred to, had a non-racial character and directed its efforts 
towards the establishment of a non-racial democratic South Africa. Nevertheless, it can be 
argued that the BCM during the 1970's also struggled for the creation of a non-racial and 
democratic South Africa (Ibid:v) despite the fact that they saw their role as that of conscientising 
Black people to fight against the Apartheid system. With the formation of the Azanian People's 
Organisation (AZAPO) in 1980 emphasis shifted to the central role of the Black Working Class 
in the struggle for liberation and towards the establishment of an anti-racist, socialist Azania 
(AZAPO Education Secretariat, 1991: 222; 233; 238). In addition, the concept of 'education for 
liberation' become more prominent and the notion of conscientisation continued to be used as 
part of the liberatory education praxis within AZAPO (Ibid: 230; 233). 
The idea of the prominent role of the Black Working Class in the South African liberation 
struggle and an anti-capitalist socialist solution is shared by Neville Alexander, an ex-Robben 
Island Prisoner, who in 1983 formed a political front called the National Forum with AZAPO 
(Alexander, 1990:104, 110; National Forum, 1991:272). For this reason, one can argue that the 
BCM and Alexander adopted strategies and tactics of conscientisation and education for 











goal the establishment of an anti-capitalist, socialist South AfricaJ Azania. This is not the case 
with the People's Education Movement led by the National Education Crisis Committee 
(NECC). 
In contrast with AZAPO and Alexander's framework, the People's Education Movement instead 
of adopting the socialist solution, only urged 'workers to resist exploitation and oppression at the 
workplace' (SAIRR Topic Briefing, Reg. No. 0511 0068/08 (PD/3/86). While utilising Freire's 
concept of 'education for liberation' this is transformed and termed 'People's Education for 
People's Power'. Mkhatshwa, one of the leading exponent of 'People's Education', quoted Freire 
to indicate the grounding of the new concept of education in South Africa (Mkhatshwa, 1985:8, 
10). In addition, Johnson (1985: 20), indicating the dialogical nature of 'Peoples Education', 
recommended a strategy of co-learning and teaching akin to Freire's critical co-investigation. 
However, on the solution to the South African situation, the NECC consultative conference of 
1985 was unanimous on the establishment of a non-racial democratic South Africa (SAIRR 
Topic Briefing, Reg. No. 05110068/08 (PD/3/86)). The adoption of the resolution for the 
establishment of a non-racial democratic SA showed that there was a link between the NECC 
and the ANC. The link between the NECC and the ANC is based on the fact that the Soweto 
Parents Coordinating Committee (SPCC) met the ANC in Lusaka before the NECC conference 
(Unterhalter, 1986: 4-5) and that it was the ANC which recommended that children must go back 
to school (Muller, 1991 :319). Hence it can be deduced that the SPCCINECC was in essence 
directly carrying on the traditions of the Charterist congress movement of non-racial membership 
and a non-racial democratic outcome in South Africa. 
In other words, the People's Education Movement had as an objective the attainment of 
educational and political goals simultaneously. These goals had to do with the negation of 
Apartheid power within the education sphere and society as a whole (Mckay and Romm, 
1992:19-20). People's Education proponents were therefore against Bantu Education, Apartheid 
oppression and 'some instances' of 'the capitalist mode of production' (Ibid:20). Hence they were 
not only against 'separate' education and for 'deracialising education' but were opposed to any 
education whose express aim was domestication and subordination (Ibid). In sum, the 
educational and political objectives of People's Education were to educate the entire South 
African society including students for democratic participation (Ibid:20). 
Parallel to this process within the political and educational domain an intellectual debate about 











(1997:92) portrayed the academy as an exclusivist institution which claimed primacy in the 
knowledge production process. The academy abrogated itself the right to decide the type of 
knowledge which is socially acceptable and which is not. In addition, Cross criticizes the 
academy for still exercising knowledge-production on the basis of Eurocentric paradigms and 
discourses to the exclusion of others. However, in the argument which will unfold in the 
remaining part of this section I will show that even the post-Marxist discourses must not be 
spared the criticism that they are based on a Eurocentric logic. Cross excluded post-Marxist, 
post-modem or post-structuralism from this criticism because he preferred this framework over 
the others which included Afrikaner nationalist, liberal, Marxist/neo-Marxist and humanistic 
theoretical perspectives on South Africa. Romm (1990:34-38) has outlined the political 
commitments and goals of some of these theoretical frameworks in order to justify her adherence 
to the 'reflexive' approach. Romm and Cross's reflections on these frameworks will be useful for 
the purposes of understanding the struggles within the academy which laid the foundation for the 
emergence and spread of Freirian and Foucauldian ideas. 
Romm distinguished three South African theoretical and practical positions which she thought 
should be abandoned in favor of the humanistic framework centered around the notion of 
reflexivity. These were the nationalist government theory and practice, the liberal theory and 
practice, and the Marxist theory and practice. The first, the nationalist government theory and 
practice or the Afrikaner Nationalist tradition characterized the South African Society as 
composed of different racial and ethnic groups with distinct identities. The Afrikaner Nationalist 
theory asserted that any practical political policy must take the fact of 'ethnic' groups with 
distinct identities into consideration. Hence the adoption of the Apartheid policy for different 
racial and ethnic groups. Romm rejected this view for its political commitment to a society 
based on racial and ethnic group identity (Ibid:34-35). 
The second, the liberal theory, had as a core argument the idea that consensus could be arrived at 
in South Africa if the policy of racial discrimination could be discontinued. However liberal 
theory remained biased towards the retention of the free enterprise economic system in South 
Africa. Romm said this bias showed that liberals were not ready to alter their own political 
commitment to the free enterprise system (Ibid:35-36). 
The third, the Marxist theory rejected racial and ethnic categories of the Afrikaner nationalist 
ideology and also disagreed with the liberal concentration on the racial character of the South 











class-based struggle. This struggle was against class oppression because racial discrimination 
was always linked to capitalist development in South Africa. Romm rejected the Marxist theory 
for its fixed political commitment to the socialist solution to the South African problem 
(Ibid:36). As an alternative Romm advanced the idea that, in line with the notion of reflexivity, 
all South Africans should be afforded an opportunity to construct their own visions of the future 
dialogically without any prior political prescriptions (lbid:37). 
In fact in the early 1980's, against the background of the dominance of structural-functionalist 
and Marxist frameworks in most South African sociology departments, a humanist approach was 
adopted by the University of South Africa (UNISA) where Romm taught. This was despite the 
fact that the sociology academics in the university then were internally divided between 
structural-functionalism, Marxism and phenomenology (Alant, 1990:X). Alant said that the idea 
of embracing a broad humanism was a result of the search for an operational strategy that would 
serve as an umbrella for teaching the divergent models within the department (Ibid). Basic 
humanism which included, amongst others, Freire's pedagogy, was embraced as a strategy to 
address the variation of sets of assumptions which formed the basis of the enquiries of the 
different staff members in the department (Ibid; Mckay, 1990:96-105). Consequently within the 
broader operational strategy of basic humanism, a consensus was reached that no specific 
theoretical paradigm should be seen 'as providing a (presuppositionless) 'final truth" (Alant, 
1990:X). A further analysis of the contest for the control of the knowledge-production processes 
in universities with periodisations is provided by Cross (1997). 
Cross (1997:86) characterized the emergence of radical historiography as an outcome of 
contestation, conflicting interests and struggle for the control of power represented by 
knowledge. Universities, he maintained, were part of the institutions and organizations involved 
in the control of the production and dissemination of knowledge. In Cross's view, since the 
1970' s the White left within these institutions and organizations dominated the process of 
creating and distributing progressive knowledge (lbid:86). However, Cross believed that it was 
the crisis of the Apartheid system between 1976 and 1980 which led to the questioning of the 
basic assumptions of liberal theory. The radicalizing effect of this crisis, he continued, led to the 
contest by a sector of the liberal establishment of the basic liberal explication of Apartheid as an 
irrational racial logic. But lack of insights in finding an alternative explanation to the organic 
crisis and the growth and radicalization of opposition struggles of the liberation movements, the 
trade union movement, and the student movement, Cross argued, opened up opportunities for the 











According to Cross, neo-Marxist approaches challenged both liberal and Afrikaner nationalist 
traditions and their modes of representing historical knowledge. They rejected both the 
conceptualization of South African society in ethnic terms by the Afrikaner nationalist approach 
and the reductionist racial logic of liberals. In doing so, Cross argued, they substituted the racial 
logic with an equally reductionist class logic which privileged subjects such as the working class 
and the trade unions (Ibid:88). It is Cross's belief that neo-Marxists gave economic relations 
primacy over non-economic factors. In fact, he continued, 'functional linkages between 
capitalism and racial domination' were subjected to a class analysis from a vantage point of a 
conceptualization of the South African situation in terms of the logic of class divisions (Ibid:87). 
For Cross therefore failure to account for subjectivity, identity and culture constituted the major 
limitations of neo-Marxist explanations (Ibid:88). This meant further development of the neo-
Marxist position was necessary. 
Cross says the neo-Marxist approach was developed in such a way that a shift from economic to 
social relations was made possible. Central to this repositioning, he believes, was a move away 
from economic reductionism to the autonomy of social factors such as race and ethnicity albeit 
within a Marxist framework. Cross says the accordance of relative autonomy to culture, race, 
politics and ideology was prominent in the writings of academics from liberal institutions, such 
as, the University of the Witwatersrand (WITS) and the University of Cape Town (UCT), since 
the late 1970's. This social 'history from below' approach of the neo-Marxists, he maintained, 
became a standard paradigm for the English-speaking universities's History and Sociology 
departments and African studies Centres. During the process neo-Marxist analyses produced 
what Cross referred to as an anti-Apartheid 'people's history' which was appropriated by the 
popular movement in South Africa since 1987 (Ibid:89). The emphasis in people's history was 
on the lived experience of the ordinary people and Cross believed the express aim of this history 
was to bring back the lived experiences of Black people into history (Ibid:89-90). However, 
Cross believed, the subordination of the cultural phenomenon to the class logic was a primary 
shortcoming of neo-Marxist analyses (Ibid:90). This limitation, he argued, had to do with the 
failure to understand the emergence of new subjects in the post-Cold War era. Cross said the 
new subjects included ecological and gay movements, ethnic and racial minorities and women. 
He is of the view that the nature of struggles from these groups cannot be subordinated to the 
class struggle logic. Hence the emergence of the post-Marxist discourse in South Africa. Cross 











entailed bringing in new identities and many struggles 'as part of a wider project of radical 
democracy' (Ibid: 90). 
The post-Marxist discourse, in Cross's view emphasized 'the need to recognize difference and 
plurality of possibilities in the tranformatory project in which class and class struggle may be 
one' (Ibid:92). In line with Cross's position, the early 1990' s witnessed the proliferation of ideas 
which undermined the prevalent canons of knowledge. The main agent of this ideas, a group I 
refer to as South African Foucauldians, was critical of the unitary conceptions of knowledge and 
the subject. Instead, this group, which included Taylor (1992), Walker (1993, 1995), Carrim 
(1995), Deacon and Parker (1994), Skinner (1995) and Bensusan and Shalem (1994), engaged on 
a discourse which promotes pluralist notions of knowledge and the subject. Note that the idea 
that South Africa was a pluralist society in need of institutions which would accommodate the 
corporate-group interest of Whites was already part of the debate for the solution of the South 
African situation (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989:207). Within the educational sphere the 
pluralist perspective was directed at indicating that the learners experience multiple and 
contradictory subject positions within the South African schools (Deacon and Parker, 1994). In 
addition, students's identities were seen as always in a position of flux and not integrated 
(Carrim, 1995:34). In particular South African Foucouldians such as Skinner (1995:12), Walker 
(1995: 18) and Bensusan and Shalem(l994:313-322) rejected the otherness created by the 
dualism of critical theory and argued for, as in Cross's framework, a new perspectives as well as 
special focus on particularity and difference. The most marked feature of South African 
Foucauldians is that they are skeptical of both the truth claims of social science and its 
emancipatory goal. In SA Foucauldians's view, most social science's empowerment and 
emancipatory promises turned out to be 'false promises' as they could not be realized (Mouton 
and Muller, 1997: 12). The highlight of the emergence and consolidation of the South African 
Foucauldian project and other poststructuralist views is represented by the two conferences in 
1990 and 1994 entitled Knowledge and Method in the Human Sciences (Mouton and 
Joubert(eds.), 1990) and Knowledge, method and the public good (Mouton and Muller(eds.), 
1997), respectively. 
As an observation it can be said that scholarly Marxist and neo-Marxist analyses might have 
nourished the political practice of the BCM and the National Forum in the 1980' s as the idea of a 
socialist solution was common in both groups. The only difference however was that the BCM 
and Neville Alexander substituted the working class as a principal agent of the South African 











divisions within the South African society. In addition, the nourishment of the political groups's 
ideas by scholarly work can be detected in the adoption of a humanist framework by the UNISA 
department of sociology at the height of the influence of Freire's pedagogy's concept of 
'education for liberation' in AZAPO and the embrace of this notion in the 'People's Education 
for People's Power' praxis of the NECC. However, there is no indication from the literature 
examined that the SA Foucauldian views had a direct impact on the struggle for liberation in 
South Africa. Rather SA Foucauldian ideas emerged in South Africa as a critique of the SA 
Freirian project. Perhaps we need to examine closely the ideas of the SA Freirians and 
Foucauldians on power to get the exact texture of their views starting with the former. 
4.3 SA FREIRIANS ON THE CONCEPT OF POWER 
In this section on the South African Freirians's conception of power, I am going to show that SA 
Frierians, following Freire, analysed power as part of an anti-dialogical theory of oppression 
which serves purposes of domination. The theories of Giddens and Thompson will be utilized to 
ground the argument that the operation of power produces asymmetrical relationships. 
Following Thompson, the position adopted here will be that even when one talks of diversity and 
difference these have to be conceptualized within systematic asymmetrical relations within 
which they happen (Thompson, 1990:330-1). In the South African setting during the Apartheid 
period asymmetric relationships could be identified between the dominant White group and the 
subordinated Blacks within all spheres of social life including the education domain. 
Nevertheless I argue, following Giddens, that the dialectic of control allowed for reciprocal 
relationship of autonomy and dependence between Whites and Blacks which made possible 
liberatory action to transform Apartheid domination to be taken. Within the education sphere, I 
analysed Bantu Education in general as an instrument of Apartheid power before specifically 
looking at the operation of the divide-and-rule strategy within the education arena as an example 
of the ways in which Apartheid power was effected. The importance of reflecting on the divide-
and-rule strategy is that amongst the characteristics of domination which include manipulation 
and cultural invasion discussed by Freire, I see divide-and-rule as the primary means by which 
conquest is ensured. In fact the divide-and-rule strategy is analogous to Thompson's 
fragmentation mode of operation of ideology which implies the construction and sustenance of 
relations of domination by creating divisions which will prevent a united front of the oppressed 
against the dominant group to be established. After deploying Giddens's dialectic of control to 
make the point that the weak can hit back against the dominant group, I then show that through 











been able to challenge and transform Apartheid education structures. With the use of Freire, 
Habermas, Thompson and Giddens's conception of ideology critique, I conclude that the critique 
of ideology not only makes people understand their situation of oppression but also creates 
possibilities for transformative action. Our starting point, however, will be the examination of 
the conceptualization of power as domination by SA Freirians before looking for possibilities 
for liberatory action. 
4.3.1 SOUTH AFRICAN FREIRIANS ON POWER AS DOMINATION 
Muller and Taylor (1995), Biko (1972; 1996), Pityana (1972), Mosala (1980), Khotseng et al 
(1987), and Matabane (1990) are the central figures in the analysis of Apartheid power as 
domination in the Freirian sense in South Africa. According to Muller and Taylor, contemporary 
critical pedagogies seriously deal with the concealed relations of power within the classroom by 
conscientising learners about the dangers of power and ways in which this state of affairs can be 
changed (Muller and Taylor, 1995:225). 
Amongst critical theories or Freirian influenced theories of change which grapple with the 
problematic of power as domination was Black Consciousness. According to Biko, Black 
Consciousness was not just a slogan used by Blacks to denounce Whites. Rather it was a call to 
Blacks to use the concept of group power in order to feature prominently in the South African 
power politics. As a dispossessed group, to attain a positive sense of self, they had to rise against 
the power of the Apartheid state. As Biko puts it: 
"At the heart of this thinking is the realisation by the Blacks that the most potent 
weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed. Once the latter 
has been effectively manipulated and controlled by the oppressor as to make the 
oppressed believe that he (sic) is a liability to the White man (sic), then there will be 
nothing the oppressed can do that will really scare the powerful masters" (Biko, 
1972:197 -198). 
Biko was of the view that in Apartheid South Africa White society held power as domination 
(Ibid:195; 201). He maintained that the Black-White power struggle in South Africa, a 
microcosm of Third World-rich White nations global confrontation, was to be transcended by 
universal humanisation (Ibid:202). Nevertheless, according to Biko's BCM colleague, Barney 
Pityana, this could not happen in a situation where political and economic power was solely 
possessed by the White minority; all preferred occupations, key positions and centres of power in 











tenns of social, educational and other services; etc. Despite the primary role Blacks played as 
the backbone of the workforce, they were excluded from power centres by a powerful White 
minority which kept them in total subjugation to White authority (Pityana, 1972: 174 175). This 
was legal racism at its best. 
Racism, argued Pityana, was practised in South Africa for the purpose of subordinating Blacks to 
White rule and for maintaining this control. In this sense, White racism was aimed at limiting the 
freedom of Blacks so that White monopoly over power could be assured in the country. 
Consequently, Pityana believed Whites in South Africa considered themselves as superior to 
Blacks on the basis of which they enjoyed the privileges Blacks were robbed of (Ibid: 178). Biko 
concurred with Pityana on the characterisation of racism in South Africa. According to him, 
racism was a phenomenon which referred to the discrimination of one group by another for 
purposes of SUbjugation and perpetuation of such SUbjugation. Racists were those individuals or 
groups who by virtue of their power subjugated others who became the objects of their racism. 
Both the National Party and the United Party, Biko maintains, were racist parties because they 
withheld power from the native population. The two parties wanted power and the United Party 
slogan "White supremacy over the whole of South Africa", indicated the extent to which its 
quest for power blinded it from reality (Biko, 1996:25; 62-63). Note that Biko's framework was 
not so rigid. His perspective allowed for some White souls to be considered anti-apartheid. On 
this issue Biko wrote: 
"Obviously it is a cruel assumption to believe that all Whites are not sincere, yet 
methods adopted by some groups often do suggest a lack of real commitment. The 
essence of politics is to direct oneself to the group which wields power. Most White 
dissident groups are aware of the power wielded by the White power structure .... 
They know exactly how effectively the police and the anny can control protesting 
black hordes -peaceful or otherwise. They know to what degree the black world is 
infiltrated by the security police. Hence they are completely convinced of the 
impotence of the black people. Why then do they persist in talking to the blacks? 
Since they are aware that the problem in this country is White racism, why do they 
not address themselves to the white world? Why do they insist on talking to blacks?" 
(Ibid:65). 
In essence Biko believed that political power in South Africa was finnly in White hands. Not 
only did Whites control Blacks in tenns of politico-economic power but they also 
psychologically manipulated Blacks on how best to cope with the situation. In this sense, Whites 
also controlled Black response or reaction to Apartheid rule. For this reason, Biko argued, 
Whites were to be bundled/lumped together as perpetrators of Apartheid rule because ifthey did 











responsible for the brutal force used to break down Black resistance to the Apartheid system - a 
system which made the White minority 'supreme masters' and 'perpetual rulers' (Ibid:66; 74; 
78). 
Letsatsi Mosala, National organiser of AZAPO, supported Biko and Pityana's view that Black 
Consciousness (BC) was a collective response by Blacks in South Mrica to White domination, 
oppression and exploitation. According to him, Black consciousness was an ideology constructed 
in order to unite the oppressed around their common experience of oppression and for this reason 
it was inevitable. It was a philosophy for national liberation on the part of the oppressed against 
domination by the White group. This philosophy conscientised Blacks for the struggle to regain 
their humanity in a situation where racism and Apartheid domination had yielded extreme forms 
of dehumanisation. This was due to the fact that Blacks were a dispossessed group without 
political power. Political power, Mosala maintains, was located exclusively in the hands of 
Whites. Hence the struggle in South Africa was primarily for access to material resources and 
political power in a setting where the White community wielded power over the Black majority. 
Self-reflection and self - definition of Blacks through the BC philosophy had resulted in self-
affirmation which implied consciousness that for liberation to be achieved White domination and 
discrimination were to be challenged. Thus the BC movement was against white privileged 
positions and seeked to mobilise Blacks against exploitation and dehumanisation (in Rand Daily 
Mail, 30 June 1980). 
As the issue of dehumanisation in general, and particularly in the education sphere, is one of the 
central concepts in this thesis, it is to this dehumanisation process within South African schools 
that we tum. Khotseng et al believed that Apartheid schools, while professing to humanise, 
contradicted themselves by embracing activities which dehumanised pupils. These activities 
ranged from aggressive authoritarianism of poorly qualified teachers to 'humiliation and 
domination suffered by children' in these educational institutions (Khotseng et aI, 1987:152). In 
addition, the claim of 'neutrality' in Apartheid schools was a mystification and a camouflage for 
the operation of the Apartheid ideology in South African schools. The hierarchical authority 
structure which was discipline orientated ensured that learners conformed to the prescribed rules 
of Apartheid schools and society as a whole (Ibid: 152-153). In supporting the claim that 
Apartheid power was in operation in South African schools, Khotseng et al wrote: 
"It is important to consider whether the "deviant" behaviour of children from 
oppressed groups is not a response to strict control against which they have to 











to learn it. Indeed this rejection activity may be a direct consequence of law -
enforcement procedures, dominant and dehumanising 'school' environment against 
which he (sic) has to struggle to get liberating education" (Ibid: 153). 
The dehumanisation process also extended to issues relating to literacy in South Africa. 
According to Matabane (1990), literacy has suffered in the South African setting because the 
Apartheid state was threatened by the power of educated Blacks to 'undermine the basis of racial 
domination and exploitation' (Matabane, 1990:343). Nevertheless, the government's tough 
stand was challenged through the educational struggle which utilised the Freirian concept of 
'education for liberation' which was transformed into the slogan 'People's Education for 
People's Power' by the Charterist section of the South African Liberation Movement. It was 
apparent in the writings of this group that the oppressed were not clamouring for their children to 
receive the same education as that received by White pupils, but instead, they were demanding 
education for liberation, that is, education which allowed the Black communities to take charge 
of their own lives. This was education which served the interest of the people as opposed to 
'education for whites' which served purposes of domination. For this reason, argued Matabane, 
curricula materials and pedagogical strategies for literacy in South Africa were directed at 
subverting the system of racial oppression and exploitation established through colonisation and 
Apartheid in the country. In addition, the literacy campaign was to stimulate critical thinking and 
active participation of all South Africans in the socio-economic, political, cultural and 
educational reconstruction of South Africa. Hence a challenge to, and transformation of, 
Apartheid education through literacy programmes become a political act. Matabane maintained 
that the political nature of these programmes was embedded in their objective to unravel social 
reality so that it could be transformed. In this sense, literacy programmes of a Freirian type in the 
country during the Apartheid period were not neutral. Their aim was to transform the South 
African society socially, economically, politically and culturally from the ravages of the 
Apartheid 'divide - and - rule' philosophy through a dialogical strategy whose endproduct was 
an egalitarian order. Within the schools, Matabane continued, a participatory two-way learning 
method was employed to counter attempts by the Apartheid state to conceal reality in order to 
preserve the status quo. The literacy campaign, according to Matabane, promoted shared 
responsibility between the learners and the teacher such that both considered themselves and 
each other not objects overwhelmed by dominating social classes but as subjects empowered 
with critical skills to change their conditions of existence (lbid:354). 
Essentially, South African Freirians were saying power as domination emanating from an anti-











relationship between the oppressor and the oppressed or the Whites as a dominant group and 
Blacks as the dominated in the South African setting during the Apartheid period. I think 
Freire's and the SA Freirians's anti-dialogical theory of oppression can be strengthened by 
utilizing Giddens's view that 'power relations are relations of autonomy and dependence, but 
even the most autonomous agent is in some degree dependent, and the most dependant actor or 
party in a relationship retains some autonomy' (Giddens, 1979:93). What this implies is that in a 
situation where power as domination operates it is possible to identify groups which are 
dominated in terms of the asymmetrical relations of power obtaining in the situation. In 
addition, Giddens is of the view that systems of domination are harnessed by sectional interests 
of social groups or classes (Giddens, 1981:61). In the South African situation Apartheid 
domination served the interest of Whites at the expense of the oppressed Black majority. 
However, knowledgeable actors though dependent retained some autonomy which left room for 
liberatory action. In fact this aspect is dealt with in Giddens's dialectic of control in social 
systems wherein Giddens indicated that the weak can 'tum their weakness back against the 
powerful'. Hence Giddens believes 'however wide the asymmetrical distribution of resources 
involved, all power relations express autonomy and dependence in both directions' (Giddens, 
1982:39). In this sense, we can theoretically ground the observation of the BCM, Khotseng et al 
and Matabane that there existed asymmetrical relations of power in South Africa during the 
apartheid period and that, as Matabane insisted, literacy programmes played a crucial role as part 
of the political action against Apartheid domination which involved the dominated Blacks 
turning their weaknesses back against the powerful Whites. Bantu education represented one site 
within which the struggle for the overall elimination of Apartheid domination took place in 
South Africa. 
4.3.2 BANTU EDUCATION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF APARTHEID POWER 
Bantu education was another sphere where these asymmetrical relations of power manifested 
themselves. The means by which the domination of Blacks by Whites was maintained was 
through Bantu education practices of massification, indoctrination and the infusion of the 
Apartheid ideology in all school-based activities. While the operation of Bantu education had 
ensured that White domination was perpetuated this had meant a subservient role and 
dehumanization for Blacks. SA Freirians, such as, Masekela (1986), believe Freire's theory 
makes the link between massification strategies and processes of domestication, dehumanization 











According to Masekela (1986:150), Freire believes men are massified if they conform to 
prescriptions of others. The Freirian concept of massification also indicates the state of affairs 
when individuals are being directed as objects and not subjects. Masekela maintains that such 
individuals, who follow choices and prescriptions of others as if they are their own, fear freedom 
(Ibid: 150). Freire says that massification processes domesticates, dehumanises and constricts 
men's horizons, making them passive, fearful, naIve beings. Following this, Enslin argues that 
the Pedagogy of the Oppressed makes it possible for the masses to come to an awareness that the 
dominated and the dominant groups are both manifestations of dehumanisation (Enslin, 
1986:225). The effects of the massification process were also evident in Apartheid 
mechanisms/strategies of mass schooling in South Africa (Prinsloo, 1987:2). 
The massification process has in fact been part of the Apartheid education provision. In page 6-7 
of the 1997 Curriculum 2005 document, Apartheid education is said to have promoted passive 
learning and a rigid content-based syllabi and curricula. All these are aspects of what Freire 
referred to as 'banking education' whose main aim is domination. Prinsloo also agreed that the 
repressive, elitist and segregated education system in South Africa during the Apartheid period 
was analogous to Freire's notion of banking education (Prinsloo, 1987:2). In addition, Coetzee 
said the traditional teaching method embedded in Bantu Education encouraged pupils to 
memorise and recite the contents of the teacher's lesson. In this sense the teacher became the 
possessor of truth and teaching an act of depositing with the educator the depositor and the 
pupils containers or receptacles. This banking approach to education which discouraged critical 
thinking and creativity was an ideological arm of an oppressive social power structure which 
served the interests of the dominant groups (Coetzee, 1995:15). 
In the past, to maintain White supremacy and a privileged status for themselves, Whites received 
a superior education meant for a dominant position in the Apartheid social hierarchy. Blacks, on 
the other hand, were given education inferior to that of Whites meant for a subject status and 
acquiescence to the legitimacy of the Apartheid status quo (Nkomo, 1990:302). In this sense, 
racial capitalism and Apartheid social relations determined the nature and form of education in 
South Africa. Educational institutions in this regard functioned as ideological arenas for the 
promotion and reinforcement of politico-economical domination by the White minority. The 
dominant Apartheid education ideology within the schools served to train Black pupils to accept 
Apartheid social relations as natural and inevitable. It also socialised these students to believe in 











socialised to accept the White-Black dominant-subordinate relations as natural and to believe in 
the unquestionable legitimacy and authority of Apartheid rule (Nkomo, 1990:294). 
Another function of the dominant Apartheid education ideology in South Africa, according to 
Nkomo, was to indoctrinate South Africans to accept racial or ethnic divisions as natural. For 
this reason, all South Africans were to be separated from each other in terms of this racial or 
ethnic criterion. This divide-and-rule strategy entailed separate residential areas and schools to 
instil racial or ethnic consciousness. In essence, this Apartheid education promoted compulsory 
ignorance as both Whites and Blacks were denied opportunities for normal social intercourse 
(Nkomo, 1990:295). Thompson( 1990:65-66) has indicated that the concept of fragmentation, 
which is one mode of the operation of ideology, can explain this state of affairs. For him, 
fragmentation establishes and maintains relations of domination by creating divisions amongst 
individuals and groups capable of dislodging dominant groups as is the case with divide-and-rule 
strategies in South Africa during the Apartheid era. 
In fact the school curriculum socialises or indoctrinates children to accept the status quo in 
education and society as a whole. According to Coetzee, Paulo Freire has taught us that 
curricular knowledge is subversive and knowledge is not neutral. Oppression for him, discerned 
in the school curriculum, is the outcome of the overwhelming control of curricular knowledge 
(Coetzee, 1995: 14-15). Mkhatshwa reflects the same sentiments when he points out that because 
education is either for domestication or for liberation, it is impossible to talk of a neutral, 
apolitical education. For him, education is either for conditioning or deconditioning purposes 
(Mkhatshwa, 1985:5). In this sense, knowledge in the school curriculum is an instrument of 
oppression used by the dominant groups to control the knowledge production processes by virtue 
of their power. Thus, banking education must be rejected as it remains distant to the oppressed 
'whom it treats as unfortunates' (Coetzee, 1995:14-15). This view is shared by AZAPO who 
believed the Apartheid education system in South Africa served purposes of indoctrination and 
domestication. It trained Blacks to adapt to the White world and accept White cultural models. 
Furthermore, AZAPO maintained that Apartheid education was an instrument for the 
entrenchment of an exploitative system and students were socialised within the schools to accept 
and satisfy Apartheid authority (AZAPO Education Secretariat, 1991 :224). For this reason, 
Apartheid education was education for domination and dehumanisation. 
Khotseng et al said, in this regard, that the Apartheid social organisation did not allow for 











of indoctrination' (1987: 166). This position is similar to that of Adendorff who believed that the 
highly structured course outlines imposed by education authorities discouraged dialogue and an 
authentic spirit of 'critical co-investigation' Freire talked about (Adendorff, 1993:203). 
The indoctrinating content within Bantu Education was a form of what Habermas has called 
distorted communication which served the interests of domination. In fact dialogue, which 
Adendorff said was discouraged by the Apartheid authorities, is for Habermas a solution to the 
problem of coercive interaction and systems of distorted communication and domination 
(Romm, 1996:199-202). This links up with Thompson's view that both the dominant and 
subordinated groups can utilise ideology, the former group to defend the status quo and the latter 
for revolutionary transformation. For this reason, while the Apartheid masters used the 
Apartheid ideology of divide-and-rule and indoctrination strategies within education to maintain 
and perpetuate Apartheid, ideology was also available for the dominated Blacks, for example, 
the proponents of the Black Consciousness philosophy, to utilise for revolutionary 
transformation. This entailed exposing the fragmentation strategies (Thompson, 1990:65-6) of 
the Apartheid state through which relations of domination were created and sustained by creating 
divisions amongst racial and ethnic groups and extending them to the schools. 
4.3.3 THE OPERATION OF DIVIDE-AND-RULE STRATEGY WITHIN APARTHEID 
EDUCATION 
The use of the fragmentation strategy has been central to the operation of the Apartheid ideology 
within education. Not only were the divisions between Blacks and Whites maintained within the 
schools but also the distinctions amongst Whites, Coloureds, Indians and Blacks were enforced. 
During the Apartheid era, Pityana observed that education was 'compulsory and free for Whites', 
and there were 'free books for the Coloured people and Indians'" but it was 'a very expensive 
item in the budget of an African home' (Pityana, 1972: 186). Indeed, Freire identified divide-and-
rule as one of the primary dimension of domination because through this strategy rifts amongst 
the oppressed which could prevent them to unite against their oppressors were created and 
deepened( Freire, 1972: 111) 
Benito Khotseng (1986) also utilised Freire's educational theory in the analysis of the divided 
education system in South Africa. Khotseng recommended Freirian conscientisation programmes 
in order to destroy socialisation processes within schools which promoted the master and slave 











difficult to achieve by teachers who instead of working for the goal of liberation became 
themselves oppressors of students in South African educational institutions. These teachers' 
thinking was so conditioned by the Apartheid reality that instead of conscientising their students 
for liberatory praxis, they trained them to ape Whites. Mimickry and imitation of Whites thus 
became their model of humanity. Teachers in the South African education system, in this case 
the oppressed educators, were unable to transcend their condition of being submerged in the 
reality of oppression. Rather they were impaired by it such that they were not conscious enough 
to engage in the struggle to overcome the contradiction inherent in Apartheid domination. As a 
result their relationship with their students, argued Khotseng et aI, was that of imposition or 
prescription. This state of affairs compelled learners to conform to prescriptions such that they 
lived their lives according to the guidelines of their teacher-oppressor. Like their Apartheid 
masters, the teachers-oppressors were threatened by the students' quest for authentic humanity as 
they were also fearful of the greater oppression from the Apartheid system (Khotseng et aI, 
1987:155-156). Following Freire, activists from the BCM characterised dehumanised persons 
like our Black teachers under Apartheid rule as adapted beings who were unable to make their 
own genuine decisions(AZAPO Education Secretariat, 1991:230). To AZAPO, an adapted 
person as object conformed to the Apartheid education philosophy which was saturated by 
dogmatic religious precepts. These dogmatic religious views ofthe dominant group subordinated 
the cultural and religious practices of the oppressed; enslaved the mind of the masses; adapted 
men to hierarchical views of society; perpetuated master-servant, ruler-ruled, superior-inferior 
relationships and other divisions; and hampered freedom of inquiry (Ibid: 223). 
AZAPO also identified the crucial strategy embedded in the Apartheid educational philosophy as 
the principle of 'divide-and-rule' which Freire said was integral to the anti-dialogical theory of 
action or simply the theory of domination. According to the AZAPO Education Secretariat, the 
Apartheid system of divide-and-rule within education promoted the illusion of the superiority of 
White culture; promoted racism and ethnicity by emphasising differences rather than 
commonalities in people; perpetuated oppressive, exploitative and dehumanising socio-economic 
relationships in terms of race and ethnicity; and advanced an educational philosophy which 
fostered the process of alienation (Ibid.). 
On the basis of this divide-and-rule strategy, pseudo-parliaments for Coloureds and Indians were 
created as part of the modern schemes for the subjugation of Blacks in South Africa (Biko, 
1997:12 13). These 'separated freedoms' of racial and ethnic groups were the means by which 











In the process the Apartheid perpetrators hoped to manipulate the world community to believe 
that all was well in South Africa and Blacks were free to run their own affairs in their own areas. 
Nevertheless separate areas were integral parts of the divide-and-rule strategy designed to 
fragment people so that they could be easily ruled without much united resistance against the 
Apartheid system (Biko, 1996:19). For this reason, the false prescribed 'freedoms' in 
'homelands' were nothing more than a central plank in the broader Apartheid strategy to stratifY 
the oppressed so that their fragmented opposition to the status quo could be swiftly crushed. In 
the final analysis the powerlessness of the oppressed, an outcome of the operation of the divide-
and-rule strategy, saw to the development of fear amongst the colonised Blacks who as a result 
subordinated themselves to the supposedly powerful Apartheid authority structure (Ibid:61 - 62; 
68; 72; 78). 
The operation of the divide-and-rule strategy therefore was linked to the practices of 
manipulation, cultural invasion and conquest. Manipulation has to do with the impositions of 
certain prescriptions by the dominant group upon the masses. Cultural invasion has to do with 
the destruction of the culture of the invaded group and its substitution with that of the conqueror. 
Cultural invasion therefore serves the interest of conquest where the conquerors impose their will 
over the conquered as if they were objects(Freire, 1972:108-123). The operation of cultural 
invasion was also evident within the education sphere during the Apartheid era. 
According to Coetzee, the traditional and Apartheid teaching method was a form of cultural 
invasion because it encouraged students to memorise uncritically the information transmitted by 
the teacher in the classroom situation. Consequently students became receptacles of the 'truth' 
possessed by the educator. Teaching in this sense, argues Coetzee, became an act of depositing 
with the teacher the depositor and learners the depositories. This was a banking model of 
education whose practice hampered creativity and the spirit of independent inquiry amongst 
students. In fact Coetzee says that Freire saw this education strategy as serving the interests of an 
oppressive order. In so doing it denied students their humanity while manipulating them to be 
obedient to the powers that be. The school curriculum in this case was used as an instrument of 
oppression or conquest such that the learners were transformed into passive SUbjects. Those who 
wished to defend their power utilised certain myths in order to manipulate and anesthesize the 
politically immature masses not to think critically (Coetzee, 1995:15-16). In support of this view, 
Morrow argues that theorists such as Freire and Foucault believe that 'there is a strong tendency 
for the dominated to develop self-understandings in terms of the basic categories of their 











revolutionary dialogical theory of action whose key element is conscietisation, systems of 
domination can be transformed. Giddens's notion of the dialectic of control is relevant here. As 
he puts it 'however wide-ranging the control which actors have over others the weak 
nevertheless always have some capabilities of turning resources back against the strong' 
(Giddens, 1981:63). In South Africa, People's Education for People's Power represented the 
capability of the oppressed to mobilise their collective strength against the Apartheid system. 
4.3.4 PEOPLE'S EDUCATION AS LINKED TO PEOPLE'S POWER 
In Cultural Action for Freedom, Freire (1970:47) maintained that those who are committed to 
cultural action for conscientisation and freedom must undertake a rigorous critique of ideology 
that will expose systems of domination and their ideological content. The unveiling of the reality 
and operation of the anti-dialogical cultural action for domination will create conditions 
favourable for conscientizing power and dialogical action for freedom (Ibid:46). The idea that 
the critique of ideology can create the basis for universal conditions for knowledge and action is 
shared by Harbemas who sees communicative action as a primary mode of action 
coordination(Cooke, 1994:8-27). Following Freire, SA Freirians were of the view that a critique 
of the Apartheid ideology and conscientisation created conditions favourable for dialogical 
action for freedom that negated the effects of Apartheid power. For instance, Coetzee (1995) and 
Mashamba (1990) believed the organic link between the education policy and the overall 
apartheid system in South Africa meant that in order to transform the education system a 
revolution was needed to overthrow the entire Apartheid structure. The interlinkage of socio-
economic and political processes with educational practices accounts for Freire's belief that 
pedagogical practices within and outside the school can either reinforce domination or help in 
the transformation of society. In this regard, Coetzee said the call for the liberation and/or 
democratisation of the school curriculum in South Africa was related to a similar general 
demand made by Paulo Freire in his classical work Pedagogy of the Oppressed. In fact, she 
continued, the influence of Freire's ideas was apparent in the majority of the guidelines for the 
NECC's People's Education for People's Power (PEPP) programme. One such idea was that of a 
cultural revolution which was to reconstruct all human activities in order to transform an 
oppressive society into a humane one. According to Coetzee, Freire sees the school curriculum 
and the educator as the interpreter of ideas within the school as having primary roles in the 
conscientisation process embedded in such a revolutionary action. The educator and a 











oppressed such that they become aware of their conditions of existence in a manner which makes 
transformation not only possible but also appreciated by both the oppressors and the oppressed. 
Nevertheless Coetzee says 'in this way power will be put in the hands of the oppressed' 
(Coetzee, 1995: 122-123). 
Mashamba's writings also testify to the affinity of the views of South African activists on 
education to those of Paulo Freire. According to him the concept People's Education for 
People's Power (PEPP) adopted by the NECC was not only directed at opposing Apartheid 
education. Instead the slogan PEPP was utilised in order to show the affinity of education 
struggles in the mid- 80' s with the liberation struggle of the United Democratic Front (UDF) and 
its demand for 'People's Power' in the country (Mashamba, 1990:45-46;48). Hence the linking 
of education struggles with the fight for a national - democratic order in South Africa by the 
NECC reflected both familiarity and identification with the Freirian concept of education for 
liberation. 
Nevertheless, Neville Alexander (1990) believes in order to properly understand the concept of 
People's Education we must go back to 1953 when the Bantu Education Act was promulgated. It 
was as a response to this Act that education activists started to think about alternatives to Bantu 
Education. Until 1969 most education and political activists' alternatives amounted to education 
that was the same to that which White children were supposed to have. It was only after the birth 
of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) in the late 60's, argues Alexander, that the view 
that South African education, Black or White, was a racist education for domination started to 
gain prominence. In this sense the rejection of White education as education for domination by 
the People's Education Movement under the leadership of Zwelakhe Sisulu, Father Smangaliso 
Mkhatshwa, Lulu Johnson and others in the mid-80's was a culmination of a process which 
started in the late 60' s (Alexander, 1990: 105-6). To be specific, it was in the consultative 
conference on education on the 28th and 29th December 1985 where the idea of 'people's 
education for people's power' originated (SAIRR Topic Briefing, Reg. No. 05/10068/08 
{PD/3/86}). However, it was in subsequent writings of scholars, such as, Walters (1986), that 
the relationship between Freire's notion of 'education for liberation' and the concept of 'People's 
Education for People's Power' was made more explicit. 
In a paper entitled People's Education: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis, whose main aim 
was a search for a conceptual structure for the study of 'people's education', Walters developed 











included Paulo Freire. Walters believed that Freire was amongst intellectuals who have made 
major contributions towards our understanding of 'education for liberation'. In her discussion of 
Freire's work, she identified key elements such as: 
the integration of education and politics; 
the development of the ability to think critically; 
the integration of process and content; 
the emphasis on the need for consciousness raising; and 
the development of organic intellectuals of the working class, which were used in the 
construction of a conceptual framework for the analysis of 'people's education' (1986:16-17). 
Within the student movement, the then president of CaSAS, Lulu Johnson, was amongst the first 
student activists who believed schools should be transformed into 'organs of people's power for 
people's education'. In his conceptualisation of the strategy and tactic of rendering Apartheid 
institutions unworkable or ungovernable and turning schools into sites of people's education and 
people's power, Johnson said: 
"People's power will rise right within the apartheid structures. People will take a 
degree of control of schools .... We must learn to transform the existing structures 
into what we want them to be with the long-term goal of scrapping the entire 
education system and replacing it by another. At the moment, making use of the 
apartheid structures to our favour becomes a burning question .30" (Quoted in 
Nkomo (ed.), 1990:299). 
Note the similarity of Johnson's view and the position advanced by the then President of the 
African National Congress (ANC), Oliver Tambo, in the 1987 annual statement sanctioning the 
call for students to go back to school to establish People's Education, which read: 
"The school, the college, the university is for us more than a place for formal 
education. It is also our assembly point, the location at which we marshal our forces, 
organise them and take the opportunity to give the order of the day. We must fight 
the enemy for the right to be at our respective institutions of learning, within which 
we should build and organise our democratic structures and within which we should 
introduce the system of people's education which is a decisive element in the future 
of our country and people. To return to school must therefore be seen as a 
revolutionary act which puts us in a better position further to advance the struggle for 
a people's education in a society in which we, the people, shall govern .. .33" 
(Quoted in Nkomo (ed.), 1990:300). 
Nevertheless it was in the hands of Zwelakhe Sisulu that the task of explaining the various 











According to Sisulu, People's Education was a means by which control over education and the 
establishment of the people's power structures necessary for the attainment of a democratic 
political and educational dispensation in South Africa, was attained. This entrenchment of 
people's power in the townships and in the schools was only possible when the education and 
political struggles were linked and the fight for self-determination in the education domain was 
integrated to the broader liberation struggle in the other social spheres (Sisulu, 1991:263). 
Hence People's Education for People's power was education for the liberation of, not only the 
education site, but instead, all social spheres. Put differently, the precondition for the success of 
the people's education campaign was the establishment of people's power in South Africa. It was 
only through people's power that Apartheid power was defeated. Only then were organs of 
people's power fully established within education and other social spheres (Ibid:264). 
In other words, Sisulu was arguing that the People's Education Movement was against Bantu 
Education because it was education for domination. Coetzee (1995:131-132) concurred that the 
call for people's education was a rejection of Apartheid education as education for domination 
and advocation for education for liberation. People's Education curriculum, in her view, 
produced knowledge useful for liberation purposes because education and politics were linked. 
In this sense, the struggle for a liberating education, People's Education, was intertwined with 
the broader struggle for a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic South Africa. For this reason, 
people's education had to develop an emancipated school curriculum for 'People's Power' which 
ensured democratic community participation in the construction of governance structures in 
education and society as a whole for the benefit of people themselves. The attainment of 
people's power was important here because for education for liberation and/or People's 
Education to be successfully implemented the oppressed had to acquire political power to 
overthrow the authoritarian Apartheid regime (Ibid.). In this sense People's Education was 
education for empowerment. Sisulu said, in this regard, that People's Education's empowering 
nature was due to the fact that it was education for liberation not imposed on the people in a top-
down fashion. This education, as a counter to Bantu Education, which served the interests of the 
Apartheid regime, could only be established in the process of struggle and secured by total 
liberation (Sisulu, 1991:266). The establishment of democratic organs of people's power in the 
entire society entailed the creation of democratically- controlled schools and the deepening of 
people's control over education (Ibid:270). In sum, the struggle for People's Education, 
maintained Sisulu, was an integral component of the demand for a liberated South Africa. In this 











political issue which affected other sectors of the community besides students and teachers 
(Ibid:267). 
Various educationists such as Kross (1998), Adendorff (1993), Khotseng et al (1987) also 
believed that the emergence of People's Education was a clear statement of no confidence in 
Apartheid education and that for the goal of people's education to be realised people's power had 
to be established within the structures of the South African society as a whole. To start with, we 
tum to the work of Glenda Kruss. Kruss said that People's Education signified the rejection of 
the Apartheid education ideology and the oppression it served to maintain. For this reason, she 
saw education as having a definite political purpose and therefore, not neutral. The political 
purpose of People's Education was thus to conscientise the people about oppression under 
Apartheid at the same time as preparing them for active participation in a non-racial, democratic 
system (Kross, 1988:10). In a word, while Bantu Education served to maintain the Apartheid 
status quo, People's Education was an integral part of the struggle for a non-racial, non-sexist, 
democratic South Africa (Ibid:1l). Kross quoted one of the resolutions of the People's Education 
declaration which said that People's Education equipped the people for effective involvement in 
the fight for People's power necessary for the establishment of a democratic dispensation in 
South Africa, to support her position (Ibid: 11). People's Education, in this way, was linked to the 
struggle for the abolition of Apartheid, the struggle for the empowerment of all South Africans, 
and the fight for the control of education so that it could serve the needs of the oppressed masses. 
In other words, People's Education represented a clear statement of rebellion against Apartheid 
education as an education for domination and an affirmation that the struggle for education for 
liberation, justice and freedom formed one site of the struggle for a democratic South Africa. 
Thus People's Education was indeed part of the politico-educational strategy for the mobilisation 
of the oppressed for the attainment of 'people's power' by means of which both a democratic 
education system and a non-racial, non-sexist democratic South Africa were established 
(Ibid:19). Hence Kruss was adamant that the campaign for People's Education was linked to the 
broader goal of empowerment and control that ensured total human liberation and full 
participation by all in all spheres of social Hfe-economic, political, cultural, etc. (Ibid: 12). 
All in all, Kross maintained that the aim of People's Education was to enlighten people so that 
they could resist Apartheid oppression and exploitation. In the education sphere the major 
objective was for 'people's power' to be established in 'people's schools' so that the shift in the 
balance of education power could be effected in favour of the people. As a starting-point, a 











authority (Ibid: 15; 21). In this sense, argued Kruss, the demand for the transfer of the control of 
the education system from the Apartheid authorities to the people was part of the process of 
students and community empowerment. Indeed, she believed, People's Education for People's 
Power signified a new approach to education whose principal goal was enabling people to take 
charge of their own life. People's Education and People's Power were thus expected to restore to 
the people their right to self-determination and control of their own communities denied them by 
successive Apartheid governments (Ibid: 11). Hence People's Education was an integral part of 
the broader struggle for national liberation. 
According to Adendorff, People's Education for People's Power was not only about changing 
the content of education but also had more to do with the broader struggle to transform political 
and administrative structures of the South African education system. It was also not only about 
access to "good" education but an act of liberation to effect ideological transformations within 
the schooling system linked to the broader emancipation process from the dominant and 
oppressive Apartheid structure (Adendorff, 1993:345). 
In support of Adendorff's position, Khotseng et al (1987) argued that, in a situation where 
students respond passively or in an alienated manner to their domination within the school 
system, the praxis of People's Education was not only aimed at giving them confidence to 
'struggle for their freedom and self-affirmation' but was also directed at conscientising them to 
go beyond mere struggles against the oppressive hidden curricula such that, together with their 
teachers, they could work towards 'overcoming the relations of domination and powerlessness, 
both in classroom and daily life'. This was because, Khotseng et al maintained, the 
democratisation and humanisation of power in the classroom could only be a reality only when 
society has been democratised( Khotseng et aI, 1987:158). All in all, Khotseng et al believed that 
in South Africa the pedagogical struggle was turned into a political struggle which did not 
confine itself to challenging hegemonic practices in the school but linked this contest to the 
liberatory action to transform the wider Apartheid society. In this sense, the struggle within the 
school was part and parcel of the broader 'pedagogical struggle to fight against apartheid' 
domination (Ibid.) 
The definition of People's Education as a pedagogical process to enable the oppressed South 
Africans to gain an understanding of Apartheid oppression made it a conscientisation instrument 
for the struggle against domination. For Giddens, the possibility and necessity of coordinated 











and freedom are dialectically related and in opposition to each other(Taylor, 1986:92-93). Hence 
the idea that People's Education was a conscientising dialogical process for the attainment of 
people's power necessary for the establishment of a non-racial democratic South Africa could be 
analysed within Giddens's concept of ideology critique. Giddens sees the relationship between 
structure and agency and ideology critique as dialectical. He deploys the concepts agency and 
praxis to indicate the capacity for human agents to reconstruct and transform their society within 
social structures that are both constraining and enabling( but which they know because they 
created them) (Craib, 1992:34,44,166; Bryant and Jary(eds.), 1991). 
In addition, Giddens believes that because all systems of power have ideological aspects, they 
can be studied from the point of view of ideology critique. The critique of ideology is likely to 
compromise the knowledge and truth claims of at least some subjects benefiting from specific set 
of power relations(Boyne, 1991:52-73; Held and Thompson(eds), 1989:5;288-293). It can also 
yield new forms of counterfactual thinking and practical programs of social intervention which 
could provide stimulus to social transformation ( Held and Thompson (eds), 1989:5;288-
293;300-301). This is in line with the view of SA Freirians that conscientisation and dialogical 
strategies could be utilized in People's Education to expose the oppressive reality of Apartheid 
domination so that transformative action and reflection which would yield a non-racial 
democratic South Africa could be taken. In fact the critical potential of the analysis of ideology 
has been also embraced by Thompson. According to him, through critical reflection relations of 
domination can be unmasked. The interpretation of ideology therefore is symbiotically related to 
the critique of domination, to critical reflection on relations of power and domination. Its proper 
utilization can lay bare the facts about asymmetrical social relations and those who derive benefit 
most as well as the least beneficiaries in these power relations(Thompson, 1990:25-26) 
4.4 SOUTH AFRICAN FOUCAULDIANS ON THE CONCEPTION OF POWER 
In this section I will show that South African Foucauldians have rejected the traditional, 
juridical-monarchical conception of power. They do not believe agents exercised power because 
power circulates and no group or individuals possess power. The section will then explore the 
various principles of modem disciplinary power which SA Foucauldians believe represents the 
best way of understanding the issue of power. Modem disciplinary power is seen as not 
centralized in one center of sovereignty and not governed by binary divisions of dominant and 
dominated groups as power is invisible. This is power interlinked with knowledge to constitute a 











fonns of knowledge in society and in the education system. On the basis of their inseparability, 
power and knowledge integrate surveillance techniques in the teaching and learning relationship 
in South Africa. The surveillance techniques are utilized to monitor the process of constituting 
curricular knowledge and subjects of power as well as disciplining them. Hence SA 
Foucauldians believe, the 'People's Education' discourse in South Africa demonstrates that 
powerlknowledge relations penneates the educational arena. 
In addition, South African Foucauldians have linked the idea that power is everywhere with the 
issue of the possibility of liberation. For them, the fact that power is everywhere means that 
there is no possibility of freedom from power. For this reason, SA Foucauldians believe power 
is not a property of particular individuals or groups, it is never possessed but instead circulates in 
a chain-like impersonal manner. As this argument goes, since power is everywhere, the 
dichotomy of power and freedom cannot be sustained because those who appear free are in 
reality the most repressed. In other words, SA Foucauldians believe those who have internalized 
disciplinary techniques of self-government or freedom and appear most liberated are actually the 
real slaves of power. They are also of the view that those individuals marginalized from the 
system are also enslaved and not free. Nevertheless, they continue, struggles and resistances 
against this domination are part and parcel of power strategies and effects. What this means, and 
as indicated by Deacon and Parker, is that despite the existence of points of resistance at the 
margins, for instance, in the rural margins of the Maputaland schools in South Africa, social 
transfonnation and freedom is an impossibility. Hence Deacon and Parker believe schooling 
should be seen as one of the strategies of subjection within which subjects are made and 
disciplined. 
As a counterargument, I think the notion of power as disciplinary is wanting. The first point of 
my counterargument is that SA Foucauldians's conception of a subject-less history is flawed. 
History actually is explicated by the situated activity of knowledgeable agents who have the 
capacity for action and reflection for transfonnation. Giddens's concept of the duality of 
structure is applicable here. The concept emphasises the dialectical relationship between action 
and structures where each of these is constituted through the other. In this sense, social 
structures which are produced and maintained by actors are both constraining and enabling, thus 
creating space for political action for liberation. This political action for liberation is undertaken 











I also argued that in systems of domination, symmetric relations of power exist together with 
identifiable groups or classes who benefit more or less from relations of domination. This is 
because, and as Giddens has argued, all forms of domination are harnessed to the sectional 
interests of groups. But the dialectic of control also allows, as a dialectic response to the act of 
domination, for the powerless to hit back. In fact where 'structured inequalities of social life' 
exists the powerless also represent the 'diversity and difference' enmeshed in social relations of 
domination (Habermas, 1990:330-1). 
The conception of modem power as disciplinary accounts for Foucauldian theory's failure to 
produce a history with human agency. I have pointed out, following Giddens, that whereas the 
notion of disciplinary power is applicable to prisons, this cannot be extended to factories where 
workers have basic liberal freedoms (Giddens, 1982:222-223). In addition, violent forms of 
power instead of disappearing are escalating in the relations amongst modem nation states 
(Ibid:224-225). In fact Foucauldians treat power, discipline and punishment as if they were real 
agents whereas human beings who are the real agents are made to look like spectators in the 
creation and recreation of social reality (Ibid: 221-222). The ever-presence of power in 
Foucauldian analyses seem to substitute for both human agents and a real lack of the theory of 
the state(s) (Ibid: 223-224). Foucauldians need to be reminded that it was within the framework 
of the state that conscious human agents created prisons to control miscreants because previous 
community strategies had failed to do so (Ibid: 222). Hence the power reductionism in 
Foucauldian analyses-the claim that power is everywhere and has primacy over everything 
including truth-must be rejected. 
The elevation of power to a central place within South African Foucauldian analyses has robbed 
these analyses an in-depth understanding of the capability of the critique of ideology to create 
space for processes of conscientisation and dialogical action for freedom. It is through ideology 
critique that the reality of systems of domination is revealed so that action and reflection for 
liberation could be undertaken (note that although Foucault's archeology of disciplinary 
institutions come close to an approximation of the practice of ideology critique, the radical 
relativism within the theory makes meaningful political action for transformation unthinkable). 
In terms of the dialectic of control, power as domination is dialectically opposed to freedom as 
the powerful are to the relatively powerless and the latter having the capability to act in order to 











Dialogical action allows for different perspectives and cultural values to be brought into the 
process of reflection and action. In fact, in contrast with de Kadt's view, I think modernity 
encompasses a reflexivity which allows for elements of African cultures to be incorporated to the 
process of critical reflection within its frameworks. In addition, the supposedly 'post-modern' 
demand by Skinner that all theories be given space is in fact a demand which can be satisfied as 
part of the values of the reflexivity of modernity. The idea of 'crossing borders' within the 
Freirian pedagogy also covers this requirement for the involvement of differing perspectives in 
the dialogical action for freedom. Utilizing the concept of ideology critique whether from the 
Giddensian or Haberrnasian perspective, however, implies taking a political stance in favour of 
one of the central values of modernity, that is, human emancipation or freedom. The practice of 
ideology critique thus becomes a primary feature of the process of revealing the reality of 
relations of domination so that political action for liberation can be conducted. Hence Haberrnas 
is of the view that disinterested tme knowledge is a pipedream. For these reasons, I argue for the 
rejection of the SA Foucauldians's view that we must embrace Foucault's conception of 
disciplinary power. However, it is important to sketch out the exact arguments of SA 
Foucauldians in full, starting with their rejection of traditional conceptions of power before 
showing the limitations of their position. 
4.4.1 SA FOUCAULDIANS'S REJECTION OF TRADITIONAL, JURIDICAL-
MONARCHICAL CONCEPTION OF POWER 
According to de Kadt (1991), Foucault is against the view that the agent exercises power. 
Foucault's analytics of power, argues de Kadt, rejects attempts to associate any exercise of 
power with the conscious intention or decision of agents, be they individuals or groups. Rather 
we are directed at 'real and affected practices' of power which ensure the ongoing subjugation of 
subjects. Any competent analysis of power should, de Kadt maintains, concern itself with the 
processes responsible for the constitution of subjects with particular behavioural characteristics. 
In this way it will be possible for us 'to grasp subjection in its material instance as a constitution 
of subjects' (de Kadt, 1991 :2). It is for this reason, argues de Kadt, that Foucault conceptualizes 
power as something that circulates; which operates in a chain or a net-like organisation. 
Following Foucault, de Kadt says that individual persons rotate between power's threads but in a 
way that allows agents to exercise power and experience its effects simultaneously. The 
difference between traditional conceptions of power and Foucault's analytics of power therefore 
is that in his view even the most powerful people in society are constituted as subjects by 











Other South African Fucauldians, besides de Kadt, who have rejected the traditional conception 
of power, whether from productive or resistance theory, as a result of their adherence to 
Fucault's analytics of power, include Deacon and Parker (1993) and Prinsloo (1987). Deacon 
and Parker are of a view that the three modernist models of education, namely, the traditional, 
the vanguardist and the critical framework, must be rejected because they 'are essentialist, and 
all dichotomise, hierarchise and absolutise social relations' (1993:134). In addition, the three 
education models have dismally failed to conceptualise diverse identities and the power relation 
between the educator and his students (Ibid). All of these models, according to Deacon and 
Parker, promote learning processes which subjugate individuals to the effects of 
powerlknowledge thus constituting them as subjects of power. They are committed to 
determinate standards of truth and knowledge which distinguish acceptable and unacceptable 
curriculum practices. On this basis those curricula practices which deviate from the prescribed 
norm are marginalised or silenced. Deacon and Parker say that, despite its nominal rejection of 
the imperialistic practices associated with the objectivism of traditional and vanguard models, 
the vice of the critical model, the Freirian pedagogy in this context, is that it conceals the 
hierarchical relationship between the educator and the student and subjects and knowledge 
(Ibid: 134-135). There is therefore a tension, they argue, discernable in critical theory, between 
the development of an autonomous being while at the same time the role of the teacher is still 
conceptualised as that of guiding or directing learners. The kind of participation model promoted 
by critical theory thus, Deacon and Parker maintain, legitimises co-optative power relations 
between learners and teachers. Concepts such as 'dialogue', 'participation' and 'critical' in this 
sense mean nothing more than giving the impression that equality between the educator and the 
learner exists while hiding the actual reality of the authoritarian(relations of domination) 
relationship between them (Ibid: 134-135). This critical evaluation of critical theory is shared by 
Prinsloo (1987: 17) who believed that Freire's preoccupation with dialogue hides the fact of the 
unequal distribution of power between leaders and the people in revolutionary and post-
revolutionary situations. 
Furthermore, SA Foucauldians believe the relationship between the people and their 
revolutionary leaders is a mirror image of the authoritarian relationship between the educator and 
his students in the classroom situation. According to Deacon and Parker, the complex relation 
between the critical teacher and students is complicated further by the authority of knowledge 
the educator is supposed to have. In his practice, they argue, the radical teacher enforces the rules 











recognition of the validity of all perspectives which translates into an instrument of control of 
what participants in classroom dialogue are allowed or prohibited to express in the name of 
critical reason (Deacon and Parker, 1993:135). For this reason the critical model of education, 
for Deacon and Parker, is as authoritarian as the traditional and vanguard models (Ibid.). In their 
own words: 
" ... it is through inequalities of power and knowledge embodied in education that 
disciplinary educative practices are precipitated. Under the aegis of modernity, the 
critical model tends to conceive of power as sovereignty-something centralized, 
stable and above all repressive, but something which can be overcome or 
transcended, and freedom, truth and utopia arrived at. This negative, external, 
centralized, homogeneous and repressive conception of power ignores all that is 
positive, internal, dispersed, heterogeneous and productive about it. In order to move 
away from this domination/liberation dichotomy inherent in what Foucault calls the 
repressive hypothesis, we must conceive of power as both subjugating and affirming; 
it is not simply 'harmful' (repressive) but can also be 'helpful' (productive or 
normalizing)" (Ibid: 136). 
Put differently, South African Foucauldians believe that power linked to knowledge is both 
positive and negative. Coetzee (1995:66) says that while power is part of our life, it is only 
visible when it is put in action. She quotes Foucault as saying that power is neither derived from 
consent nor an act of giving up freedom. It is also not about renunciation or transference of one's 
rights to some individuals or groups. While it does not preclude the above concept, Coetzee says 
that power is not by its nature a reflection of commensuration/agreement. All these objections to 
how power should or should not be conceptualised link up neatly with Foucault's criticism of the 
way in which traditional methods characterise power. However, Giddens is of the view that 
while the notion of disciplinary power is applicable to prisons, it cannot be utilised in the 
analysis of processes in the factory where workers have basic liberal freedoms. The faulty 
analysis of modern power as disciplinary can also be discerned in the writings of SA 
Foucauldians. 
4.4.2 MODERN POWER AS DISCIPLINARY 
Amongst South African Foucauldians who believe that modern power is disciplinary are Mastin 
Prinsloo (1986) and Raphael de Kadt (1991). Prinsloo is of the view that Foucault's notion of 
power's utility is in its conceptualization of power as a multiplicity of power relations. These 
power relations are not centralized in one center of sovereignty but are located in innumerable 
places. Power relations originate from both the top and the bottom and therefore are not 











the whole fabric of society (Prinsloo, 1986: 286 287). For Raphael de Kadt (1991: 10), the 
state is impregnated with apparatuses of administrative control, coercion and surveillance. This 
quest for order, de Kadt maintains, has much to do with management, engineering and 
manipulation. There is therefore a tension between the values of modernity and some of its 
forces and consequences. In the South African situation, de Kadt believes, the Apartheid political 
engineering which orders and disciplines is a distortion of the modernisation process despite the 
fact that Apartheid is partially directed at reinforcing the ideal values of modernity. The reason 
here is that the dichotomizing Apartheid vision created opportunities for some while denying 
these for others thus opening space for resistance by the latter group against these overpowering 
forces of modernisation (Ibid.). As de Kadt put it, 
" ... apartheid, the 'democracy for some' based on a complete violation of human 
rights for the majority, is a logical consequence of modernity as well as 
modernisation. Yet however distorted South African modernity may be, it is 
modernity which contains the promise of emancipation in occidental terms. Even 
after the removal of apartheid from the statute books these skewed versions of 
modernity and modernisation will continue to structure our society. But it is 
important that we work towards resolving these in some form of perhaps, post-
modern society which will be able to reconcile positive aspects of modernity with 
elements of African cultures" (Ibid.). 
I think, contrary to what de Kadt is saying, modernity encompasses a reflexivity which allows 
for the incorporation of elements of African cultures within its frameworks. As capitalism spread 
throughout the world, it not only influenced the cultures of the colonies but it was also 
reflexively altered by them. Giddens has criticised post-modern perspectives of a real lack of any 
theory of the state. In fact, to him, we can no longer speak of a theory of the state but the theory 
of 'states' with 'an escalation of violence upon a level unparalleled in prior history' 
(Giddens, 1982:224-225). In the context of nation-states therefore it is inaccurate to argue that 
violent forms of power have been eliminated. For this reason it is nonsensical for SA 
Foucauldians to see modern power as entirely disciplinary because while this applied to prisons 
where prisoners have been forcibly incarcerated, such an analysis cannot be extended to factories 
where individuals still enjoy 'bourgeois' or 'liberal freedoms'. It is on the basis of the 'freedom 
of contract and freedom to organise politically' that labour movements emerge to both challenge 
and influence the direction of change within capitalism (Ibid:222-223) 
In sum, what I think should be clearly pointed out here is the power reductionism in Foucauldian 
analyses. The reductionism that power is everywhere, that it can explain everything and that it 











power' (Ibid:227) must be rejected. To bring further clarity on this issue let us examine the 
relationship South African Foucauldians believe power has with knowledge. 
4.4.3 POWER LINKED TO KNOWLEDGE TO CONSTITUTE POWERIKNOWLEDGE 
South African Foucauldians , such as Miller (1990), Coetzee (1995), Macleod (1995), Prinsloo 
(1986), Flanagan (1991) and Skinner (1998) believe power is symbiotically intertwined with 
knowledge to constitute a power-knowledge axis. Miller, for instance, is of the view that the 
notion of knowledge is associated in an essential way with the corresponding concept of power. 
For him, know ledges operate on behalf of power relations within communities, groups or 
societies. In the Foucauldian sense every instance of power, is an instance of knowledge 
production. Consequently, any text or article of knowledge creates conditions conducive for the 
exercise of power (Miller, 1990: 115; 117). Put differently, Miller believes those who advance a 
position which privileges objective true knowledge over other knowledges are in favour of the 
regimes of truth whose entrenchment could not be satisfied without the use of power strategies 
and/or effects. Thus in order to evaluate the epistemological validity of knowledge, he maintains, 
questions of the truth or falsity of such knowledge are irrelevant-rather our recourse is to the 
relations of power this knowledge upholds (Ibid: 118). In this sense powerlknowledge relations 
are implicated in the contest for the control of the curriculum within the schools. 
In this regard, Coetzee is of the view that the power struggle within the curriculum debate 
represents a fight against the power effects which are symbiotically intertwined with knowledge. 
It is also the struggle against the privileges of knowledge in the power structure in our local 
formation. The central issue in this contest, Coetzee argues, is not about the status of knowledge 
and truth but the functioning and circulation of knowledge and its relations to power (Coetzee, 
1995:12 -13). 
The various voices and discourses within the curriculum debate are centered quite significantly 
around issues of power (Ibid:12; Macleod, 1995:78). Macleod points out that it is the dual 
character of discourse that is key to understanding the powerlknowledge relations. While 
discourse is the means by which the world of meaning and reality becomes apparent, it is also a 
medium through which what could be known or said is restricted (Macleod, 1995:65; Prinsloo, 
1986:284; 294). The latter aspect of the dual character of discourse clearly indicates that 
knowledge is linked to power to produce a knowledge/power axis-implying that knowledge and 











discourses are part and parcel of powerlknowledge strategies in the sense that they are 
inseparable from notions of power, control and struggle (Prinsloo, 1986: 284). In other words, it 
is because knowledge and power are discursive practices that they are conjoined and inseparable 
(Ibid:287). 
In the same vein, Macleod (1995:71) believes power is a force of field relations with 
discourseslknowledges as constituent elements thus making it a system of relations. This view is 
also embraced by Coetzee who says knowledge serves to either justify or challenge the balance 
of power in any social formation. In this sense knowledge is a form of domination such that it 
has to be seen as power. Conversely the contest for power within the school curriculum has 
become a cultural dilemma which has precipitated a crisis in the dominant Western culture 
(Coetzee, 1995:1). In addition, Coetzee (Ibid:7 - 8) maintains that 'the relationship between the 
school curriculum and the struggle for power is closely related to perceptions of authority which 
'legitimizes' the origin of truth of knowledge (and the corresponding balance of power in the 
social reality)'. Foucault's concept of surveillance is applicable here because it is as a result of 
the operation of powerlknowledge strategies within the school situation that some know ledges 
are either included or excluded from the curriculum programme. 
On the above issue, Flanagan (1991) believes the utilization of the concept of surveillance by 
Foucault is useful in understanding how the teacher operates within the classroom setting. In her 
view, the integration of surveillance techniques in the teaching-learning relationship within the 
school is in the service of powerlknowledge relations (Flanagan, 1991:179). This view has an 
affinity with a position taken by Deacon and Parker (1993) with regard to teaching-learning and 
curricular processes within the South African schools. According to Deacon and Parker, it is 
through the technologies of powerlknowledge that curricular processes and subjects are 
constituted. These curricular and subject constitution processes are effects of powerlknowledge 
relations. Consequently, the starting point of curriculum content analysis ought 'to be the 
relations of power within which these subjects are embedded' (Deacon and Parker, 1993:137). 
This symbiotic linkage between knowledge and power can be illustrated by pointing to the 
existence of a hierarchy of knowledge and standards of truth within the educational institutions 
which serve to constitute subjects of power and discipline them accordingly (Ibid). In fact on this 
point Skinner (1998:4) says that powerlknowledge allows or prohibits knowledge forms which 











Furthermore, Skinner (Ibid.) believes Foucault's concept of power/knowledge is a heuristic 
device by means of which the power of truth is detached from those domineering thought 
structures which function to stifle our ability for critical analysis. In this sense, she maintains, the 
Foucauldian post-structuralist perspective has an ability of exposing the power relations 
associated with knowledge production such that it becomes apparent that knowledge is not 
absolute. On this point, Skinner argues that our analysis of any social issue must of necessity 
take an eclectic form (rather than an ideological one) which is both respectful and skeptical of all 
educational theories. As a conclusion, she asserts that the people's education discourse in South 
Africa demonstrate that powerlknowledge relations permeates the education arena more 
significantly than usually admitted. In sum, for Foucault and the South African Foucauldians, 
knowledge is linked to power in such a way that the effects of power are always knowledge 
effects. For this reason, SA Foucauldians believe knowledge cannot be seen as the basis for 
freedom from power 
I think this conclusion was erroneously arrived at because of the treatment of power as a primary 
factor in every social activity. In my view, Power as domination should be seen as being in a 
dialectical opposition with liberation and this factor allows for the swing of the pendulum from 
anti-dialogical action to dialogical action which Freire believes can bring about freedom. Hence, 
the argument by Skinner that all educational theories be given space is indeed part of the value of 
the reflexivity of modernity. This requirement could also be accommodated within the Freirian 
dialogical strategy which crosses borders in order to involve differing perspectives in the 
dialogue for authentic liberation. However another requirement will have to be added on, that is, 
those involved in this dialogue clearly state their political stance and the moral and political 
project they advance as knowledge is linked to human interests. On this issue Habermas has 
clearly stated that social sciences should encourage dialogical teaching and research which 
advance the modernist ideal of human emancipation. The link between interest and knowledge-
production processes means the truth discovered during research is not independent of the 
observer. For this reason, for the ideal of emancipation to be realised social scientists would 
have to take a conscious political stance and utilise the concept of ideology critique to reveal the 
reality of power as domination so that transformation actions can be conducted to change the 
situation. Hence Habermas believes disinterested true knowledge does not exist(McKay and 












4.4.4 POWER IS EVERYWHERE AND THEREFORE THERE IS NO FREEDOM FROM 
POWER 
To start with, Miller (1990) says power is everywhere because it comes from everywhere. Power 
operates in an impersonal way. It is an impersonal social force which affects and is affected by 
individual agents without being the property of particular individuals or groups. In this sense, 
power cannot be explained by reference to the domination of one individual or group by another. 
Instead, Foucault encourages us to analyse power as something which is never possessed but 
circulates in society in a chain-like manner (Miller, 1990:122). Hence, in Coetzee (1995:2-3)'s 
view, the contests for power which bring about provisional systems of domination are universal 
phenomena which are dispersed throughout society. 
Moreover, Coetzee is in agreement with Miller that power is not a possession of a particular 
institution, an elite group or class but a technique embedded in the knowledge content of the 
school curriculum which allows and prohibits certain behaviours. Linked to this is the fact that 
power at the margins (local micro power) is as important and effective as power originating from 
the macro level in the struggle for knowledge/power (Ibid:13). According to Skinner (1998:4), it 
is on the understanding that power is everywhere that we can speak about the possibility of local, 
national and international struggles. 
South African Foucauldians believe that social institutions and practices in the country could be 
analysed by use of Foucault's analytics of power. In this regard, de Kadt shows that in the South 
African schools the teaching of English is implicated in the power relations dominant in the 
country (1991: 8). The English language in this sense has a more encompassing power over us. It 
is part and parcel of the discourse of Apartheid which has constituted and constrained most, if 
not all, South Africans. For this reason, English is implicated in the power systems of Apartheid 
in a less visible way as compared to other power mechanisms of the Apartheid state. Hence the 
issue of how we free or emancipate ourselves from this discourse becomes very problematic 
(lbid:9). According to de Kadt, 
"Clearly, there has been little space for emancipation in apartheid South Africa. 
Apartheid has not only resulted in highly visible external constraints for the majority 
but also in less visible but equally stringent internal constraints which affect all of us. 
The high degree of closure in apartheid society has conditioned us to fear and reject 
the wealth of 'otherness' around us. With the coming transition to majority rule we 
have the opportunity to seek to realize a form of society in which a greater degree of 
freedom might be possible for more people, freedom from physical and material 











can make a substantial contribution to this process, through the choice of a language 
policy with emancipatory potential, which on the one hand pressuposes knowledge 
about the links between language and power and on the other leads to a greater 
awareness of the nature of language" (Ibid.). 
In support of this democratic and emancipatory spirit within the South African education 
institutions, Deacon and Parker (1993) also argue that there is a need to problematise the 
egalitarian directive role of the problem-posing pedagogue as he guides students during the 
learning process. This has to do with the contradiction between the role of guiding the students 
and that of being a mere participant or critical co-investigator in classroom practices and 
activities. The point that Deacon and Parker are making is that the directive role of the teacher 
makes it difficult for the democratic aspiration of critical pedagogy to be realised. It also affects 
the whole issue of identifying power with repression at the same time as attempting to draw a 
distinction between power and freedom (Deacon and Parker, 1993: 138). 
Nevertheless, Deacon and Parker believe that the dichotomy between power and freedom cannot 
be sustained because those who appear free are in reality the most repressed. For instance, in a 
capitalist society those who have internalised disciplinary techniques of self-government or 
freedom and appear to be the most liberated are actually the real slaves of the capitalist power 
relations (Ibid: 138). By the same token, those who are marginalized from the system are also 
enslaved and thus are not free from the capitalist power relations. What this means is that despite 
the existence of points of resistance at the margins, for instance in the rural margins of the 
Maputaland schools of South Africa, this fact in itself does not guarantee the possibility of social 
transformation taking place in these marginalised communinities. The implication therefore is 
that we cannot escape or transcend the grip of asymmetries of power on us. This view is indeed a 
negation of the myth of the utopian liberatory education. Hence the utopian problem-posing 
education should be abandoned because it is unachievable. This conclusion is arrived at by 
Deacon and Parker on the basis of the fact that power is immanent within education and 
individuals are subjects of power/knowledge such that their struggles and resistances are part and 
parcel of power strategies and effects. For this reason, Deacon and Parker are adamant that 
pedagogy, critical or traditional, will always have authoritarian tendencies and the curricular 
knowledge content will always be determined from the center (Ibid: 139). What this implies is 
that we must dispense with utopian dreams of a curriculum which could be an aid in the 
improvement of schooling in marginalised rural settings. In Deacon and Parker's own words: 
"In other words, to dispense with politics based upon utopian dreams is not to fall 











non-meaning can be posited. In reconceptualising power we need to identify the 
points of resistance upon which it depends. By examining curriculum and pedagogy 
within the schools of Maputaland we have shown how power and knowledge 
constitute subjects , and the relations between them, in ways that exclude and 
oppress, but paradoxically, this subjection also constitutes rural power relations as 
possible points of resistance. The marginalisation of the rural where dichotomies are 
extreme provides fertile soil for curriculum innovation. There is an irony here in that 
the rural is usually conceptualised as disadvantaged, dominated and disempowered, 
and solutions are premised upon education for empowerment and an infusion of 
resources. This would be merely affirming the equality of both poles of the rural -
urban dichotomy without dislodging the entrenched hierarchy. By making a rural 
margin of central importance, we seek to reverse and displace hegemonic norms and 
their subordinate rural counterparts by reconceptualising power relations" (Ibid: 139-
140). 
Deacon and Parker are also of the view that power must not be characterised as concentrated 
only at the center but as also dispersed in local contexts. There is therefore power embedded in 
the practices of local schools like those in rural Maputaland. At these margins, the effects of 
power constitute subjects through multiple thoughts, forces and energies. For this reason, it is 
not accurate to conceive of power as represented by the domination of one individual or group 
over another. On the contrary, power circulates in a web-like chain in such a way that we 
undergo power simultaneously as we exercise it. We are thus targets of power and the means of 
its articulation. Power is internalised in the form of technologies of self-government and 
therefore the view that it is external to individuals is erroneous (Ibid: 136), 
In sum, Deacon and Parker believe Foucault's analytics of power are useful for our 
understandings of the way in which pedagogy and curriculum construct subjects. In the 
Maputaland case schooling is constituted by power in the sense that the top-down relationship 
between the teacher and the pupils is an effect of pedagogical and administrative techniques 
linked to powerlknowledge relations. Schooling, therefore, is an instrument of power through 
which curricular prescriptions are integrated to educational discourses by means of which 
education agents like teachers and learners are subjected and disciplined. Hence, Deacon and 
Packer believe that schooling should be seen as one of the strategies of subjection within which 
subjects are made and disciplined (Ibid: 136-137). 
Giddens urges us to reject the idea that power has primacy over every sphere of social life. In his 
own counterfactual argument against the view that power is everywhere, he wrote: 
" I think it quite wrong to be thereby seduced by a Nietzchean radicalisation of 
power, which elevates it to the prime position in action and in discourse. Power then 











everything. I consider it very important to reject the idea that power has primacy over 
truth, or that meanings and norms can be explicated as congealed or mystified power. 
A reductionism of power is as faulty as economic or normative reductionisms are" 
(Giddens, 1982: 226-227) 
I think Giddens is right that we should be wary of Foucauldian power reductionistic ideas. This 
also goes for Foucault's attempt to explain the happenings in modem society in terms of 
disciplinary power. My argument here, following Giddens, is that disciplinary power's utility in 
explaining occurrences in the factories and schools, for instance, where 'bourgeois' and 'liberal 
freedoms' exist is suspect. This is because, as Giddens has indicated, 'violent forms of power' 
are still predominant in 'nation-states' today. In addition, I think SA Foucauldians are wrong to 
think freedom from power is impossible. Of course one has to note that in fact their conception 
of power as disciplinary has been found wanting. Freedom is dialectically opposed to power as 
domination and where such power exists it will always be necessary or inevitable for liberation 
movements to spring up in order to counter its effects while paving the way for political action 
for liberation. This one aspect of Giddens's dialectic of control we can ignore at our own peril. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has presented a comparison between the contrasting conceptions of power from SA 
Freirian and Foucauldian approaches. Raging arguments have characterized the debate between 
SA Freirians and Foucauldians around the way power affects and is affected by processes within 
the education terrain in South Africa. The conclusion arrived at is that it is within the South 
African Frierian framework that a conception of power that makes possible political action for 
liberation can be found. On the contrary, the SA Foucauldian view that power is everywhere and 
is subject-less has no room for either political action or freedom itself. In the latter view we have 
multiple and contradictory subjectivity and no real agents exercising power. Instead we have 
disciplinary power which seems to be a substitute for the actual agents. The overall position 
taken in the chapter, however, is that through conscientising dialogue, akin to Giddens and 
Thompson's concept of ideology critique, ideological distortions within relations of domination 
are unmasked and impositions removed. This paves the way for political action synonymous 
with Freire's action and reflection, in a word, praxis, for liberation. Some specific issues raised 
by South African Freirians and Foucauldians follow below starting with the former. 
SA Freirians, led by Biko, Pity ana, Alexander, Walters, Silulu, Johnson, Mkhatshwa, Molobi, 
Coetzee and Enslin, see dialogue as central to understanding the notion of power. In the absence 











system utilized this type of power in order to exert control over societal institutions including 
schools. Power as domination emanating from the anti-dialogical theory of oppression is 
rejected by SA Freirians in favor of the theory of power emanating from revolutionary action 
which takes dialogue as its central ingredient. This conception of power as part of a dialogical 
theory of liberatory action is embodied in the democratic people's power derived from the South 
African concept 'People's Education for People's Power'. This concept which is akin to Freire's 
notion of 'education for liberation' has been a central organizing element in the struggles within 
the education sphere from the mid to the late 80's. Essentially SA Freirians embrace Freire's 
view that power as domination must be replaced by a dialogical and pedagogical power of the 
masses which, after the conscientisation processes within the educational sphere, amongst others, 
will through revolutionary action and reflection, liberate humanity from oppression. In other 
words, revolutionary power or democratic people's power is a means by which a state of 
emancipation or freedom is reached. 
In contrast, SA Foucauldians, following Foucault, do not believe freedom can be achieved since 
power is everywhere and that the elimination of one type of power allows another type to take 
over. Consequently, SA Foucauldians believe the supposed equality of the teacher and herOs) 
students within critical theory is a myth. Critical co-investigation of the teacher and her(is) 
students andlor the facilitator role of the teacher mask the authority of the teacher in processes of 
knowledge production and classroom interaction in educational institutions. Furthermore, the 
teacher and students as subjects are acted upon by multiple variables which defy their 
characterization as either simply powerful or free. Due to plurality of forces acting on each 
agent, teachers or students can be powerful in some instances and powerless in others depending 
on the situation. As a 'corrective' SA Foucauldians believe the traditional juridical conception 
of power must be rejected in favour of the modem notion of power as invisible and disciplinary. 
This non-economic analysis of power shows that knowledge and truth are implicated in the 
operation of power. As a consequence, the truth of any particular knowledge, including that 
designed by critical theorists and Freirians, is, according to SA Foucauldians, related to the 
balance of power-thus making freedom an impossibility. 
Nevertheless the notion of power as disciplinary is questionable especially because the 
conception of a subject-less history is absurd. Giddens's concept of the duality of structure 
indicate the existence of a dialectic relationship between structures and action which gives 
capability for knowledgeable agents to engage in coordinated action and reflection to transform 











important role in the creation and recreation of society and its history. In systems of domination 
where asymmetric relations of power exist, groups or classes who derive more or less benefits 
from these relations are identifiable. This is because systems of domination are harnessed to the 
sectional interests of groups and consequently this producing structured inequalities in society. 
However, through the mechanisms of the dialectic of control the downtrodden are in a position 
to take coordinated action to change their situation. I concur with Giddens that the notion of 
disciplinary power must be rejected because history without human agency is unthinkable. 
Neither could we allow discipline to take the place of real agents nor the 'ever-present' power to 
substitute for human agency because as both the duality of structure and the dialectic of control 












CHAPTER 5: SOUTH AFRICAN FREIRIANS CONTRA FOUCAULDIANS ON THE 
ISSUE OF SUBJECTS FOR AUTHENTIC EDUCATIONAL PRAXIS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter deals with the differing characterization of human subjects by SA Freirians and 
Foucauldians. The position advanced herein is that the idea by SA Freirians of human agency 
capable of conscientising dialogical action for freedom should be preferred over the SA 
Foucauldians's view which celebrates a fragmented, pluralist notion of multiple subjectivity. 
The SA Foucauldian position on subjectivity which, because of its links to powerlknowledge 
strategies, does not allow for liberation, has to be rejected. The reason for this rejection is that it 
gives primacy to power and its emphasis on difference may promote the creation of divisions in 
the South African community at a period that the nation-building project of the non-racial 
democratic South Africa was starting to unite the various traditions in the country. I however 
also indicate that there is a problem with the South African Freirians's distinction between 
passive and active subjects. My position is that the intention of the Bantu Education Act of 1953 
to produce and reproduce docile Black subjects was not fully realized as the activists Biko, 
Pityana and Molobi proved to be active subjects after all. For this reason, I think the SA Freirian 
conception of subjectivity can benefit from the ideas of Anthony Giddens who considered 
discursive consciousness as central to the process of ideology critique on the basis of which self-
reflective subjects transform their reality. Below I provide brief summaries of both the SA 
Freirian and Foucauldian positions on subjectivity before outlining an elaborated version of each 
position in the rest of the chapter. To start with, let's present a brief summary of the SA Freirian 
position on the subject. 
South African Freirians have, in line with Freire's distinction of necrophillic and biophilic 
subjects, divided subjects in terms of two categories, that is subjects constituted for the purposes 
of the maintenance and perpetuation of the Apartheid system of domination and those who 
through the practice of a dialogical pedagogy acquire the ability for cultural action for freedom. 
Necrophillic subjects are subjects constituted through processes of domination and 
subordination which have as major examples the vertical relationship between the teacher and 
students and the oppressor and the oppressed. From the writings of Johnson, Molobi, Alexander, 
Nkomo, Jansen, AZAPO, McKay and Pityana, for an example, the South African Apartheid 
education system was intended to produce passive subjects who practice the culture of silence. 










and/or the norms, values, mannerisms and styles prescribed to them by teachers in the service of 
Apartheid oppression. The adapted South African pupils and masses were beings who had lost 
the ability to make choices and independent decisions. Their decisions were made for them by 
their Apartheid masters without their active participation. In the case of students, they played no 
active role in the determination of what was taught, how it was taught and who taught them. 
This was a recipe for imitation, which had as its major consequence an inability by the masses 
and students to transform their social reality as reality was transmitted to them as static, finite 
and unchangeable. The Black community and Black students alike were subjects of choices of 
others making them objects of Apartheid education and domination while their Apartheid 
masters were subjects of this historical process. 
This brings us to the fact that Black students and the Black community as a whole were 
expected to be an adjusted group to the Apartheid reality. They were subject to external 
prescriptions by the White dominant elite and the imposition of inert Apartheid ideas from 
above. In the education sphere, in particular, South African Freirians saw this as analogous to 
the practices of education for domination which is banking in nature. The South African version 
of this type of education was Apartheid and/or Bantu education whose authority structures, 
pedagogical approaches and curriculum content were pregnant/saturated with an ideology whose 
main objective was the preservation of White prosperity and superiority/supremacy. Apartheid 
education was education for domestication, which ensured that White children were socialised 
for future positions of power and Black students trained for servitude in the South African 
society. This was a jug and mug learning process where students were filled with deposits of 
what the Apartheid masters considered as absolute knowledge which they were supposed to 
repeat and memorise without question. In a nutshell, Bantu/Apartheid pedagogy was education 
for submission and servility. It was an education for oppression, domination and the 
perpetuation of the Apartheid status quo. The social identities and statuses it wished to preserve 
included oppressor/oppressed; teacher/student and subject/object divisions in the South African 
society. A domesticated consciousness amongst White and Black people was achieved through 
the introjection of external Apartheid authority structures and values. What the oppressed were 
compelled to do in order to make this process achieve its major aims, those of one-way 
transmission of Apartheid ideas and values and conformity (or obedience) to them, was 
internalisation and housing of the oppressor. Once you internalise and house the oppressor it 
becomes very difficult to separate/distinguish his/her ideas, values, norms and ultimately his/her 
interests from yours. The result is that you accept your prescribed role as natural and inevitable. 











slave mentality whose major consequences were the reactionary and uncritical retention of the 
Apartheid system. By housing the oppressor, the oppressed masses played a vital role in their 
own oppression. The notion of a person as object rather than a subject applies here. The 
oppressed under the Apartheid system were objects submerged in reality. Through this 
alienation and passivisation process, they lost their ability to create and recreate their conditions 
of existence, their history, and their culture as well as negating their historic vocation to 
transform their social reality. Subjects in a state of passivity are incapable of revolutionary 
action whose main objective is total liberation. The practices of conformist beings could not 
yield any alternative to Apartheid dehumanisation. The only way humanisation can be assured is 
through the creation of biophillic subjects in the problem posing pedagogical discourse. 
Biophillic subjects, SA Freirians maintain, could only be an outcome of an act of knowing 
geared towards critical understanding which was foundational to action and reflection for 
liberation. These active subjects who were gravediggers of the Apartheid system were 
exemplified by a reciprocal relationship between teachers-facilitators and pupils as joint and 
mutual learners within the South African education system. In this process every teacher was a 
learner and every learner a teacher such that the end- product became a liberated humanised 
being. A post-Apartheid humanised being must be one with a critical capacity to make 
independent choices and decisions. This is the liberated being capable of creativity and 
innovativeness in the process of transforming her[is] society from an oppressive state to a more 
humane social environment. Active subjects who consciously transform reality are autonomous 
agents who are architects of their own destiny with the authentic culture of the masses and/or the 
learners as their starting point. They are active participants in history and change, who were 
neither directed by their Apartheid masters nor led blindly by self-appointed leaders who 
manipulated the oppressed for their own sectional interests. As in Freire's pedagogy, SA 
Freirians believe it is only through a problem-posing education, education for liberation, that 
such conscientised masses could engage in liberatory activity as knowing subjects. For People's 
Education for People's Power and SA Freirian literacy projects to achieve their liberatory aim, 
democracy in constructing and appropriating the curriculum is a key feature. The implication is 
that for liberation or freedom to be fully attained, the masses are at once students and teachers, in 
a word, each one teaches one. It was this collective conscientisation process which brought 
awareness to the oppressed in South Africa about their socio-economic and political conditions 
of oppression which could only be transformed through an emancipatory action of conscientised 
persons. In this sense education for liberation or People's Education for People's Power, in the 











values. Such a process was clearly a negation of the banking pedagogical strategies of Apartheid 
education such as prescription and memorisation of a static curriculum content. In its stead, 
People's Education for People's Power placed a critical, communicative and dialogical 
liberatory/emancipatory content in education. This pedagogical approach yielded revolutionary 
action and reflection for liberation. Such an action and reflection, however, could only be 
conducted by persons who have overcome the domestication effects of Apartheid education. We 
are here referring to a democratic citizen who was conscious of her[isJ rights and responsibilities 
in authentic human interaction. A person as a subject whose historic vocation was to overturn 
the Apartheid system and its pedagogical approaches, was an agent in communion with others 
and who struggles for truth and liberation. This was a conscious subject who played a central 
role in the universal humanisation of the entire South African society. 
Nevertheless the possibility of communion amongst subjects and their common view of what 
constitute the goal of liberation is contested by SA Foucauldians who believe in a contradictory 
subjectivity and differences in gender, race, class and ethnic backgrounds of actors, which 
creates problems for a homogenised subject and a unitary liberatory goal. South African 
Foucauldians who have made an important input on the discourse about subjects such as 
Macleod, Skinner, Mc Lennan, Deacon and Parker and other educationists who include Levin, 
Prinsloo and Kallaway advance three essential points as part of their contribution to the debate. 
The first point involves their rejection of critical theory's essentialism, dualisms, absolutisation, 
dichotomisation and hierarchisation. The second point deals with the various relationships 
between knowledge, power and truth which have a direct impact on the types of subjectivities 
that are constituted. Lastly SA Foucauldians state as their point of departure in constructing an 
alternative conceptualisation, the problematisation of the status and role of the human subject. 
SA Foucauldians have advanced various reasons for their rejection of the oppressor/oppressed 
dualism, the powerful/powerlessness absolutisation, the individual/society hierarchisation; the 
dominationlliberatory dichotomy; and the domesticating/liberatory education binary division 
within Freire's pedagogical strategy. The most important of these is the criticism that critical 
theory and Freire's pedagogy does not accommodate otherness. This has much to do with 
critical theory's homogenisation of the subject as unitary. For instance, Levin and Kallaway, 
amongst others, believed that the idea of 'community' in the rhetoric of contemporary opposition 
in South Africa was a mirror image of categories of the dominant discourse. For them concepts 
'people'; 'nation'; 'community'; and 'people's power' were imprecise terms with varied 











humans are not homogenous units. In the same vein, the process of homogenising pupils at 
school must be discouraged. By the same token, the concept of equality in education, which 
employs the notion of the generalised other, must be rejected. A good example is the adoption of 
a generalised concept of the oppressed in critical pedagogy's approach to the issue of social 
transformation. As a consequence critical theory overlooks other important variables to be 
considered during this process, for instance, gender differences. South African Foucauldians 
thus view critical pedagogy's transformation without reference to gender subordination as 
deficient and wanting. They say we must expose critical theory's rejection of domination which 
gives an illusion of equality leaving the authoritarian relationship between the teacher and 
students intact. In fact critical theory's transformed or horizontal relationship between the 
teacher and the students does not in any way affect the hierarchisation of social relations between 
inter alia subjects and knowledge. In sum, what constitutes SA Foucauldian's major criticisms 
of Freire and his SA followers is centred around the notion of a monolithic society and the 
concept of a unitary subjectivity. 
If this criticism is taken into consideration, they argue, SA Freirians will be compelled to drop 
the notion of a teacher as a unified subject and school processes and practices which create 
sameness through outlawing differences. The main variable which informs South African 
Foucauldians' conclusions is the now almost commonsense view that power with knowledge is 
involved in the creation of subjects. 
There is a specific manner in which the construction of subjectivity is linked to the types of 
relationships amongst knowledge, power and truth which exist in society. A deeper 
understanding of the factors impacting upon forms of subjectivity which evolve out of this 
process could help us resolve the problematic of characterising the subjects. This is what critical 
theorists are criticized by SA Foucauldians for failing to do. 
To reiterate, powerlknowledge, South African Foucauldians believe, is implicated in the 
construction of identities and creation of subjects. Put differently, forms of subjectivities emerge 
or are constituted with power/knowledge relations. In this sense, the powerlknowledge axis is 
responsible for discourses which allow or prohibit certain types of subjectivities, thus linking 
both subjectivities and discourses directly to power. SA Foucauldians believe discourses are 
produced within disciplines which impose structure and constraints. The dual character of 
discourse is in their view linked to the symbiotic relation between knowledge and power. The 











accounts for the symbiotic bond amongst power, knowledge and subjectivity. On this basis it 
could be argued that a homogenous subject is unthinkable. Politics and knowledge/power/truth 
strategies are responsible for the prevention of such a unitary, non-contradictory subjectivity to 
take shape. 
To deal with this problematique or difficulty of the characterisation of the subject, SA 
Foucauldians prescribe the practice of politics of difference. They believe we must construct a 
political identity which recognises the plurality of the roles of the individual agent. This is 
because, for them, the individual agent occupies subjective positions within a variety of 
discursive formations. In the educational arena, for instance, there exists a contradictory teacher-
subject within diverse discourses. In other words, SA Foucauldians recommend that in dealing 
with educational processes we must take into serious consideration the contradictory nature of 
pedagogical discourses and recognise the fact that subjectivity whether it is of teachers or 
students is multiple and contradictory. The contradictory nature of subjectivity is mainly due to 
the existence of different discourses in education. An individual teacher or student thus is 
invested in many discourses making educational subjects simultaneously powerful and 
powerless. It logically follows therefore that notions of identity must incorporate issues of 
diversity, difference, plurality and heterogeneity. The implication of this is that the 
multiple/plurality of identity, voices, perspectives and subjectivities has to occupy a central place 
in any analysis. Subjectivity is historically and socially produced through discursive and 
signifying practices. Thus discourses create a world of meaning while restricting the range of 
possible knowledge and experiences. In the educational sphere, the insertion of the teacher as a 
contradictory subject would make the learning process successful in South Africa. Furthermore, 
SA Foucauldians believe the recognition of the unstable nature of the self and subjectivity will 
lead to the development of a concept of equality which, rather than imposing unitary identities, 
will accommodate differences. 
Nevertheless, SA Freirians, in contrast, argue that through conscientisation strategies such as 
those employed by Freire in Brazil and Guinea Bissau, communion leading to cultural action for 
liberation can be undertaken in the educational terrain and society as a whole. In addition both 
Freire and Harbermas would argue that dialogue or undistorted communicative action can bring 











5.2 SOUTH AFRICAN FREIRIANS ON SUBJECTS 
In the following elaborated version of SA Freirians on subjects, I begin by presenting issues 
related to passive subjects before dealing with SA Freirians's recommendation that the Freirian 
educational praxis be adopted so that active subjects capable of liberatory action for freedom in 
SA could be produced 
5.2.1 SOUTH AFRICAN FREIRIANS ON PASSIVE SUBJECTS 
SA Freirians believe that Apartheid education produced domesticated subjects whose horizons 
were constricted. Domesticated subjects were passive, fearful and naIve beings who were 
incapable of challenging the system in order to change it (Enslin, 1988: 225). In the classroom 
domesticated subjects were produced through the use of a mug and jug pedagogy. This practice 
together with the authoritarian power-structure and an alienating curriculum account for the 
resultant passive student subject. Confirming this state of affairs in Apartheid Schools, Khotseng 
et al (1987) wrote: 
"To many teachers the question of maintaining discipline in the classroom ranks high 
in their priority but they get surprised and dissatisfied when their pupils become 
passive and only receptacles of information. Pupils are expected to learn effectively 
in a passive suppressive and authoritarian environment created by the teacher with 
his 'mug and jug' pedagogy. Any sign of resourcefulness and reading non-prescribed 
literature is perceived as a threat and a challenge to the teacher's authority. This 
attitude of smothering of any sign of initiative converts schools into 'psychological 
prisons' with no freedom to reflect on practical issues. Although it is essential for 
teachers to have some minimal form of control for the sake of pupils, on the other 
hand, black schools discipline and practices remaining silent, not questioning 
authority and lately producing identity £ards at the school gates- serve little purpose 
apart from 'maintaining law and order' 1.1987:154). 
The Apartheid education system alienated and disorientated Black students from reality. 
Dehumanisation, an original Freirian concept, is utilised here by Khotseng et al to denote a state 
of affairs were feelings of inferiority were inculcated in Apartheid schools. This education was 
not only self-depreciating but also created 'negative self-concepts of inadequacy amongst 
blacks' (Khotseng et aI, 1987:163). 
The production of uncritical subjects through Apartheid education practices and the superior-











subjects) and Blacks in a perpetual position of pupils (passive subjects) (Biko 1996:24). As 
perpetual pupils, Blacks were deprived of making their own decisions and choices like other 
active subjects. This was dehumanising because it is a human vocation to make own decisions 
and choices. It is thus being cowed by Whites which accounted for Blacks acquiring the status of 
passive subjects (objects) under the Apartheid system and its education sub-system (Biko, 
1996:76). 
Such object status could be transcended by Blacks through the resolution of the oppressor-
oppressed contradiction between Whites and Blacks by the use of what Freire termed liberatory 
education. In the same vein, AZAPO did not only describe the dilemma of Black parents and 
their children in Freirian terms, but the resolution of this problematic through liberatory 
education was also Freirian. A part of AZAPO's education policy document reads: 
"In a state of oppression man (sic) is a dehumanised being, an adapted being. He 
(sic) has lost his (sic) ability to make choices, he is subject to the choices of others, 
and his decisions are no longer his own: they result from external prescription. The 
adapted man represents the weakest form of defence. If man is incapable of changing 
reality he adjusts himself (sic) instead. Adaptation is symptomatic of man's 
dehumanisation. The adapted being accepts his submission and servility through the 
historical experience of the oppression of man by man. The oppressor introjects his 
values, his external authority, into the being of the oppressed whereby the oppressed 
internalise this and thus develop a consciousness which "houses" oppression, which 
creates what we so often call "slave mentality" or "colonial mentality" .... Education 
should be a process of extrojecting Le. destroying myths and values which have been 
introjected into the oppressed by the oppressor to maintain and perpetuate his 
position of privilege" (AZAPO Education Secretariat, 1991 :230). 
AZAPO's statement reflects a very conscious process of adapting Freire's pedagogy to the South 
African situation especially their view that the imposition of Apartheid views on Blacks reduced 
the latter into mere objects and that this state of affairs could be transcended through an 
education praxis whose action and reflection result into liberation (Ibid:230-31). In the 
organisation's view nobody should think for others as this contempt and/or patronage of the 
masses can never lead into a truly liberating revolution in the educational sphere and society as a 
whole (Ibid.). Indeed South African Freirians, who believed education was central to the 
democratic transformation of the country, called for a literacy campaign which would involve 
the masses as active participants in the revolutionary transformation of their conditions of 
existence. The masses are imbued with critical skills and rather than being mere spectators or 
objects they are full participants/subjects in both the education and revolutionary processes. In 
this sense it would be difficult for both the dominant classes and the revolutionary leaders to 











Mokubung Nkomo concurs with this view when he said the literacy campaign undertaken to 
educate the illiterate rural masses, must treat them as subjects rather than objects (Nkomo, 
1990:305). In other words, the rural masses are to be enabled to participate in the education 
process 'as subjects empowered with critical skills that can help them transform social reality.47' 
(Ibid.). 
This implies that Apartheid teaching methods which put emphasis on rote learning must be 
rejected in favour of active dialogue in the education process. Following Freire, Njobe (1990:4) 
and Coetzee (1995:15) argued that the traditional teaching method compels students to echo 
what the teacher prescribes in the classroom thus turning them into containers ready to be filled 
by the educator who acts as the sole bearer of knowledge and truth. They believe that in this 
situation where the educational process is transformed into an act of depositing, the teacher as a 
depositor is an active subject and the students, the receptables in this case, are passive subjects or 
objects. Such an educational approach they consider unacceptable. In their view, it has to be 
abandoned in favour of an educational method which puts emphasis on the active involvement of 
students in the pedagogical process. This position is reinforced by Khotseng et al (1987) who 
criticised Apartheid banking education for insulting the human dignity of learners by turning 
them into depositories. According to them, Apartheid banking education treated students as 
manageable, adjustable subjects to be dominated at will. To counteract this state of affairs, South 
African schools were to be turned into bases from which through 'problem-solving education' 
(mistaken for Freire's problem-posing pedagogy), the revolution against Apartheid domination 
could be launched (Khotseng et aI, 1987:165). 
The passivisation function of the Apartheid education system was very explicit in the operation 
of Apartheid schools. Nkomo (1990:294) maintains that Black students were socialised within 
SA schools to accept Apartheid social relations as normal and inevitable. According to Khotseng 
et aI, social control was exercised in schools through 'the set of regulations that govern the 
behaviour of children' and the school curriculum (1987:153). However, it was through the 
curriculum that Black children were put at a disadvantage by being given 'low status' education 
as compared to the quality education received by White children (Ibid). It was the differentiated 
schools, the curriculum, and the system of control in schools, amongst others, which 
indoctrinated Black children to accept Apartheid social relations (Ibid). Indeed Apartheid 











This was the case for the rest of social relations in the Apartheid era. In this period Apartheid 
rulers created barriers between Blacks and Whites in such a way that Whites benefited at the 
expense of Blacks. Since Whites enjoyed the privileges they accepted the Apartheid lie as 
normal. But if they had to embrace this lie it was no longer possible for them to resist the racist 
argument that Blacks were inferior to Whites. Consequently Whites hardened their attitude, 
started despising Blacks, due to the false belief that Black was inferior and bad. With most 
whites being haves and Blacks have-nots it was not difficult for Whites to find confirming 
evidence for the argument that Blacks were inferior, less intelligent and lazy. In a situation like 
this the entire system had to be pulled down before both Blacks and Whites could transcend their 
inferiority-superiority complexes necessary for the universal humanisation of all, Black and 
White. Whites and B lacks under Apartheid rule acted as distinct groups, subjects in the case of 
the former and objects in the case of the latter (Biko, 1997: 1 0-11; Biko, 1996:50,64,66,77). In a 
similar vein Barney Pityana believed in a situation where 'white men (sic) consider themselves 
superior to black men (sic)' and 'Black men (sic) want to prove to white men (sic) at all costs the 
richness of their thought, the equal value of their intellect', 'simply because the whites enjoy the 
privileges Blacks are robbed of, political action had to be taken to correct this state of affairs 
(Pityana, 1972: 178). 
Educational institutions under Apartheid strove to instil this superiority-inferiority complexes 
amongst White and Blacks, respectively. Apartheid education served to enforce the acceptance 
by Blacks of the supposed supremacy of Whites and their own inferiority; to promote White 
consciousness and identity for the purpose of adherence to this viewpoint; to enforce the 
adherence to a philosophy or ideology of racial exclusivity as natural, to promote the acceptance 
of the 'divide-and-rule' strategy in education and other social domains; and to promote 
intellectual underdevelopment of Blacks in defence of the status quo. In this sense, it can be 
argued that the Apartheid education policy was an instrument for the promotion of compUlsory 
ignorance amongst Blacks and Whites (Nkomo, 1990:294-5).According to Nkomo (Ibid: 302), 
for Whites to have 'a privileged status' and White supremacy to be sustained and perpetuated, 
Whites were given better education in the Apartheid era. Nkomo believes this was an education 
which was directed at ensuring the dominance of Whites in the socio-economic pecking order 
(Ibid). In contrast, he continued, Blacks received inferior education that would guarantee 'their 
disadvantaged status' in the South African society (Ibid). Amongst the major objectives of this 
Apartheid education policy, Nkomo maintained, was to guarantee the constant supply of cheap 
labour and controlled access into certain occupations and 'to promote acquiescence to the 











Nkomo believes that in order to resolve this problematic education must 'not be passive in the 
functionalist sense', but should 'articulate and critically promote a new egalitarian ethos' 
(lbid:303). For this to happen the colonialist inferior-superior Black-White complexes; the 
Black-White dependency and the raced-based White-privileges and Black disadvantage had to be 
transformed. This is the only way that the race-based homogeneity of groups in South Africa as 
well as group consciousness could be transcended. Only then will Whites escape the label/tag of 
being the oppressor and together with Blacks regain their true humanity (Biko, 1996:19; 23; 69). 
According to Biko, Blacks would have to react constructively to oppression in order to ensure 
that the outcome is the universal liberation of all, Black and White. As preparatory work the 
myth that it is in their genetic structure that Blacks are inferior and Whites superior has to be 
abandoned. In the process Whites have to relinquish their fear of Blacks ('die swart gevaar' or 
the Black peril) and Blacks their inferiority complex-both products of Apartheid socialisation 
(Ibid: 72; 76-78). This state of affairs, if achieved, will speed up the process of destroying or 
deconstructing Apartheid and its ideological manifestations. The adoption of an egalitarian 
ideology will also hasten the destruction of Apartheid education for domination and its 
replacement by liberatory education (Nkomo, 1990:302-3). In a nutshell, 
"The post-apartheid education system must then articulate and critically promote a 
new egalitarian ethos. Its mission must be to become a prism for the critical 
discourse on the dynamic and dialectical relation between the state and the 
individual. It must not be passive in the functionalist sense, responding to the dictates 
of quantitative economic adjustments. It must foster the liberation of the person, 
unleashing the full potential of the person to playa vital role in the development of a 
society bound together by a social contract that upholds a cohesive national 
consciousness devoid of the prejudices, privations and psychological mutilations 
committed by apartheid ideology. And this can in greater measure be achieved 'only 
by radically remoulding the teaching organisation, and training of the youth ... to 
ensure that the efforts of the younger generation will result in the creation of a 
society that will be unlike the old society' 42" (lbid:303). 
In other words, Nkomo want the post-Apartheid education system to produce active agents, as 
opposed to passive subjects, who would advance the interest of a democratic society. 
However it is important to point out that there are aspects of the South African Freirians's 
characterisation of the subject which present analytic problems. This relates to the division of 
subjects into passive/domesticated and active categories. In the original Freirian distinctions of 











especially in the 1970's when Apartheid oppression was more overt the Black Consciesness 
Movement (BCM) integrated this division of notions of subjects into domesticated/passive and 
active categories/notions without critical evaluation. To the BCM it was through 
conscientisation strategies that these passive Black subjects could be mobilised into taking action 
to transform relations of domination within the Apartheid system. With the further appropriation 
of Freire's pedagogy in the early 80's especially in the 'education for liberation' praxis of 
AZAPO this characterisation of the subject was left intact No wonder the People's Education 
Movement which emerged in 1985 saw nothing wrong with this characterisation of the subjects 
as either domesticated or active despite the fact that their liberatory praxis pointed towards a 
different conception of the subject. The point I am trying to make here is that by characterising 
Black people as passive subjects the assumption was that Whites, who were seen as the 
oppressors by the BCM, were active subjects. Of course such an idea was understandable in 
view of the express intention of Bantu education to produce docile Africans who accepted their 
position of servitude within the Apartheid system. However the resistance against the 1953 
Bantu Education Act in the 1950's led by the African National Congress CANC) , and the 
conscientisation campaign led by the BCM which culminated into the Soweto 1976 student 
uprising (Price 1992:23-29) show that the intention of Bantu education to produce and reproduce 
docile Black subjects was not fully realised. 
Perhaps we need to further contextualise the emergence of the BCM and its appropriation of 
Freire's pedagogy. First, it must be noted that the BCM emerged in the late 60's after a lull in 
political action in South Africa after the banning of the ANC and the Pan Africanist Congress 
(PAC) in the early 60's (Ibid:iv-v). During the 60's the Apartheid system was consolidated such 
that a clear separation between Blacks and Whites, which produced a perception of 'them' and 
'us', was visible. This created a gulf between Blacks and Whites which produced the emergence 
of the BCM with a radical agenda to conscientize Blacks that only they on their own could 
liberate themselves from White domination. Under these conditions the congress tradition of 
recognising the existence of a White progressive element could not be carried forward. Hence 
the continuous reference to the paternalistic attitude of the liberal Whites who thought they knew 
what was best for the Black oppressed. Second, the influence of the Black Power movement 
also hardened the SASO/BCM's negative attitude toward the genuineness of White liberals's 
claim that they were anti-Apartheid. Under these circumstances the BCM saw Whites in general 
as active subjects and Blacks as passive subjects who needed to be conscientised in order to 











In my opinion it seems sensible to distinguish subjects in terms of asymmetric relations as the 
powerful and the relatively powerless. Giddens's conception of human agency within the 
dialectic of control would suggest that subjects are in reciprocal relations of autonomy and 
dependence whether they are powerful or relatively powerless. Giddens's structuration theory 
characterise structures as not simply putting constraints to transformative activities of human 
agents but as also enabling. Despite acknowledging the existence of ideological distortions 
which need to be exposed by the process of ideology critique, his depiction of human agency 
always points towards active subjects who, in the dialectic of control, even as the relatively 
powerless, have the capability for political action. For this reason, it is surprising why the 
People's Education Movement which claimed to carry the congress tradition forward and had 
some progressive Whites in its structures could not detect this theoretical flaw of characterising 
all Blacks as passive and Whites as active subjects. Thus care has not been taken to understand 
how Pityana, Biko and Molobi themselves have managed to playa pivotal role in the struggle for 
the liberation of South Africa despite being products of Bantu Education. A more theoretically 
sound characterisation of human agency would, in line with Gidden's view, conceptualise 
subjects as having transformative capacity. Instead of Freire's passive and active categories of 
SUbjectivity, Giddens has unreflective and self-reflective agents, respectively. The difference 
between the two theorists is in that the latter considers all subjects, self-reflective or unreflective, 
as active agents in an ontological sense. Freire's active subjects, on the other hand, represent an 
attitudinal shift rather than an ontological one. Nevertheless, not all Blacks cold fit into the 
category of unreflective agents (or what Freire called passive subjects) as some of them, 
especially the political activists, were self-reflective agents who played an active role in the 
struggle against Apartheid. By the same token it is inconceivable that all Whites who lived 
during the Apartheid era were self-reflective agents or what Freire called active subjects. 
5.2.2 SA FREIRIANS ON ACTIVE SUBJECTS 
Necrophilic subjects suffer from the domination of their superiors and are subjugated selves. In 
the case of Apartheid South Africa such a group was excluded from the determination of inter 
alia, the nature and form of their education system. Nevertheless, Biko believed strategies could 
be evolved to negate this state of affairs. One such strategy to mobilise/conscientise Blacks 
against White oppression in all social spheres-social, economic, political, educational, etc.- he 
proposed, was the Black Consciousness (BC) philosophy. Biko believed that this philosophy 
could conscientise B lacks to realise 'that the most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is 











longer be manipulated and controlled by White oppressors as they would now see themselves as 
active, entire beings (Ibid) 
The Black individual who sees himself as an entire being is an active agent, a subject who 
participates fully in the transformation of his society. This conception of a Black person as a 
conscious subject is analogous to Freire's conception of biophillic beings. 
Coetzee (1995: 15) has utilised Freire's approach directly in conceptualising the role of active 
South African subjects in the construction of the curriculum for liberation in the country. 
According to her, biophilic agents want a school curriculum which can be a vehicle for the 
oppressed to liberate themselves from the power and control of the oppressors. In this way they 
could dislodge knowledge production processes from the grip of the Apartheid functionaries thus 
reclaiming their humanity through transformative action in the education sphere. Abstracting 
directly from Freire, Coetzee insists that a truly liberating pedagogy cannot enforce passivity but, 
on the contrary, encourages the oppressed to acquire a genuine voice which could enable them to 
challenge and transform race, class or sexual inequalities within the Apartheid power structure 
(Ibid: 128). In the same vein, McKay and Romm (1992) have also directly utilised Freire's 
pedagogy in order to show that for social transformation to take place the teacher and hislher 
students or the researcher and hislher research subjects have to adopt a discursive mode of 
operation. McKay and Romm believe Freire's concept of 'critical awareness of reality' entails 
that research subjects be involved in knowledge production processes as co-investigators. In 
addition, they support Freire's rejection of the view that participation of research subjects might 
compromise the objectivity of the investigation. This is because, McKay and Romm, like Freire, 
believe neutrality is impossible in the research process and that themes do not exist in an 
objective, pure form. Hence their adherence to a dialogical approach to the research process on 
the basis of which self-reflection for emancipatory social transformation can be ensured (McKay 
and Romm, 1992:95) 
To reiterate, both Coetzee and McKay and Romm believe in pedagogical practices which enable 
the oppressed, students or research subjects to acquire an aunthetic voice which could serve as a 
means to bring about emancipatory social transformation. In addition, Coetzee (1995:15) and 
McKay and Romm advocate for South African pedagogical approaches and curriculum in the 
service of the liberation of the oppressed masses. Utilising insights on people's education from 
Njobe (1990), Coetzee (1995: 18) went further to point out that a liberated South African 











sex. More important, however, was its role in necessitating and accelerating the transfer of 
political power from the Apartheid regime to a democratic South African government as part of 
the liberation strategy. Matabane (1990:354)) echoed this sentiment when she discussed the 
nature and form the literacy campaign should take in South Africa. In her view, this campaign 
should involve the process of making the general population active subjects who are aware of 
their history, 'their reality and their rights and responsibilities' (Ibid). 
Active subjects are created through humanistic education whose learning processes are geared 
towards social transformation. It is in this learning environment where self-initiated discovery 
leading to informed decision-making in dialogue with a teacher-facilitator occurs. Non-
oppressive authentic learning is dialogic education whose fundamental goal is emancipation and 
the creation of conscious thinking subjects knowledgeable enough to create and recreate their 
social environment for the better (Flanagan and Sayed, 1994: 154). Thus in a learner driven 
pedagogy both the teacher and his/ her students learn from each other. They are together creators 
of knowledge, active subjects whose education praxis is unburdened by unnecessary divisions 
between a supposedly 'knowledgeable' teacher-subject and learners (objects of the learning 
process) (Muller, 1991:329). The teacher's role here is that of a facilitator of the learning 
process. This learning facilitation role of the teacher is the instrument through which the 
distinctions between the teacher and the student are blurred thus making both active subjects of 
the education process. As a result the teacher is himselflherself taught in dialogue with the 
student who teaches while he/she learns. This dialogical educational situation ensures the 
positive development of both teacher and student (McKay and Romm, 1992: 116) and in the 
long-run helps them to get rid of a domesticated consciousness fostered onto them by the 
Apartheid colonisers (Ibid: 139). Co-investigation and or co-creation of knowledge by the 
student and the teacher is a dialogical process between co-learners as active subjects who can 
transform their conditions of existence. 
People's education in South Africa can benefit from the communicative discourse approach of 
Habermas and Freire in the sense that this approach believes in the indissolubility of speech and 
freedom (Ibid:141). Since the culture of silence was not an aid for South Africans in their 
struggle against Apartheid oppression, they had to be encouraged to practice dialogical 
education. As McKay and Romm put it, 'perceiving emancipation as implicit in the act of 
speech, critical humanism focuses on the necessity of invoking discursive skills as fundamental 
in education curricula' (Ibid: 142). Only active biophilic subjects as opposed to passive mute 











shared amongst a broad spectrum of scholars and organic intellectuals in the country. AZAPO, 
an affiliate of the BCM, for example, had the following to say about education for liberation and 
the nature of the subjects who could advance this project in South Africa: 
"Education is a process towards liberation. Liberation is ultimately the humanisation 
of man (sic). To be human is to engage in relationships with others and with the 
world. Man is a being of relationships. He (sic) is not only in the world but with the 
world. Man relates to his (sic) world in a critical way. He looks critically at the past, 
understands the present, and moves towards the future, as if permanently asking 
'where do I come from, where am I and where am I going?' The role of man is not a 
passive one. He participates in the creative dimension as well as intervenes in reality 
in order to change it. Thus the liberated being, the humanised man, is able to 
perceive reality, the contradictions that lie therein, and thereby respond to solve these 
contradictions on the basis of his perception .... Education that is liberatory is that 
which integrates man with reality. Integration is a distinctively human activity which 
results from the capacity to make choices and to transform that reality. The 
integrated person is a person as subject as opposed to an adapted person as object. 
The subject person is a participant in change, a liberated being who is an architect of 
his destiny." (AZAPO Education Secretariat, 1991:230). 
It is clear from the above statement that AZAPO's concepts of a person as object and person as 
subject are akin to Freire's concepts passive subject (necrophilic) and active subject (biophilic), 
respectively. In this sense one can argue that AZAPO's way of looking at educational matters in 
South Africa is Freirian. Indeed a further reading of the organisation's position would reveal that 
other Freirian concepts such as 'liberatory educator', 'critical' thinking Ireflection, 'teachers as 
co-ordinators', 'true dialogue', etc. have been employed in their educational discourse. Moreover 
AZAPO urges students and liberatory educators to fully participate in dialogue with other 
subjects, in the education for liberation process. As in Freire's pedagogy, the organisation 
believes that 'education for liberation is not restricted to institutionalised education at the school 
or university'. Instead it is viewed broadly as a learning process which takes place in all societal 
spheres. In this sense education for liberation 'aims at transforming men from being mere objects 
submerged in reality to that of being subjects and active participants in history and change' (Ibid: 
230-231). All in all, AZAPO insists that the SA masses must be conscientised to be critical 
subjects who teach as they are taught. These are subjects who are central in the creation of their 
own history and culture. For this reason, instead of domestication or alienation, authentic 
education should seek to conscientise the oppressed SA masses to liberate themselves as active 
subjects (lbid:232). Indeed the BCM's main objective was to counteract 'a strong white racism' 
with its 'antithesis', 'a strong black solidarity' in order to produce a synthesis which points 











1997:18). For purposes of clarity I present in the form of a quote the exact way in which Biko 
saw the struggle for education and its relationship to the overall fight for liberation in SA: 
"The overall analysis therefore, based on the Hegelian theory of dialectical 
materialism, is as follows. That since the thesis is a white racism, there can only be 
one valid antithesis i.e. a solid black unity to counterbalance the scale. If South 
Africa is to be a land where black and white live together in harmony without fear of 
group exploitation, it is only when these two opposites have inter-played and 
produced a viable synthesis of ideas and a modus vivendi: We can never wage any 
struggle without offering a strong counterpoint to the white racism that permeate our 
society so effectively .... We are aware of the terrible role played by our education 
and religion in creating amongst us a false understanding of ourselves. We must 
therefore work out schemes not only to correct this, but also to be our own 
authorities rather than want to be interpreted by others. Whites can only see us from 
the outside and as such can never extract and analyse the ethos in the black 
community" (Biko, 1996:51-52). 
In a nutshell, the idea that Apartheid and its education created White subjects and Black objects 
and that in order to arrive at universal humanisation, or to transcend the oppressor-oppressed 
dialectic, Blacks have to be conscientised so that they could play an active role (as active 
subjects) in their own and their oppressors's liberation is loud and clear. It is this aspect which 
closely link the above-cited scholars and organic intellectuals' work with Freire's pedagogy of 
knowing and especially in this case this conception of the subject. 
Indeed Freire's pedagogy has undergone various metamorphoses, changes and adaptations (or 
distortions?) depending on the orientation of individuals utilising it and the context within which 
they operate. A good example of this state of affairs is the confusing of Freire's concept of 
'problem-posing' education with a related 'problem-solving' pedagogy. Benito Khotseng et al 
reflect this confusion when they wrote: 
"Problem-solving education .... 'respects the individuality of the student. Problem-
solving education is revolutionary futurity. It posits as fundamental that man (sic) 
subjected to domination must fight for their emancipation ... it enables man to 
overcome their false perceptions of reality' 140" (1987:165). 
In addition, Thompson is critical of any conception of ideology as 'false perception of reality' as 
reflected in Khotseng's view above. A similar problem could be discerned in Freire reference to 
'false words' and 'the mystifications of ideology' (Freire, 1970: 47;1974:76). Thompson has 
rejected the criterion of falsity in ideology (this rejection of the ideology-truth distinction, 
however, is also a Foucauldian principle). He draws on Marx's latent conception ofideology and 











conception of ideology. Note however that the unique feature of this new conception of 
ideology has to do with the use of general modes of operation to reflect on ways in which 
meanings serve to establish and sustain relations of domination (Thompson, 1990:56-60). The 
more relevant aspect of Thompson's new critical conception of ideology for our purposes here is 
the view that individuals do not passively accept ideological forms but challenge and contest 
these by contestatory symbolic forms or ideology critique. In this sense the operation of 
ideology is dialectically linked with subversive practices to oppose, negate, contest or diffuse its 
force in that particular social setting (Ibid:68). 
Despite these differences on how to characterise ideology, however, Thompson's conception of 
ideology critique can be utilised to develop the argument by Freire and the SA Freirians that the 
critique of ideology is the starting point in the contestation of relations of dominations sustained 
and maintained by ideological forms. This contestation is carried out in order to unveil the 
reality of domination so that active subjects can take action to transform their situation. It is 
through critical reflection within the concept of ideology critique that asymmetrical relations of 
power are laid bare and the groups who benefit and the least beneficiaries from this set-up are 
identified. The critical reflection in Thompson's conception of ideology critique is similar to 
reflection and action embedded in Freire's notion of conscientisation. It is through 
conscientisation processes that SA Freirians believe active subjects could be inserted into a 
demythologised reality so that they could act to transform their oppressive situation. 
The conception of active subjects by SA Freirians can also be improved by utilizing Giddens's 
structuration theory. The concepts of duality of structure and dialectic of control would allow us 
to see the possibility of human action for transformation despite the constraining element of 
structure and the existence of relations of domination. This is because the duality of structure 
implies that structures which are creations of human activities are also the medium of human 
action thus making them both constraining and enabling. In addition, the dialectic of control 
allows the relatively powerless in the reciprocal relations of autonomy and dependence to take 
action to change their conditions of existence. Giddens further maintains that the valid way of 
explicating subjectivity has to be based on an in-depth understanding of the concept of discursive 
consciousness (Giddens, 1982:8-9). However, the concept of discursive consciousness must be 
distinguished from the notion of practical consciousness. Practical consciousness concerns the 
skills you learn through your body, like walking and riding a bicycle, which one can do without 
thinking. In contrast, discursive consciousness affords human beings the ability and the skills for 











articulate insights about themselves and to engage in the practice of ideology critique. The 
concept of discursive consciousness fit in well with Freire's notion of an active, biophilic 
subject. Hence Giddens's structuration theory can be utilized to develop the SA Freirian idea 
that conscientized oppressed masses in South Africa could engage in dialogical action for 
educational and political Hberation as knowledgeable active agents. 
5.3 SA FOUCAULDIANS ON SUBJECTS 
This section deals with South African Foucauldians on subjectivity. Essentially this section has 
more to do with the SA Foucauldian critique of the concept of unitary subjectivity within the SA 
Freirian view. The criticism directed at SA Frerians is that their essentialist notions of 
subjectivity which characterise agents in binary terms of oppressor/oppressed are restrictive 
because subjectivity is historically and socially produced through discursive and signifYing 
practices. In fact, instead of homogenising subjects and dichotomising them South African 
Foucauldians believe sUbjectivity is multiple. SA Foucauldians advance the position that human 
beings are acted upon by many forces such that we should speak of multiple identities, 
subjectivities and voices. Two examples used to explicate this plurality of identities are the 
nation-building concept and women's subjectivities. Nation-building, Enslin argues, has been a 
concept used as a strategy of transforming the fragmented, divided and unequal Apartheid 
society. In doing so, she continues, nation-building was offered as a means of creating unity 
from diversity. This new conception of subjectivity emphasises homogeneity instead of 
heterogeneity which Enslin considers as a major flaw. Enslin maintained that the nation-
building approach must be abandoned because it excludes feminine values or women as political 
agents in its logic. In her view such a universalist and essentialist approach fails to create space 
for democratic gender politics in its framework. South Africa, to Enslin, should embrace a 
concept of citizenship which embodies a range of social relations including gendered ones. 
Rather than viewing a social agent as a unified entity we should see it as constituted by a 
plurality of subject positions within a variety of discourse formations (Enslin, 1993/1994: 22). 
Another adherent of this view, Walters, says that there should be recognition, sensitivity and 
validation of differences such as those involving gender, ethnicity, race, imperialism and class. 
In general terms South African Faucauldians are against situating human beings at the centre and 
as agents who construct and reconstruct their own social reality. Instead they view humans as 
decentred and dispersed. This is because, SA Foucauldians argue, humans are constituted as 
objectified subjects by the operation of power/ knowledge technologies. The constitution of 











In contrast, I believe the nation-building concept adopted by the post-Apartheid South Mrican 
government should be embraced. This is because this strategy was directed at counteracting the 
racial and ethnic divisions of the past Apartheid system and creating a common 
nationhood/citizenship. Furthermore, against the accusation of dichotomisation I deployed 
Giddens's observation that collectivities, groups and social categories based on sectional 
interests are an integral component of social relations within systems of domination organised in 
asymmetrical ways. On this basis I defend South African Freirians against the charge that their 
theory is implicated in the creation of authoritarianism by utilising Thompson's displacement 
aspect of his dissimulation strategies. The point advanced therein is that the Freirian pedagogy 
cannot be accused of authoritarianism because the theory was, in the first place, designed to 
combat authoritarian tendencies. It is twisted logic to accuse the South African Frerians's praxis 
of the denial of freedom as this perspective is part of a conscious effort to encourage liberatory 
praxis. The SA Freirian pedagogy, for instance, impacted on the praxis of the social forces which 
freed South Africans from Apartheid domination. In fact the commitment of SA Foucauldians to 
freedom is doubtful because, following Foucault, they do not believe liberation is an achievable 
goaL 
5.3.1 AFFIRMATION OF THE CONCEPTION OF MULTIPLE SUBJECTIVITY 
SA Post-structuralist theorists contend that any serious sociological theory must transcend the 
characterisation of the individual in terms of essentialist notions of personality, biology or 
society in a monolithic fashion. The concept of 'complex interaction' does also not escape this 
dualism as it 'fails' to capture the true essence of this interaction (Macleod, 1995:65). Macleod 
says that there are detectable problems in the Freirian-based critical theory. For instance, the 
problem of dichotomising education into domesticating and liberating categories. In addition, the 
relationship of power and powerlessness between the oppressor and the oppressed, respectively, 
is viewed by SA Foucauldians as creating a restrictive notion of subjectivity. In fact Macleod 
calls for an alternative conception which takes into consideration 'the contradictory nature of 
subjectivity in which the person may be invested in many different discourses' (Ibid:71-72). 
In other words, South African Post-structuralists believe that subjectivity is historically and 
socially produced through discursive and signifying practices. However discourse for them is a 
double-edged sword which in one instance creates the world of meaning whilst on the other hand 
restricting the range of possible knowledge and experiences. Michel Foucault has linked this 











knowledge/power axis is responsible for discourses which allow/prohibit certain types of 
subjectivity in society (Ibid:65). 
For this reason, South African Foucauldians reject the individual/society divide, the essentialist 
notions of biology, personality/mind or society, with the monolithic notion of society or its 
effects. In addition, the dualism inherent in the proposal of a 'complex interaction', as a solution 
to this problematic, is rejected (Ibid.). Thus Macleod and other SA Foucauldians reject Freire's 
conception of the nature of the person. For instance, Macleod criticises Freire for the failure to 
distinguish between the nature of the child and that of a mature, adult person (Ibid:71). 
According to her, the child and the adult, in Freire's pedagogy, are seen as both learners who are 
'always in the process of becoming' (Ibid.). In addition, the focus on the oppressor-oppressed 
contradiction in this theory, Macleod argues, diverts attention away from the differences in the 
nature of adults and children (Ibid.). 
Furthermore, SA Foucauldians reject the 'total binary opposition between dominant and 
dominated' (Prinsloo, 1986:287). They believe a Freirian- type theory of power is lacking in 
terms of the conceptualisation of power and the social complexities thereof. In Prinsloo's own 
words, Freire's 
"notions of oppressor and oppressed are formal categories and there is no sense of 
the dynamics of their conflict. The revolutionary educator as well as the 
revolutionary are un-theorised entities, except that they are from the bourgeoisie, 
have had an 'easter experience', committing class suicide to rise again on the side of 
the oppressed. Like dialogue and conscientisation they are critical entities ... for it is 
they that resolve the dualities of being .... in 'problem-solving' education the teacher 
-student dichotomy is dissolved through dialogue and they all become student and 
teacher. What happens to the authority of the teacher in this context? Does it 
disappear entirely? Freire is ambivalent on this: 'In this process arguments based on 
'authority' are no longer valid, in order to function authority must be on the side of 
freedom not against it!' 26. On the material relations between teacher and learner 
Freire remain largely silent." (Prinsloo, 1991:368-9). 
Note here that Prinsloo commits the same mistake as Khotseng in confusing Freire's problem-
posing pedagogy with 'problem- solving education'. 
Furthermore, in Prinsloo's view, Freire antinomies of education, banking and 'problem -solving' 
education, create problematic notions of the act of learning. On the one hand, banking education 
which involves transferral of information is a bad thing, on the other, 'problem -solving 











Knowledge in the latter education type is deri~ed from the experience of learners as teachers and 
teachers as learners. Put this way, Prinsloo believes, 'the discursivity of knowledge' and its 
location in specific cultural-historical practices remains untheorised in Freire's pedagogical 
approach (Ibid: 370). These inherently asymmetrical and dichotomising notions of subjectivity, 
dominating and resistantlemancipatory agents, can only be transcended, according to de Kadt, by 
the use of the post-modernist contradictory subjectivity (1991:10; 14). 
In fact, Deacon and Parker (1993:132) outline and criticise three models of the teacher-learner 
relationship which they reject in favour of the post-modem conception of SUbjectivity. The first, 
Fundamental pedagogics (FP), a variant of the traditional model, which was dominant in the 
South African Apartheid schools, transmitted knowledge instrumentally to students as passive 
recipients. This authoritarian pedagogical approach unproblematically viewed the teacher as a 
bearer of knowledge and authority with the students being subjugated to 'certain prescribed 
norms' authorised by God (the higher authority). Learners were prohibited from questioning the 
knowledge of the teacher, as this would, by extension, be a challenge of the authority of God. 
Not only was this knowledge considered certain and true, but also the students were compelled 
to treat as natural and desirable the social hierarchies and inequalities within the Apartheid 
schooling system. Consequently learners found themselves in a situation of absorbing 
uncritically the restricted content through the use of the rote-learning method. In this sense the 
students were denied a voice and treated as subordinates who should 'naturally' submit to 
commands and prescriptions without any question (Ibid.). According to Deacon and Parker (Ibid: 
13 2-13 3), Fundamental pedagogics was dominant within schoo Is in Maputaland. The most 
obvious reason for this was that most teachers were trained within the tradition of Fundamental 
pedagogics. The less obvious reason, however, was the sense of security the model offered to 
teachers owing to the constitution of learners as passive and unquestioning subjects. This 
concealed teachers' inadequacies and thus offered 'a coherent survival strategy' for both 
qualified and unqualified teachers (Ibid.). 
The second model, the vanguard model, has been prominent during the student struggles against 
Apartheid education and in the People's Education for People's Power (PEPP) movement in the 
1980's. Like the traditional model, this approach views the teacher as the legitimate bearer of 
knowledge and authority. The difference between the two, however, is in that the vanguard 
model abhors social hierarchies and utilises conscientising strategies in order to make students 
critical of their socio-economic and political reality so that they can change it. The only problem 











virtually intact but also attempts to justify it. It justifies the authority and knowledge of the 
educator in terms of his scientific literacy and lor access to objective knowledge/truth. In 
addition the vanguard model legitimises this unequal relationship on the basis of the common 
ideological interests of the teacher and students. Nevertheless in doing so the teacher who speaks 
on the behalf of the students becomes a subject while the students become passive objects 
despite attempts to use lack of sufficient degree of political consciousness by learners as a 
justificatory factor (Ibid: 133). 
The third and last model Deacon and Parker criticise is the critical model, which mostly 
influenced the discourse of alternative education in South Africa. While Deacon and Parker 
acknowledge the sincere intentions of this model to challenge the relations of Apartheid 
domination, they criticise it for providing the illusion of freedom and equality while in fact the 
dominant -subordinate relationship between the teacher and the learners is left intact. How can 
the teacher make autonomous subjects out of students without directing them, they asked. Thus 
emphasis on reason within the classroom, despite the 'myths' of equal participation disciplines 
students and obliges 'them to speak under the coercive gaze of reason' during the process of 
reflection and dialogue with the teacher. Deacon and Parker say that this does not make for 
equal subjects but instead the teacher who do the directing is an active subject while the learners 
are passive subjects (Ibid: 135), In a nutshell, they argue that: 
"All three models bear the mark of modernity. That is, all three are essentialist, and 
all dichotomise, hierarchise and absolutise social relations.,. Each ultimately fails to 
adequately address the issue of the different identities of, and the hierarchical 
relationship between teacher and learner and subjects and knowledge. Traditional 
approaches to pedagogy and curriculum ignore the issue; the vanguard model 
rationalises it; and the critical model conceals it. In so doing, all three models efface 
the pedagogical and curricular processes constituting both learners and teachers as 
subjects through which power produces knowledge, processes which in turn 
authorise and extend power while at the same time obscuring their constitutive role. 
A feature of modernity common to all three models is a commitment to determinate 
standards of truth or knowledge (notwithstanding the critical model's nominal 
rejection of the imperialistic practices associated with such objectivism), This 
commitment empowers each model to distinguish between justifiable and 
unjustifiable pedagogical/curricular goals and methods and to silence or marginalize 
those practices which fail to conform to the rule. " The critical model assumes that it 
is through the instrumentalism of traditional and vanguard educative practices that 
the conditions for authoritarianism and inequality are created. In contrast, we argue 
that it is through inequalities of power and knowledge embodied in education that 











In fact Deacon and Parker have utilised insights from Foucault's theory in problematising the 
construction of subjectivity in schools in the Maputaland region of K waZuluNatal where the 
curriculum operates as part ofthe mechanisms of power relations (Ibid:127). 
Similarly, Flanagan (1991:13 - 14) believes Foucault's work serves as an alternative to all the 
three models because it has successfully problematised the concept of human beings and the role 
and status of the human subject. In an attempt to understand the construction of women primary 
school teachers' subjectivity she concluded that post-structuralism has an acceptable degree of 
explanatory power as compared to, say, humanist Marxism. The reason she gives for this utility 
is that post-structuralism 'is a way of conceptualising the relationship between language, social 
institutions and individual consciousness which focuses on how power is exercised and the 
possibilities for change' (Ibid: 14). Foucault's post-structuralism best explains how human beings 
are measured against the powerlknowledge and truth norm, classified, and disciplined 
accordingly-in other words, how humans are arbitrarily made subjects and treated as objects 
(Frigerio, 1990:324). Another South African scholar who believes in the utility of Foucault's 
conception of subjectivity is Miller who says that the 'subject is a plurality of positions and 
functions' and 'is constituted by the rules of discourse' ( 1990: 116). 
The use of the plurality of subject positions is relevant in the discourses around the curriculum 
and pedagogical practices. Coetzee (1995:58) speaks of the representation of all the multiple 
voices of participants in the debate on the curriculum. On the issue of pedagogical approaches, 
Macleod argues that a teacher must be seen as a 'contradictory subject inserted in many non-
uniform discourses in the middle ground between theory and practice' (1995:63). Utilising data 
from the old homeland departments of education she concludes that 'teachers invoke 
contradictory pedagogical and personal discourses in their attempts to make sense of the process 
of learning and teaching' (Ibid.). This implies that teachers' subjectivity and discourses in the old 
homeland schools were contradictory. Nevertheless SA Foucauldians believe that critical theory 
does not acknowledge the contradictory nature of subjectivity. Instead subject positions are 
homogenised without due consideration to the multiple perspectives and discourses which 
influence them. A good example is the homogenised 'people' in the people's education for 
people's power rhetoric. Macleod (Ibid:71) criticised SA Freirians of using these 'theoretically 
imprecise terms'. In her view, the treatment of 'people' and 'community' in ways which make 
'sets of humans' into 'homogeneous units' would make the operationalisation of People's 











From the above statement it is clear that South African post-structuralists believe that the 
homogenisation tendencies of critical theorists are counterproductive and need to be rejected in 
favour of a perspective which problematises subjectivity. For instance, Levin's view that 'the 
people' and 'the community' 'can under no circumstances be construed as homogeneous 
entities' (1991: 11) means the political diversity of the South African community must be taken 
into consideration in the discourse about identity and sUbjectivity. Carrim believes that the 
South African pedagogical dilemma can be resolved by acknowledging the existence of diverse 
discourses, identities, voices, subjectivities and perspectives. Reflecting a contradictory 
subjectivity himself (the merging of post-structuralist insights with some critical theorists' 
ideas), he wrote: 
" disciplinary boundaries and canons need to be challenged explicitly.... In 
pedagogical terms it would entail explicitly problematising and challenging the 
canons within disciplines rather than mastering content about or applications of such 
cannons. This would amount to working within what Giroux 37 calls a 'border 
pedagogy'. This is a pedagogy where marginal voices are consciously released, 
where canons are treated critically and where authorities are critically and explicitly 
demystified" (Carrim, 1995: 190). 
Linked to this issue of the constitution of subjectivity and its problematisation is the question of 
the place of women in the pedagogy for liberation. This relates directly to the issue of patriarchy. 
In the socialist feminist perspective patriarchy is understood as a form of oppression which 
varies from one historical period to another rather than as a monolithic problem. Flanagan 
(1991: 13) believes that can only be resolved within a post-structuralist perspective as opposed to 
the various strands of Marxist sociology. 
Enslin(1993/94) has dedicated an article on the question of women subjectivity within the 
discourses of both Apartheid and the liberation struggle against it. She argues that as a strategy 
of transforming the fragmented, divided and unequal Apartheid education system, the 
development of national consciousness and nation-building was offered as a means for creating 
unity from diversity. The concept of nation-building implies the construction of a new 
conception of subjectivity-one which emphasises homogeneity instead of heterogeneity. In other 
words, Enslin believes that the education for nation-building strategy has two constituent 
elements. The first feature contains the demand for a transformed ontology. This relates to the 
need for South Africans to change their conception of their selves and identities in favour of 
being part of a nation as opposed to a divided identity imposed by Apartheid on them. Secondly, 











identity and politics a loyal nationalistic character. Enslin rejects the nation-building strategy for 
the following reasons: 
"Arguments for nation-building are routinely if not ritualistically accompanied by 
declarations of support for the principles of democracy, non-racialism and non-
sexism, which have been central to the demands of the democratic movement for the 
transformation of the political and educational systems in South Africa .... There is a 
serious tension between the principles of democracy and non-sexism on the one hand 
and nation-building on the other, in both the ontological and moral senses identified 
above. My claim is that, like other political categories our concept of <nation' is an 
expression of predominantly male experiences and aspirations. In making this claim I 
plan to bring to bear on South African issues the claim of feminist political 
philosophy that our political concepts are profoundly distorted by the privileging of 
male perspectives. In doing so I take issue with the disturbing tendency in current 
progressive discourse on education and politics in South Africa to pay lip-service to 
"non-sexism", a term which is used with a superficial grasp of its implications. In 
this case, 'non-sexism' is invoked in a context where the term 'nation-building' is 
defended, as though it were gender-neutral" (1993/94:14). 
To reiterate, Enslin rejects the idea that the ideal strategy for politico-educational transformation 
in South Africa is nation-building. In other words, she is openly challenging the appropriateness 
of the concepts of national consciousness, national sentiment and ideology in the political and 
educational reconstruction of the country. Moreover, Enslin argues that South African schools 
should not see themselves as vehicles through which national consciousness and identity are 
constituted amongst students (Ibid.). Instead, she argues that nation-building is not the basis for 
democratic non-sexist politics. The reason for holding this position revolves around the fact that 
the logic of nationhood is part of the male-centred politics. This logic creates a universalist 
ontology which is gender exclusive. Consequently women are excluded from this logic of 
nationhood. Moreover the logic of nationhood has a moral authority saturated by values which 
are masculine to the exclusion of feminine ones (Ibid: 15). 
Put differently, Enslin maintains that the education for nation-building strategy should be 
abandoned for its failure to include feminine values or women as political agents in its logic. For 
her this universalising approach and its essentialism cannot accommodate democratic gender 
politics. As a logic for exclusion, the logic of nationhood and its universalist assumption should 
be totally rejected as it is wanting in terms of the promotion of democratic gender politics. 
Paraphrasing Chantal Mouffe, Enslin argues for an alternative and appropriate way of 
conceptualising radical democratic politics which will take gender issues seriously. This 
alternative strategy will not only serve to deconstruct essentialist identities but also to articulate 











Further, the new strategy will embrace a concept of citizenship which will enable the principles 
of liberty and equality to embody a range of social relations including gendered ones. In this 
sense the view that a social agent is a unified entity will be negated in favour of the idea that a 
social subject is 'constituted as a plurality who occupies several subject positions within a 
variety of discursive formations' (Ibid:22). Coming to the specific case of women subjectivity, 
Enslin believes women should not be viewed as subjects with a common essence. Their 
resemblances as women is just one amongst a plurality of subject positions constituted by 
variables ranging from class through race and to sexual orientation. In addition, the struggle 
against subordination needs thorough revision such that a reconstructed approach allocates equal 
weight to the expression of women, gays, workers, Blacks, etc. grievances and rights. This 
cannot be done without abandoning the notion of universal citizenship and substituting for it 'a 
notion of political identity which comprises identification with the principles of liberty and 
equality (Ibid:22). Note that this notion of radical democratic citizenship is distinctive from other 
feminist views which are saturated with concepts which essentialise femininity. Enslin's 
'citizens enjoy a plurality of particular alliagencies but "are bound by their common 
identification with a set of ethico-political values"43, (Ibid: 22). In her view, political and 
educational reconstruction cannot be disadvantaged by demands that we anchor them on 
common South African nationhood and identity. Instead of common nationhood, education must 
encourage South Africans to embrace the values of freedom, tolerance, constitutionalism and 
equality which are the primary principles of democracy. These, in Enslin's view, constitute the 
only base upon which a successful democracy can be built in South Africa. For this reason, she 
believes, notions of nationhood which have an ontology and a morality in contradiction with the 
goal of a non-sexist democracy must be abandoned. All in all, Enslin advocates for the 
constitution of political identity citizenship which takes into consideration the different subject 
positions of the social agent and also allows 'for a plurality of specific allegiances and for the 
respect ofindividualliberty 45' (Ibid:23). 
Another South African scholar who used women's plight to demonstrate the urgent need for the 
resolution of the problematic of subjectivity, identity and difference, is Shirley Walters. Shirley 
Walters (1993/94:122) believes that Black women whether critical Third World feminists or 
post-modernist feminist theorists are united in their critique of the notion of a universal women's 
experience. The convergence is based on the agreement that the concept of a universal women's 
experience is both racist and homogenises women subjectivity. Post-structuralist / post-
modernist feminists, in particular, argue that the unstable nature of the self has to be taken 











not only adhere to the view that the construction of identity and lor selves takes the form of a 
negotiation process but that the notion of universal women's experiences has imperialist 
connotations. Walters maintains that the universalist and essentialist concept of women 
experience cannot be defended because of the varied and diffused nature of experiences of 
subjugated groups manifested in imperialism, class oppression, sexism, homophobia, and racism 
(Ibid: 122-123). 
Furthermore, Walters says that the question of difference can only be resolved where coalitions 
and common strategies as well as goals are constructed where there is recognition, sensitivity, 
and validation of difference such as those involving gender, ethnicity, race, imperialism and 
class. Even where these coalitions are necessary in order to combat the growing power of 
conservative rightist groups, there is still a need for the marginalised, for instance, Black women 
to work out a theoretical approach which fully expresses their particular experiences. Turning to 
the specific strategy to combat racism and sexism in the South African setting, Walters says 
workshops must encourage women to explore such experiential differences even if this might 
entail breaking up women into working groups in terms of race classification viz. 'white' 
'black', 'coloured', 'Indian', etc. (1993/94: 123), 
Flanagan who also supports the view that different experiences must be given expression in a 
transformed critical pedagogy is sceptical of some versions of critical theory for forcing 
educators and learners to 'engage in the full range of views in the classroom in a critically 
reflective manner'. She believes the implication of this statement is that this discourse be 
conducted by 'people as fully rational subjects' (Flanagan, 1991:32). What this means, Flanagan, 
paraphrasing Walkerdine, maintains that: 
" schools have participated in producing 'self-regulating' individuals by 
developing in pupils capacities for engaging in rational argument. By ignoring the 
'irrational other' in schools, rational deliberation and consideration of all viewpoints 
has become a vehicle for regulating conflict and the power to speak, for transforming 
'conflict into rational argument by means of universalised capacities for language 
and reason' ... In a racist and sexist society with racist and sexist institutions such as 
those in South Africa, debate over one's personal experience cannot be made 'public' 
in the sense of including all parties and affording them equal weight and legitimacy. 
Nor can such debate be free of conscious and unconscious concealment of interests. 
Subjecting personal experience of minority groups to rational debate about their 
validity is inappropriate, for 'words spoken for survival come already validated in a 












SA Foucauldians's focus on 'multiple subjectivities' and the 'politics of difference' has 
dangerous implication for post-Apartheid South Africa. Apartheid society was constructed upon 
a foundation of race and ethnic-based group classification. Since 1948 when the National Party 
came to power (Price, 1992:12) until the establishment of the Government of National Unity 
(GNU) in 1994 the country experienced one political crisis after another as race and ethnic based 
differentiations were contested and challenged. Among the highlights of this crisis are the 1960 
Sharpville Massacre, the 1976 Soweto student uprising (Ibid:iv; 25-27) and the 1985 school 
crisis (Alexander 1990:61). It was the De Klerk reforms of the early 1990's which created space 
for negotiation and a nation-building project directed at a common nationhood and the 
discouragement of the fragmentations and divisions of the past. For this reason, I think the 
stance of Alexander that in the light of past racial and ethnic divisions emanating from the legal 
framework of the Apartheid state since 1948, nation-building means engaging in practices which 
negate racial and ethnic consciousness in favour of non-racialism and anti-ethnicism (Alexander, 
1989:8), is more convincing. For Alexander, the static 'cartesian' depiction of South African 
society as composed of 'separate' and 'discrete cultures' should be subjected to a rigorous 
critique (Alexander, 1990:78). Such a critique, Alexander maintains, should be based on a 
conception of an all-embracing human culture which is inclusive of all members of the South 
African community (Ibid:76). From this viewpoint, Alexander believes it would be possible to 
engage in a nation-building process which is a synthesis of 'all positive and constructive 
elements in the different traditions that constitute South Africa' (Ibid:77). Note that what 
Alexander refers to as 'fighting against racism and against ethnic divisions' (Alexander, 1989:8) 
and his attack on the 'cartesian' depiction of African society as composed of 'separate' and 
'discrete cultures' and identities has qualities similar to those of Thompon's and Giddens's 
ideology critique in the sense that Alexander's attack or denounciation of Apartheid divisions is 
part of incipient forms of the critique of ideology where ideological forms can be challenged, 
contested and disrupted by contestatory symbolic forms (Thompson, 1990:6-8;66-68). 
However, the SA Foucauldian project has to be looked at historically especially the conception 
of 'plurality' which Enslin advocated. Giliomee and Schlemmer had for a long time adhered to a 
view that South Africa was a plural society (1989:207). They adopted this sociological pluralism 
in order to divert South Africans's attention away from the establishment of a purely democratic 
system (Ibid: 224). Giliomee and Schlemmer rationalised their view by saying that South Africa 
was a deeply divided society with group conflicts involving a material, interest based element 
and another element termed emotional, identity component (Ibid:207). I think the pluralism of 











to the emotional, identity component of Giliomee and Schlemer. For this reason, it has to be 
rejected because from a socio-historical perspective the concept of group rights is unthinkable in 
the new South Africa. In fact Thompson who has been central to my adoption of the 
fragmentation concept as a sensitising device in any theoretical analysis believes that we must 
not be 'blinded by the spectacle of diversity that we are unable to see the structured inequalities 
of social life' (Thompson, 1990:330-1). Hence Thompson sees the preoccupation with diversity 
and difference as unjustified because 'in the actual circumstances of modern societies, diversity 
and difference are commonly embedded in social relations which are structured in asymmetrical 
ways' (Ibid: 3 30-1) 
In addition, I want to reiterate that accusations of hierachisation and dichotomisation of social 
relations, levelled at the SA Freirian project, can be dismissed in terms of Giddens's view that in 
systems of domination it is possible to identify groups, classes or collectivities in terms of their 
sectional interests (Giddens, 1981:50;61). I also showed, with the use of Thompson's 
framework, that relations of domination are established by being denied or obscured and by their 
representation in ways that divert attention from existing processes and social relations. In this 
sense the accusation that critical theory is implicated in the creation of authoritarianism and 
inequalities must be resisted. It is the express aim of critical theory of the Freirian-type to fight 
against authoritarianism and systems of domination which produce inequalities, not the other 
way round. Within the Freirian theory authoritarian relationships are transcended through the use 
of dialogue that is akin to Habermas's communicative action. Ideal communicative action is 
made possible by employing specific strategies for checking validity claims of statements made 
in social encounters. For Habermas these strategies would include concerns for appropriateness, 
intelligibility and comprehensibility of speech acts, the truth of the propositional content and the 
sincerity of the speaker (Bernstein, 1995:48-49). Hence in a situation where validity claim 
checks are in place and speech acts are orientated towards consensus, there is no room for 
authoritarianism. 
Moreover, by using the term of authoritarianism which is usually reserved for practices of 
domination to refer to theoretical categories of the Freirian theory, SA Foucauldians are 
employing the displacement instrument which Thompson believes is a typical dissimulation 
strategy. Here SA Foucauldians are thinking that the negative connotations of authoritarianism 
normally used to point at domination and subordination practices of the Apartheid system of 
domination will be transferred to the praxis of South African Freirians despite the fact that the 











twisted logic of argumentation in SA Foucauldians has to be resisted. Agents in asymmetrical 
relations of power are either dominator/oppressor or oppressed and their dichotomy is a result of 
practices in systems of domination. 
A more problematic view from the SA Foucauldians is that in fact even the liberation the SA 
Freirians are working towards cannot be realised because subjectivity is linked to 
powerlknowledge strategies thus making it impossible for freedom from power to take place as 
power is everywhere. 
5.3.2 SUBJECTIVITY LINKED TO POWER! KNOWLEDGE STRATEGIES 
According to de Kadt (1991:2), Foucault dismisses the claim that the agent exercises power. He 
says Foucault believes no subject possesses power. This is why Foucault constructs his power 
analysis without relying on the notion of the subject or conscious agency (Frigerio, 1990:327). 
Nevertheless, de Kadt maintains that the subject is affected by continuous and uninterrupted 
processes which account for our ongoing subjugation to mechanisms of power. Subjects are 
constituted through a multiplicity of forces. In this sense subjection in its material instance is a 
process whereby subjects are constituted. Thus, argues de Kadt, Foucault 'sees all individuals, 
even the most powerful', 'as subjects to power: all people are in equal measure constituted by the 
various power mechanisms of society' (de Kadt, 1991:2). But subjects never possess power. 
Miller (1990:122) says power cannot be characterised as one person's domination over other 
people but instead it is something that circulates but never in one individual's hands. On the 
contrary, it is composed of forces attached to institutions which characterise individuals as, for 
instance, sane or insane, thus making them subjects of power. This power is what Foucault 
termed 'normalisation' where individuals are categorised, controlled and constructed as subjects 
by power vested in institutions and social practices. Power vested in these institutions and social 
practices thus produce a certain kind of being. However, argues Miller, the subject which power 
creates also becomes its means of circulation. In this sense, the view that individuals are wholly 
formed by power is not accurate as the subject is not only affected but also affects power 
relations. This implies that any form of reductionism in characterising the subject must be 
resisted. In fact what is important in the characterisation of the subject is the agents' 
'participation in mutually beneficial social arrangements, not domination and submission' 
(Ibid.). For this reason, the recasting of pedagogy and curriculum in the South African setting 











power relations between them as a result of the inscription of identities and differences (Deacon 
and Parker, 1993:140). To further illuminate this point, Deacon and Parker argued that within the 
Apartheid curriculum the differences between White and Black subjects was a norm (Ibid). In 
the post- Apartheid South Africa, they maintain, new identities and differences which will be 
constituted would be towards dichotomies such as those of spatial location, gender and class. 
However, Deacon and Parker insisted that' any conception of society as a divided or unified 
totality .. .is an effect of a violent and artificial constitution and disciplining of identities and 
differences by power' (Ibid.). 
According to Frigerio (1990:326), underlying Foucault's rejection of the traditional conceptions 
of the subject is the view that modern strategies and technologies of objectification are outside 
the scope of human beings' control. While the primary constitutive element of the agent, as seen 
by humanists, is that it is a 'constitutive' agent, Foucault refocuses our attention to the way in 
which humans are constituted as objectified SUbjects. Foucault wants to expose the concealing of 
the operation of powerlknowledge technologies in the constitution of the subject through the use 
of concepts, such as, for instance, 'human progress' and 'human nature'. He dismisses as illusion 
attempts to situate human beings at the centre, and as agents who construct and reconstruct their 
own social reality. Instead, humans are decentered and dispersed without any capability to create 
and recreate their conditions of existence. For this reason, according to Foucault, the illusion 
created by the humanist ideologues that human progress and/or reform is possible thus providing 
justification for the use of technologies of domination to discipline the human subject, must be 
exposed once and for alL This is because the humanity which humanists study to understand and 
liberate is itself the result of previous technologies of subjection (Ibid.). Humans, therefore, are 
subjectified through powerlknowledge technologies free from human will and control (Ibid:325). 
In Frigerio's view, human sciences, together with power, have created prisons, schools and 
education buildings, inter alia, for the further application of knowledge (Ibid: 240). In fact, 
Frigerio says that humans are constituted as subjects and treated as objects by epistemology and 
politics which combine to form powerlknowledge (Ibid.). On this basis, he argues, Foucault has 
rejected the view that 'power/knowledge technologies' operate as 'a form of repression' and that 
there exist underlying agents who take control over 'the lives of other people' (Ibid.). Frigerio 
maintains that the emergence and operation of powerlknowledge apparatuses are autonomous of 
any group in society. Hence humans are made subjects by techniques of powerlknowledge 











In the South African context this process can be illustriated by the way in which Carrim (1995) 
describes how one of his students, Rani, was created as a subject and treated as an object by 
educational technologies at the University of Witwatersrand (WITS). Carrim says that the fact 
that Rani was made to push himself in his studies which contained cultural practices outside his 
experience shows that the enforcement of a cultural arbitrary curriculum by an arbitrary power is 
tantamount to an exercise of symbolic violence. Rani was compelled to study curriculum content 
in direct contradiction to his culture and his conception of reality. Carrim is of the view that the 
compulsion of Rani to adopt the institutional ethos of WITS violated his cultural orientation. In 
the process of imposing this 'cultural arbitrary' through the use of 'arbitrary power', he argues, 
the institution 'inferiorated' Rani and constructed him as an 'at risk student' who needed support 
(Carrim, 1995:188). In this sense, Rani was made to feel as being on the margins of the 
knowledge systems in an Apartheid society which did not recognise his own cultural ethos 
(Ibid.). 
The case of Rani clearly describes how subjects are constructed through techniques of 
powerlknowledge. SA Foucauldians, such as, Macleod, as already indicated, believe the 
knowledge/power axis is responsible for discourses which allow/prohibit certain types of 
subjectivity in society (Macleod, 1995:5). According to Macleod, power is a 'force of field 
relations' in a 'system of relations' with discourseslknowledges as elements. The constitution of 
power in this form provides us with the space and latitude to conceptualise an individual as 
invested by diverse and varied discourses and thus making the contradictory nature of 
subjectivity more apparent (lbid:71-72). Indeed it is those discourses and discursive practices 
which enable or constrain the possibility of assuming certain subjects positions (lbid:65). 
Subjects are gradually constituted through power effects although no one individual or group has 
a homogeneous domination over another. It is only the technologies of power/knowledge 
independent from individuals or groups invested by its effects which playa decisive role in the 
constitution of subjects (Deacon and Parker, 1993:136). The utilisation of the new conception of 
the process in which subjects are constructed on the basis of a reformulated notion of power can 
go a long way in helping us understand the Apartheid education structure and possible ways in 
which it could be transformed. This reconceptualisation of power, Deacon and Parker maintain, 
will clarify the way in which subjects and their relationships are constituted by the curriculum 
and pedagogy. In this way, they continued, we would understand that 'schooling is subjection' 
because it is through the operation of powerlknowledge within schools that vertical relationships 
between the teacher, learner and knowledge are created, 'discipline exercised and teachers and 











In other words, Deacon and Parker believe curricular processes do not account for the 
empowerment and enlightenment of particular subjects. On the contrary, effects of 
powerlknowledge are responsible for curricular processes and mechanisms of constructing 
subjects. Therefore, the curriculum and the teachers, students and knowledge which are 
constructed as subjects in rural schools of Maputaland 'are effects of the powerl knowledge 
relations involved in the processes of becoming educated' (Ibid: 137). Furthermore, Deacon and 
Parker argue that a critical analysis of the curriculum should have as a point of departure power 
relations within which the subjects are enmeshed rather than descriptions of the actors and their 
relationships (Ibid.). This is because, they further argue, it is powerlknowledge and its 
adherence to particular truth claims which account for the constitution and disciplining of 
subjects (Ibid.). 
Deacon and Parker say there is a need to emphasise local common sense over and above some 
preconceived standards of rationality. The transformed pedagogy, for them, must focus on the 
relation between teachers and learners itself rather than on the subjects of the relation. In 
addition, the points of resistance to the power relations of modernity, if properly contextualised, 
can bring out the opportunities and non-opportunities of learning. Owing to the latter factor, 
Deacon and Parker believe curriculum and pedagogical practice in rural classrooms such as those 
of Maputaland could lead into the affirmation of likeness at the same time as pointing insistently 
towards differences, But this will be done, they maintain, with cautiousness such that the 
differences ('otherness' arrived at) themselves are also unsettled (Ibid: 141). 
In this regard, Coetzee says the acknowledgement Irecognition of differences and lor otherness is 
linked to the issue of the existence of multiple voices within a curriculum debate, Nevertheless, 
in her view, the proliferation of voices within the discourse about the curriculum does not reflect 
that issues within this debate had become more exciting or urgent. On the contrary, the many 
new voices taking part in the curriculum debate are primarily political rather than 
professional(Coetzee, 1995: 12), The political nature of the curriculum debate, I think, constitutes 
the main reason for Deacon and Parker to be doubtful as to whether schooling processes could 
benefit from the De Klerk socio-economic and political reforms of the early 1990's. Deacon and 
Parker believe the South African urban centres will continue to dictate the nature and form of 
pedagogy in the rural margins even in the reconstituted modernity in SA. In addition, they argue 
that 'new set of identities and differences' transmitted by the dominant English language will be 











It is for this reason that Deacon and Parker called for the deconstruction of the 
inclusion/exclusion processes which would be biased towards the different identities of the 
previously marginalized. Linked to this issue, Deacon and Parker maintained, should be the 
transmission of the core curriculum 'in the local language and idiom' of those at the margins 
(Ibid.). 
The need to teach the core curriculum in rural areas in the local language and idiom of the 
marginalised has become the focus of SA Foucauldians including de Kadt. De Kadt (1991: 10; 14) 
is of the view that the use of multi-lingualism could be a means of acknowledging the existence 
of the worlds of the 'Other'. In addition, he believes that multi-lingualism could serve as an 
instrument for subverting the pervasive power that a language like English wields over South 
Africans (Ibid: 14 ).Hence he felt the view that English be the lingua franca for South Africa 
could serve to maintain and exacerbate asymmetric relations of power. Commenting on the 
NECC People's English Commission recommendation that People's English be preferred over 
and above British English or American English, de Kadt argued that the hegemonic English 
language has an 'encompassing power over us' and was 'implicated in the power systems of 
apartheid' (Ibid:9). English and all African languages, he maintained, played a role in the 
constitution and constraining of Apartheid subjects (Ibid.). For this reason, emancipation from 
the Apartheid discourse, de Kadt believes, includes movement away from the fear of 'Otherness' 
and a strategic formulation of a language policy (Ibid.). de Kadt recommended that, because 
language could play a crucial role in the liberation process, South Africa must construct 'a 
language policy with emancipatory potential-one which 'presupposes knowledge about the links 
between language and power' (Ibid.). 
Nevertheless, according to Deacon and Parker, powerlknowledge relations cannot be explained 
in terms of the subject of knowledge constrained by or free from power, but, instead, it is the 
processes and struggles which transverse power-knowledge that determine the forms and 
domains of knowledge (1993: 137). No subject therefore is free or can ever be free from power. 
Deacon and Parker further argue that subjects which seem to be free in the dichotomy between 
power and freedom are in fact the most affected by the effects of power (Ibid: 138-139). This is 
because, they maintain, these subjects have 'internalised disciplinary techniques of self-
government' in an effective way (Ibid.). Deacon and Parker believe these subjects are the 'chief 
slaves' of power because 'in return for their relative empowerment they are condemned forever 
to serve and prostrate themselves before power' (Ibid.). Nevertheless those at the margins, 











by power in the sense that 'they are constituted not as the same but as other, as points of 
resistance' (Ibid.). 
Consequently, Deacon and Parker believe utopian and romantic ideas are not relevant to the 
solution of the situation in the South African rural areas. The way of life of the people in 
Maputaland is not going to be affected or changed because of curriculum transfonnation in their 
schools. This is because asymmetries of power cannot be transcended by utopian emancipatory 
education. Utopian emancipatory education, and its supposed power to free the excluded other, 
is a myth because power is immanent within and not external to pedagogical practice. Schools 
and other educational institutions are pregnant with disciplinary mechanisms and pervasive 
fonns of modernity. Human beings as subjects of power and knowledge and their resistances and 
lor struggles are part and parcel of the powerlknowledge structures they wish to transfonn. They 
and their actions to conserve and/or transfonn the system are implicated in the operation of 
power. Deacon and Parker insist that no change can be envisaged for rural schooling as the 
curriculum will always be constructed in the urban centres resulting into an alienating and 
authoritarian pedagogical practice in rural areas (Ibid: 139). They further argue that the 
distinction between ideological knowledge (corrupted by power) and authentic knowledge Itruth 
(which is undistorted by power) is a false one. This is because curriculum knowledge and 
schooling in rural areas are effects of power, which make rural people subjects and treat them as 
objects. The creation of an emancipatory curricular and the resurrection of marginalised 
knowledge cannot therefore free these rural subjects from the clutches of powerlknowledge 
(Ibid: 138). In Deacon and Parker's own words: 
" curriculum is always hegemonised by dominant theoretical practices, which 
themselves are constructs of power. To this extent, knowledge is limited (but also 
enabled) by power; representations are in effect power - induced misrepresentations. 
Hence, oral history's celebration of the 'authentic' popular voices of the oppressed is 
as mythical as 'letting the facts speak for themselves' ... We speak for others as much 
as theory speaks for the facts. A similar contradiction bedevils literacy programmes 
that attempt to situate their pedagogy and curriculum within a thematic narrative of 
their learners' existence and environment constructed through problem- solving 
exercises under the egalitarian guidance of the teacher. In identifying power and 
repression and drawing an exclusive distinction between power and freedom, the 
themes, the problems, the subjects and the environments are constructed in such a 
way that in revealing the relations of oppression they conceal their own power 
relations" (Ibid.). 
What Deacon and Parker, who also mistake Freire's problem-posing pedagogy for 'problem-
solving education', are saying is that we must do away with utopian politics. For them to 











fatalism and passivity. The reason they provide for this is the fact that any Foucauldian analytics 
of power, depend for their utility, upon the points of resistance they include in their 
reconceptualisation of power. Utilising this Foucauldian approach, Deacon and Parker have 
demonstrated that power / knowledge, through curriculum and pedagogy in Maputaland schools, 
constitutes subjects and exclusive or oppressive relations between them. Nevertheless these 
relations of power are also resisted by rural people thus making it possible for points of 
resistance to be established in the Maputaland setting, and particularly within the schools. In fact 
it is the extreme forms of marginalisation and dichotomies which provide the platform for the 
construction of transformed curricula and pedagogy. For this reason, theoretical frameworks 
which view rural people simply as dominated, disempowered and disadvantaged requiring 
education for empowerment and physical and human resources for their liberation, must be 
rejected. Deacon and Parker believe rejecting such a conception merely gives equal weight to 
'the rural - urban dichotomy without dislodging the entrenched hierarchy'. The act of giving the 
rural margin a place of prominence in their analysis is directed at reversing and displacing 
'hegemonic norms and their subordinated rural counterparts by reconceptualising power 
relations' (Ibid: 139 - 140). 
In a similar vein, Frigerio says human sciences-derived knowledge/power created schools and 
education buildings for the application and improvement of its findings. He maintains that 
Foucault's genealogical analysis is accurate in concluding that 'epistemology and politics' are 
linked to powerlknowledge 'technologies and apparatuses (dispositifs) by which human beings 
are made subjects and treated as objects' (de Kadt, 1990:324). It is mostly for this reason, 
Frigerio argues, that Foucault felt a fundamental break with the Kantian knowing subject was 
long overdue. Frigerio identified the major flaw in the thinking around the Kantian knowing 
subject as the view that powerlknowledge technologies operate as a form of repression. In 
addition, he says humanists believe that in the process of repression there exists one identifiable 
group of oppressors and another composed of those who are subjugated, in a word, the 
oppressed. It is this position, Frigerio maintains, which Foucault has rejected because, unlike 
humanists who believe in underlying agents, he gives autonomy to the emergence and operation 
ofpowerlknowledge apparatuses (1990:324). 
Frigerio's uncritical acceptance of Foucault's view which gives autonomy to the emergence and 
operation of powerlknowledge rather than real human agents must be questioned. The same 
must be done to other SA Foucauldians, such as, Deacon and Parker, for their uncritical 











discipline cannot be treated as real agents as if history is subject-less. On the contrary, human 
beings are knowledgeable agents whose reflective consciousness allow them to make critical 
choices in their day-to-day interaction with their social context. Giddens's structuration theory 
has indicated that it is not 'punishment' or 'calculated technology of subjection' but 
knowledgeable human beings who are the real agents of social change. Power, according to the 
structuration theory, does not have primacy over everything and hence knowledgeable human 
agents armed with reflective consciousness can engage in coordinated political action to 
transform their social reality. Hence Giddens adheres to the view that human agency is 
responsible for historical change. For this reason, he urges us to reject the power reductionism in 
Foucault's framework. This implies that both the liberation project of SA Freirians and freedom 
from Apartheid power are possible endeavours. 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
There exists a marked contradiction between the characterisation of subjects by South African 
Freirians and the way in which SA Foucauldians view the processes in which power/knowledge 
is involved in the creation of subjects. This distinction hinges on the fact that whilst Freirians 
believe that power as domination embedded in banking educational practices produces two poles 
made up of oppressed (or students) objects and oppressor(or teachers) subjects, Foucauldians on 
the contrary, are against these dualisms. In addition where SA Freirians perceive problem 
posing education as a means by which this oppressor/oppressed problematic can be resolved 
through conscientisation strategies aimed at the dissolution of the oppressor/ oppressed 
contradiction in favour of universal humanisation, SA Foucauldians hold the view that the 
concept of equality in education which employs the notion of the generalised other is a non-
starter. SA Foucaldians thus believe that no educational strategy can guarantee us liberation 
since each individual agent is invested in many discourses which are themselves contradictory. 
In essence this is a call for us to drop the notion of a unified subject in favour of a subjectivity 
which is multiple and contradictory. For SA Foucauldians, we have to problematise the status 
and role of the human subject such that homogenising concepts like the 'people', the 'nation', etc 
are avoided at all times in the light of gender, ethnic, class and other differences. It is on this 
basis that they believe that a state of freedom cannot be attained either in society as a whole or in 
the educational terrain. SA Foucauldians's characterisation of the subject, a contradictory 
subject acted upon by a variety of forces, is a description of an agent incapable of attaining 
liberation. This of course poses a major challenge for South African Freirians whose 











subjects who, through revolutionary action, can liberate all humans from the oppressor/oppressed 
relationship. The pedagogy of the oppressed cannot be realised in the absence of a dialogical 
being who through communication brings about communion in the cultural action for freedom. 
Following Freire and Harbermas, I argue that education as a process of extrojecting and 
destroying Apartheid myths and values can lead to revolutionary action and reflection for 
humanisation. SA Freirians believe this emancipatory project is only possible through the act of 
knowing whose primary features, dialogue and conscientisation, have as their objective social 
transformation for a democratic South Africa. 
In supporting the South African Freirians's position I have drawn more from Giddens's 
characterization of human beings as knowledgeable actors who create and recreate their society 
as active agents. I have pointed out however that the SA Freirian framework on active subject 
can be enhanced by the use of Giddens's concept of discursive consciousness. This is because 
discursive consciousness is central to the ideology critique process on the basis of which self-
reflective agents engage in transformative action. Possession of discursive consciousness 
provides active subjects with the capability to use ideology critique to unmask and challenge 
ideological manifestations in relations of domination. Hence the deployment of this concept can 
go a long way into improving the effectiveness ofthe Freirian liberatory education praxis in SA 
On the other hand, I utilize Thompson's idea that we should be wary of the Foucauldians's 
preoccupation with diversity and difference to criticize SA Foucauldians's position which 
celebrates multiple and plural identities, voices and subjectivities. Like Thompson, I think 
diversity and difference should always be seen as embedded in asymmetrical relations of power 
which produce the structured inequalities of social life. I have also pointed out that the view that 
we should reject a unitary and homogenous conception of 'the nation' in the nation-building 
project of the new democratic South Africa is without substance. As a principle separatism 
should be rejected in favour of a democratic citizenship which disavows race, ethnicity and 
culture or religion as points of reference in South Africa. For this reason, Alexander's view that 
we combine all positive and constructive elements in the South African traditions to build a 
unique South African culture should be supported. 
Lastly, in my opinion, the uncritical ceding of autonomy to the emergence and operation of 
powerlknowledge rather than human agents by S.A Foucauldians warrants critical appraisal. 
This is the view that subjectivity is linked to power strategies in ways that do not allow for 











the structuration theory of Giddens, it can be argued that human agents have the 
knowledgeability and discursive consciousness which can enable them to engage in action and 
reflection to transform their situation and hence the Freirian liberatory political action for 
freedom is possible. In sum , the position I advanced here is against the Foucauldian view, 
particularly that of Frigerio (1990:327), that human freedom can only be guaranteed by 
opposition to the arbitrary manner in which subjects have been classified, categorized and 
defined. In addition, my viewpoint is opposed to the idea that being skeptical and rebellious 
against categories used to characterize the human subject is enough for the achievement of 
human freedom(Ibid:329). I believe for the attainment of emancipation, a conception of a 'good 











CHAPTER 6: SA FREIRIANS CONTRA FOUCAULDIANS ON THE (1M) POSSIBILITY 
OF TRUTH AND LIBERATION 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main objective of this chapter is to explore the debate between SA Freirians and 
Foucauldians on the (im)possibility of truth and liberation through educational practices. SA 
Freirians who hold the view that truth and liberation are achievable goals, at times hold 
contradictory positions about truth as final and provisional truth. Despite this tension, South 
African Freirians are agreed that the truth in education for liberation andlor People's education 
was an outcome of a dialogical process. Dialogue in their view yielded knowledge and truth on 
the basis of which transformative action against Apartheid power which brought about liberation 
was taken. In contrast, SA Foucauldians criticized critical theory's commitment to determinate 
standards of truth as a means by which a 'regime of truth' in which some viewpoints are 
legitimized while others are silenced is established. For them, truth is more illusive than the 
critical model makes it to be because there are always going to be multiple perspectives and 
truths. In addition, because, like Foucault, they hold the view that power has a principal 
influence over truth claims, they do not see any possibility that truth can be liberated from 
power. Hence for SA Foucauldians truth and liberation are impossible to achieve. Instead their 
solution of the problem of domination is simply conducting a ruthless critique of standards of 
truth and to expose the operation of power in the legitimation of truth. However, SA 
Foucauldians fail to take advantage of their politics of resistance to come up with a programme 
of social reconstruction or the notion of a 'good society'. 
Against the Foucauldian view that power has primacy over truth and everything, I argue that 
power instead is dialectically related to truth. This makes truth to be subversive of power thus 
making liberation possible. Moreover, taking Giddens's position into consideration, power has 
to be seen as having a transformative capacity which can enable human subjects to change their 
society. Hence utilizing dialogical action within what Habermas termed the public sphere 
transformative action that will yield the truth and liberation South African Freirians talked about 
is possible. 
In other words, the chapter employs Habermas's theory of communicative action to strengthen 











for freedom. Another way around this issue is to deploy Giddens and Thompson's concept of 
ideology critique to show that critical self-reflection or counterfactual thinking is central to a 
process of transforming society. In fact critical self-reflection is a key element of the dialogical 
process, embraced by South African Freirians, which serves liberation purposes. The contours 
of the core elements of the SA Freirians and Foucauldians arguments on the (im)possibility of 
truth and liberation follow below starting with the former. 
South Mrican Freirians believe the utilisation of Freire's pedagogical strategy, the act of 
knowing, in eduation, and conscientisation processes in society as a whole will bring about truth 
through which liberation can be achieved. Problem-posing liberatory education praxis, for them, 
is a means by which the teacher and students, the masses and their leaders or the oppressor and 
the oppressed could practice horizontal pedagogical processes which could bring about truth and 
liberation. A practice of this nature, SA Freirians maintained, could transform both Apartheid 
education and the Apartheid power structure into People's Education For People's Power and a 
democratic dialogical power, respectively. Both People's Education for People's Power and 
Democratic People's Power, for them, attest for the practice of freedom which can guarantee 
liberation for all - oppressor and oppressed. 
In other words, a conscientising Freirian pedagogy of knowing is an instrument by which truth 
and liberation can be attained. Truth is the antithesis of ideological prescription which banking 
strategies adopted by Bantu Education and other Apartheid practices had fostered within 
educational and other Apartheid social institutions. There is an unbreakable connection between 
knowledge and truth. Apartheid knowledge and truth were connected in such a way that the 
truth of Apartheid knowledge served to maintain and sustain White prosperity and supremacy. It 
was for this reason that those who struggled against Apartheid had targeted the educational arena 
as a site of the struggle. The position these latter forces have advanced for doing this was that 
unless Apartheid knowledge and truth were overturned the masses would remain ignorant of 
Apartheid power and its reinforcement strategies. Nevertheless, South African Freirians also 
believed that authentic truth was part and parcel of liberatory education praxis. They linked 
conscientisation processes to the method of reaching truth. Unlike ideological and political 
Apartheid knowledge and truth, authentic knowledge was seen as a positive, objective truth 
which represented a process of illumination arising from dialogic and critical education as a 
shared process. This education was anologous to the inter-subjectivity which emerged out of a 
process of communicative action similar to that represented by Habermas' ideal speech acts. 











in Bantu Education. The main goal of critical education, the problem-posing type, was freedom 
and self affirmation as against the passivity and alienation embedded in the banking nature of 
Apartheid education. In contrast the critical understanding of education for liberation was 
derived from or based on the lived experience of students. This was knowledge mediating 
between the experience of the oppressor and the oppressed such that the oppressor and oppressed 
contradiction was transcended once and for all in favour of a fully liberated being. For liberation 
to be a reality critical understanding and conscientisation which yielded truth through which 
Apartheid myths and values were exposed were necessary. This process constituted active 
subjects whose struggle for truth was crucial for the attainment of freedom. People's Education 
for People's power was a good example of projects undertaken by these conscious subjects 
whose primary objective was the negation of the effects of Apartheid education. 
People's Education for People's Power proponents stood for a progressive democratic 
curriculum which served purposes of liberation. This was in opposition to the oppressive 
Apartheid hidden curriculum whose indoctrination function constituted docile subjects who 
accepted Apartheid as natural and inevitable. A democratic problem-posing derived curriculum 
ensures that justice and democracy are served by schooling whereas an Apartheid curriculum 
was an instrument of manipUlation and control-strategies adopted by those whose interests were 
protected by the Apartheid power structure, that is, the White elites and their Black cronies. 
Education for liberation, or specifically People's Education For People's Power, in the case of 
South Africa, was revolutionary. Within it was embedded processes which ensured the 
indissolubility of speech and freedom. It was against oppression connected with the theme of 
silence or culture of silence. As against authoritarianism it emerged from egalitarian forms of 
teaching and learning which treated learners as teachers and teachers as learners. It was an 
education for emancipation which arose out of a dialectical relation between theory and practice. 
As an authentic praxis it involved processes which linked action to reflection and vice versa. In 
a word, speaking a word is an act of transforming social reality. In the South African setting 
speaking a word involved transformative action aimed at the complete overhaul of Bantu 
education and other Apartheid power structures. For this reason critical pedagogy is unquiet, it 
is less certain of certainties. The implication here is that there exist no absolute truth. Truth is 
essentially provisional and lacking concrete or sacrosanct 'circles of certainty'. South African 
Freirians, therefore, contend that those who suffer from the absence of doubt are lost because 
truth is constructed and reconstructed during social interaction. The truth of knowledge is 











knowledge is related to the balance of power. If this power is dominative, as in the case of 
Apartheid power, the result is domination for the oppressor and sub-ordination for the rest of the 
population (the oppressed or the masses). On the other hand, dialogical pedagogical strategies 
yield educational processes which through conscientisation activities brought about liberated 
subjects who acted in order to transform the Apartheid reality. In this sense the truth of 
curricular knowledge is not fixed or universal but contestable. SA Freirians such as Coetzee, 
Jantjes, Pityana, Khotseng, McKay & Romm, Biko, Jansen, Nkomo, and Adendorff, maintain 
that for liberation to be a reality the truth of Apartheid curricular knowledge had to be contested. 
The exposure of the myths and lies within this banking education practice conscientised the 
oppressed Black masses to take action in order to transform the whole Apartheid system. Not so, 
replied the South African Foucauldians-no educational practice however well-intended can bring 
about justice, truth and liberation because these values are by their nature 
unreachable/unattainable. 
South African Foucauldians , unlike their Freirian counterparts, believe the saturation of social 
practices with mechanisms of power makes truth political and liberation an impossibility. 
Following Foucault, they argue that the interlinkages amongst truth, power, knowledge and the 
constitution of subjectivity imply that each group or society has its own 'regime of truth' . 
Flanagan believes that the 'regime of truth' each society has shows that truth is relative rather 
than absolute. In support to Flanagan, Miller also argued that the provisional or partial nature of 
truth could be discerned from the strong bond between knowledge, power and objective truth. 
The truth of one group/society does not necessarily apply in another context. In addition, 
Flanagan, following Foucault, believes that scientific knowledges are not ideologies or cultural 
representations. Their political nature is due to their intimate link with power relations. Claims 
of truth are thus linked to this powerlknowledge axis such that their objectivity is compromised 
in the process. This refers to the concept of 'regime of truth' and the temporal specificity of 
truths and practices. In Deacon & Parker's own words, we cannot exercise power without the 
production of knowledge and truth. Coetzee adds that the conjoining of power, knowledge and 
truth is an established fact which defies any critical interrogation. Truth is thus constraining. 
Discourses of 'truth' are exercised on the body and identity of individuals. Deacon & Parker and 
Mc Lennan believe that truth, like powerlknowledge, is linked in a constraining and enabling 
way to identity and/or subjectivity. This is because, as Coetzee had argued, knowledge and truth 
are legitimised through power. Truth, for her, is associated with knowledge in such a way that a 
special selection of knowledge as 'truth' puts power in the hands of a special group/person. This 










moved away form conceptions of power as a possession or a property. Below follows elaborated 
versions of both SA Freirian and Foucauldian on truth and liberation, starting with the former. 
6.2 SOUTH AFRlCAN FREIRlANS ON TRUTH AND LIBERATION 
This section maps out the SA Freirians's conception oftruth and liberation. First it identifies the 
tension between truth as final and the provisionality of truth in the writings of Biko and the 
practice of People's Education. Nevertheless the work of Biko talks about 'a continuous struggle 
for truth' and the need to challenge the 'monopoly of truth' and messages portrayed as 
containing 'universal truth' (Biko, 1997:22-23;26). This aspect of Biko's work allows for a 
conception of truth which is not absolute but arrived at dialogically. In addition, Muller's 
criticism that learners expected "from people's education, the unvarnished 'truth'" (Muller, 
1991:329) can be counter-posed to Coetzee's view that People's Education did not conceive 
truth as limited to established views in educational institutions or embedded in Apartheid 
hegemonic discourses (Coetzee, 1995:129). Instead, Coetzee claims, truth within People's 
Education was the outcome of dialogue between pupils, teachers and parents (Ibid) 
Second, the section acknowledges that the idea held by SA Freirians that truth is arrived at 
dialogically and that this process involves equal participation and horizontal relationships 
between educators and learners, revolutionaries and the masses is more akin to Freire's 
pedagogy. In a typical Freire-style, Njobe believed embracing Freire's dialogical education for 
liberation means abandoning the traditional rote-learning pedagogical method which treat 
teachers as possessors of truth and learners as empty vessels (Quoted in Coetzee 1995:15). 
Hence South African Freirians including Coetzee maintain that it is only through active 
involvement and dialogue amongst all participants in knowledge and truth production processes 
that liberation can be achieved (Ibid) 
Third, the section will also deal with the idea by SA Freirians that the practice of education for 
liberation and People's Education can yield action and reflection for liberation in South Africa. 
In a clear identification with Freire's concept of education for liberation, AZAPO advanced the 
view that the education struggle in South Africa was linked to the overall revolutionary struggle 
for liberation in the country. AZAPO holds the position that the search for truth is a basis for the 
acceleration of change. Through authentic knowledge and truth, the organisation believed 
students could be conscientised to engage in transformation action which will bring about 











People's Education allows for a dialogical process of reflection and action necessary for the 
revolutionary transformation of the South African Society. Hence both AZAPO and People's 
Education proponents utilised the notion of education for liberation in the struggle for both 
emancipatory education and freedom from Apartheid domination. 
Within the section I utilise Habermas's theory of communicative action especially his idea that 
in ideal speech situation where participants reveal their intentions, claims of validity of 
cognitions can be settled through intersubjective discourse and testing to strengthen the SA 
Freirians's view that truth is discovered and altered in an ongoing dialogical process. In 
Habermas's theory truth represents a consensus reached in a dialogue entered into by individuals 
who operate within the confines of an emancipatory cognitive interest as a moral underpinning 
of communicative action. It is within the value of commitment to dialogical forms of 
communication in addition to an interest in human emancipation that claims to normative 
rightness and subjective sincerity can be made. On this basis a link between communicative 
action of Habermas and South African Freirians's dialogical process that will produce 
knowledge and truth through which action and reflection for freedom can be undertaken, can be 
established. 
Employing the ideology critique concept of Giddens and Thompson, I argue that South African 
Freirians were right to believe that education for liberation strategies could free them from 
Apartheid domination. This is because through the process of critical self-reflection, Thompson 
argued that individuals can change their lives. I think Thompson's critical self-reflection, as is 
Giddens's counterfactual thinking, is akin to Freire's reflection and action embedded in 
dialogical action. Hence the claim by South African Freirians that conscientising dialogue 
within education for liberation andior People's Education can yield action which will bring about 
freedom from Apartheid power is defensible. In fact this aspect fall within Giddens's dialectic 
of control which allows the relatively powerless agents to engage in action to alter their social 
and material circumstances.Let's start by examining SA Freirian's views on truth before showing 
that the search for truth is in itself linked to liberatory praxis. 
6.2.1 SOUTH AFRICAN FREIRIANS ON TRUTH 
Following Freire, South African scholars such as McKay and Romm (1992:30) believe that the 











and relevant knowledge. This conception of knowledge meant to develop individual abilities and 
capabilities required by their social environment, is criticised by Freire as domestication (Ibid.). 
In the same vein, Barney Pityana, one of the BCM's leading figure, says that consonant with the 
banking idea, Black people were compelled to accept White "truths" at the expense of the 
destruction of their own truths and values (1972: 178). 
The truth of humanism hinges on what is essentially good in human nature (Flanagan and Sayed, 
1994:154). According to Coetzee (1995:15) this is the central idea in Freire's pedagogy. She 
says Freire: 
", .. wants knowledge in the school curriculum to be a tool by which the oppressed 
can regain their 'humanity' and 'liberate themselves' from the oppressors 'who 
oppress, exploit, and rape by virtue of their power' to control the knowledge 
production processes,.. He does not make it quite clear whether by 'regaining 
humanity' he means that society will be 'free' from 'power' altogether. An important 
point that he makes, though, is that 'no pedagogy which is truly liberating can remain 
distant from the oppressed by treating them as unfortunates' in the balance of power 
in any social reality ... " (Ibid.). 
Note that Freire and South African Freirians use the word 'true' or 'truly liberating' in a 
simplistic way (see Enslin, 1986:224 and Coetzee, 1995:15). The writings of Steve Biko of the 
Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) are impregnated by this type of usage of the word 'true' 
or 'truth' such that the reader is left with the feeling that the statement is unquestionable or has 
been arrived at with absolute certainty (Biko, 1997:11;14), 
Biko is also fond of throwing in words like knowing of 'the problem', sticking 'by our findings', 
and 'true humanity' (Ibid: 15-18). In addition, he says that 'everybody". knows what is right and 
all are looking for the most seemly way of dodging the responsibility of saying what is right' 
(Ibid: 18), Such statements indicate certainty of what has been said in the same way Freire uses 
the term 'authentic' although this is only one side of Freire's position on truth. 
Freire also holds the view that truth is provisionaL As Enslin puts it: 
"One way in which a concern for truth is demonstrated is in holding the belief that 
something is true provisionally. Freire himself subscribes to this sort of notion of 
truth when he criticises those who close themselves in 'circles of certainty' and those 











Biko also seem to hold this second Freirian position on truth. When dealing with the tasks of the 
Black Consciousness philosophy in South Africa, he talks of struggles for truth and values. He 
questions the authenticity of Christian truth and values. In addition he accuses Christianity of 
'monopoly on truth' and missionaries who spread their message as if it contained 'universal 
truth' (Biko, 1997:26). As a solution to this problem, he turns to Black theology as a religious 
approach which does not 'allow a [Christian or missionary] lie to rest unchallenged' 'and does 
not claim to be a theology of absolutes' (Ibid.). This perception by Biko would make Black 
Consciousness and Black theology sceptical of traditional education models which claim to have 
scientifically discovered the 'truth'. Nevertheless, Biko contradicts himself by saying Black 
theology 'seeks to bring back God to the black man and to the truth and reality of his situation' 
(Ibid.). What I'm trying to demonstrate here is that Biko utilises Freire's conception of truth 
uncritically such that he does not detect the contradictions within it. Like Freire, he believes that 
truth is provisional and that it has to be fought for, while at the same time contradicting this 
relativist view of truth by absolute statements like 'having found right answers'. Biko provided a 
good example of this contradiction when he wrote: 
"In order that Black Consciousness can be used to advantage as a philosophy to 
apply to people in a position like ours, a number of points have to be observed. As 
people exist in a continuous struggle for truth, we have to examine and question old 
concepts, values and systems. Having found the right answers we shall then work for 
consciousness among all people to make it possible for us to proceed towards putting 
these answers into effect. In this process, we have to evolve our own schemes, forms 
and strategies to suit the need and situation, always keeping in mind our fundamental 
beliefs and values" (Ibid:22-23). 
Biko's confusion between 'right answers' and the rejection of 'an artificial fabrication of truth' 
(Ibid: 10) is a sin for which Freire has been accused for when post-structuralists of a Foucauldian 
kind dismiss binary divisions and dichotomies in the critical model of education. The reason 
behind this confusion is that critical theorists start by criticising traditional educationalists for 
enforcing a rigid knowledge Itruth system in schools in order to control I oppress students. They 
then argue for the truth of traditional education model to be contested so that authentic dialogical 
truth can be arrived at. Dialogical truth is seen by Freirian critical theorists as a means for the 
establishment of emancipatory processes and the achievement of liberation. By so doing 
Foucauldians believe critical theorists fall into dichotomization of truth into distorted knowledge 
(ideology) and undistorted knowledge (truth). 
In addition, the belief that the truth which emerges from contesting the validity of the traditional 











the authenticity of critical theory's truth is seen to be nothing less than a claim to absolute 
certainty. 
This problematic can also be captured in the People's Education Project in South Africa which 
also utilised the concept of truth. According to Muller, 
"Insistence on process while developing curricula means emphasis on the 
development of critical skills rather than exclusive stress on alternative content. But 
it is hardly surprising that many students still expect from people's education the 
unvarnished 'truth', given some of the more extravagant public claims put forward 
in its name, for example: ' to recover and comprehend the past in full' 27. A 
campaign will be needed to co-ordinate student expectations with the way curricula 
are taking shape" ( 1991 :329). 
The notion of People's Education was formed on the assumption that to overcome the 
domestication affect of the Apartheid education and its cultural cleavages, South Africans had to 
fight for the democratisation of knowledge (Coetzee, 1995:129). Coetzee says truth was 
conceived by People's Education as not limited to established views in educational institutions or 
as embedded in the hegemonic discourse of Apartheid politicians. Instead, it was an outcome of 
the dialogue between pupils, teachers and parents. In this sense teachers, books and experts were 
not seen as having the monopoly of knowledge. Hence learners, educators and community 
members were encouraged to have a say in the generation and accreditation of knowledge 
(Ibid.). 
Furthermore, Coetzee argues that People's Education was opposed to a positivist epistemology. 
People's Education proponents, she maintains, did not see knowledge as objective. They 
believed in multiple versions of truth rather than one. This is because, Coetzee continues, the 
social context plays a primary role in determining the truth version which is embraced. 
Knowledge is thus socially constructed and therefore could be used for purposes of domination 
as it could also be transformed and utilised by the oppressed for liberatory purposes. 
Consequently the oppressors and the oppressed would have different interpretations of the same 
experience or situation. In Coetzee's view People's Education did not distinguish between 
theoretical and practical knowledge in terms of importance and / or scientific objectivity. This 
means that theoretical and practical or scientific knowledges were both important in People's 
Education. Suffice to say that all knowledges were considered useful and important by People's 











The above position taken by People's Education proponents about the status of truth and 
knowledge is similar to Freire's view that truth is provisional and that the cultural experience of 
learners can be the foundation upon which knowledge is constructed through critical reflection. 
Coetzee confirms this connection or deduction when she says: 
"because of Paulo Freire's influence on People's Education it has to be noted that, 
according to Freire ... knowledge is not 'a gift bestowed by those who consider 
themselves knowledgeable upon those whom they consider to know nothing'. In 
other words, knowledge cannot, for example, be transmitted from the teacher to the 
student in a final form (or banking system); the notion that some people are in a state 
of 'absolute ignorance' while others are in possession of 'knowledge', does not take 
into account that knowledge is also a process of enquiry. Freire furthermore argues 
that, because knowledge 'emerges only through invention and re-invention through 
the ... continuing, hopeful inquiry men pursue in the world, with the world and with 
each other' ... neither language nor knowledge 'can exist without a structure to which 
they refer' ... Hence the people's perception of their social reality is crucial in 
determining either the objectivity or the richness, significance, plurality, 
transformations and historical composition of knowledge or 'truth' ... " (Ibid: 129-
130). 
Despite the tension between truth as absolute and provisional truth as detected in the writings of 
Biko and as pointed out by Muller in the People' Education praxis in South Africa, Biko's idea 
of 'a continuous struggle for truth' (Biko, 1997:22-23) and the notion of truth as provisional 
detected by Coetzee in the praxis of People's Education can be developed by utilizing 
Habermas's theory communicative action. According to McKay and Romm (1992:94), 
Habermas does not believe truth is independent of the observer. On the contrary, they maintain, 
Habermas is of the view that priviledged access to truth is anathema and disinterested true 
knowledge a pipedream. Habermas believes only through intersubjective discourse and testing 
can claims of validity of cognitions be settled. Speech acts, he maintains, establish a relation 
between speaking subjects in addition to revealing their intentions. This allows for the 
possibility of raising claims to normative rightness and subjective sincerity (Dew, 1984:72-95). 
Habermas explicitly spelled out his intention to secure the normative foundations of critical 
theory and admitted that securing the moral underpinning of critical theory entails holding 
particular values. However instead of holding arbitrary values, he recommends the value of 
commitment to dialogical forms of communication. In an ideal speech situation, he argued, 
those involved in the dialogue must question the authenticity, morality, the appropriateness and 
the accuracy of speech acts. Habermas believes people are orientated towards uncoercive 
interaction and communication free from domination. He sees them as striving to reach 












I think claims to nonnative rightness, truth, and subjective sincerity are the basis for authentic 
communicative action. I believe this is akin to Freire's true dialogue which is the foundation for 
the practice of freedom. However, the process of constituting and unveiling provisional truth, 
like conscientising dialogue and communicative action, is an ongoing one. According to McKay 
and Romm while conscientising dialogue allows people to participate in shaping their society, 
dialogue about social reality must be seen as continuous. For them, as it is for most South 
African Freirians, the face of reality is never pennanent and therefore particular views of reality 
must not be blindly accepted (McKay and Romm 1992:9-10). Showing clearly the affinity of 
their critical humanist view on truth to that of Freire, they insist 'that the route to dismantling 
power relations and the apparently fixed hierarchies of authority in society, is through the 
creation of a critical citizenship which is able to press for cognitive participation in the 
fonnulation of "truths" in society' (McKay and Romm, 1993:276). Hence the linking of the 
conception of truth and strategies for achieving liberation from Apartheid power in the views of 
South Mrican Freirians. 
6.2.2 TRUTH AND LIBERATION 
Enslin (1986:213) says Freire uses the phrase the 'right to be human' as a justification of his 
pedagogy whose aim is to expose oppression so that through action and reflection a struggle for 
humanisation and liberation would free the dehumanised oppressed from their chains. Similarly, 
Coetzee (1995:15) believes Freire's approach's main objective was to make the school 
curriculum the instrument through which the dominated masses could regain their humanity and 
liberate themselves from oppression. Freire, argues Coetzee, wanted to rescue knowledge 
production processes from the control of the dominant group who use their power to oppress and 
exploit the oppressed. However, Coetzee believes, there is no clarity in Freire whether regaining 
humanity implies freedom from power altogether. Despite this aspect, she maintains that Freire's 
pedagogy clearly indicates that a truly liberating education allows equal dialogue between 
educators and learners, revolutionaries and the masses in the struggle to tip the balance of power 
in favour of the oppressed. In line with this view Njobe has argued that curriculum must serve 
the needs of society. In the South African setting Njobe says this means the curriculum must 
serve the needs of liberation such that political power is transferred to the people. In addition, a 












Coetzee says central to Freire's view that education must serve the needs of liberation, is his 
belief that knowledge is praxis. This refers to the idea that knowledge can only be achieved 
where there is active involvement and dialogue amongst all participants in the education process. 
Njobe says that in view of the dialogical nature of education for liberation, the traditional rote-
learning pedagogical method which treats teachers as possessors of truth and students as empty 
vessels who know nothing must be rejected. This banking system which robs human beings of 
authentic knowledge, creativity and transformative praxis signifies some form of miseducation 
(Ibid: 15 ). 
Dialogue, according to Mason, implies that people communicate with others authentically in a 
space free from domination. In a space free from domination, teachers and students have a 
mutual objective to maximise understanding so that all can experience what is it to be human. It 
is an education process free from domination that can ensure human freedom for both teachers, 
parents and students alike. In this sense teachers, parents and students could exercise their right 
to choose and make decisions which can guarantee a democratic practice within South African 
schools. Here human ideals are nurtured without any constraints which could negate the 
attainment of human freedom. As a result this questioning attitude makes possible the 
challenging of established norms and ideologies in such a way that power is redistributed, 
knowledge is clarified, and true interests are revealed resulting in authentic transformation 
(Mason, 1995:199-200). 
The democratic teacher, as Freire has indicated, is conscious that her/his authority is the basis 
upon which the freedom of students is made possible. Authority separated from freedom, Freire 
believes, can no longer be seen as authority but, instead, has become authoritarianism 
(Adendorff, 1993:316). One way in which non-authoritarian pedagogical practice can be ensured 
in South African educational institutions is through, according to Flanagan and Sayed, the use of 
group work, collaborative learning and dialogic education. In other words: 
"Dialogic education was an almost inevitable choice under the circumstances for a 
dialogical situation implies the absence of authoritarianism .... The important thing 
about dialogic education is its ethos of collective endeavour and collaboration in 
teaching for the liberation of the oppressed" (Flanagan an Sayed, 1994: 154). 
In South Africa, the concept of People's Education for People's Power (PEPP) was 
conceptualized along the lines of this Freirian critical or liberatory education. According to 
Macleod, this concept emerged as part of the challenge to Apartheid state structures (1995:70). 











authoritarian, non-racist and democratic education structures which could make possible for 
educators and learners alike to play their part in the overall liberation of the South African 
society. In the words of one of the leading proponents of this view, Zwelakhe Sisulu, 
"What do we mean when we say we want people's education? We are agreed that we 
don't want Bantu Education but we must be clear about what we want in its place. 
We must also be clear as to how we are no longer demanding the same education for 
domination. People's education means education at the service of the people as a 
whole; education that liberates; education that puts the people in command of their 
lives. We are not prepared to accept any 'alternative' to Bantu Education which is 
imposed on the people from above .... To be acceptable every initiative must come 
from the people themselves; ... Of course this is a long-term process, a process of 
struggle, which can only ultimately be secured by total liberation. But we have 
already begun this process" (Sisulu, 1991:266). 
People's education was therefore a carbon copy of Freire's education for liberation. In fact, even 
before the advent of People's Education, Freire's conception of education for liberation was 
utilised in the construction of AZAPO's education policy. In a document authored by the 
AZAPO Education secretariat, education was viewed as a process towards liberation and 
humanisation. This process made 'man' critical of the social environment rather than reacting 
passively to it. The person as a subject or the liberated and humanised being was considered 
capable of intervening in reality in order to transform it (AZAPO Education Secretariat, 
1991:230). 
The AZAPO education policy was, in this regard, Freirian because it viewed education in South 
Mrica as linked to the overall revolutionary struggle for liberation. AZAPO also saw the search 
for truth as a basis for the acceleration of change. Through authentic knowledge and truth, the 
organisation believed students could be conscientised to act to transform their society. This 
transformation action of South African students was to be geared towards guaranteeing South 
Africans 'freedom from ignorance, fear, dehumanisation and oppression' (Ibid:232- 233). In this 
sense the students become at once learners and educators thus negating the domesticating and 
alienating effects of Apartheid education (Ibid.). The above formulation of AZAPO's education 
policy shows clearly that it had affinity with Freire's concept of education for liberation. Indeed, 
as Skinner (1998:37) maintains, Freire's pedagogy since the 1970's had. conscientised 
educational actors about power issues in this domain so that they could use this arena 'as an 
agent of democracy and transformation'. As did AZAPO, People's Education also signified the 
NECC's efforts to utilise the notion of education for liberation in the struggle for both 












Moreover, SA Freirians believed in the transformative capacity of People's Education. In their 
view, the ultimate goal of this educational strategy was liberation. However, Mckay and Romm 
say in addition to this goal People's Education must bring about a state of tolerance for 
differences (McKay and Romm 1992:9). As they put it: 
" if people's education as a movement for liberation in society is to retain its 
liberative dimension, it cannot ground its claims or practices in a suppression of 
difference and a call to collective consensus. As a process which is continually 'in-
the-making' people's education signifies a struggle to preserve the discursive 
character of social reality, so that any posited 'new world' never becomes, as Freire 
puts it, 'sacred' ... " (Ibid.). 
In the same vein, Flanagan, who confesses the influence of Freire's pedagogy in her work, 
argues that liberatory pedagogy is investigative and less certain of certainties. It is, she adds, 
particularly critical and inquiet (1991:11). A pedagogy for liberation demands that learners and 
educators interact with material presented in the classroom in a critically reflective way. For this 
to be a reality, those engaged in classroom dialogue must act as self-reflective subjects. 
Educational institutions therefore are expected to produce self-regulating learners who can 
engage in rational discourses. Critical self-reflective practices allow rational arguments to 
develop and unnecessary conflicts to be avoided within the classroom situation. In the racist and 
sexist society like South Africa conflict should be transformed into universalised capacities for 
reason in such a manner that all parties feel included (Ibid:32). In the Harbemasian sense rational 
undistorted discussions are only possible where participants practice communication informed 
by an emancipatory interest derived from normative rightness and subjective sincerity. 
According to Flanagan, giving each voice equal weight and legitimacy creates space for the 
practice of education for liberation. In this situation it is not advisable to hide conscious interests 
because this can hamper free speech (Ibid:32-33). This brings us to the empowering nature of the 
Freirian pedagogy/education for liberation. Flanagan says that the concept of empowerment 
implies that we must make an effort to understand that the viewpoints of the masses are partial 
and partisan. For this reason, they must be interrogated so that their effects on 'other social 
movements and their struggles for self-determination' are exposed. Empowerment, for Flanagan, 
is a capacity to effectively act to transform society. For teachers and students the utilisation of 
this concept will imply that they are accountable for their pedagogical practice to each other and 
society as a whole (Ibid:33). In this sense critical pedagogy's task is to anchor processes whose 











freedom. Hence the concept of empowerment is not only directed at students but also to 
educators' praxis in the service of socio-economic and political reconstruction. It refers to an 
educational discourse which allows students and teachers to take risks to transform the existing 
and ongoing relations of power (Ibid:33-34). The concept of empowerment links up well with 
Biko's view that the starting point in the struggle for liberation is to free the oppressed from fear 
through the use of conscientisation strategies. 
In other words, Biko says that in order to successfully struggle for liberation we must remove the 
concept of fear from our vocabulary. This is because where there is fear truth cannot prosper. 
The Apartheid system, Biko believes, was perpetuated and imposed on the Black community 
because of fear of the latter to challenge the Apartheid power structure (Biko, 1997:34). Through 
the use of education for liberation, AZAPO Education Secretariat maintains, fear is dispelled and 
education becomes 'a process of extrojecting, i.e. destroying myths and values which have been 
introjected into the oppressed by the oppressor to maintain and perpetuate his position of 
privileges' (AZAPO Education Secretariat, 1991 :230). To achieve freedom from fear and to 
realise the quest for true humanity, Biko says courage and determination are needed (Biko 
1997:35). In addition, he believes truth rather than lies or myths would make it possible for 
South Africa to acquire a more human face (Ibid). In his own words: 
"This is the first truth, bitter as it may seem, that we have to acknowledge before we 
can start on any programme designed to change the status quo. It becomes more 
necessary to see truth as it is if you realise that the only vehicle for change are these 
people who have lost their personality. The first step therefore is to make the black 
man (sic) to come to himself (sic); to pump back life into his (sic) empty shell; to 
infuse him (sic) with pride and dignity, to remind him of his complicity in the crime 
of allowing himself to be misused and therefore letting evil reign supreme in the 
country of his birth. This is what we mean by an inward-looking process. This is the 
definition of 'Black Consciousness' " (Biko, 1996:29). 
Biko's view here is analogous to Freire's view that conscientisation was an instrument to make 
students and the oppressed aware of their oppression so that they can act to liberate themselves. 
Khotseng et al also show affinity with this position when they say that the 'least that can be 
hoped for is if all efforts could be geared towards making the people aware that something can 
be done to change their otherwise helpless situation' (1987:166). Biko maintains that the 
oppressed have to know that they are on their own and that it is their duty to change their 
conditions of existence. For consciousness of being Black and oppressed serves as a starting 
point for participation in the struggle for emancipation (Biko, 1997:34; Biko, 1996:48). Steve 











conscientisation are starting to rid themselves of thought-imprisoning notions of the dominant 
Whites in South Africa and thus freeing them to struggle for authentic liberation and 
humanisation (Biko, 1996:68). In his own words: 
"The philosophy of Black Consciousness therefore expresses group pride and the 
determination of the black to rise and attain the envisaged self. Freedom is the ability 
to define oneself with one's possibilities held back not by the power of other people 
over one but only by one's relationship to God and to natural surroundings. On his 
(sic) own, therefore, the black man (sic) wishes to explore his surroundings and test 
his possibilities - in other words to make his freedom real by whatever means he 
( sic) deems fit. At the heart of this kind of thinking is the realisation by blacks that 
the most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed. If 
one is free at heart, no man-made chains can bind one to servitude, but if one's mind 
is so manipulated and controlled by the oppressor as to make the oppressed believe 
that he is a liability to the white man, then there will be nothing the oppressed can do 
to scare his powerful masters. Hence thinking along lines of Black Consciousness 
makes the black man see himself (sic) as a being complete in himself. It makes him 
(sic) less dependent and freer to express his manhood (sic). At the end of it all he 
cannot tolerate attempts to dwarf the significance of his manhood" (Biko 1997:22). 
The idea by Giddens that political action is not only 'possible' but 'necessary' globally and 
locally (Giddens, 1990:150) allows for the types of liberatory praxis the BCM, the People's 
Education proponents and other South African Freirians advanced, to occur. In fact, Thompson 
is of the view that critical theorists were accurate in their view that the process of critical self-
reflection can enable groups or individuals to challenge and transform relations of domination. It 
is through the indepth understanding of the situation, Thompson argued, that 'self-reflective 
agents' can engage in action to transform their society (Thompson, 1990:330-331). Hence the 
search for liberating and authentic truth which AZAPO advocated for was part and parcel of the 
process of ideology critique by means of which Apartheid relations of domination were 
challenged, contested and disrupted thus creating conditions conducive for political action for 
liberation. In this sense the BCM and the People's Education proponents were justified to 
advance the Freirian notion of education for liberation in the struggle for both emancipatory 
education and the broad struggle for the liberation of South Africa from the Apartheid social 
order. Indeed it was also Giddens's view that the dialectical relationship of autonomy and 
dependence between the powerful and the relatively powerless in the dialectic of control allows 
for the relatively powerless to take action directed at transforming this relationship. This is made 
possible by Giddens's depiction of power as 'equivalent to transformative capacity of human 
action' (Giddens, 1977:347-348). In terms of this view human agents have the capacity to 
engage in praxis which can alter their 'conditions of social and material existence' (Ibid.). In 











action freedom from Apartheid domination in the education sphere and society as a whole could 
be achieved. 
The concept of dialogue was central to the means by which SA Freirians wanted to liberate 
South Africa. The Freirian concept of dialogue is akin to Habermans's communicative action. 
In Habermas's view, the goal of freedom can only be realized through authentic communication 
geared towards mutual understanding, real consensus and intersubjectivity (Bernstein, 1995:48). 
I think Habermas's idea of a communicative action which ensures intersubjectivity and freedom 
can be used to anchor SA Freirians's view that conscientising dialogical education for liberation 
was a primary means for freedom from Apartheid domination in South Africa. 
The dialogical process in the struggle against Bantu Education and Apartheid power was in a 
way similar to the operation of Thompson and Giddens's ideology critique. In line with 
Thompson(1990), s view, critical reflection unmasked the Apartheid relations of domination 
thereby showing the oppressive aspects of the system, the asymmetric relations of power 
between Whites and Blacks, and the beneficiaries and those who suffered under the system. 
Giddens says the process of ideology critique can compromise the truth claims of the dominant 
group (Boyne, 1991:52-73, Held and Thompson (eds), 1989:5, 288-93). I think Njobe's 
observation (quoted in Coetzee, 1995:15) that education for liberation can expose the 
domesticating nature of traditional rote-learning methods which treat teachers as possessors of 
truth and students as empty vessels is in line with Giddens's position. In fact Giddens is 
adamant that the process of ideology critique produces counterfactual thinking and practical 
programs of social intervention which could provide stimulus for social transformation (Held 
and Thompson (eds), 1989:5; 288-93;300-1). Hence the South African Freirian view that the 
practice of conscientisation and dialogue within education for liberation led to political action for 
freedom from Apartheid power, is convincing. This idea however has been contested by SA 
Foucauldians who believe freedom from power is an illusion and that the Freirian view is 
utopian. An elaborated critique of critical theory and the Freirian project by SA Foucauldians 
follows below. 
6.3 SA FOUCAULDIANS ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF TRUTH AND LIBERATION 
This section will outline the ideas of SA Foucauldians who criticize the critical model for its 
commitment to determinate standards of truth. Such a commitment they argue, establishes a 











truth is more illusive than critical theory makes it to be. Some SA Foucauldians, such as, Enslin, 
however, believe there is some sense in which Freire's pedagogy can be exempted from this 
criticism as it propagates the position that truth is provisional. Nevertheless, Enslin says 
Freire's overall perception of truth is suspect because it collapses the distinction between 
education and production processes in the factories. In her view while effective engagement in 
production processes requires a considerable absence of doubt, within the education sphere 
certainty is neither appropriate nor desirable. In addition, Enslin is of the view that the treatment 
of truth as provisional by Freire contradicts the revolutionary goal he advances because certainty 
about the goal is a must in the struggle for liberation. This is because the continuous search for 
truth can distract revolutionaries from their revolutionary objective to establish a Marxist utopia. 
Furthermore, SA Foucauldians maintain that truth is linked to powerlknowledge. In this sense, 
the idea of objective knowledge and verified truth is not defensible because it is power which 
certifies the truth of particular knowledges. In other words, they believe it is power which 
imposes versions of truth human subjects are compelled to recognize and those they are 
supposed to ignore. As a solution they recommend a ruthless criticism of standards of truth and 
all verified truth which also expose the operation of powerlknowledge in the legitimation of truth 
claims. In addition, South African Foucauldians see the faultline in the critical model as the 
conception of power as sovereignty. In their view, it is this conception of power which allows 
for its transcendence through liberatory reflection and action which has as its outcomes truth and 
freedom. Furthermore, SA Foucauldians think it is the division of knowledge into two moments 
of distorted knowledge represented by ideology and undistorted knowledge represented by truth 
which makes possible the attainment of liberation. However, they believe no revolutionary 
change can take place because asymmetries of power cannot be transcended. 
Instead of power being determinate of truth, power, I believe, is dialectically related to truth. 
Truth is subversive to power in such a way that it could create conditions conducive for what SA 
Freirians terms liberatory action. In fact power itself, as Giddens has indicated, has a 
transformative capacity wich can be utilized by the relatively powerless in the struggle for 
liberation. On the other hand, truth arrived at dialogically is the basis for what Habermas called 
communicative action which will ensure human emancipation. This is why Habermas has put 
much emphasis on the notion of the 'public sphere' which gives space for discursive interaction 
amongst citizens before consensus is reached. The notion of the public sphere, like Freire's 
conception of diaogue, can be used to anchor the view of South African Freirians that it was 











Apartheid relations of power. In this way freedom and human emancipation were made 
possible. 
Moreover, SA Foucauldians, like Foucault, fail to utilize their politics of resistance to promote a 
positive programme of social transformation. Instead of a clear vision of a democratic or 'good 
society' they offer fragmentary and anarchistic prescriptions. This is a paralyzing form of 
political disengagement that prescribes that no united front be forged to contest the impositions 
of systems of domination. Giddens and Habermas have recommended that political choices be 
made in favour of transformative action and human emancipation, respectively. Hence the 
political choice by SA Freirians to utilize liberatory education praxis to achieve freedom from 
Apartheid domination. We now turn to a discussion of the SA Foucau1dians's charge that 
critical theory is involved in the creation of a 'regime of truth'. 
6.3.1 CRITICAL THEORY CRITICIZED FOR CREATING ITS OWN REGIME OF TRUTH 
The critical model rejects imperialistic practices associated with objectivism but like traditional 
and vanguard models, it is committed to 'determinate standards of truth as knowledge' (Deacon 
and Parker, 1993:132-135). It is this commitment which gives authority to each of these 
educational models to determine acceptable and unacceptable methods, curricular and 
pedagogical goals with those practices that do not conform to the rule being either silenced or 
marginalised (Ibid: 135), Flanagan and Sayed agree with Deacon and Parker that the critical 
model is committed like the other two models to determinate standards of truth. In striving for a 
discourse which puts much faith in human beings, critical theory (from which the critical model 
is derived) established its own 'regime of truth' (Flanagan and Sayed, 1994:154). In Flanagan 
and Sayed's own words: 
"Humanism was also part of the vocabulary and conceptual categories that formed 
this 'regime of truth', for it too exerted a strong 'influence on what issues were 
perceived as problematic'. This discourse is characterised by a profound faith in the 
essential goodness of human nature" (Ibid.). 
Against this viewpoint, Prinsloo argues that there is no absolute certainty and the critical model's 
'truths' only reflect 'conditions of sayability' in time and space. Thus the regimes of truth, he 
contends, are acceptable or otherwise in terms of the context within which they operate 
(Prinsloo, 1986:293-294). In support of this position, Flanagan says Foucault has clearly 
indicated that societies have their own regimes of truth and types of discourses they embrace as 











power relations which are themselves attached to such 'know ledges and relations between them' 
(Flanagan, 1991:14), This linkage between truth, knowledge/power and subjectivity is also 
evident in Frigerio' s elaboration of Foucault's views. 
Following Foucault, FrigeIio says the knowing subject is used as a categorical apriori for the 
human science's claim that the product of their activity is scientific knowledge. What this means 
is that the human sciences are saying that they have discovered or invented new 'truths' about 
human beings. On the basis of this claim, they are prescribing standards, norms, pathologies and 
deviancies as well as the diagnosis needed for the treatment of the latter two social problems / 
ailments. In addition, an excess number of so-called experts have mushroomed prescIibing how 
human beings must be measured in relation to the norm, classified and disciplined or made 
subjects in accordance with these standards (Frigerio, 1990:324). 
Skinner also believes that those who claim to know the truth tended to convince some people to 
accept it and on the basis of the support derived from this acceptance impose their version of 
truth and reality upon the rest. The reality of the situation, however, is that those who claim to be 
bearers of 'knowledge of truth' are, in most instances, talking on behalf of one political position 
at the expense of others (the ones they wish to undermine) (Skinner, 1995:10). Notwithstanding 
these practices, Skinner maintains that truth is more illusive than that and that educators must 
take this fact seriously. In fact, she believes this idea must inform their pedagogical practice. As 
an elaboration to this point, Skinner says: 
"It would seem that how we teach must become less didactic and interventionist now 
that the truth is more illusive. But the truth has in any case imposed a tremendous 
burden upon us all to ensure that the young are correctly and completely schooled in 
whatever it is we are entrusted to teach them. Greater acceptance that power and 
situation structure what we know is not so very different from the ideological 
concerns of emancipatory discourses - only now the political search for the 
particular ideologies which structure discourses is abandoned in favour of a more 
diffuse understanding of the multiple framings of all discourses which it becomes 
interesting and (ethically) illuminating for students and teachers to attempt to 
unpack" (Ibid: 12). 
This sentiment is in line with Flanagan's position that the Foucauldian concept 'points of 
resistance' gives teachers room to contest the power of this knowledge/truth by producing 
alternative pedagogical discourses. In addition, Flanagan says that the Apartheid education 
system in South Africa could only be seriously challenged through the infiltration of the 











Similarly, Skinner says within the education process educators must seek to encourage learners 
to challenge accepted 'truths' by not providing them with ready-made answers (1988:47). 
Skinner believes that efforts are already being made to train a more critical cadre of students in 
South Africa. For instance, in order to promote original and independent thought, one Black 
academic in the University of Natal-Durban campus Commerce Faculty, through a methodology 
course gives room to first-year students to problematise disciplinary assumptions. Skinner 
maintains that this allows the students to be critical of 'disciplinary assumptions as they are 
being learnt and before they become sedimented into the accepted 'truths' which postgraduates 
will tend to assume' (Skinner, 1998:Abstract). Indeed, as Miller (1990: 117) contends, the 
conception of knowledge which views knowledge as the way humans discover objective truth 
about their social surroundings is rejected by Foucault. Miller says to expose the inadequacies of 
this conception of knowledge/truth, Foucault argues that we must interrogate the historical 
conditions within which it was conceived, the interests it serves and the power relations it 
upholds (Ibid: 118). 
According to Enslin, there is a sense in which Freire's pedagogy might be exempted from this 
Foucauldian critique of the way the traditional, the vanguard and the critical models have 
characterised knowledge/truth. The reason she gives for this is related to Freire's position that 
truth is provisional and his critique of those he considered suffering 'from an absence of doubt' 
(Enslin, 1986:255). Nevertheless Enslin has some reservations about Freire's overall conception 
of truth. First, she reckons that the collapsing of the distinction between education and 
production in factories created problems for Freire's notion of truth. This is because whilst 
'certainty and absence of doubt could never be appropriate to education, effective engagement in 
production in the factory or the farms seems to require a considerable absence of doubt' (Ibid: 
255-256). Second, Enslin argues that whilst Freire's view that truth is provisional is a noble idea, 
it contradicts the revolutionary struggle which he embraces. She believes for one to engage in the 
struggle for liberation, certainty about the goal of this emancipatory process is a must because 
'the lUXUry of being distracted, by the so-called search for truth' cannot be afforded. So, she 
continues, any theory which has as its primary revolutionary goal a Marxist utopia cannot afford 
the luxury of questioning such an overriding goal (Ibid:258-259). However, in the light of the 
argument by Freire that the revolutionary leaders are expected to adhere to the dialogical method 
during and in the aftermath of the revolution (Freire, 1972:59), this criticism cannot be sustained. 
In addition, SA Freirians, such as, Mckay and Romm, believe the face of reality is never 
permanent and consequently dialogue must continue to be the modus operandi even after the 











In a nutshell, for Foucauldians truth is symbiotically intertwined with knowledge /power. 
According to Coetzee, the primary issue around the exposition of this interconnection transcends 
the uncritical adherence in the objectivity of scientific knowledge or scepticism to all verified 
truth. It has more to do rather within the rotation and operation of knowledge and its relations to 
power (Coetzee, 1995: 13). To justify this position, Coetzee paraphrases Foucault: 
" power is manifest in a set of 'general matrix of force' relations: the power 
attributed to knowledge is dependent upon a complex set of 'rules' in any given 
society at any given time. The same influences that succeed in affecting or 
challenging the 'general matrix of force' relations will eventually challenge the 
'rules' by which knowledge is legitimised and will therefore change the definition of 
reality with which 'truth' is associated. This means that the 'truth' associated with 
knowledge is at the same time transformed significantly. It follows then that insofar 
as we accept a specific definition of reality - or a specific selection of knowledge as 
'truth' we are putting power in the hands of a specific group or person. 
Consequently the power we ascribe to knowledge (or our definition of 'truth') 
provides the conceptual framework within which we live and work ... " (Ibid:70). 
However, I think the SA Foucauldian view that critical theory is implicated in the creation of 
regimes of truth and that truth cannot be del inked from power is wanting. This is because truth 
arrived at dialogically is both 'temporary and fragile' and linked to reflection and action for 
liberation from systems of domination. The centrality of dialogue in the production of truth that 
can dismantle fixed hierarchies of authority in society is embedded in McKay and Romm's 
critical humanistic approach. McKay and Romm (1993) believe truth is achieved through a 
dialogical process which is continuous. They maintain that the creation of a critical citizenship 
which participates in the ongoing negotiation in the process of constituting and reconstituting 
'truths' can not only disrupt systems of domination but can also go a long way in dismantling 
power relations. For them, contestation and critical self-reflection on divergent viewpoints in 
search of agreement is the basis for the idea of democracy (McKay and Romm, 1993:276). In 
McKay and Romm's position, democracy demands that citizens engage each other's viewpoints 
and perspectives 'as the route to the generation of human truth' and provisional 'agreements 
which accommodate the diversity of viewpoints brought to the social encounter' (Ibid:277). 
Moreover, the idea that dialogue is the means by which mediation amongst diverse viewpoints to 
produce consensus is made can be linked and strengthened by Habermas's notion of the public 
sphere. Habermas saw the public sphere as designating a theater for political participation 
through democratic conversation in contemporary societies. Through the medium of talk, 
citizens engage in discursive interaction about their common affairs within this public space. In 











produced and circulated. Within this space debates and deliberations are unbounded and open-
ended thus creating opportunities for a plurality of discourses and perspectives to be interrogated 
before consensus is reached. Hence the discourse within the public sphere, Habermas 
maintained, operate under conditions which allow for ideal speech acts (Torres and Morrow, 
1998:22-24). According to Torres and Morrow (Ibid:24), Freire's dialogical model, which set 
the stage for respectful and tolerant dialogue, becomes a basic pedagogical devise in the 
construction of public spheres. In my opinion, this is the space within which provisional truth 
arrived at dialogically can be used to subvert the power discourses of domination thus creating 
opportunities for reflection and action for freedom. Hence truth can be de-linked from power in a 
way which makes liberation praxis possible. Because Foucault and the SA Foucauldians do not 
believe truth can be emancipated from the system of power, the next section will focus on this 
issue. 
6.3.2 SA FOUCAULDIANS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER 
When Foucault talks about opposition to the dangerous effects of power he is referring to the 
rebellion against the objectifying force of power/knowledge found in, for instance, the 
administration over learners in educational institutions. The main objective of this rebellion is 
not to uncover 'truth' concealed in ideology by power but to expose the damage of power 
relations distinctive in particular social discourses. In other words, Foucault is criticising the 
technique of power which imposes itself on human subjects by classifying people and forcing 
version of truths they are compelled to recognise. In a word, this struggle is directed at the 
'government of individualisation', not against individuals (Frigerio, 1990:328). As Frigerio puts 
it: 
"In Power and Knowledge (132 -133) Foucault says that our participation in such 
specific struggles should take place from a position which can take on a general 
significance. We should operate at the general level of the 'regime of truth', and' the 
ensemble of rules according to which the true and false are separated and specific 
effects of power attached to the true'. This regime of truth is essential to the structure 
and functioning of our society and the struggle is not on behalf of the 'truth' but a 
struggle about the 'status' of truth and the role it plays in the structure of our society. 
For Foucault the essential problem is not that of emancipating truth from the system 
of power which is a chimera because truth is already power, but that of detaching the 
power of truth from the forms of social, economical, and cultural hegemony within 
which it operates at the present time" (Ibid:329). 
Prinsloo says, in this regard, that Foucault has no interest in the 'truth of grand theories but rather 











words, Prinsloo continued, the truth Foucault is dealing with has to do with the context of the 
communication and the condition of their sayability rather than truth in any absolute sense 
(Ibid.). Essentially, says Skinner, Foucault's conception of powerlknowledge function only as a 
trial and error method which allows us to disengage the power of truth from dominant systems of 
thought which constrain our practices. What is more important is that, she argues further, post-
structuralism makes us conscious 'of the multifarious foundations of knowledge whilst at the 
same time decreasing our assurance that we know the full story' (Skinner, 1998:4). Thus. in 
Skinner's view, absolute truth or certainty is anathema. For this reason, she believes, the task of 
a post-modem educationist involves engaging the standards of truth within educational 
institutions, the exclusionary mechanisms within knowledge, the constraining nature of 
rationalist epistemologies, and the dearth or silences around the way powerlknowledge constitute 
subjects and treat them as objects. Skinner thinks that the post-modem educator's critical 
discourse around these concerns must go 'beyond the scope of traditional emancipatory' theories 
(Skinner 1995:7). To quote directly from her work: 
"Foucault suggests ... that it is helpful to understand that the nature of power 
operating at any particular time will provide clues as to the kinds of truth which will 
never be discoverable with any finality, this is where Marxists are, he thinks, too 
utopian - but to ignore the element of power within all social formations is naIve" 
(Skinner, 1998:45). 
In a similar vein, Coetzee says that the discourse around truth is not limited to issues of the 
uncritical acceptance of scientific knowledge and its flip side, a ruthless criticism of all verified 
truth, but also involves the operation of knowledge symbiotically intertwined with power. The 
target of post-structuralist education discourse, therefore, Coetzee maintains, cannot be a class or 
group (which is supposed to possess power) but, on the contrary, the technique or the form of 
power embedded 'in the knowledge content of the school curriculum' (Coetzee, 1995:13). It is 
this problematique which Deacon and Parker feel the critical model of education cannot properly 
comprehend. For them, the critical model is made ineffective by its embrace of the rationalist 
myth that the educator enjoys privileged access to knowledge which makes his authority 
justified. The critical model regulates conflict and the nature of dialogue through mechanisms 
which include the rhetoric of participants as equal subjects and the emphasis on rational analysis, 
reflection and evaluation. In this way, Deacon and Parker maintain, the teacher finds it easy to 
enforce the rules of reason in the school. Consequently, learners are disciplined and obliged 'to 











Furthermore, Deacon and Parker are critical of the utopian solution provided by the critical 
model to the issue of power. They say the critical model sees power as sovereignty. This is the 
belief that power is centralised, stable and repressive. In addition, it is the conception of power 
which sees it as something which could be transcended through liberatory praxis leading to the 
attainment of truth, freedom and utopia. Deacon and Parker argue that critical theory's negative, 
external and homogeneous conception of power must be rejected and be replaced by a notion of 
power sensitive to the positive, internal, dispersed, productive and heterogeneous characteristics 
of power. Instead of a domination/liberation dichotomy prevalent in the repressive hypothesis, 
Deacon and Parker urge us to view power as both subjugating and affirming, repressive and 
productive or normalising (Ibid: 136). 
Following Foucault, Deacon and Parker believe that individuals are SUbjugated to the 
constitution of truth through power. In this sense, there is no way in which power can be 
exercised without a simultaneous link to the production of truth. The symbiotic link between 
power and knowledge is more apparent in the correspondence of the dedication to truth or 
hierarchical knowledge as a yardstick and the capacity to constitute human beings as subjects 
and discipline them through disciplines such as medicine and school administration. Thus to 
authorise certain knowledge as scientifically true is to deny the validity of other knowledges. It is 
the exercise of power, Deacon and Parker maintain, linked to the production of truth which 
allows certain discourses to proliferate at the expense of others. Those techniques which are 
accepted as scientific are accorded value and status. In this sense, we cannot talk of truth without 
pointing out its linkage with power strategies. Thus truth is, according to Deacon and Parker, 
created only by virtue of multiple constraint embedded in the exercise of power (Ibid: 137 -138). 
The critical model is also accused by Deacon and Parker for attempting to divide knowledge into 
two moments, the moment of distorted knowledge (ideology) and another involving power 
(undistorted knOWledge/truth) in its attempt to construct an explanation of knowledge /power 
which makes possible the attainment of liberation. Deacon and Parker argue that this distinction 
of knowledge into two moments, one conserving the status quo and another emancipatory is 
faulty due to the fact that: 
" 'our' 'knowledge' of 'reality' and of 'ourselves', and more specifically of 
'curriculum' and 'rural schooling' are effects of power, which constitute us as 
subjects and permeates our knowledge by constructing its objects. Even an attempt to 
free knowledge from power, to generate an emancipatory curriculum or to resurrect 











supposed object - 'a progressive popular voice is one that has been forged' ... " (Ibid: 
138), 
To illustrate the above point, Deacon and Parker use the rural schools of Maputaland in 
KwaZulu. They argue that romantic fantasies and utopian dreams cannot be achieved solely by 
changing the curriculum of rural Maputaland schools. No deep-going revolutionary change is 
going to be achieved by transfonning the curriculum because asymmetries of power cannot be 
transcended. For this reason the myth of emancipatory education must be buried once and for all. 
In Deacon and Parker's own words, emancipatory education, 
"is a utopian, unattainable and even undesirable myth, given that it too is premised 
on the promulgation and policing of a nonn, a margin and excluded Other. Power is 
immanent within and not external to education; indeed, the disciplinary mechanisms 
and institutions of schooling embody some of the most pervasive fonns of 
modernity. We must recognise that we are subjects of power and knowledge and that 
we, and our struggles and resistances are always implicated in the structures we are 
trying to change ... Must we therefore conclude that rural schooling is a lost cause, 
that the curriculum will always be detennined by the centre and that pedagogy will 
remain authoritarian?" (Ibid: 139). 
In a nutshell, Deacon and Parker contend that a transfonned pedagogy advocated by the critical 
model will still make the educator and rationality the touchstone of knowledge and authority. To 
resolve this problem the binary divisions and dichotomies within the critical model must be 
displaced. A perspective capable of reversing these binary divisions, unitary concepts, and 
dichotomies must substitute the current rigid schooling structure with 'a more dispersed fonn of 
provision less reliant on buildings and teachers'. In addition, Deacon and Parker believe 
rationality or rational standards must be displaced with the local common sense of the rural 
people of Maputaland (Ibid: 140-141). 
On the contrary, power, as Giddens (1977) has indicated, has a transfonnative capacity. Power 
is a component of action and 'is closely bound up with the notion of praxis' thus allowing human 
agents to act in order to transfonn their social reality (Giddens, 1977:347-8). In fact Giddens is 
of the view that the 'idea that power has primacy over truth' should be rejected as a fonn of 
reductionism (Giddens, 1982:226-227). Hence South African Frierians's idea that through the 
acquisition of 'people's power' within the practice of People's Education transfonnative action 
that would bring liberation and humanization was possible, is convincing. 
Moreover taking into consideration Taylor (1986)'s position, without the idea of liberation the 











emancipation and to truth (Taylor 1986:92). However this is a relationship in which power does 
not have primacy over truth and liberation. The dialectical relationship here allows for a notion 
of provisional truth which is subversive of power relations. This creates opportunities for the 
lifting of impositions emanating from systems of domination and reflection and action for 
liberation. Truth therefore becomes the condition for cultural action for freedom (Ibid:92-93). 
Taylor's argument that truth and liberation is possible is akin to the view of South African 
Freirians that truth derived from a dialogical process was utilized to contest the impositions of 
Apartheid power within the framework of the broad struggle for liberation in South Africa. 
Hence the practice of education for liberation or People's Education was a means by which 
Apartheid power was subverted so that transformative action for freedom could be undertaken. 
This idea is opposed to the SA Foucauldian view that truth and liberation are ideals which are 
impossible to achieve, which is discussed in the subsection below. 
6.3.3 SA FOUCAULDIANS ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF TRUTH AND LIBERATION 
"For Foucault, the reduction of power to repression is not only inadequate, 
it is dangerous. It makes us think that the liberation struggle can be won by 
demasking 'truths' that have been made invisible by the mechanisms of power. 
These truths are generally associated with a presupposed true essence of man. The 
idea that by unveiling them we will free ourselves from the oppressive effects of 
power is part of the humanist ideology. For Foucault there are no hidden truths 
concealed under 'false' beliefs and engendered in us by those in power. Beliefs 
cannot be cut off from the social practices in which they are embodied, nor can 
beliefs be measured outside those practices" (Frigerio, 1990:328). 
Foucault's view that there is no underlying truth, which after its revelation by exposing false 
beliefs will result in emancipation, paraphrased above by Frigerio, is shared by Mastin Prinsloo 
and Jane Skinner, amongst other South African educationists. Prinsloo is critical of discourses 
which adopt procedures limiting and controlling the type of knowledge, which are viewed as 
'true' and as a result others deemed 'false'. These types of frameworks and particularly those 
aligned to critical theory similar to the Freirian pedagogy make certain discourses of the 
'reasonable man' true and acceptable while views of the other/marginalised are labelled false and 
unacceptable (Prinsloo, 1986:285). 
According to Skinner, critical theory and other discourses of enlightenment within the education 
debate legitimate themselves on the basis of the triad composed of reason, freedom and 
authenticity. But the effects of this triad on justice and ethics compels us to enquire into the 











whether freedom denies or enhances ethical positions'. This problematic, however, cannot be 
resolved within critical theory as 'modernist discourses in themselves are too narrow to 
accommodate widely ethical stances' (Skinner, 1995:1-2). Modem functionalist education 
systems won't do because of their rationalist, didactic and hierarchical character which makes 
them strive for closure and certainty in truth. Emancipatory discourses also won't do because 
whilst challenging the functionalist hegemony, they still believe that education can track truth 
down. Seen from this angle both modem functionalist education theories and emancipatory 
discourses believe education must affirm authenticity and reason at the expense of closing 'off 
openings to difference'. Suffice to say that both these modernist frameworks find truth and ethics 
in regulated systems. This position is challenged by postmodern discourses which point to the 
point of resistance generated by the activities of the Other or marginals. In other words, human 
subjects have a well-grounded 'position of ethical responsibility which precedes the logic of 
moral rules' (Ibid:2-3). 
Modernist empirical reason and dialectical reason both seek resolution of pedagogical matters by 
demanding closure and truth as well as the suppression of the Other. This clears the way for the 
unchallenged rein of 'a narrow established superior and universal truth' (Ibid:4). Skinner 
believes that such a conception of a 'superior and universal truth' is false and nothing prevents 
us from questioning the validity of reason (Ibid:5). Closure, argues Skinner, cannot be proposed 
or accepted on the issue of truth and rationality. In fact it has to be appreciated that there may be 
many truths. In the post-modem framework, Skinner says, the belief is that truth and reason are 
situational and the self is a shifting and constructed entity (Ibid:7). For this reason, twentieth 
century educationists will be well advised to treat all truth as relative (Ibid:8). 
Linked to the question of the certainty Irelativism of truth is the issue of whether critical 
pedagogy can accommodate differences. Skinner questions the possibility of critical theory 
achieving the goal of emancipation when it fails to accommodate otherness. This question, she 
believes, is central to the critical pedagogy/postmodernist education debate in South Africa. As 
Skinner puts it: 
"Critical pedagogy claims to unsettle the (falsely) perceived needs of pupils and 
replace them with rationally validated ones. Bensusan and Shalem contend that a 
satisfied desire (final resolution) is not going to provoke the ongoing thirst for 
knowledge which is important for pupil involvement in learning. Other teaching 
strategies are necessary including unsettling and disrupting (not resolving or 
replacing) settled conceptions. Thus it becomes possible to suggest not only that 











gain so much impetus as the provocation and stimulus which non-resolutory 
discourses can provide" (Ibid:9). 
Postmodemism does not claim to be the only approach which has exposed the operation of 
power within educational institutions. Skinner says that there is a clear acknowledgement within 
postmodernism that radical discourses have also illuminated the way power operates in 
education although, and this is their chief defect, they do so 'in the name of truth'. 
Postmodernism goes beyond this by deconstructing radical discourses (including critical 
theory)'s utopia. It also directs us towards an awareness that we are always constructed as 
subjects within hidden Icamouflaged power discourses. These concealed discourses of power 
impose certain responsibilities on us as educationists. For instance, it is these regimes of truth 
which operate to divide educationists in such a way that academic theorists are seen as superior 
to teachers who are situated in positions of inferiority. Power !knowledge thus, argues Skinner, 
situates academic educators in positions of privilege in South Africa (Ibid: 11). The following is 
Skinner's recommended solution to this problematique: 
"The reorientation in this kind of thinking must entail consequences for what we 
teach, how we teach it and the kind of educational provision which policy - makers 
will be inspired to work for. Syllabuses would have to acknowledge less certainty 
about the authority of the intellectual experts and of the canons of truth on which 
they are based but this does not mean that the value of authoritative knowledge is 
downgraded but rather that the framing of power and place which support it now 
emerge and demand to be taken into account. In the past we were happy to assume 
that there were no framings and that the canons represented the nearest 
approximation to truth available to us, and on that account they required our 
unquestioning acceptance (9)" (Ibid.). 
In supporting this position, Flanagan (1991:15-16) argues that in order to improve our 
pedagogical practice in South African schools, we have to go beyond the established 'regime of 
truth'. For this to be a reality the conception of women primary school teachers as 'carers' and 
'maternal nurturers' has to be challenged through the practice of 'critical pedagogy' so that 
women teachers' subject positions within the overall network of social power relations are 
transformed. However, a Foucauldian type of transformation is not similar to the utopian 
socialist change advocated for by critical theory and the Marxists. Instead of hoping for a utopia, 
Foucault wants something different and arbitrary as the past has been arbitrary and history 
contingent. Essentially, Foucault's conception of human freedom has more to do with the 
existence and possibilities for alternatives and arbitrary radical change which are capable of 












"Foucault's histories are designed to make the present seem less inevitable. Showing 
the arbitrariness of past practices he wants us to understand the arbitrariness of our 
present practices ... For him human freedom does not lie in the discovery of some 
essential feature of the human situation, ... but rather in rebellion against the 
arbitrarily ways in which we are already defined, categorised and classified ... 
Foucault tells us that the "history of the present" show possible alternatives to 
objectifying practices ... " (lbid:327). 
I think Seidman (1994),s critique of Foucault's project will also apply to the extension of such a 
project by SA Foucauldians to the South African situation. Like SA Foucauldians, Seidman sees 
Foucault's politics of resistance as rejecting the dream of freedom from domination and control. 
But Seidman believes Foucault has failed to use his politics of resistance as an anchor to a 
credible programme of social transformation. Instead Seidman sees Foucault's project as lacking 
any credible moral and political values thus making it 'anarchistic' (Seidman, 1994:227-
228;231). The same criticism can be level to SA Foucauldians who insists on promoting 
activities which disturb the normalizing practices without an explicit notion of a 'good society'. 
Furthermore, Giroux (1988: 177) has observed that poststructuralism's attack on critical 
pedagogy is 'a crippling form of political disengagement'. Ultimately in matters of social 
change, Giddens has stated that political choices have to be made and that human agents are able 
to 'incorporate social theory and research within their own action' (Giddens, 1982: 15-16). 
Social theory and research is bound to inform the moral and political choices which could best 
serve the purpose of democratizing society. Incidentally, the issue of political choices and 
interests is also addressed by Habermas's theory of communicative action. Habermas is of the 
view that reality is never constructed in a disinterested way. For this reason, he believes social 
scientists must embrace an emancipatory cognitive interest that will ensure human emancipation 
(Mckay and Romm, 1992:77-78). It is on the basis of dialogue driven by the emancipatory 
interest that intersubjecive understanding or truth which guides action for human emancipation 
can be achieved (Ibid: 94). Hence, contrary to SA Foucauldians's belief, the dialogue derived 
truth directed at human emancipation was the basis upon which liberatory education and/or 
People's Education practices of the SA Freirians were turned into cultural action for freedom. 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
The modernist philosophy has it that truth and liberation are achievable. South African 
Freirians, following the modernist philosophy and Freire, believe that the practice of truth is the 











practices imbedded in the theory of anti-dialogical action. To negate processes of indoctrination 
which produce situations of manipulation and control we have to practice a dialogical approach 
which forms the basis for cultural action for freedom. The key variable for this process is the 
conscientisation of the masses such that, for instance, education for liberation is possible in the 
South African setting. Through the application of conscientisatising dialogue, critical thinking 
yielded truth on the basis of which Apartheid myths and values were exposed. The circles of 
truth can enable the development of active subjectJwho struggle for truth and liberation. Within 
education, South African Freirians believe People's Education For People's Power was well-
positioned to encourage classroom praxis whose endproduct was the liberation of both the 
teacher and the learner. The utilisation of the Freirian pedagogical strategies ensured that both 
the oppressor and the oppressed (coloniser and colonised) were liberated. This is the process of 
universal humanisation which makes both the oppressor and the oppressed subjects of their 
historical and cultural reality. They become actors who create and recreate their conditions of 
existence as conscious subjects. In contrast, South African Foucauldians, following Foucault, 
believe that authentic liberatory praxis is impossible. To them, the symbiotic relationship 
between power, truth, knowledge and the subject implies that truth is politicaL What this means 
is that the linkage between powerlknowledge and truth makes it difficult to develop a 
subjectivity which is both objective and has the ability for an act of knowing for authentic 
freedom. The bond between truth and power, for them, makes freedom impossible. It is on this 
basis that SA Foucauldians contend that each society has its own 'regime of truth'. The 'regime 
of truth' of two individuals, groups or societies is different implying that there is no objective 
truth out there. Truth therefore is constraining because it is linked to mechanisms of domination 
and control because truth is legitimated through power. Bantu Education in South Africa, for 
instance, was legitimated through Apartheid power. The special selection of Apartheid 
knowledge as 'truth' thus justified the Apartheid system at the same time as putting power in the 
hands of the White elites whose interests were served by the maintenance and perpetuation of the 
Apartheid power structure. Curricular knowledge in South African educational institutions thus 
justified or challenged the Apartheid power structures. What this amounts to is that there is no 
certainty in knowledge and truth. It follows logically that the possibility of freedom and 
liberation in the educational arena or society as a whole is made problematic by the association 
of knOWledge/truth with mechanisms of power by SA Foucauldians. 
In contrast with the SA Foucauldian view, I think rather than being determinate over truth, power 
is dialectically related to truth. On this basis truth becomt1subversive of power thus unmasking 











liberation. In fact power itself has to be perceived as having a transformative capacity which can 
ensure the attainment of the state of freedom. This chapter therefore has utilized Habermas's 
theory of communicative action in combination with Giddens and Thompson's conception of 
ideology critique to justify the argument by South African Freirians that truth and liberation are 
achievable goals. Through the use of critical self-reflection, counterfactual thinking and inter-
subjective dialogue consensual truth can be arrived at on the basis of which trans formative action 
which will bring about liberation and humanization can be taken. Hence the possibility of truth 












From the preceding chapters of this historical-cum-theoretical study it has become clear that it is 
through the adoption of Freire's pedagogy of knowing that authentic education praxis for 
liberation is possible in South Africa. Central to Freire's pedagogy, which is embraced by SA 
Freirians, is conscientising dialogue which informs the process through which learners and the 
oppressed are made aware of their situation of domination so that they could take political action 
to transform it. This process is akin to the operation of ideology critique within the theories of 
Giddens, Thompson, Habermas and McKay and Romm which, through critical self-reflection, 
exposes impositions within systems of domination such as the Apartheid order. The exercise of 
counterfactual thinking yields knowledge and consensual truth on the basis of which cultural 
action for liberation, in line with the Freirian dialogical action strategy, can be undertaken. For 
Giddens and Habermas, it is crucial that in lifting impositions and exposing distorted 
communication, through the process of ideology critique, political choices are made in favour of 
transformation and emancipation. From these insights and in line with Thompson's argument in 
relation to the general project of critical theory, I believe SA Freirians were right to think that 
through the process of critical self-reflection South Africans could be in a position to contest, 
challenge and transform Apartheid relations of domination in order to better their social life. For 
these reasons, the Foucauldian characterization of powerlknowledge, truth and subjectivity 
which create difficulties for the goal of emancipation from domination is rejected. I argue, in 
contrast, that the treatment of resistance as an integral part of mechanisms of disciplinary power 
is paralyzing because it renders struggles for liberation meaningless. Foucault and SA 
Foucauldians's theory is for this reason morally and politically bankrupt and its denial of the idea 
of freedom and liberatory truth a recipe for quietism, nihilism and fatalism. In contrast, through 
the process of ideology critique, which bears close resemblances with Freire's conscientising 
dialogue, domination mechanisms are revealed and opportunities for political action for 
liberation created. 
As a starting-point, this historical-cum-theoretical study's chapter 2 made a comparative analysis 
of the contrasting conceptions of knowledge, power, subjects and truth from the theories of 
Freire and Foucault. The main objective for doing this was to show which of the two 
approaches was best placed to encourage authentic educational praxis on the basis of which 
political action for liberation can be taken. In the process Freire's pedagogy of knowing was 
shown to be the touchstone for liberatory educational praxis especially because it housed within 











active subjects in conscientising processes on the basis of which consensual truth which yields 
action and reflection for emancipation can be undertaken. Hence, unlike Foucault's approach 
which has denied the possibility of truth and liberatory education praxis for freedom, the 
Freirian pedagogy allows for inter-subjective action for liberation through the practice of 
authentic education. In order to anchor this position, a theoretical framework derived from the 
concept of ideology critique from Giddens' structuration theory, Thompson's critical conception 
of ideology and Habermas's theory of communicative action was used to show that the process 
of critical self-reflection and counterfactual thinking is the basis for challenging relations of 
domination in order to transform them. This process, which is akin to Freire's dialogical action, 
has the capacity to conscientise human subjects to take action to transform their social reality 
as active agents. In particular, critical self-reflection yields truth which is subversive to power 
as domination such that liberation can be achieved. For this reason, Freire's pedagogy of 
knowing is preferred over Foucault's anarchistic view on knowledge, power, the subject, truth 
and liberation. Note, however, that Chapter 2 is an elaboration of the pure Freire-Foucault 
debate outside of the South African context. The insuing chapters show how this debate gets 
inserted and carried on in the South African situation. 
SA Freirians, following Freire, consider education as political and not neutral. According to this 
conception of education, elaborated in Chapter 3, knowledge can be used either as an instrument 
for domination or for liberatory action and humanization. In the former case we have 
indoctrinatory banking education such as Bantu education which was utilized for the promotion 
and perpetuation of Apartheid domination in South Africa. Apartheid education in general 
socialized White children for future positions of power whereas Black children were taught to 
accept subordinate positions in the social structure. To SA Freirians such an education which 
treated Black children as objects and promoted submission to the Apartheid system was 
undesirable. For this reason, they advocated for the destruction of Apartheid practices in 
education and other spheres of society and their replacement by education for liberation or 
what was referred to as People's Education for People's Power in South Africa. The latter is a 
problem-posing dialogical education which conscientised the oppressed so that they could be 
aware of their situation of Apartheid oppression and take action to transform it. Since the early 
70' s the BCM proponents embraced the idea that the Freirian conscientisation process was the 
basis for the liberation of Blacks from Apartheid oppression in general and particularly from 
Bantu Education practices in schools. The People's Education for People's Power Movement 
which emerged in the 1980's also saw the practice of the Freirian concept of education for 











supposed to promote horizontal relations between teachers and students, the production of 
knowledge content and curriculum which promote democratic and participatory values 
amongst parents, teachers and students, and conscientisation processes which formed the basis 
for collective political action to transform the oppressive Apartheid structure in education and 
all spheres of social life. 
On the contrary, SA Foucauldians do not believe any act of knowing can bring about liberation 
since knowledge is power. SA Foucauldians distinguished between formalized knowledge and 
marginalized historical knowledge as part of their argument to demonstrate the political nature 
of knowledge. In their view, science has placed formalized knowledge at the top of the 
hierarchy of know ledges at the expense of marginalized historical knowledges. It is its claim to 
truth and its association to science, they maintained, that account for formalised knowledge's 
dominance over excluded historical knowledge. This political exclusion of historical 
knowledges, they further argue, is also due to the link formalized knowledge has with power 
and truth. For this reason, SA Foucaldians believe a struggle for the emancipation of historical 
knowledges from the coercion and subjection by scientific knowledge is necessary. Moreover, 
scientific formalized knowledge's link with power to constitute a powerlknowledge axis, SA 
Foucauldians contend, makes its claims about the true nature of subjects suspect. Hence such a 
knowledge and the type of subjectivity it yields cannot, in their view, be the basis for 
educational practices which can bring about liberation. 
In addition, SA Foucauldians point out what they consider faults in the Freirian project, such as, 
dichotomisation, hierarchisation and homogenization which, in their view, have resulted in the 
problems of the theorization of the human subject. Such a conception of the subject, they 
maintain, cannot be the basis for the emancipatory goal of the Freirian pedagogy. This is 
because, SA Foucauldians argue, scientific knowledge Freirians want to utilise in the liberation 
process is part and parcel of modern disciplinary power techniques through which humans are 
subjected to technologies of control. SA Foucauldians see these technologies of sUbjection as 
responsible for processes of hierarchisation, homogenisation and dichotomisation of human 
subjects. Hence such knowledge which is interlinked with these power strategies, for them, 
cannot be the basis for liberation. 
Yet another SA Foucauldian critique of the SA Freirian project centered around the concept of 
'consciousness-raising' which they have mistaken for Freire's notion of conscientisation. 











that the oppressed might remain forever at this stage without moving on to the political action 
phase. Instead, they argue that for the revolutionary goal of emancipation to be achieved, if 
this was possible at all, for SA Foucauldians believe this goal is not achievable, education for 
liberation should be an integral part of the process through which freedom is attained. In fact, 
SA Foucauldians believe there is a contradiction which is difficult to resolve in Freire's 
pedagogy. This contradiction involves the revolutionary goal of liberation and the fostering of 
individual growth or critical thought. It is possible, they argue, that conscientised subjects 
might choose a course deviant from the revolutionary goal of pedagogy. 
In my opinion, theoretical frameworks must avoid either SUbjectivism or objectivism at all cost. 
In particular, like structure in structuralist analyses, invisible disciplinary power's primacy 
over human agents must be resisted in favour of dialectic analyses such as those contained in 
Giddens's structuration theory. Within the latter approach, human beings as active agents are 
seen as having the capacity to take meaningful action to transform their social environment 
despite the limits set by their circumstances. In addition, due to their mutual knowledge, 
conscious agents are in a position to understand the context within which their transformative 
action takes place and they alter this context accordingly to suit their changing circumstances. It 
is my contention, following insights from Giddens, that amongst the constituent elements of this 
mutual knowledge which informs the discursive consciousness of human agents are hierarchies, 
dichotomies and dualities. For instance, a critical analysis of South Africa during the Apartheid 
period will obviously reveal the dominant-subordinate relationships between Whites and 
Blacks, an issue that South African Freirians have constantly pointed out. It is therefore a 
mistaken criticism to accuse SA Freirians of essentialism, dichotomisation, dualism and 
hierachisation. Hence approaches, such as those of SA Foucauldians, which fail to identify these 
contextual realities where they exist cannot aid the process of improving human beings' living 
conditions. 
Another misplaced criticism of the Freirian project is the accusation that the pedagogy promotes 
and perpetuates authoritarianism in the relationship between the teacher and the students. It is 
claimed by SA Foucauldians that the Freirian pedagogy does this by concealing such 
relationships within the dialogical process. In contrast, I think the express aim of the Freirian 
pedagogy is to expose the hierarchical relationship between teachers and students in the 
traditional pedagogical model through the use of ideological critique so that action can be taken 
to transform such an oppressive relationship. To counter this point, I used Thompson's theory to 











dissimulation strategies. What is happening therefore is that the sins of the traditional model are 
being transferred to the Freirian pedagogy so that the negative connotations of the practice of the 
former approach might now come to be associated with the praxis of the latter by an 
unsuspecting and uncritical public. However, this criticism cannot stick because the Freirian 
pedagogy emerged as a challenge to all types of oppression including hierarchical and 
authoritarian relationships. 
Moreover, I think Giddens's structuration theory can be utilized to form the basis for the claim 
by SA Freirians that conscientisatising dialogical action can yield emancipation. This is made 
possible through the notion that there exists systematic knowledge, although this is constantly 
altered thought the process of reflexivity which guides active agents in their transformative 
praxis. Critical self-reflection entailed in Giddens's concept of reflexivity is akin to Habermas's 
notion of communicative action. Communicative action relates to dialogical processes similar to 
those in Freire's pedagogy and by means of which consensual knowledge and truth are arrived at 
so that transformative action which can yield emancipation can be taken. 
Yet another concept which is an aid to exposing elements of distorted communication and 
mounting a moral and political project for liberation is that of ideology critique which is found in 
the writings of inter alia Giddens, Thompson, Freire, McKay and Romm and Habermas himself. 
However, the process of ideology critique which could ensure the humanization of all has to 
make an explicit political bias in favour of emancipation. This view, which is supported by both 
Giddens and Habermas, has been central to the liberation action and reflection praxis of SA 
Freirians. SA Freirians believed because education was political, banking education such as 
Bantu education during the Apartheid era served purposes of subordination whereas problem-
posing pedagogy can yield political action for liberation from power as domination 
SA Freirians's view that power is part of an anti-dialogical theory of oppression which serves 
purposes of domination, explored in Chapter 4, allows for conscientisation and dialogical 
strategies of action and reflection to be adopted in order for liberation to be attained. One 
consequence of power as domination is that it produces asymmetrical relations of power 
inherent in what Freire termed the theory of anti-dialogical action. In the South African setting 
during the Apartheid era, asymmetrical relationships of power could be discerned between the 
dominant White group and the dominated Blacks in all spheres of life including the education 
site. Within the education domain, Apartheid education was used as an instrument to promote 











aim was to perpetuate White dominance over Blacks was in operation. It is through the operation 
of the divide-and-rule strategy, which is akin to Thompson's fragmentation mode of the 
operation of ideology, that divisions aimed at fostering the sustenance of relations of 
domination are created. The divide-and-rule strategy is also a primary instrument of securing 
conquest. 
Nevertheless, I believe the act of knowing through conscientising dialogue could be used to 
counteract the effects of the divide-and-rule strategy. In addition, dialogical action can be 
deployed to debunk the theory of anti-dialogical action within systems of domination thus 
paving the way for action and reflection for liberation. I take the cue from Giddens's dialectic of 
control to argue that within the relationship of autonomy and dependence between Blacks and 
Whites during the Apartheid era the subordinated Blacks were able to take action to liberate 
themselves. Through the practice of People's Education and other liberatory strategies, South 
Africans have indeed been able to challenge and transform Apartheid education structures. This 
is one reason for me to think that the concept of ideology critique in the writings of Freire, 
Habermas, Thompson, and Giddens still retains its currency in that the critique of ideology does 
not only stop at making people understand their existential situation but it is also an instrument 
for creating possibilities for transformative action. The concept of ideology critique is one reason 
for believing SA Freirians were right to insist that the practice of education for liberation or 
People's Education in the South African context could result in the transformation of Apartheid 
power. This is akin to Giddens's view that in situations where asymmetrical relations of power 
are involved, coordinated political action is not only possible, but necessary. 
However, SA Foucauldians are, in contrast, adamant that the fact that power is everywhere 
means that freedom is an illusive goaL In their view, the idea that political action for liberation is 
possible is linked to a wrong conceptualization of power in traditional juridical-monarchical 
notions of power which they reject in favour of the modern disciplinary conception of power. 
Modern disciplinary power, for SA Foucaldians, has no subjects who exercise power. 
Consequently they insist that the idea that human agents could engage in conscious political 
action for transformation should be rejected because power circulates and cannot be possessed. 
Furthermore, they argue that the dichotomy of power and liberation is impossible to sustain in 
the light of power being everywhere and those appearing to be liberated being the actual slaves 
of power. I think Thompson's displacement strategy is at work here. SA Foucauldians are using 
this dissimulation strategy to deny the fact that dominant groups do benefit from asymmetric 











representing this relationship in ways which divert attention from the fact that asymmetrical 
relations of power benefit the dom inant groups at the expense of the powerless. 
The notion of disciplinary power itself leaves a lot to be desired. It is a conception of power 
which accords agency to power instead of human agents with the consequence of creating the 
picture of a subject-less history. This warrants a correction and I believe we need to look no 
further than Giddens'S structuration theory. In particular, the conception of the duality of 
structure with two moments, the constraining element and the enabling moment, which allows 
for knowledgeable agents to take political action for liberation. In addition, the notion of the 
dialectic of control in Giddens's theory allows for the dominated in a situation where there exist 
asymmetrical relations of domination to engage in action and reflection for transformation. In 
fact the concept of ideology critique can again be of help here. The critical self-reflection and 
oounterfactual thinking inherent in the notion of ideology critique is akin to the conscientising 
dialogue central to the liberation strategy of Freire and SA Freirians within education and 
society as a whole. Ideology critique is an instrument through which the reality of domination 
is unmasked to the dominated thus making it possible for them to engage in action and reflection 
for liberation as active agents. The utility of the concept of ideology critique therefore is its 
capacity to reveal the reality of asymmetrical relations of power thereby creating space for 
processes of conscientisation and dialogical action, by knowledgeable actors, for emancipation. 
In contrast, the utilization of the disciplinary notion of power derived from the work of SA 
Foucauldians, would have made it difficult, if not impossible, for political action to be taken to 
liberate South Africans from Apartheid in all social spheres including the education site.This is 
because such a conception gives agency to power rather than human agents in addition to its 
failure to acknowledge the dialectical relation between power and freedom. 
Furthermore, the ceding of primacy to power over truth is another faulty aspect of the SA 
Foucauldian theory. I concur with Giddens that power has no primacy over 
processual/provisional truth. What is apparent, too, is that truth is a core element of the critique 
of ideology in that it operates in a subversive way to expose ideological forms used to legitimize 
relations of domination. Consensual truth arrived at reflexively as part of dialogical action for 
liberation is also an integral part of the strategy for lifting impositions. For this reason, it will be 
illogical, as SA Foucauldians seem to be doing, to continue to hold the view that power has 
primacy over truth. In my view, consensual truth and liberation are opposites of power as 
domination and this truth is one which is created and constantly reviewed in a dialogical process. 











Moreover, it is the idea of truth derived from dialogical processes which gives credence to the 
view that human beings can find a common framework within which they could challenge and 
transform systems of domination.This view is apparent in the SA Freirian perspective where 
human agents are accorded the capability of engaging in a democratically coordinated 
conscientising dialogical action for liberation. Hence it will be suicidal for social scientists to 
encourage the promotion of a conception of a fragmentary and pluralistic subjectivity as this 
tendency is evident in statements by SA Foucauldians covered in Chapter 5. This is because the 
SA Foucauldian notion of multiple subjectivity with its links to powerlknowledge strategies 
seeks to deny any possibility for liberation. Hence my belief that such a conception of 
subjectivity must be rejected in favour of the notion of subjectivity capable of transformative 
action akin to that within the Frierian pedagogy. 
However, Freire and SA Freirians's division of subjects into two categories, namely necrophillic 
(passive) subjects and biophillic (active) also needs some theoretical grounding. SA Freirians 
believed Apartheid education produced passive, fearful and uncritical subjects who did not 
question Apartheid domination and that it was through the conscientisation process within the 
HCM and the People's Education Movement that active subjects who challenged and 
transformed Apartheid power relations were produced. Indeed the use of Habermas's theory of 
communicative action can shed some light as to the processes of creating passive subjects. This 
will involve the utilisation of distorted communication whereas the production of active subjects 
would, in contrast, require undistorted communicative action. Undistorted communicative action 
is akin to Freire's authentic dialogue on whose basis intersubjectivity necessary for action and 
reflection for liberation can be taken. Nevertheless, note has to be taken that Giddens has 
characterized human beings as possessing a transformative capacity which always enables them 
to act otherwise. On this basis human beings must be viewed as always active agents. In fact, 
following this statement by Giddens, it could be argued that while the intended aim of Bantu 
Education was to produce and reproduce docile Black subjects, it was the products of this 
pedagogy, such as Biko, who were at the forefront of the struggle to transform the Apartheid and 
Bantu Education systems. In this sense, it would seem problematic to insist that these were 
passive subjects. However, at another level, I think Freire's view about subjectivity approximate 
Giddens's position on agents. What Freire refers to as passive subjects are equivalent to 
Giddens's unreflective agents. These unreflective agents can in no way enjoy the same status as 
Freire's biophillic or active subjects. In fact, it my view that Giddens is making an ontological 











beings, he maintains, have an influence on any situation in which they find themselves. Even 
slaves have an influence on their masters without even intending to because social life is always 
and everywhere impregnated with dialectical power. This, however, is not the same as what 
Freire means by active subjects. This is because Giddens's agents with ontological capacity can 
be both unpracticed in the use of ideology critique (what Freire calls passive) or they can be 
skilled in that use (what Freire would call active). For Giddens, therefore, while there is no such 
thing as a passive agent, there is, however, such a thing as an unreflective agent. The 
unreflective agents are, in this sense, equivalent to the passive subjects of Freire. ill contrast, 
Freire's conception of active subjects represents an attitudinal shift rather than an ontological 
one. These Freirian active subjects are akin to those agents Giddens characterised as skilled in 
the use of ideology critique. In other words, the passive and active subjects of Freire are akin to 
Giddens's unreflective and self-reflective agents, respectively. Suffice is to say what 
differentiate unreflective from self-reflective agents is that the latter possess discursive 
consciousness which affords them the capacity to engage in ideology critique. I therefore think 
that within Giddens's structuration theory it is the self-reflective agents who are more enabled by 
both the duality of structure and the dialectic of control to act in order to transform their 
situation. ill the first instance, the duality of structure demands that we acknowledge the 
enabling and constraining moments of structure in as far as transformative action by active 
agents is concerned. Secondly, the dialectic of control allows even the relatively powerless in the 
relation of autonomy and dependence to act to transform their social reality. Hence the view by 
SA Freirians that the oppressed were capable of acting to transform the Apartheid order was in 
line with Giddens's structuration theory. Thus political action by active agents directed at 
transforming systems of domination is not only necessary but possible. 
Nevertheless, the concept of unitary subjectivity within the SA Freirian framework has been 
criticized by SA Foucauldians. The objections raised by them include the view that the Freirian 
notion of subjectivity is an essentialist one which creates restrictive binary terms or 
dichotomies of oppressor/oppressed and that it homogenized subjects who otherwise experience 
multiple identities and subjectivities. The post-Apartheid nation-building concept whose express 
aim is to unite groups which were fragmented by the past Apartheid divide-and-rule policies is 
the target of this criticism. This nation-building approach, SA Foucauldians argue, while offering 
unity in diversity in the new non-racial democratic South Africa, exclude women identities, 
subjectivities and values thus failing to open-up opportunities for the practice of democratic 
gender politics in its approach. Hence, according to SA Foucauldians, the concept of unitary 











plurality of subject positions. This implies that human beings as constituted objectified subjects 
by technologies and strategies of powerlknowledge are decentred and dispersed without any 
capacity to transform their society. Ultimately, human agents are denied, in this framework, the 
capability of engaging in action and reflection that would emancipate them from asymmetrical 
relations of power, such as, Apartheid domination. 
SA Foucauldians do not see this explanation as imprisoning both teachers and students who, in 
this instance, are made powerless to transform their social environments. Inherent in their 
discourse is a ceaseless doubt that liberation is an attainable objective and that relations of 
domination can be transcended. Essentially therefore they have resigned themselves to a notion 
of subjectivity linked to power/knowledge strategies to deny the possibility that human beings 
as active agents who can engage in political action to change their situation. In contrast, I 
believe, in line with Giddens's insights, rather than erroneously giving autonomy to the 
operation of power at the expense of human agents in the process of history formation, human 
beings should be instead characterized as both knowledgeable and in possession of 
transformative capacity. It is on the basis of the latter factors/ qualities that human agents 
should be viewed as capable of transformative political action to liberate themselves from 
systems of domination. In addition, it is of crucial importance to understand that without a 
ceaseless search for dialogically derived consensual truth SA Freirians like McKay and Romm 
talked so much about, the goal of liberation from power as domination will be difficult to realize. 
Although at times there exist contradictory statements in the writings of SA Frierians about truth 
covered in Chapter 6, there is an acknowledgement in their work that truth is arrived at 
dialogically. Such a ceaseless and continuous struggle for truth through conscientising dialogue 
is the basis for the acceleration of change. It is this action and reflection within liberatory 
education and People's Education which yields dialogical truth that was the cornerstone of the 
struggle for both emancipatory education and freedom from Apartheid domination. This idea is 
akin to Habermas's communicative action which requires that intersubjective discourse within 
an ideal speech situation be the basis for dialogically-derived truth that serves emancipatory 
purposes. The practice of action and reflection for freedom is closely linked to the process of 
critical self-reflection and counterfactual thinking in Thompson and Giddens's writings which 
makes it possible for individuals to transform society. Giddens, in particular, points to the 
dialectic of control on the basis of which relatively powerless agents can change their 











Most SA Foucauldians criticize SA Freirians for commitment to detenninate standards of truth 
and 'regime of truth' through which other discourses are marginalized. They hold the idea that 
truth is an illusive phenomenon. Enslin, however, is of the view that Freire's pedagogy must be 
spared this criticism as it treats truth as provisional. Nevertheless, Enslin utilizes this 
provisionality of truth in Freire's theory as an armament to criticize Freirians for contradicting 
the revolutionary goal of the pedagogy of knowing which demands absolute certainty. Her 
position is that the attainment of a fixed humanist/Marxist utopia does not entertain distracting 
processes of a continuous search for truth. 
In addition, SA Foucauldians believe that truth is conjoined with power thus making it 
impossible for power to be transcended. In their view, it is the conception of power as 
sovereignty that allows its transcendence through liberatory praxis. But, they maintain, power is 
disciplinary and everywhere such that truth cannot dislodge itself from power and therefore 
liberation is impossible. On the contrary, my conception of truth is that which is subversive of 
power thus making it possible for liberatory action for freedom to be undertaken. If one combine 
the insights of Giddens's dialectic of control and Habennas's communicative action, it is 
possible to logically arrive at a position where dialogical truth can create conditions for 
transfonnative action for freedom. Furthennore, Habennas's conception of the 'public sphere' 
can be utilized to enhance SA Freirians's conscientising dialogue on whose basis consensual 
truth can infonn action and reflection for liberation. 
Hence, it is surprising that SA Foucauldians, like Foucault, have not taken advantage of the 
notion of resistance to promote a positive programme for social transfonnation. They are content 
in simply conducting a ruthless critique of standards of truth and exposing the operation of 
power in the legitimation of truth without posing alternative solutions. SA Foucauldians hold the 
view that resistance is part and parcel of the function of power. However, liberation processes 
cannot take root in a situation where the resistance action of the oppressed is viewed as 
manifestations of the operation of power. In fact, it is the quest to liberate the oppressed from 
the bondage of domination which gives SA Freirians an edge over their Foucauldian 
counterparts. It is the ascription of agency to the oppressed that allows SA Freirians to put 
emphasis on the capacity of subjects to act to transfonn their situation. Such a notion of 
resistance, which allows for political action for liberation, is at the heart of the approach of SA 
Freirians. Political education, in the fonn of conscientising dialogue, is also necessary to 
deepen the insights of the oppressed that they have the ability to resist asymmetrical relations 











takes the form of problem-posing pedagogy makes it clear to the oppressed that the liberation 
of their society from domination depends upon them. In contrast, there is a lack of political 
commitment in the SA Foucauldians's description of how power is exercised as their 
explanation never translates into a strategy to transform power relations. In other words, the 
Foucauldian conception of power is devoid of any authentic notion of resistance. Its portrayal 
of resistance fails dismally to begin to create conditions for the negation of relations of 
domination. A creative and critical notion of resistance is one which helps subjects not only to 
oppose but also to engage in political action that will transform relations of domination. These 
are subjects who exercise critical consciousness within the context of resistance to engage in 
action and reflection for freedom. Hence the notion of resistance as a dependent function of 
power must be substituted by one which acknowledges the subversive nature of resistance to 
relations of domination. Only then can it be possible for resistance to yield action and reflection 
for freedom. The transformatory nature of resistance, therefore, is accounted for by its 
capability to negate relations of domination and to encourage political praxis for the attainment 
of human liberation. This is in line with Freire, Thompson, Giddens and Habermas's goal of 
using action and reflection, critical self-reflection, counterfactual thinking and intersubjective 
dialogue to generate consensual truth that would be the basis upon which transformative 
praxis for liberation and humanization is undertaken. Herein lies the utility of the concept of 
ideology critique outlined in Chapter 2. In the South African setting during the Apartheid era, the 
use of ideology critique yielded action and reflection which was responsible for the 
transformation of Bantu Education and other Apartheid power structures. It was the truth which 
was constructed and reconstructed in dialogue with the oppressed in South Africa that made it 
possible for the Apartheid oppressive structures to be overthrown. The exposure of the 
Apartheid myths and lies formed the basis of the conscientising process which led the 
oppressed masses of South Mrica to take action in order to transform the entire Apartheid 
system including the banking Apartheid education structure. 
The question which however remains is what accounts for this schism in SA social theory 
scholarship. According to Mouton and Muller (1998:5), Apartheid was partly responsible for the 
division of the SA scholarship community into two camps, the pro-Apartheid and the anti-
Apartheid factions. This 'general logic of schism' in scholarship was derived from the 
antagonism within the political community in South Africa involving the proponents of the 
Apartheid ideology, on the one hand, and activists within the liberation movement, on the other 
(ibid.). Added to this variable was the fact that SA scholars also uncritically utilized concepts 










borrowing which accounted for the transplantation of the Western confrontations between 
modernist and post-structuralist versions of social theory into the South African setting (Ibid:4). 
The combined effects of Apartheid fragmentation and the global pluralist theoretical influence 
resulted in the stalling of progress towards 'building strong and enduring communities' of 
scholars locally 'or indigenous paradigms, at home' (Ibid:6 - 7). As a consequence, 
'international debates' were often 'cast in the same terms' and 'fought out with the same ferocity 
here' without due consideration to our distinct social context (Ibid.). Despite the positive factor 
of remaining up-to-date with epistemological and theoretical developments in the West, 
Mouton and Muller argue, unfortunately the preoccupation with international debates meant 
that 'no South African scholar has made a significant original contribution to social theory' 
(Ibid: 10 11). 
However, indications are that in their transplantation of international social theory to South 
Africa, SA Freirians and Foucauldians alike did attempt some modifications to suit their 
situation. For instance, SA Freirians substituted Freire's rural and working class subjects of Latin 
America by the black working class. This is evident in the writings and praxis of the Black 
Consciousness Movement and Neville Alexander. However, it can be argued that the likening 
by Freire of all instances of oppression with conquest meant that urban/rural, class and racial 
distinctions could be fitted into the framework. 
Similarly, SA Foucauldians, such as, Flanagan, Prinsloo, Macleod and Deacon and Parker's 
overemphasis on differences seem to be motivated by their opposition to the nation- building 
strategies of the new South Africa rather than being merely influenced by Foucault's 
poststructuralism. This is because pluralist views have reference in South African politics 
especially in the approach of Giliomee and Schlemmer to the solution of the racial and ethnic 
problem during the Apartheid period. Certainly some of Freire's concepts have been 
misunderstood or mistaken for notions unrelated to the pedagogy of knowing. For instance, 
Khotseng et al (1987), Prinsloo (1991) and Deacon and Parker (1993) confused Freire's 
problem-posing pedagogy for 'problem-solving education'. There have also been an erroneous 
substitution of 'consciousness-raising' for Freire's conscientisation by Walters, Prinsloo and 
Adendorff. 
However, some SA scholars involved in the Freire-Foucault debate on suitable educational 
praxis for liberation do not neatly fit into one category or the other. Rather the tendency in these 











making statements which lend themselves to irresolvable contradictions in terms of the two 
pedagogical theories. There is in particular a small group which has consciously adopted an 
approach which seeks to synthesise the main ideas of the two theorists in order to enlighten 
South Africans on processes of domination and liberation which can be derived from the 
educational arena. Those who fused critical theory and poststructuralist insights include 
Coetzee ( 1995), Carrim (1995) and Flanagan (1991). In fact, at times Coetzee, Prinsloo and 
Skinner, for instance, provided a very thorough exposition of Freire's ideas before criticizing 
them. Despite their critique of these ideas, the richness of their exposition unintentionally or by 
default makes them the best exponents of the Frierian model in South Africa. While this 
approach lends itself to contradictory statements in the light of irreconcilable standpoints of 
modernists and postmodernists, eclecticism has become an acceptable approach to a section 
of the social theory community of late. Coetzee, in particular, has always attempted to construct 
statements which are simultaneously Frierian and Foucauldian. For instance, the statement that 
curricular knowledge justifies or challenges power structures, is fully within both theories. In 
addition, it has been SA Foucauldians, such as, Skinner, who have been vocal on the fact that 
truth, whether from the Apartheid ideologues or their nemesis, the liberation movement, is 
always political. For different reasons the political nature of truth is an idea which is accepted 
by both Freire and Foucault. It was on this basis that Deacon and Parker demanded that critical 
theory's commitment to standards of truth be rejected in the educational sphere. Deacon and 
Parker believe curriculum processes, whether for Apartheid education or for People's Power, 
are effects of power, knowledge or truth. This is because, as Skinner intimated, there is no 
certainty in knowledge and truth. This uncertainty, she continued, implied that there is no 
possibility of freedom. Skinner concluded that the use of the Freirian pedagogy cannot lead to 
the achievement of freedom. 
It has to be pointed out, however, that the work of SA Foucauldians, such as, Deacon and Parker 
and Skinner, undermines the Freirian project which was starting to take shape in South Africa 
during the 1970's and the 1980's in a major way. Nevertheless the adoption of this stance, 
especially in the South African situation where the necessity of working out strategies for the 
transformation of education from the Apartheid banking type to a problem-posing one, will 
obviously have dire consequences for the future of the country. This will not only lead to the 
negation of the evolving Freirian educational praxis but has the ability of discouraging the unity 
process in the SA setting where an educational philosophy is in the process of being constituted. 
In European environments where an established educational philosophy already exists, a 











The danger of holding strong relativistic postmodernist positions such as those embraced by SA 
Foucauldians is a serious one for our fragile new democracy and this is part of the issues this 
theoretical but historically oriented thesis also highlights. Owing to a complex interaction 
between historical and theoretical moments in this study, two sections in Chapters 3 and 4 
addressed briefly the socio-political and educational context within which the Freirian pedagogy 
was appropriated and the Foucauldian critique emerged in South Africa. With these two sections 
as historical anchors, in the rest of the study historical incidents are used to illustrate a point at 
random owing to the exigencies ofthe theoretical argument being developed at that stage. The 
balance is created in the sense that the illustrative historical occurrence's chronological 
intervention could be checked from the two brief but critical sections on the genealogy of the 
Freirian and Foucauldian debate in SA. The importance of the study in creating this genealogy 
and in determining which of the two rationalities is suitable for authentic education praxis from 
the examination of the utility of their differing conceptions of powerlknow ledge, truth and 
subjectivity cannot be overemphasized. Ultimately the route to liberation through a problem-
posing approach, conscientisation and dialogue, akin to the process of ideology critique, taken by 
Freire and SA Freirians turned to be the most convincing. Conscientisation gives subjects the 
capacity to understand their reality so that they could transform it whereas diaogue free from 
coercion has a democratic character. In fact, dialogue, as is Habermas's communicative action 
or ideal speech act, is the foundation for intersubjectivity-an intersubjectivity which can be 
transformed in the light of the emergence of new elements initially not taken into consideration 
when generalizations were made. Considering that Freire views revolution as a process which 
does not end when liberation is attained, and that this process has to continue in order to ensure 
that revolutionary leaders do not betray the masses, the struggle for liberation is, therefore, not a 
finite one. The vigilance which Freire requires the masses to retain, even after independence, 
clearly shows that he was conscious of the fact that reality is a constantly changing entity. In 
other words, the process of liberation is an unended quest and reality is always created and 
recreated again and over again. Freire and Habermas, from different backgrounds, share similar 
theoretical roots signified by concepts 'education for liberation' and 'conscientisation' for the 
former and the 'democratic public sphere' and the ideal speech situation for the latter. The two 
have been particularly concerned to draw out the subjective and communicative aspects of 
interpersonal power relations and potentials for their transformation as shown by their concepts 
of dialogue and communicative action respectively. In fact these aspects have an indissoluble 











Thompson. In terms of this self-reflective process, reality is not static but ever changing in terms 
of its reformulation in the light of incoming information. 
In addition, the counterfactual thinking in the process of ideology critique could lay bare 
asymmetrical relations of power thus creating opportunities for active human agents to take 
action to change them. Herein lies the key to understanding the SA Freirian argument that the 
practice of the pedagogy of knowing is the basis upon which political action for liberation can 
be made possible. The implication for educational change are very clear-cut, that policy 
frameworks must be infonned by a deepgoing understanding of the theoretical rigour/adequacy, 
the moral and political commitment, the emancipatory content and the utility in enabling 
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